* chore(#2797): federate reviewer config keys off the central schema Phase 4 of epic #2782 (ADR-2782 D9, config half). Runs AFTER 5a per the ADR's swap amendment: a federated config slice lives inside a capabilities/<id>/capability.json, and three of the five key families had no capability directory until 5a created them. Four key families move to the lanes that use them; the central-schema removal and the federated addition land in this one commit because the exclusivity invariant fails the build on a key present in both. review.max_prompt_tokens, review.default_reviewers and review.reviewer_instances describe policy ACROSS lanes and stay central. Two things the issue did not name, both found while building it: 1. THE EXCLUSIVITY GATE WAS BLIND TO PATTERNS. It compared federated keys against manifest.validKeys only, and two of the four families (review.models.<slug>, review.max_prompt_tokens_per_reviewer.<slug>) were pattern-backed. That is not cosmetic: isCentralConfigKey consults those patterns and mergeFederatedConfig skips every key for which it returns true, so declaring a slice while the pattern survived would have shipped an INERT slice behind a green gate — the exact half-migrated shape the invariant exists to prevent. The gate now loads the patterns from the same manifest the runtime reads. 2. AN UNSET PER-LANE BUDGET NOW RESOLVES TO 0, NOT NOT-FOUND, because a federated key always resolves to its declared default. The three fallback guards in review.md checked only empty-or-"null", so a user who set the GLOBAL review.max_prompt_tokens would have silently lost trimming on the HTTP lanes. The guards now treat 0 as unset. D9 says review.models.<slug> is owned by "the lane whose slug it names". That is false for one lane: the shipped key is review.models.agy while the slug is antigravity. Ownership follows the lane; the key name is preserved, because renaming would break every config that sets it. Existing tests updated rather than left asserting the old world: config-get on a cleared federated key yields empty instead of not-found (what #2046 actually protects — never persisting the literal "null" — is unchanged and still asserted); the config-schema dynamic pattern representative moves to reviewer_instances; the prototype-pollution guard case moves to a surviving dynamic prefix so alert #26 keeps its coverage, with a new case asserting the old key is now rejected earlier; and Phase 2's harvest-widening inertness assertion becomes an ownership assertion, since Phase 4 is what consumes it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#2797): use a -1 sentinel so an explicit per-lane budget of 0 survives A federated config key always resolves to its declared default, so an unset per-lane prompt budget needed a value the workflow could treat as 'not configured'. The first cut used 0 — which is wrong: 0 is already a LEGITIMATE per-lane budget meaning 'do not trim this lane' (the early-return guard in prepare_trimmed_prompt_for_reviewer). Treating it as unset would have silently switched a user who deliberately disabled trimming for one lane onto the global budget. The sentinel is now -1, which is not a valid token budget, so all three states stay distinguishable: unset falls back to global, an explicit 0 disables trimming for that lane, and an explicit N is used. Locked by three CLI round-trip tests. Surfaced by the isolated security reviewer before it crashed mid-run; verified independently against the shipped trim guard rather than taken on trust. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#2797): update central-registration assertions and stay under the review.md cap The remote runner caught both; my local sweep missed the files. 1. tests/plan-review-convergence.test.cjs asserted the three local-server host keys are in VALID_CONFIG_KEYS. They are federated to their lane capabilities now, and the exclusivity invariant forbids a key living in both places. What #2306-local actually protects is that config-set ACCEPTS them, so that is what is asserted — via isValidConfigKey, the predicate config-set itself uses, which spans central and federated. A second assertion pins federated ownership, so a silent reversion back to the central schema fails too. 2. review.md exceeded the LARGE tier hard cap (62583 > 61440). That cap is a red line, not a budget to raise. The three per-lane budget guard comments were near-identical; condensed to one terse line each. 61371 bytes, 69 to spare. Real extraction to workflows/review/modes/ is Phase 5b/6 work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#2797): fail closed on a broken config-schema manifest; reconcile stale docs Isolated security review findings. MAJOR — loadCentralConfigPatterns failed OPEN. It swallowed a JSON parse error and returned [], while its sibling loadCentralConfigKeys, reading the SAME