* feat(#1451): wire gsd capability install/update/remove/list/disable/enable CLI ADR-1244 D5/D6: the management command was built as a library (capability-lifecycle.cjs install/upgrade/remove + capability-ledger.cjs) across Phases 3-5 but never wired to a user-facing command — gsd-tools.cjs 'capability' only handled state/set. This adds the six subcommands, dispatching to the existing lifecycle/ledger: - install <spec> [--integrity] [--scope global|project] [--yes] [--shared-file <rel>]… - update [<id>|--all] [--scope] [--yes] [--shared-file] (re-resolves recorded source) - remove <id> [--purge-data] [--scope] (first-party rejected) - list [--json] (first-party + overlay, both scopes, JSON array) - disable|enable <id> (activation-state alias of capability set --off/--on) Scope→runtimeDir mapping matches capability-loader exactly (global=$GSD_HOME||home, project=project root; caps at <root>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>, ledger at <root>/.gsd-capabilities.json). Consent is non-interactive: --yes grants; without it an executable install aborts after printing the disclosure and writes nothing. Best-effort reconcile before each mutation. Tests: tests/capability-cli.test.cjs (20 behavioral, real resolver via local specs, GSD_HOME-sandboxed) — install consent/block/usage matrix, list, update round-trip, remove round-trip + first-party guard, disable/enable, unknown subcommand. Docs: docs/reference/gsd-capability-command.md reconciled to the real surface (ledger paths, --shared-file, consent model, disable mechanism, outdated marked planned); docs/COMMANDS.md gains the gsd capability entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#1451): resolve adversarial-review findings + root-cause the --raw silent-output bug Adversarial-review (Codex) fixes: - capReadStrict passes a malformed strict_known_registries value THROUGH so the trust gate fail-closes on it (was silently downgrading to permissive) - installCapability/upgradeCapability gain an expectedId guard + first-party-id rejection (capability-lifecycle.cts): an overlay can't shadow a first-party id, and 'update <id>' can't act on a different id if the recorded source was retargeted - capability update: prints the consent disclosure, exits non-zero on --all partial failure, no longer masks the resolved id - capability remove: ledger-first ordering so an overlay is removable even if it shadows a first-party name; first-party guard only fires for ids not in the ledger - gsd-capability-command.md: disable/enable doc corrected (registry-known ids; overlay toggle not yet wired through this path) Silent-output bug (root cause, not waved off as pre-existing): - captureStdoutSyncWrites buffered fd-1 output and DISCARDED it on the throw path — any --raw command that emitted a result/error envelope then threw (to set a non-zero exit) lost ALL of stdout. Now it flushes the captured buffer before re-throwing (exit code preserved). - cmdCapabilitySet threw via process.exit() (bypassing the capture wrapper entirely); now throws ExitError so the wrapper flushes — matches the repo's no-process-exit architecture. - Regression test: capability disable <unknown> --raw must emit the JSON error envelope on stdout. Verified: capability suite 165/165, @file/json-errors/phase 183/183, lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#1451): address adversarial-review R2 — shared-file confinement, MCP no-clobber, config fail-closed - confinedSharedFile(): realpath-confine every shared-config write/strip to the scope root (mirrors safeRmUnder), so a --shared-file whose parent is a symlink escaping the scope can't write outside it. - mcpServers shared edits: never overwrite an UNOWNED entry — a name collision with the user's (or another capability's) server is skipped, so install/remove can't silently clobber user MCP config (hooks already append; the map-keyed mcpServers path was the gap). - capReadStrict: a PRESENT-but-unparseable .planning/config.json now fails CLOSED (lockdown) instead of silently downgrading the strict_known_registries policy to permissive. - Tests: symlink-escape shared-file writes nothing outside scope; colliding user mcpServers entry preserved; unparseable config blocks an external install. capability suite 83/83, lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#1451): address code-review — aborted-status robustness + coverage + project-scoped strict doc - install/update: handle an 'aborted' result independently of the requiresConsent flag so it can never fall through to the generic 'blocked: unknown reason' arm (aborted always means consent-needed per the lifecycle contract; latent today, hardened for future status additions). - Clarify capResolveScope comment (project scope === already-resolved cwd) and document that strict_known_registries is a PROJECT-scoped policy (read regardless of --scope; no machine-wide allowlist) in gsd-capability-command.md. - Tests: update --all over an empty ledger returns an empty result set (exit 0); a flag value that looks like another flag (--integrity --scope) is rejected, not swallowed. CLI suite 33/33, lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#1451): FEATURES.md entry #147 + Added/Fixed changesets for the capability CLI Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#1451): backfill changeset PR number → #1457 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
@@ -1115,6 +1115,30 @@ Toggle which skills are surfaced — apply a profile, list, or disable a cluster
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/gsd-surface reset # Restore install-time profile
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```
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### `gsd capability`
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Manage GSD capabilities — first-party (shipped) and third-party overlays. CLI form `gsd capability <subcommand>` (slash form `gsd:capability` on slash-command runtimes). See the [`gsd capability` command reference](reference/gsd-capability-command.md) for the full contract, source-spec forms, and install layout.
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| Subcommand | Description |
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|------------|-------------|
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| `install <spec> [--integrity …] [--scope global\|project] [--yes] [--shared-file <rel>]…` | Resolve, verify, consent-gate, and install a capability from a registry / git / npm / tarball / local source |
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| `update [<id> \| --all] [--scope …] [--yes]` | Re-resolve a capability's recorded source and upgrade it (atomic stage-then-swap) |
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| `remove <id> [--purge-data] [--scope …]` | Remove an installed overlay capability's files + marker-isolated shared edits (first-party cannot be removed here) |
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| `list [--json]` | List first-party + installed overlay capabilities as a JSON array |
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| `disable <id>` / `enable <id>` | Toggle a capability's activation state (same as `capability set <id> --off`/`--on`) |
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| `state` / `set <id> …` | Inspect resolved capability state / set activation + per-hook gates |
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```bash
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gsd capability list --json # All capabilities as JSON
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gsd capability install ./my-cap --scope project # Install a local capability into the project
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gsd capability install npm:@org/gsd-cap-x@^1 --yes # Install from npm, granting executable-surface consent
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gsd capability update my-cap # Upgrade from its recorded source
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gsd capability disable my-cap # Turn it off without removing it
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gsd capability remove my-cap # Remove the overlay capability
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```
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**Programmatic access:** `node gsd-tools.cjs capability <subcommand>` — see [CLI Tools Reference](CLI-TOOLS.md).
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---
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## Brownfield Commands
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user