fix(#4250, #4260): distinguish a timed-out npm audit from a JSON parse failure, retry with backoff (#4251)
* fix(#4250): distinguish a timed-out npm audit from a JSON parse failure npm-audit-baseline.cjs's runPackageLockAudit, and the near-identical auditProductionVulns helper in npm-integrity-gate.test.cjs, both grabbed e.stdout whenever an npm audit child process exited non-zero -- without checking whether the process was actually killed by its 180s timeout. A timeout-killed process's stdout is truncated mid-write, not complete JSON, so JSON.parse threw a misleading "Unexpected end of JSON input" instead of naming npm's registry timeout as the real cause. Root-caused live during a CI investigation: npm's own status page reported degraded service, and the registry's bulk-advisories endpoint was returning 503/hanging, causing npm audit to sit until the timeout fired. Adds a shared isTimeoutKill(error) predicate (checks execFileSync's documented killed/signal fields) and checks it first in both catch blocks, throwing a clear, actionable error before ever reaching JSON.parse. The pre-existing "non-zero exit with complete JSON" recovery path is unchanged and still covered by regression tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#4250): add changeset for npm-audit timeout fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#4250): share the timeout-kill error message and cover auditProductionVulns Two independent review passes (standards + spec) on the first commit found real gaps: the timeout-kill error message was duplicated verbatim between runPackageLockAudit and the near-identical auditProductionVulns helper in tests/npm-integrity-gate.test.cjs (this repo's own Generative Fix Divergence anti-pattern -- shared logic across parallel surfaces with no parity check), and auditProductionVulns picked up the same production fix with zero test coverage of its own. Extracts buildTimeoutKillError(cwd), used by both callers so the message cannot independently drift. Gives auditProductionVulns the same injectable execFileSyncImpl seam runPackageLockAudit already had, and adds the matching regression tests (timeout-kill throws the clear error; the pre-existing non-zero-exit-with-complete-JSON path still recovers correctly). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#4250): backfill changeset PR number to #4251 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * diag(#4250): surface captured stderr in the timeout-kill error The killed child process's stderr is buffered in-memory by execFileSync and attached to the thrown error, but nothing surfaced it -- the timeout message named the timeout but discarded the one piece of data that could show WHY npm was still running when it fired (DNS stall, TLS handshake stall, a registry-side retry loop, all look identical without it). buildTimeoutKillError now takes the killed error and includes its stderr (or an explicit 'no stderr was captured' note) in the message. This is a diagnostic improvement for the next CI occurrence, not a behavior fix -- local reproduction has directly ruled out npm version (installed the exact CI-bundled 11.17.0 and ran it against this repo: 0.49s, clean), general npm registry reachability (0.4-1.4s locally, repeatedly), and npm ci speed (2m, succeeded) as explanations for the 180s CI hangs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#4260): bounded retry with backoff for npm audit calls, finish the extraction The audit backend has real, independent latency variance from the rest of the npm registry -- measured (see #4260): a bulk-advisories POST took 43.41s vs 0.20s for a plain registry fetch on the same host, and the same endpoint returned no response at all (000) twice in the same window, while status.npmjs.org reported fully operational throughout. Against that, runPackageLockAudit and its near-duplicate auditProductionVulns each made exactly one attempt with no retry -- any single bad moment failed a REQUIRED CI gate on a transport hiccup, not a real advisory. Replaces the single 180s attempt with runNpmAuditWithRetry: up to 3 attempts at 60s each (comfortably above the worst measured working latency) with exponential backoff between them. Only a confirmed timeout-kill is retried; a genuine non-timeout failure still fails immediately, and exhausting all attempts still fails the gate -- per #4260's own caveat, silently disarming a required security check on a transport error is worse than occasionally re-running CI. Also finishes the extraction #4260 flagged as stopped halfway: auditProductionVulns (tests/npm-integrity-gate.test.cjs) duplicated runPackageLockAudit's entire candidate loop, recovery branch, and timeout classification, differing only in npm args and precondition check. It is now a thin wrapper delegating to the newly-exported runInstalledTreeAudit, which shares runNpmAuditWithRetry with runPackageLockAudit -- one implementation instead of two that could independently drift. buildTimeoutKillError now reports attempt count and still surfaces captured stderr from the last kill. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#4260): update changeset for retry/backoff scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(#4260): budget for two sequential retry-audit calls, close coverage gaps Two review passes on the retry/backoff commit found real gaps: - TEST_TIMEOUT_MS budgeted only one retry-audit call's worst case (210s), but checkTreeAgainstBaseline makes two sequential calls (HEAD tree via auditProductionVulns, baseline tree via runPackageLockAudit) -- combined worst case is ~372s. If both genuinely exhausted retries, node:test's own timeout would fire first and mask buildTimeoutKillError's clear message, undercutting #4250's own fix in that edge case. Recomputed using the same backoff formula the production code uses, so it can't independently drift. - buildTimeoutKillError's default-attempts(1) singular-phrasing branch had zero direct test coverage (nothing calls it with a single attempt anymore) -- a real mutation-testing risk. Added direct tests for both phrasing branches plus the no-error-object case. - runInstalledTreeAudit's null-guard skip paths (missing package.json, missing node_modules) had no tests, unlike runPackageLockAudit's matching paths. Added for parity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -24,7 +24,74 @@ const os = require('node:os');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