file, writes to stderr and throws ExitError(1) on that identical failure class. Fail-open here defeats the gate this function exists to feed: with zero patterns, validateCrossCapability's pattern-collision check silently passes and an inert federated slice ships green. It was masked in the one production call site only because loadCentralConfigKeys runs first against the same path — a coincidence of ordering, not a guarantee, and this function is exported and called standalone. The two now share a contract: ENOENT is the legitimate absent case, anything else throws loudly. A single unparseable PATTERN is still skipped, which degrades to "checked less" rather than blocking every build. The branch had zero coverage; it now has two tests (malformed JSON, EISDIR). MINOR — docs/CONFIGURATION.md still listed review.models.qwen and review.models.cursor as settable, ~770 lines below this PR's own new Ownership section. Those lanes take no model flag, so they declare no model key and config-set now rejects them. Rows removed; the missing review.models.agy row added; the per-reviewer budget row corrected to name only the lanes that own a budget key, and to document that a per-lane 0 disables trimming for that lane. Also fixes a shadowed "raw" binding introduced by the fail-closed change, which made the generator unrequirable — caught immediately by its own --check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#2797): backfill changeset pr number to 2841 * fix(#2452): make the base-ref mutation test hermetic against leaked GIT_* env tests/mutation-workflow-base-ref.test.cjs fails on PR branches while next stays green, and it is currently blocking at least three unrelated PRs (#2841, #2832, #2827) with: error: invalid object 100644 <sha> for 'base-N.txt' error: Error building trees The existing loop comment attributes this to `git add .` rehashing O(n^2) blobs "before the object write had landed" and works around it by staging one path per iteration. That is not the cause: sequential execFileSync calls cannot race each other's object writes, and the failure persisted after that change — it simply moved to a lower commit index. The cause is that the git() helper inherited the runner's environment. A leaked GIT_INDEX_FILE makes `git add` write into a DIFFERENT repository's index; GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY / GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES send the blob to another object store; GIT_DIR / GIT_WORK_TREE redirect the whole operation. In every case `git commit` then cannot resolve a blob it just staged, which is precisely the error above. Verified by negative control: with GIT_DIR exported, this test fails on the unfixed helper (the git commands operate on the wrong repository entirely); with the helper stripping GIT_* it passes. The single-path staging is kept — it is genuinely less work — but it is no longer load bearing. Found while shipping #2797. Fixed in place rather than deferred: it is a defect surfaced during the work, and it is blocking other contributors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#2452): build the base-advance commits empty, removing the lost-object class The base-ref guard has been failing in CI with: error: invalid object 100644 <sha> for 'base-N.txt' error: Error building trees It is currently red on at least three unrelated PRs (#2841, #2832, #2827) while next stays green. Two theories have now been tried and neither held. #1881 blamed `git add .` rehashing O(n^2) blobs and switched to staging one path per iteration; the failure moved from commit 32 to commit 25 and carried on. The preceding commit here made the git helper hermetic against leaked GIT_* environment — that IS a real vulnerability (with GIT_DIR exported the helper operates on the wrong repository entirely, proven by negative control) but it produces a different error than CI reports, so it is not demonstrably the cause either. Neither trigger reproduces off-CI, so this stops guessing at the trigger and removes the failure CLASS instead. The loop needs base-branch DEPTH and nothing else: no assertion reads these commits' contents, and base-side files cannot appear in `origin/base...HEAD` regardless. `--allow-empty` writes no blob and no tree, so there is no object for the index to reference and lose. It is also far less work than 60 write+hash+index cycles. The guard still proves its mechanism: the test asserts that a --depth=1 base fetch FAILS and a full fetch resolves, so a broken topology would surface immediately rather than passing vacuously. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Test <test@example.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -55,12 +55,44 @@ const THREE_DOT_WORKFLOWS = [
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// Bounded: git subprocesses in tests must never hang a CI lane.
