* feat(#1435): capability matrix (generated + drift-guarded) + trust-model doc consolidation ADR-1244 Phase 6. Adds the capability matrix reference, generated FROM the committed registry so it can never drift from the actual capability set: - scripts/gen-capability-matrix.cjs (--write / --check); --check is a CI drift guard. - tests/capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs (4 tests): drift guard, buildMatrix==committed, every cap present, no placeholders. - docs/reference/capability-matrix.md regenerated from the registry (release-stable: shows engines.gsd, omits the lockstep per-cap version that would churn the file every release). - Consolidated the duplicate trust-model doc: deleted docs/explanation/the-capability-trust-model.md, merged its content into capability-trust-model.md, redirected ~10 references; no stale links remain. - Diataxis verification (now that gsd capability is a real command): corrected the matrix's third-party section — the matrix is the first-party catalogue; the overlay-aware view of installed third-party capabilities is 'gsd capability list', not this generated file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#1435): Added changeset for the capability matrix reference Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#1435): address code-review — non-vacuous matrix test + generator polish - capability-matrix-sync.test.cjs: assert the 'security registers a ship:pre gate' precondition unconditionally so the extension-point check can never degrade to a vacuous pass on registry drift. - gen-capability-matrix.cjs: warn (stderr) on an unknown loop point at generation time; rename enginesOf -> fmtEngines for consistency with the other fmt* helpers (output unchanged). - capability-trust-model.md: point the two how-to links at the real files (import-a-capability-from-a-url.md, version-a-capability.md) instead of the bare directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#1435): backfill changeset PR number → #1458 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
|
||||
> **Explanation** — This document describes *why* GSD draws its trust
|
||||
> boundaries where it does, and *what the trade-offs are*. It is not a
|
||||
> step-by-step guide to installing capabilities; for that, see the how-to
|
||||
> guides for [importing a capability](../how-to/) and
|
||||
> [version management](../how-to/). For the decision record, see
|
||||
> guides for [importing a capability](../how-to/import-a-capability-from-a-url.md) and
|
||||
> [version management](../how-to/version-a-capability.md). For the decision record, see
|
||||
> [ADR-1244 D5](../adr/1244-capability-ecosystem.md#d5--trust-model-artifact-parity-is-full-trust-posture-is-tiered).
|
||||
> For the capability field reference, see the
|
||||
> [capability matrix](../reference/capability-matrix.md).
|
||||
@@ -172,6 +172,15 @@ What it does not defend against: a malicious capability where the author
|
||||
themselves publishes a bad bundle. The SHA is honest about what you are
|
||||
installing; it says nothing about whether what you are installing is safe.
|
||||
|
||||
It also pins **only the top-level bundle**, not an `npm`-sourced capability's
|
||||
resolved dependency graph. `--ignore-scripts` and copy-only staging stop
|
||||
install-time execution, but when a command module is later `require()`'d, Node
|
||||
resolves and runs its transitive dependencies — which the bundle SHA does not
|
||||
cover (the Wiz / VS Code lesson). For the `npm` source kind, a green integrity
|
||||
check means "the package tarball is the one you pinned," not "every line of code
|
||||
that will run is the code you reviewed." Authors who want a stronger guarantee
|
||||
should vendor their dependencies or ship a lockfile.
|
||||
|
||||
### Auto-update off by default, re-consent on executable-set change
|
||||
|
||||
When auto-update is enabled for a third-party capability, each update is
|
||||
@@ -200,13 +209,54 @@ rejected at the conformance gate. This prevents impersonation: a malicious
|
||||
actor cannot publish a capability called `gsd-security` and exploit a user's
|
||||
implicit trust in the GSD namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
### `strictKnownRegistries` for managed environments
|
||||
### `capabilities.strict_known_registries` for managed environments
|
||||
|
||||
Teams or enterprises that want to constrain which capability sources are
|
||||
permissible can set `strictKnownRegistries` in managed or project config to an
|
||||
explicit allowlist of URLs or registry names. Setting it to `[]` blocks all
|
||||
external installs. This gives an administrator a policy lever that operates
|
||||
before the user even sees a consent prompt.
|
||||
permissible set `capabilities.strict_known_registries` in config. Its semantics:
|
||||
|
||||
- **unset / `null`** *(default)* — permissive: external installs (git / npm /
|
||||
tarball) are allowed, each still passing the consent + integrity gate. Local
|
||||
filesystem installs are always allowed.
|
||||
- **`[]`** *(explicit empty array)* — lockdown: **all external installs are
|
||||
blocked**; local-only.
|
||||
- **non-empty list** — a **host-based** allowlist: only sources whose host
|
||||
matches an entry (exact host or a subdomain of it — `github.com` matches
|
||||
`api.github.com` but never `evilgithub.com`; the literal token `npm` permits
|
||||
the npm source kind). A malformed (non-array) value **fails closed**.
|
||||
|
||||
This gives an administrator a policy lever that operates before the user even
|
||||
sees a consent prompt. The default is permissive-with-consent (not Obsidian-style
|
||||
restricted-by-default), because the epic deliberately chose decentralised import
|
||||
with the consent prompt as the default barrier and lockdown one config key away.
|
||||
|
||||
### Command dispatch: where third-party code runs (1.6.0)
|
||||
|
||||
A capability may declare a **command family** (`commands: [{ family, module,
|
||||
router }]`); `gsd-tools <family>` dispatches it by `require()`-ing the router.
|
||||
This is the one place a third-party capability's own code executes, so it is
|
||||
gated twice. **Consent:** a third-party family is dispatchable only if its
|
||||
capability has a **committed ledger entry** — i.e. you installed it through the
|
||||
lifecycle and consented. A bundle merely present on disk with no install record
|
||||
still contributes its declarative surfaces but is **not** command-dispatchable.
|
||||
**Confinement:** the router module loads only from the capability's own install
|
||||
root (bare-`.cjs` basename, `realpath`-confined, rejecting `..` traversal and
|
||||
symlink escape); a first-party command can never be shadowed by a third-party one.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The project-scope trust boundary
|
||||
|
||||
Capabilities install **globally** (`$GSD_HOME/.gsd/capabilities/`) or
|
||||
**project-scoped** (`<projectRoot>/.gsd/capabilities/`). The consent record is
|
||||
the ledger — and a project-scope ledger lives **inside the repository**. A repo
|
||||
you check out can therefore ship a capability bundle *and* a ledger that marks
|
||||
it committed; running `gsd-tools <its-family>` in that repo executes its code.
|
||||
This is the same boundary that already applies to a repo's build scripts or a
|
||||
project-scoped capability's hooks, and it is **narrower** — a command never fires
|
||||
on its own; you have to type it. GSD cannot cryptographically distinguish a
|
||||
genuine project-local install from a forged project ledger, so: a **global**
|
||||
install's consent record lives outside any repo and is trustworthy; a
|
||||
**project-scoped** capability is only as trustworthy as the repository it ships
|
||||
in. Review repos before running `gsd` commands in them, and prefer global
|
||||
installs for capabilities you want to trust across projects.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user