feat(#1724): complete install write-confinement (copyWithPathReplacement, installCodexConfig) (ADR-1239 Phase B) (#1725)

* feat(#1724): complete install write-confinement (copyWithPathReplacement, installCodexConfig)

ADR-1239 Phase B (parent #1679). PR #1706 (2a) confined the layout-driven
plan path and _copyStaged's inline guard; this completes the destSubpath
write-confinement acceptance criterion for the two remaining write sites
and canonicalizes _copyStaged.

- copyWithPathReplacement: new required confinementRoot param; a fail-closed
  gate (assertDestWithinConfigHome + hasExistingSymlinkBetween) runs BEFORE
  the rmSync/mkdirSync; root threaded through recursion + all 4 call sites
  (stageRoot for pristine staging, targetDir for the 3 install sites); writes
  go through the validated absolute path. Exported for behavioral testing.
- installCodexConfig: confines config.toml, agents/, and per-agent
  agents/<name>.toml (name from agent frontmatter) via the canonical gate +
  symlink-escape guard (parity with the other two functions).
- _copyStaged: fail-closed when configDir omitted (all callers pass it);
  delegates strict-subpath to the canonical gate, keeps its symlink guard,
  writes through the validated absolute path.

Reuses the existing assertDestWithinConfigHome (handles absolute dests via
path.resolve) and hasExistingSymlinkBetween — no new module. Behavioral
regression tests (escape/dest==root/fail-closed/symlink/name-injection),
red-first proven; cross-platform symlink tests use t.skip not bare return.

