fix(#1626): make the security gate severity-aware via per-threat severity (#1635)

workflow.security_block_on was documented as the minimum threat severity
that blocks advancement, but threats carried no severity and the auditor's
threats_open count (the SECURITY.md gate field) counted every open threat
regardless of severity — so the threshold had no effect, and the auditor's
block_on vocabulary (open/unregistered/none) did not even match the config
enum (critical/high/medium/low/none).

- planner: add a Severity column to the STRIDE threat register; assign
  severity per threat.
- auditor: read severity; reconcile the <config> block_on domain to the
  severity enum; redefine threats_open as the count of OPEN threats whose
  severity is at or above block_on (none => 0). Below-threshold opens are
  reported as non-blocking and excluded from threats_open.
- SECURITY.md template + planning-config.md reconciled.

No gate-check site changed: threats_open == 0 stays the gate everywhere;
only its computation is now severity-filtered.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-06-23 19:04:13 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent f9d9dfb4bc
commit 207d8f1697
11 changed files with 241 additions and 39 deletions

View File

@@ -33,18 +33,19 @@ Does NOT scan blindly for new vulnerabilities. Verifies each threat in `<threat_
- Marking CLOSED based on code structure ("looks like it validates input") without finding the actual validation call
**Required finding classification:**
- **BLOCKER** — `OPEN_THREATS`: a declared mitigation is absent in implemented code; phase must not ship
- **BLOCKER** — `OPEN_THREATS`: a declared mitigation is absent in implemented code AND the threat's severity ≥ `block_on` threshold; phase must not ship until resolved
- **OPEN — non-blocking** — mitigation absent BUT the threat's severity is below the `block_on` threshold; tracked in SECURITY.md, does NOT count toward `threats_open`, does not block ship
- **WARNING** — `unregistered_flag`: new attack surface appeared during implementation with no threat mapping
Every threat must resolve to CLOSED, OPEN (BLOCKER), or documented accepted risk.
Every threat must resolve to CLOSED, OPEN-blocking (severity ≥ block_on), OPEN-non-blocking (severity below block_on), or documented accepted risk.
</adversarial_stance>
<execution_flow>
<step name="load_context">
Read ALL files from `<required_reading>`. Extract:
- PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block: full threat register with IDs, categories, dispositions, mitigation plans
- PLAN.md `<threat_model>` block: full threat register with IDs, categories, severities, dispositions, mitigation plans
- SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags` section: new attack surface detected by executor during implementation
- `<config>` block: `asvs_level` (1/2/3), `block_on` (open / unregistered / none)
- `<config>` block: `asvs_level` (1/2/3), `block_on` (critical | high | medium | low | none) — severity ordering: critical > high > medium > low; none = never block
- Implementation files: exports, auth patterns, input handling, data flows
**Context budget:** Load project skills first (lightweight). Read implementation files incrementally — load only what each check requires, not the full codebase upfront.
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ This ensures project-specific patterns, conventions, and best practices are appl
</step>
<step name="analyze_threats">
For each threat in `<threat_model>`, determine verification method by disposition:
For each threat in `<threat_model>`, read its `severity` field (critical|high|medium|low). If building the register retroactively (no `<threat_model>` in PLAN.md), assign a severity to each threat you construct based on impact × likelihood. Determine verification method by disposition:
| Disposition | Verification Method |
|-------------|---------------------|
@@ -83,7 +84,13 @@ For `transfer` threats: check for transfer documentation → present = `CLOSED`,
For each `threat_flag` in SUMMARY.md `## Threat Flags`: if maps to existing threat ID → informational. If no mapping → log as `unregistered_flag` in SECURITY.md (not a blocker).
Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` count. Return structured result.
**Severity-aware `threats_open` computation (severity order: critical > high > medium > low):**
`threats_open` (the SECURITY.md frontmatter gate field) = the count of threats whose status is OPEN AND whose severity rank ≥ the `block_on` rank. `block_on: none` ⇒ 0 (nothing ever blocks). `block_on: low` ⇒ all open threats block. `block_on: high` (default) ⇒ only high and critical open threats block.
Open threats BELOW the block threshold are recorded in SECURITY.md as **open — below {block_on} threshold (non-blocking)** and MUST NOT be counted in `threats_open`.
**Fail-closed for missing severity:** if an OPEN threat has no severity or an unparseable severity (e.g. a legacy register predating the Severity column), treat it as `critical` for this computation — it COUNTS toward `threats_open` (blocking). Never silently drop an unranked open threat.
Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` to the severity-filtered count. Return structured result.
</step>
</execution_flow>
@@ -100,9 +107,9 @@ Write SECURITY.md. Set `threats_open` count. Return structured result.
**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
### Threat Verification
| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |
| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {mitigate/accept/transfer} | {file:line or doc reference} |
### Unregistered Flags
{none / list from SUMMARY.md ## Threat Flags with no threat mapping}
@@ -120,14 +127,21 @@ SECURITY.md: {path}
**ASVS Level:** {1/2/3}
### Closed
| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {disposition} | {evidence} |
| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Disposition | Evidence |
|-----------|----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {disposition} | {evidence} |
### Open
| Threat ID | Category | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
|-----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
| {id} | {category} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
### Open (blocking — severity ≥ block_on threshold)
| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
|-----------|----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
### Open (non-blocking — severity below block_on threshold)
| Threat ID | Category | Severity | Mitigation Expected | Files Searched |
|-----------|----------|----------|---------------------|----------------|
| {id} | {category} | {critical\|high\|medium\|low} | {pattern not found} | {file paths} |
*Only blocking-open threats count toward `threats_open` in SECURITY.md frontmatter.*
Next: Implement mitigations or document as accepted in SECURITY.md accepted risks log, then re-run /gsd:secure-phase.