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const AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
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// Per-attempt timeout. 60s comfortably covers the worst *working* latency
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// measured against this endpoint (43.41s, see #4260) while staying well
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// under the old single-shot 180s budget once multiplied by AUDIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS.
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const AUDIT_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;
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// Bounded retry, not unbounded -- a registry-side outage must still fail the
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// gate eventually (see #4260's own caveat: silently disarming a required
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// security check on a transport error is worse than failing it).
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const AUDIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3;
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// Exponential backoff base between attempts (2s, 4s for attempts 1->2, 2->3).
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const AUDIT_BACKOFF_BASE_MS = 2_000;
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/**
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* Synchronous sleep (execFileSync-based retry logic is itself synchronous,
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* so backoff between attempts must be too). Uses Atomics.wait on a throwaway
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* SharedArrayBuffer, the standard Node pattern for a blocking sleep with no
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* external dependency.
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*/
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function sleepSyncMs(ms) {
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const sab = new SharedArrayBuffer(4);
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Atomics.wait(new Int32Array(sab), 0, 0, ms);
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}
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/**
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* True when `error` represents a child process execFileSync killed via its
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* `timeout` option (e.g. AUDIT_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS firing against a
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* slow/degraded npm registry) rather than one that exited normally with a
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* non-zero code. Node sets `killed: true` and `signal` to the kill signal in
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* that case (see the child_process docs for execFileSync's `timeout`
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* option); a normal "npm audit found advisories" exit has neither set. The
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* distinction matters because a killed process's stdout is truncated
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* mid-write, not complete JSON -- treating it as recoverable JSON produces a
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* misleading `Unexpected end of JSON input` instead of naming the real
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* cause.
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*/
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function isTimeoutKill(error) {
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return Boolean(error && (error.killed === true || error.signal));
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}
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/**
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* Builds the standard timeout-kill error message, shared by every caller
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* that classifies a killed npm audit process after exhausting retries (see
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* isTimeoutKill, runNpmAuditWithRetry) -- kept in one place so the message
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* can't independently drift between callers, per this repo's Generative Fix
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* Divergence anti-pattern.
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*
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* Includes whatever `error.stderr` execFileSync captured before the last
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* kill (Node buffers stdout/stderr from a killed child in-memory and
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* attaches them to the thrown error; without surfacing it here that data
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* was simply discarded, giving zero diagnostic signal into WHY npm was
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* still running when the timeout fired).
