chore(#3059): close the ESLint glob-coverage escape and guard it (#3277)

* chore(#3059): close the ESLint glob-coverage escape and guard it

62 tracked source files matched no `files:` glob in eslint.config.mjs, so
ESLint skipped them entirely while `eslint .` still exited 0 — including all
26 files under hooks/, the enforcement machinery itself.

Covers 56 of them (eslint-rules/, hooks/, bin/lib/, pi/, examples/, vscode/,
the plugin shims, root *.mjs) and allowlists the 6 deliberate
must-not-compile brand-typing fixtures with a recorded reason each.

hooks/** is covered with n/no-process-exit deliberately off: a hook's whole
contract is its exit code, several exits are load-bearing stdin-timeout
guards where nothing else terminates the process, and ADR-0012/0174 scope the
no-process-exit convention to the Command Routing Hub. bin/lib/ui-safety-gate.cjs
is dual-mode, so it keeps the rule live and takes two targeted disables in its
require.main===module tail instead.

Adds scripts/lint-eslint-glob-coverage.cjs + a node:test drift guard so the
class cannot regrow: allowlist entries require a non-empty reason, the list
ratchets down only (a stale entry fails), and a tracked-count floor means a
broken `git ls-files` fails rather than reporting clean.

Closes #3059

* chore(#3059): apply review findings — correct the changeset count, add parser properties

Isolated adversarial review, confirmed by rebuilding a byte-for-byte replica
of the pre-change eslint.config.mjs: the changeset claimed 44 previously-
unlinted files. The real figure is 56 (56 covered + 6 allowlisted = 62).
That was user-facing CHANGELOG text and was wrong; corrected, along with three
consequential figures in the design record.

CLAUDE.md requires a fast-check property test for parsers and budget limits,
and listTrackedSourceFiles is a parser. The standards review called this
"satisfied in spirit"; it is not. Adds three properties driving the real
exported parser through an injected execFile: extension totality/soundness
including a trailing terminator, backslash-normalization totality, and
CRLF/LF equivalence — the invariant the repo's recurring CRLF defect class
breaks.

Also de-duplicates the anchor rows onto one shared resolver, kept deliberately
independent of the guard's own resolveFileCoverage so an anchor still fails if
that resolution regresses, and records in the guard's header why the
bin/install.js family is NOT allowlisted: it resolves to 2 rules under
ADR-1703, so an entry would trip the allowlist_stale ratchet.

* fix(#3059): make the coverage guard's git call container-safe

The remote runner reported the guard degrading to `git_failed` on both Node
lanes:

  fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at '/work'

The runner executes in a container where the repo is owned by a different UID,
so git refuses to operate on it. The guard's degraded-verdict path worked
exactly as designed — it reported the failure instead of throwing or falsely
reporting clean — but a guard that cannot run in CI is not a gate.

`git ls-files` is now invoked as `git -c safe.directory=* ls-files`. `-c`
scopes the override to the single invocation and mutates no config file, and
the wildcard is appropriate because this command only enumerates tracked paths
in the repository it is already executing inside.

Adds a regression test that captures the argv through the injected execFile
seam and asserts `-c safe.directory=*` precedes `ls-files`, so the container
case is pinned behaviorally rather than by reading the script's source.

* chore(#3059): backfill changeset PR number

pr:0 placeholder replaced with the real number now that #3277 exists.

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>

hooks/gsd-check-update-worker.js

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ try {
 // (e.g., gsd-intel-*.js) must be ignored to avoid permanent stale warnings (#1750)
 // MANAGED_HOOKS is imported from ./managed-hooks-registry.cjs above.
 
-let staleHooks = [];
+const staleHooks = [];
 if (configDir) {
   // #3023: the bundle's directory name is runtime-descriptor-driven (pi stages
   // it as `gsd-hooks/`), so deriving it as `<configDir>/hooks` silently scanned

hooks/gsd-cursor-pre-tool.js

@@ -22,9 +22,6 @@
 
 'use strict';
 
-const fs = require('fs');
-const path = require('path');
-
 const WRITE_TOOL_RE = /write|edit|replace|create|delete|remove|append|apply|patch|insert|mkdir/i;
 const PATH_KEY_RE = /^(path|file|file_?path|filepath|target_?path|target|dir|directory|uri|filename)$/i;
 const PLANNING_PATH_RE = /(^|[\\/])\.planning([\\/]|$)/;

hooks/gsd-cursor-subagent-stop.js

@@ -20,13 +20,14 @@
 
 'use strict';
 
-let raw = '';
 const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => {
   process.exit(0);
 }, 10000);
 
 process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
-process.stdin.on('data', (chunk) => { raw += chunk; });
+// Drain stdin (puts the stream into flowing mode so 'end' fires); the
+// payload itself is unused — this hook responds unconditionally.
+process.stdin.on('data', () => {});
 process.stdin.on('end', () => {
   clearTimeout(stdinTimeout);
   try {

hooks/gsd-prompt-guard.js

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
 // The goal is to surface suspicious content so the orchestrator can inspect it,
 // not to create false-positive deadlocks.
 
-const fs = require('fs');
 const path = require('path');
 
 // Prompt injection patterns (subset of security.cjs patterns, inlined for hook independence)