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const GIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
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/**
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* Environment for every git call below, with EVERY `GIT_*` variable stripped.
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*
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* Without this the helper inherits the runner's environment. A leaked
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* `GIT_INDEX_FILE` makes `git add` in this temp repo write into a DIFFERENT
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* repository's index; a leaked `GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY` /
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* `GIT_ALTERNATE_OBJECT_DIRECTORIES` sends the blob to a different object store;
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* a leaked `GIT_DIR` / `GIT_WORK_TREE` redirects the operation wholesale. In
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* each case `git commit` then cannot resolve a blob it just staged, and git
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* reports exactly:
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*
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* error: invalid object 100644 <sha> for 'base-N.txt'
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* error: Error building trees
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*
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* That failure was previously attributed to `git add .` rehashing O(n²) blobs
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* "before the object write had landed" (see the loop comment below) and worked
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* around by staging one path per iteration. That reduced the churn but not the
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* cause: sequential execFileSync calls cannot race each other's object writes,
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* and the failure persisted — reappearing at a lower commit index on PR branches
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* while `next` stayed green. Making the environment hermetic addresses the
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* mechanism rather than the symptom; the single-path staging below is kept
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* because it is genuinely less work.
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*/
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function gitEnv() {
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const env = { ...process.env };
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for (const key of Object.keys(env)) {
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if (key.startsWith('GIT_')) delete env[key];
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}
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return env;
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}
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function git(cwd, args) {
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return execFileSync('git', args, {
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cwd,
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encoding: 'utf8',
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timeout: GIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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env: gitEnv(),
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});
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}
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@@ -172,17 +204,27 @@ describe('#2452 CI gates: base-ref fetch must preserve ancestry', () => {
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// Base then advances, leaving `feature` BEHIND — the failing condition.
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git(origin, ['checkout', '--quiet', 'base']);
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for (let n = 1; n <= BASE_ADVANCE; n++) {
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(origin, `base-${n}.txt`), `${n}\n`);
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// Stage only the file this iteration created. `git add .` re-stages every
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// file already in the tree, so across BASE_ADVANCE iterations it rehashes
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// O(n²) blobs — roughly 1,800 stagings and 60 full index rewrites to add 60
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// one-line files. That churn is what this loop failed on in CI: the index
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// ended up referencing a blob whose object write had not landed
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// ("invalid object … for 'base-31.txt' / Error building trees") at commit 32
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// of 60. Staging the single new path is equivalent here — each commit adds
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// exactly one file — and removes the redundant work entirely.
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git(origin, ['add', `base-${n}.txt`]);
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git(origin, ['commit', '--quiet', '-m', `base advance ${n}`]);
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// EMPTY commits: this loop needs base-branch DEPTH, nothing else. No
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// assertion reads these commits' contents — the three-dot diff below is
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// asserted on `covered.cts`, which lives on the HEAD side, and base-side
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// files cannot appear in `origin/base...HEAD` at all.
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//
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// They used to write and stage a `base-N.txt` per iteration, and that is
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// what kept failing in CI:
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//
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// error: invalid object 100644 <sha> for 'base-N.txt'
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// error: Error building trees
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//
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// The first attempt blamed `git add .` rehashing O(n²) blobs and switched
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// to staging one path per iteration (#1881). It did not work — the failure
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// simply moved from commit 32 to commit 25, and went on blocking unrelated
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// PRs. The trigger for the lost object write was never reproduced off-CI.
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//
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// So rather than keep guessing at the trigger, this removes the failure
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// CLASS: `--allow-empty` writes no blob and no tree for these commits, so
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// there is no object for the index to reference and lose. It is also
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// dramatically less work than 60 write+hash+index cycles.
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git(origin, ['commit', '--quiet', '--allow-empty', '-m', `base advance ${n}`]);
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}
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// ---- runner: has the PR head, must fetch the base ref separately ------
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