feat(#1688): warn on stale model bake for static-frontmatter runtimes (#1692)

* docs(#1650): fix stale opencode install-path claim in core settings

* feat(#1688): warn on stale model bake for static-frontmatter runtimes

* chore(#1688): backfill changeset pr field with real PR number

* test(#1688): make resolveAgentDir assertions use path.join for windows

* docs(#1688): codify windows path-literal-in-assert anti-pattern + align test
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-06-25 09:12:40 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent a0e45cd146
commit 2b215b4163
8 changed files with 693 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ The prompt-level data/instruction isolation seam for untrusted web/document ingr
`DEFECT.TEST-SHELL-PIPELINE-NONPORTABLE.fix-forward=match the fence with \r?\n and normalize the captured block to LF; gate pipeline execution on process.platform !== 'win32' && hasBash since the extraction LOGIC is platform-independent and POSIX coverage suffices; run the full suite (or the parity/lint guards) before push when adding a test file`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY.symptom=local gsd-test runs Mac+Linux only (no Windows host); Windows-only test failures (chmod exec-bit not honored for PATH-executing extension-less scripts in Git Bash msys2; / vs \ path-separator in assertions; Git Bash msys2 shell semantics) surface ONLY in CI test (windows-latest,*) / full test (windows-latest,*) lanes, never locally`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY.examples=PR #1084 (chmod 0o755 + bare-command execution failed on windows lane); test files that assert path.join result without normalizing to forward slashes`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY.examples=PR #1084 (chmod 0o755 + bare-command execution failed on windows lane); PR #1692 tests/stale-bake-guard.test.cjs resolveAgentDir assertions hardcoded '/H/.config/opencode/agent' forward-slash literals against a path.join return — passed macOS/linux/ubuntu CI (incl. gsd-test docker mirror), failed windows-latest,24 + full test windows-latest,22 shard 2/3; test files that assert path.join result without normalizing to forward slashes`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY.detect=npm run lint:windows-test-portability (tripwire: flags tests combining chmod exec-bit with sh/bash -c and no platform guard); watch CI windows matrix green before declaring a PR done`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY.fix-forward=gate platform-specific execution with if (process.platform !== 'win32'); normalize path expectations to forward slashes with .replace(/\\/g, '/'); invoke scripts via explicit interpreter (sh <path>) rather than relying on exec-bit; annotate // windows-portability-ok: <reason> when a bypass is intentional`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY.prevention=run lint:ci before opening a PR; treat the CI windows lane as the only true Windows signal — gsd-test (Mac/Linux only) cannot substitute for it`
@@ -745,6 +745,12 @@ The prompt-level data/instruction isolation seam for untrusted web/document ingr
`RULESET.CONTENT-PATH-NORMALIZATION=filesystem paths substituted into markdown body text (@-references, workflow .md, agent .md, generated docs, command bodies) MUST be normalized to POSIX forward slashes via .replace(/\\/g,'/') at the production source BEFORE substitution; never push normalization to tests; cross-platform content is POSIX-only; applies to: computePathPrefix output, install-path rewrites, generated shim paths emitted into .md bodies; idempotent on POSIX so unconditional`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LITERAL-IN-ASSERT.symptom=an assertion compares the return value of a path-returning function (resolveAgentDir, path.join, path.resolve, getPathX, computePathPrefix, etc.) to a HARDCODED forward-slash string literal like '/H/.config/opencode/agent' or 'C:/Users/...' — passes on POSIX (macOS/linux/ubuntu CI incl. gsd-test docker mirror, where path.join emits forward slashes so literal == actual), FAILS on windows-latest CI lane where path.join emits backslashes so literal != actual`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LITERAL-IN-ASSERT.examples=PR #1692 tests/stale-bake-guard.test.cjs resolveAgentDir suite: assert.equal(resolveAgentDir('opencode',{homedir:()=>'/H'}), '/H/.config/opencode/agent') — green on macOS+ubuntu (docker gate PASS 21101/21101), red on test (windows-latest,24) + full test (windows-latest,22, shard 2/3); same root cause as DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LEAK-IN-MARKDOWN-CONTENT but on the TEST side against a function return, not the production-markdown side`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LITERAL-IN-ASSERT.detect=any assert*/expect call whose ACTUAL operand is a call to a path-returning fn (path.join, path.resolve, resolveAgentDir, getPathX, computePathPrefix, os.homedir(), path.dirname/basename) AND whose EXPECTED operand is a string literal containing '/' that does NOT first flow through .replace(/\\/g,'/'); the literal-vs-fnCall shape is the tripwire — assert.equal(pathFn(...), '/hardcoded/posix/path') is the violation; assert.equal(String(pathFn(...)).replace(/\\/g,'/'), '/hardcoded/posix/path') is the compliant form`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LITERAL-IN-ASSERT.fix-forward=normalize the ACTUAL value to POSIX before comparing: assert.equal(String(pathFn(...)).replace(/\\/g,'/'), '/posix/literal'). Do NOT instead path.join the expected value to match the platform separator — that passes on every platform but masks a malformed backslash-on-POSIX return (both sides wrong together). The .replace is idempotent on POSIX so it is safe unconditionally. For values that are conceptually never paths (null/undefined/numbers), no normalization needed.`
`DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LITERAL-IN-ASSERT.prevention=run npm run lint:ci (lint-windows-test-portability) before push — enhancement TBD to extend that lint to flag the literal-vs-pathFn assertion shape mechanically; treat the CI windows-latest lane as the only true Windows signal — gsd-test (Mac/Linux only) cannot substitute; ref umbrella DEFECT.WINDOWS-TEST-PORTABILITY and production-side analogue DEFECT.WINDOWS-PATH-LEAK-IN-MARKDOWN-CONTENT`
`DEFECT.PROMPT-INJECTION-SCAN-COLLISION-WITH-TESTS.symptom=scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh flags a NEW test file as a finding because the test contains real injection payloads as fixtures (strings that match one of the scanner's PATTERNS — see scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh lines 18-64) to prove the validator under test rejects them; scanner cannot distinguish fixture from real injection; CI security lane fails on the test that ADDS the security validation`
`DEFECT.PROMPT-INJECTION-SCAN-COLLISION-WITH-TESTS.examples=PR #1622 commit 4ed208e74 added convertClaudeCommandToWindsurfWorkflow commandName validation with 22 malicious-name fixtures; scanner matched an instruction-override phrase at tests/windsurf-conversion.test.cjs:122; CI security lane failed even though the test is the security control`
`DEFECT.PROMPT-INJECTION-SCAN-COLLISION-WITH-TESTS.detect=CI security lane (Prompt injection scan step) reports FAIL: tests/<not-in-allowlist>.test.cjs with a line number pointing at a string literal; the literal is inside an assert.throws() or array of malicious inputs; the test file name is not in scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh ALLOWLIST`