fix(#1626): make the security gate severity-aware via per-threat severity (#1635)

workflow.security_block_on was documented as the minimum threat severity
that blocks advancement, but threats carried no severity and the auditor's
threats_open count (the SECURITY.md gate field) counted every open threat
regardless of severity — so the threshold had no effect, and the auditor's
block_on vocabulary (open/unregistered/none) did not even match the config
enum (critical/high/medium/low/none).

- planner: add a Severity column to the STRIDE threat register; assign
  severity per threat.
- auditor: read severity; reconcile the <config> block_on domain to the
  severity enum; redefine threats_open as the count of OPEN threats whose
  severity is at or above block_on (none => 0). Below-threshold opens are
  reported as non-blocking and excluded from threats_open.
- SECURITY.md template + planning-config.md reconciled.

No gate-check site changed: threats_open == 0 stays the gate everywhere;
only its computation is now severity-filtered.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-06-23 19:04:13 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent f9d9dfb4bc
commit 207d8f1697
11 changed files with 241 additions and 39 deletions

View File

@@ -380,11 +380,11 @@ Output: [Artifacts created]
## STRIDE Threat Register
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
| T-{phase}-01 | {S/T/R/I/D/E} | {function/endpoint/file} | mitigate | {specific: e.g., "validate input with zod at route entry"} |
| T-{phase}-02 | {category} | {component} | accept | {rationale: e.g., "no PII, low-value target"} |
| T-{phase}-SC | Tampering | npm/pip/cargo installs | mitigate | slopcheck + blocking human checkpoint for [ASSUMED]/[SUS] |
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|-----------------|
| T-{phase}-01 | {S/T/R/I/D/E} | {function/endpoint/file} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | mitigate | {specific mitigation action} |
| T-{phase}-02 | {category} | {component} | low | accept | {rationale for acceptance} |
| T-{phase}-SC | Tampering | npm/pip/cargo installs | high | mitigate | slopcheck + blocking human checkpoint for [ASSUMED]/[SUS] |
</threat_model>
<verification>
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ Only include what Claude literally cannot do.
**Step 0: Extract Requirement IDs**
Read ROADMAP.md `**Requirements:**` line for this phase. Strip brackets if present (e.g., `[AUTH-01, AUTH-02]` → `AUTH-01, AUTH-02`). Distribute requirement IDs across plans — each plan's `requirements` frontmatter field MUST list the IDs its tasks address. **CRITICAL:** Every requirement ID MUST appear in at least one plan. Plans with an empty `requirements` field are invalid.
**Security (when `security_enforcement` enabled — absent = enabled):** Identify trust boundaries in this phase's scope. Map STRIDE categories to applicable tech stack from RESEARCH.md security domain. For each threat: assign disposition (`mitigate`/`accept`/`transfer`) per the configured OWASP ASVS level — see @~/.claude/gsd-core/references/security-asvs-levels.md. Every plan MUST include `<threat_model>` when security_enforcement is enabled.
**Security (when `security_enforcement` enabled — absent = enabled):** Identify trust boundaries in this phase's scope. Map STRIDE categories to applicable tech stack from RESEARCH.md security domain. For each threat: assign a **severity** (critical|high|medium|low) based on impact × likelihood, and a disposition (`mitigate`/`accept`/`transfer`) per the configured OWASP ASVS level — see @~/.claude/gsd-core/references/security-asvs-levels.md. Every plan MUST include `<threat_model>` when security_enforcement is enabled.
**Package legitimacy gate (npm/pip/cargo only):**
- Require RESEARCH.md `## Package Legitimacy Audit` before package-manager install tasks.
@@ -987,6 +987,7 @@ Phase planning complete when:
- [ ] User knows next steps and wave structure
- [ ] `<threat_model>` present with STRIDE register (when `security_enforcement` enabled)
- [ ] Every threat has a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
- [ ] Every threat has a Severity (critical|high|medium|low)
- [ ] Mitigations reference specific implementation (not generic advice)
## Gap Closure Mode