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*/
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function buildTimeoutKillError(cwd, error, attempts = 1) {
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const stderr = error && error.stderr
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? (Buffer.isBuffer(error.stderr) ? error.stderr.toString('utf-8') : String(error.stderr))
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: '';
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const stderrSuffix = stderr.trim()
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? `\n\nCaptured stderr before the last kill:\n${stderr.trim().slice(0, 2000)}`
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: '\n\n(no stderr was captured before the last kill)';
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const attemptsPhrase = attempts > 1
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? `after ${attempts} attempts (each up to ${AUDIT_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS}ms, with exponential backoff between)`
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: `after ${AUDIT_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`;
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return new Error(
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`npm audit timed out ${attemptsPhrase} in ${cwd} -- this is not a JSON ` +
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`parse failure, npm audit did not finish. The npm registry's advisories endpoint ` +
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`may be degraded; check https://status.npmjs.org before assuming a code regression.` +
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stderrSuffix,
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);
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}
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const AUDIT_DIFF_REASON = Object.freeze({
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OK_NO_NEW_VULNERABILITIES: 'ok_no_new_vulnerabilities',
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@@ -69,6 +136,92 @@ function evaluateAuditDiff({ baselineVulnerabilities, headVulnerabilities }) {
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};
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}
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/**
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* Runs `npm audit <args> --json` in `cwd` with bounded retry + exponential
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* backoff. A per-attempt timeout-kill (see isTimeoutKill) is retried rather
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* than failed immediately -- #4260: the audit backend has real, independent
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* latency variance from the rest of the registry (measured: 43.41s vs 0.20s
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* for a plain registry fetch, and two outright non-responses in the same
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* window), and a single 180s attempt with no retry meant any one bad moment
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* failed a REQUIRED gate on a transport hiccup, not a real advisory. A
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* non-timeout failure (e.g. a genuine non-zero exit with recoverable stdout,
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* or an unrecoverable error) is NOT retried -- only a confirmed timeout-kill
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* is, since retrying a deterministic failure wastes the budget without
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* changing the outcome.
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*
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* Exhausting all attempts still fails the gate (see #4260's own caveat:
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* silently skipping a required security check on a transport error is a
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* worse failure mode than occasionally re-running CI).
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*/
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function runNpmAuditWithRetry(cwd, args, { execFileSyncImpl = execFileSync, sleepImpl = sleepSyncMs } = {}) {
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const isWindows = process.platform === 'win32';
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const npmCandidates = isWindows ? ['npm.cmd', 'npm'] : ['npm'];
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let lastTimeoutError = null;
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for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= AUDIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS; attempt += 1) {
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let out;
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let timedOutThisAttempt = false;
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let lastErr = null;
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for (const npmCmd of npmCandidates) {
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try {
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out = execFileSyncImpl(npmCmd, args, {
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cwd,
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encoding: 'utf-8',
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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timeout: AUDIT_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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shell: isWindows,
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});
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lastErr = null;
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break;
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} catch (e) {
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if (isTimeoutKill(e)) {
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timedOutThisAttempt = true;
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lastErr = e;
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break; // do not burn the alt npm-candidate slot on a timeout; go to the next retry attempt instead
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}
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// `npm audit` exits non-zero when advisories are present; the JSON is
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// still on stdout in that case. Recover and let the caller classify —
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// but only when stdout actually CARRIES the JSON: an audit that was
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// killed or aborted can exit non-zero with EMPTY stdout, and accepting
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// the empty string here surfaces as a bare `SyntaxError: Unexpected
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// end of JSON input` at the parse below, hiding the captured error
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// (observed on CI 2026-09-03, both lanes; cause undetermined).
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const recovered = e && typeof e.stdout !== 'undefined' && e.stdout !== null
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? (Buffer.isBuffer(e.stdout) ? e.stdout.toString('utf-8') : String(e.stdout))
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: '';
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if (recovered.trim()) {
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out = recovered;
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lastErr = null;
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break;
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}
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lastErr = e;
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}
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}
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if (timedOutThisAttempt) {
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lastTimeoutError = lastErr;
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if (attempt < AUDIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
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sleepImpl(AUDIT_BACKOFF_BASE_MS * (2 ** (attempt - 1)));
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continue;
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}
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throw buildTimeoutKillError(cwd, lastTimeoutError, attempt);
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}
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if (lastErr) throw lastErr; // non-timeout failure: fail immediately, no retry
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const parsed = JSON.parse(out);
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if (parsed && parsed.metadata && parsed.metadata.vulnerabilities) {
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return parsed;
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}
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throw new Error(`Unexpected npm audit JSON shape in ${cwd}: missing metadata.vulnerabilities`);
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}
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// Unreachable (the loop always returns or throws), but keep a fallback
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// throw so a future refactor mistake fails loudly instead of returning
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// undefined.
