fix(#4652): confine every boundary that joins argv to a managed root
Phase 2 of epic #4636, absorbing #4327 and #4354. Implements ADR-4650 decision 3: containment is a boundary concern — the predicate runs where external input enters, not at whichever interior call site remembered. Four boundaries now validate against their managed root and reject with a USAGE-shaped error before touching the filesystem: todo complete <name> -> todosDir(cwd) check predicate --phase-dir <dir> -> projectDir check decision-coverage-plan <dir> -> projectDir (via resolvePath) check gap-analysis.plan-post <dir> -> projectDir #4327 understated its own severity. It reports that a traversal name "resolves outside the todos root", which reads as an information leak. Measured, it was destructive: the command exited 0, MOVED the outside file into completed/, and unlinked the original. cmdTodoComplete ends in fs.unlinkSync(sourcePath), so an unconfined name consumed across the boundary rather than merely reading across it. Validation now precedes every fs call — existsSync, readFileSync, ensureDir, writeSync, unlinkSync — and both halves of the move are confined, so neither source nor destination can land outside the root. --dry-run is rejected on the same terms; a preview must not leak a resolved outside path either. #4354 reproduces exactly: a BLOCKING gate returned block:false sourced entirely from a SECURITY.md in a caller-chosen directory outside the project. THE HARDER HALF, found by the isolated adversarial review of the first attempt: validating a path and then using a DIFFERENT one closes nothing. The first fix validated `--phase-dir` joined against `--cwd`, then passed the RAW unjoined value into the predicate context. gate-predicate-evaluator uses it as-is and findPhaseArtifact resolves a relative path against the REAL process cwd — so validation and the read used two different roots whenever process.cwd() differed from --cwd. Reproduced: running from a directory holding a plan with `secret_field: LEAKED_VALUE`, a predicate declared against an empty --cwd project exited 0 and returned "actual":"LEAKED_VALUE". The rule now applied at all three router sites: **use the validated resolved path, never the raw input.** Independently re-verified after the fix — the lookup resolves in the --cwd project and no value leaks. gate-predicate-evaluator.cts is untouched and still imports no fs. Confining in the router is what keeps that pure-leaf contract intact AND covers ${PHASE_DIR} interpolation into command-exit-zero, which an evaluator-local fix would have missed entirely. Also fixed, same review: `todo complete .` and `..` passed containment (they resolve to the pending dir, which IS inside the root) and then threw an uncaught EISDIR with an absolute-path stack trace. Now a clean USAGE rejection naming the real reason — "todo name is not a file" — rather than borrowing the escape message, which would have stated something false. Ripples discharged BEFORE the verification checkpoint rather than after, per the Phase 1 retrospective: docs/reference/gate-predicates.md and docs/CLI-TOOLS.md document the new constraints, CONTEXT.md records why containment lives at the router rather than the evaluator, the changeset is written, and the install-tree goldens were regenerated to confirm unchanged (no new shipped file) rather than assumed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -871,6 +871,25 @@ describe('todo complete — containment boundary (#4327)', () => {
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});
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}
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// '.' and '..' resolve to the pending dir itself (which IS inside the
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// root, so containment passes) but are not a todo name — before #4652
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// this fell through to an uncaught EISDIR with an absolute-path stack
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// trace instead of a clean rejection.
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for (const name of ['.', '..']) {
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test(`[regression #4652] "todo complete ${name}" is rejected cleanly (no uncaught EISDIR / stack trace)`, () => {
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const result = runGsdTools(['todo', 'complete', name], tmpDir);
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assert.strictEqual(result.success, false, `"${name}" must be rejected`);
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assert.ok(
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!/at\s+\S+\s+\(.*\.c?ts?:\d+/.test(result.error || ''),
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`rejection must not leak a stack trace (got: ${result.error})`,
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);
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assert.ok(
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!(result.error || '').includes('EISDIR'),
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`rejection must be a clean USAGE error, not an uncaught EISDIR (got: ${result.error})`,
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);
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});
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}
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test('[RED #4327] an absolute path outside the project is rejected', () => {
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const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-todo-outside-'));
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try {
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