workflow.security_block_on was documented as the minimum threat severity that blocks advancement, but threats carried no severity and the auditor's threats_open count (the SECURITY.md gate field) counted every open threat regardless of severity — so the threshold had no effect, and the auditor's block_on vocabulary (open/unregistered/none) did not even match the config enum (critical/high/medium/low/none). - planner: add a Severity column to the STRIDE threat register; assign severity per threat. - auditor: read severity; reconcile the <config> block_on domain to the severity enum; redefine threats_open as the count of OPEN threats whose severity is at or above block_on (none => 0). Below-threshold opens are reported as non-blocking and excluded from threats_open. - SECURITY.md template + planning-config.md reconciled. No gate-check site changed: threats_open == 0 stays the gate everywhere; only its computation is now severity-filtered. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -33,18 +33,19 @@ Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in `<threat_
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- Marking CLOSED based on code structure ("looks like it validates input") without finding the actual validation call
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**Required finding classification:**
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- **BLOCKER** — `OPEN_THREATS`: a declared mitigation is absent in implemented code; phase must not ship
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- **BLOCKER** — `OPEN_THREATS`: a declared mitigation is absent in implemented code AND the threat's severity ≥ `block_on` threshold; phase must not ship until resolved
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- **OPEN — non-blocking** — mitigation absent BUT the threat's severity is below the `block_on` threshold; tracked in SECURITY.md, does NOT count toward `threats_open`, does not block ship
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- **WARNING** — `unregistered_flag`: new attack surface appeared during implementation with no threat mapping
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Every threat must resolve to CLOSED, OPEN (BLOCKER), or documented accepted risk.
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Every threat must resolve to CLOSED, OPEN-blocking (severity ≥ block_on), OPEN-non-blocking (severity below block_on), or documented accepted risk.
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</adversarial_stance>
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<execution_flow>
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<step name="load_context">
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Read ALL files from `<required_reading>`. Extract:
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- PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block: full threat register with IDs, categories, dispositions, mitigation plans
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- PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block: full threat register with IDs, categories, severities, dispositions, mitigation plans
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- SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags` section: new attack surface detected by executor during implementation
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- `<config>` block: `asvs_level` (1/2/3), `block_on` (open / unregistered / none)
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- `<config>` block: `asvs_level` (1/2/3), `block_on` (critical | high | medium | low | none) — severity ordering: critical > high > medium > low; none = never block
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- Implementation files: exports, auth patterns, input handling, data flows
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**Context budget:** Load project skills first (lightweight). Read implementation files incrementally — load only what each check requires, not the full codebase upfront.
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@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ This ensures project-specific patterns, conventions, and best practices are appl
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</step>
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<step name="analyze_threats">
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For each threat in `<threat_model>`, determine verification method by disposition:
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For each threat in `<threat_model>`, read its `severity` field (critical|high|medium|low). If building the register retroactively (no `<threat_model>` in PLAN.md), assign a severity to each threat you construct based on impact × likelihood. Determine verification method by disposition:
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| Disposition | Verification Method |
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|-------------|---------------------|
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@@ -83,7 +84,13 @@ For `transfer` threats: check for transfer documentation → present = `CLOSED`,
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For each `threat_flag` in SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags`: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as `unregistered_flag` in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).
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Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` count. Return structured result.
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**Severity-aware `threats_open` computation (severity order: critical > high > medium > low):**
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`threats_open` (the SECURITY.md frontmatter gate field) = the count of threats whose status is OPEN AND whose severity rank ≥ the `block_on` rank. `block_on: none` ⇒ 0 (nothing ever blocks). `block_on: low` ⇒ all open threats block. `block_on: high` (default) ⇒ only high and critical open threats block.
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Open threats BELOW the block threshold are recorded in SECURITY.md as **open — below {block_on} threshold (non-blocking)** and MUST NOT be counted in `threats_open`.
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**Fail-closed for missing severity:** if an OPEN threat has no severity or an unparseable severity (e.g. a legacy register predating the Severity column), treat it as `critical` for this computation — it COUNTS toward `threats_open` (blocking). Never silently drop an unranked open threat.
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Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` to the severity-filtered count. Return structured result.
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</step>
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</execution_flow>
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@@ -100,9 +107,9 @@ Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` count. Return structured result.
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**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
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### Threat Verification
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| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
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| {id} | {category} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |
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| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Disposition | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|----------|-------------|----------|
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| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |
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### Unregistered Flags
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{none / list from SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags with no threat mapping}
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@@ -120,14 +127,21 @@ SECURITY.md: {path}
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**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
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### Closed
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| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
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| {id} | {category} | {disposition} | {evidence} |
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| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Disposition | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|----------|-------------|----------|
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| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {disposition} | {evidence} |
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### Open
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| Threat ID | Category | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
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|-----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
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| {id} | {category} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
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### Open (blocking — severity ≥ block_on threshold)
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| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
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|-----------|----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
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| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
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### Open (non-blocking — severity below block_on threshold)
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| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
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|-----------|----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
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| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
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*Only blocking-open threats count toward `threats_open` in SECURITY.md frontmatter.*
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Next: Implement mitigations or document as accepted in SECURITY.md accepted risks log, then re-run /gsd:secure-phase.
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