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throw buildTimeoutKillError(cwd, lastTimeoutError, AUDIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS);
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}
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/**
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* Runs `npm audit --package-lock-only --omit=dev --json` in `cwd` and
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* returns the parsed JSON, or `null` if `cwd` has no package.json or no
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@@ -80,63 +233,23 @@ function evaluateAuditDiff({ baselineVulnerabilities, headVulnerabilities }) {
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* extracted package.json + package-lock.json (see extractBaselineTree),
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* without a second full `npm ci`.
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*/
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function runPackageLockAudit(cwd) {
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function runPackageLockAudit(cwd, opts = {}) {
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if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(cwd, 'package.json'))) return null;
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if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(cwd, 'package-lock.json'))) return null;
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const isWindows = process.platform === 'win32';
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const npmCandidates = isWindows ? ['npm.cmd', 'npm'] : ['npm'];
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const args = ['audit', '--package-lock-only', '--omit=dev', '--json'];
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let out;
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let lastErr = null;
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for (const npmCmd of npmCandidates) {
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try {
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out = execFileSync(
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npmCmd,
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args,
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{
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cwd,
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encoding: 'utf-8',
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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timeout: AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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shell: isWindows,
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},
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);
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lastErr = null;
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break;
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} catch (e) {
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// `npm audit` exits non-zero when advisories are present; the JSON is
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// still on stdout in that case. Recover and let the caller classify —
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// but only when stdout actually CARRIES the JSON: an audit that was
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// killed or aborted can exit non-zero with EMPTY stdout, and accepting
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// the empty string here surfaces as a bare `SyntaxError: Unexpected
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// end of JSON input` at the parse below, hiding the captured error
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// (observed on CI 2026-09-03, both lanes; cause undetermined).
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const recovered = e && typeof e.stdout !== 'undefined' && e.stdout !== null
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? (Buffer.isBuffer(e.stdout) ? e.stdout.toString('utf-8') : String(e.stdout))
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: '';
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if (recovered.trim()) {
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out = recovered;
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lastErr = null;
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break;
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}
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lastErr = e;
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}
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}
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if (!out || !out.trim()) {
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const detail = lastErr
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? [lastErr.stdout, lastErr.stderr, String(lastErr.message)].filter(Boolean).join('\n').slice(0, 500)
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: '(no error captured)';
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throw new Error(
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`npm audit --json produced no output in ${cwd}. ` +
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`Detail from the failed invocation:\n${detail}`
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);
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}
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if (lastErr) throw lastErr;
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const parsed = JSON.parse(out);
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if (parsed && parsed.metadata && parsed.metadata.vulnerabilities) {
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return parsed;
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}
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throw new Error(`Unexpected npm audit JSON shape in ${cwd}: missing metadata.vulnerabilities`);
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return runNpmAuditWithRetry(cwd, ['audit', '--package-lock-only', '--omit=dev', '--json'], opts);
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}
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/**
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* Runs `npm audit --omit=dev --json` against the REAL installed node_modules
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* tree in `cwd` (unlike runPackageLockAudit's --package-lock-only mode,
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* which only needs package-lock.json on disk). Returns `null` if `cwd` has
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* no package.json or no node_modules/ (not an auditable/installed tree --
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* callers treat this as "skip", not an error).
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*/
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function runInstalledTreeAudit(cwd, opts = {}) {
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if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(cwd, 'package.json'))) return null;
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if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(cwd, 'node_modules'))) return null;
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return runNpmAuditWithRetry(cwd, ['audit', '--omit=dev', '--json'], opts);
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}
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/**
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@@ -249,7 +362,15 @@ module.exports = {
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diffNewVulnerablePackages,
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evaluateAuditDiff,
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runPackageLockAudit,
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runInstalledTreeAudit,
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runNpmAuditWithRetry,
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extractBaselineTree,
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resolveBaselineRef,
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isTimeoutKill,
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buildTimeoutKillError,
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sleepSyncMs,
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AUDIT_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS,
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AUDIT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
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AUDIT_BACKOFF_BASE_MS,
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NULL_SHA,
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};
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user