fix(#2873): close review findings across fences, sanitizer and docs

Isolated security review found resolveSpecRootReference's fence tracker
toggled on any delimiter, so a backtick fence could be closed by a tilde
one and an include in the gap was rewritten inside a code block. Fixed by
reusing scanFencedBlocks - the canonical engine already behind
stripFencedCode and extractFencedBlock - rather than carrying a fourth
copy of fence detection, which also closes the duplication the standards
review flagged.

sanitizeForRender now strips combining marks and zero-width characters
alongside the ANSI, control and bidi classes it already handled.

Adds the C, E and F matrix rows the spec review found missing, including
installer-level coverage that spawns the real install rather than calling
the report builder. Ships the how-to, the reference and command docs in
five locales, the changeset, the inventory and glossary entries, and
regenerates health.md for the new W028 rule.

Refs #2873
This commit is contained in:
sim
2026-08-14 23:09:36 -04:00
parent 2641e6cb67
commit 147856040b
25 changed files with 747 additions and 34 deletions

View File

@@ -175,26 +175,42 @@ const CONTROL_RE = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f]/g;
* #13 names. */
const BIDI_RE = /[‪-‮⁦-⁩]/g;
/** Combining marks (U+0300-U+036F) — "zalgo" text. Stacked onto the
* preceding base character, an unbounded run visually overflows into
* adjacent terminal cells/rows even though the string stays within the
* 64-char cap `readInstallManifest` enforces. Written as `\u{...}` escapes
* (not literal combining characters) so the source itself stays plain
* ASCII and does not visually combine in editors/diffs. */
const COMBINING_MARK_RE = /[\u{0300}-\u{036F}]/gu;
/** Zero-width characters: ZWSP (U+200B), ZWNJ (U+200C), ZWJ (U+200D), and
* BOM/ZWNBSP (U+FEFF). None of these are JS `\s`, so they survive both the
* char-count cap and the whitespace-collapse step below undetected. */
const ZERO_WIDTH_RE = /[\u{200B}-\u{200D}\u{FEFF}]/gu;
/**
* Sanitize a `declaredRuntime` (or any similarly attacker-influenceable
* string) for terminal/console rendering. `null` passes through as `null`;
* `''` passes through as `''`. Strips ANSI escapes, C0/C1 controls, and
* Unicode bidi overrides/isolates (replacing each stripped run with
* nothing — never a space), then collapses any remaining whitespace run
* (including adjacent spaces left behind by a removed newline) to a single
* space and trims.
* `''` passes through as `''`. Strips ANSI escapes, C0/C1 controls, Unicode
* bidi overrides/isolates, combining marks (zalgo), and zero-width
* characters (replacing each stripped run with nothing — never a space),
* then collapses any remaining whitespace run (including adjacent spaces
* left behind by a removed newline) to a single space and trims.
*
* Idempotent by construction: once ANSI/control/bidi bytes are gone and
* whitespace is collapsed to single internal spaces with no leading/
* trailing space, a second pass finds nothing left to strip or collapse.
* Never truncates — `readInstallManifest` already caps at 64 chars.
* Idempotent by construction: once ANSI/control/bidi/combining/zero-width
* bytes are gone and whitespace is collapsed to single internal spaces with
* no leading/trailing space, a second pass finds nothing left to strip or
* collapse. Pure character-class filter — never truncates; `readInstallManifest`
* already caps at 64 chars.
*/
export function sanitizeForRender(value: string | null): string | null {
if (value === null) return null;
const stripped = value
.replace(ANSI_RE, '')
.replace(CONTROL_RE, '')
.replace(BIDI_RE, '');
.replace(BIDI_RE, '')
.replace(COMBINING_MARK_RE, '')
.replace(ZERO_WIDTH_RE, '');
return stripped.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
}