Closes #1724

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#1724): backfill changeset PR number (#1725)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-06-25 16:54:59 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent c57e0d56c2
commit 41dfeed45a
5 changed files with 474 additions and 31 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
'use strict';
/**
* Behavioral regression tests for ADR-1239 Phase B write-confinement.
*
* Tests cover:
* - copyWithPathReplacement: happy path, escape rejection, dest===root,
* fail-closed (no confinementRoot), symlink escape
* - installCodexConfig: happy path, agent name-injection rejection
* - _copyStaged: escape rejection, symlink escape (regression preserved)
*/
const { describe, test } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const os = require('node:os');
const path = require('node:path');
const { cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
process.env['GSD_TEST_MODE'] = '1';
const {
copyWithPathReplacement,
installCodexConfig,
_copyStaged,
} = require('../bin/install.js');
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// copyWithPathReplacement
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('copyWithPathReplacement write-confinement', () => {
test('1. happy path: file is written under confinementRoot', () => {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-happy-'));
try {
const srcDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-src-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'test.md'), '---\nname: test\n---\nbody\n', 'utf8');
const destDir = path.join(root, 'sub', 'dest');
copyWithPathReplacement(srcDir, destDir, '~/.claude/', 'claude', false, false, root);
// The dest dir and its content must exist inside root
const written = fs.existsSync(path.join(destDir, 'test.md'));
assert.ok(written, 'test.md must have been written to destDir under root');
assert.ok(
path.resolve(destDir).startsWith(path.resolve(root) + path.sep),
'destDir must be under root',
);
} finally {
cleanup(srcDir);
}
} finally {
cleanup(root);
}
});
test('2. escape rejected: destDir outside confinementRoot → throws, nothing written at escape path', () => {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-root-'));
const escapeName = 'gsd-cwpr-escape-' + Date.now();
const escapePath = path.join(os.tmpdir(), escapeName);
try {
const srcDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-src2-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'evil.md'), '# evil\n', 'utf8');
// destDir resolves outside root via parent traversal
const destDir = path.join(root, '..', escapeName);
assert.throws(
() => copyWithPathReplacement(srcDir, destDir, '~/.claude/', 'claude', false, false, root),
/escap|must be a strict subpath|refusing/i,
);
// Nothing must have been created at the escape path
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(escapePath), 'must not create anything at the escape path');
} finally {
cleanup(srcDir);
}
} finally {
cleanup(root);
// also remove escapePath if it was somehow created (defensive)
if (fs.existsSync(escapePath)) cleanup(escapePath);
}
});
test('3. dest === root rejected: throws when destDir equals confinementRoot', () => {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-eqroot-'));
try {
const srcDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-src3-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'x.md'), '# x\n', 'utf8');
assert.throws(
() => copyWithPathReplacement(srcDir, root, '~/.claude/', 'claude', false, false, root),
/escap|must be a strict subpath|refusing|configHome itself/i,
);
} finally {
cleanup(srcDir);
}
} finally {
cleanup(root);
}
});
test('4. fail-closed: omitting confinementRoot throws with descriptive message', () => {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-fc-'));
try {
const srcDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-src4-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'y.md'), '# y\n', 'utf8');
const destDir = path.join(root, 'sub');
assert.throws(
() => copyWithPathReplacement(srcDir, destDir, '~/.claude/', 'claude', false, false, undefined),
/confinementRoot is required/,
);
} finally {
cleanup(srcDir);
}
} finally {
cleanup(root);
}
});
test('5. symlink escape: destDir via symlink outside root → throws', (t) => {
const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-syml-'));
const outside = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-out-'));
try {
const srcDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cwpr-src5-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'z.md'), '# z\n', 'utf8');
const linkPath = path.join(root, 'link');
try {
fs.symlinkSync(outside, linkPath);
} catch (_symlinkErr) {
// Symlink creation unsupported on this platform/privilege — skip test body
t.skip('symlink creation unsupported on this platform/privilege');
return;
}
const destDir = path.join(linkPath, 'sub');
assert.throws(
() => copyWithPathReplacement(srcDir, destDir, '~/.claude/', 'claude', false, false, root),
/symlink|escap|confinement|install root/i,
);
// Nothing written to outside
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(outside).length, 0, 'must not write to the outside dir via symlink');
} finally {
cleanup(srcDir);
}
} finally {
// unlink the symlink before cleanup to avoid crossing boundaries
try { fs.unlinkSync(path.join(root, 'link')); } catch { /* already gone */ }
cleanup(root);
cleanup(outside);
}
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// installCodexConfig
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('installCodexConfig write-confinement', () => {
test('6. happy path: config.toml and agents/<name>.toml written under targetDir', () => {
const targetDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-happy-'));
try {
const agentsSrc = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-src-'));
try {
// Minimal valid agent frontmatter
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(agentsSrc, 'gsd-foo.md'),
'---\nname: gsd-foo\ndescription: x\n---\nbody\n',
'utf8',
);
const count = installCodexConfig(targetDir, agentsSrc);
assert.strictEqual(count, 1, 'must return count of 1 agent processed');
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(targetDir, 'config.toml')), 'config.toml must exist under targetDir');
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(targetDir, 'agents', 'gsd-foo.toml')), 'agents/gsd-foo.toml must exist under targetDir');
} finally {
cleanup(agentsSrc);
}
} finally {
cleanup(targetDir);
}
});
test('7a. name-injection rejected: frontmatter name "../../evil" must throw, nothing written at escape', () => {
const targetDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-inj-'));
// Use a unique escape name derived from the targetDir basename so the escape
// path can never collide with pre-existing files in os.tmpdir().
// agentsTomlDir = resolve(targetDir, 'agents'); ../../<escapeName>.toml from
// there = resolve(targetDir, '../<escapeName>.toml') = dirname(targetDir)/<name>.toml
const escapeName = path.basename(targetDir) + '-escape';
const escapePath = path.join(path.dirname(targetDir), escapeName + '.toml');
try {
const agentsSrc = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-src-inj-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(agentsSrc, 'gsd-evil.md'),
`---\nname: ../../${escapeName}\ndescription: injected\n---\nbody\n`,
'utf8',
);
assert.throws(
() => installCodexConfig(targetDir, agentsSrc),
/escap|strict subpath|refusing|NUL/i,
);
// Verify nothing was written at the escape location
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(escapePath), 'no file/dir written at escape location');
} finally {
cleanup(agentsSrc);
}
} finally {
cleanup(targetDir);
if (fs.existsSync(escapePath)) cleanup(escapePath);
}
});
test('7b. name-injection: "../config" and "../evil" must both throw (clobber-prevention, tighter agentsTomlDir root)', () => {
// With confinement rooted at agentsTomlDir (not targetDir), a name like
// "../config" resolves to targetDir/config.toml — still inside the configHome
// but OUTSIDE agents/ — so the gate must throw (clobber prevention).
// Similarly "../evil" resolves to targetDir/evil.toml, also outside agents/.
// Both must throw regardless of whether they escape targetDir.
// Case A: "../config" — would clobber config.toml, must throw.
const targetDirA = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-inj2a-'));
try {
const agentsSrcA = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-src-inj2a-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(agentsSrcA, 'gsd-clobber.md'),
'---\nname: ../config\ndescription: clobber attempt\n---\nbody\n',
'utf8',
);
assert.throws(
() => installCodexConfig(targetDirA, agentsSrcA),
/escap|strict subpath|refusing|NUL/i,
'name "../config" must throw — it escapes agents/ even though it stays inside targetDir',
);
} finally {
cleanup(agentsSrcA);
}
} finally {
cleanup(targetDirA);
}
// Case B: "../evil" — escapes agents/, must throw (new behavior with agentsTomlDir root).
const targetDirB = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-inj2b-'));
try {
const agentsSrcB = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-src-inj2b-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(agentsSrcB, 'gsd-up.md'),
'---\nname: ../up-escape-attempt\ndescription: boundary test\n---\nbody\n',
'utf8',
);
assert.throws(
() => installCodexConfig(targetDirB, agentsSrcB),
/escap|strict subpath|refusing|NUL/i,
'name "../evil" must throw — it escapes agents/ (resolves to targetDir/evil.toml)',
);
} finally {
cleanup(agentsSrcB);
}
} finally {
cleanup(targetDirB);
}
// Case C: "../../evil" still throws (escapes both agents/ and targetDir).
const targetDirC = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-inj2c-'));
try {
const agentsSrcC = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-src-inj2c-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(agentsSrcC, 'gsd-deep.md'),
'---\nname: ../../deep-escape\ndescription: deep escape\n---\nbody\n',
'utf8',
);
assert.throws(
() => installCodexConfig(targetDirC, agentsSrcC),
/escap|strict subpath|refusing|NUL/i,
);
} finally {
cleanup(agentsSrcC);
}
} finally {
cleanup(targetDirC);
}
});
test('10. symlink-escape: agents/ is a symlink outside targetDir → throws', (t) => {
const targetDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-syml-'));
const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-syml-out-'));
try {
const agentsSrc = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-icc-syml-src-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(
path.join(agentsSrc, 'gsd-foo.md'),
'---\nname: gsd-foo\ndescription: x\n---\nbody\n',
'utf8',
);
const agentsLink = path.join(targetDir, 'agents');
try {
fs.symlinkSync(outsideDir, agentsLink);
} catch (_symlinkErr) {
// Symlink creation unsupported on this platform/privilege — skip
t.skip('symlink creation unsupported on this platform/privilege');
return;
}
assert.throws(
() => installCodexConfig(targetDir, agentsSrc),
/symlink|escap|refusing/i,
);
// Nothing must have been written to the outside dir via the symlink
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(outsideDir).length, 0, 'must not write to the outside dir via symlink');
} finally {
cleanup(agentsSrc);
}
} finally {
try { fs.unlinkSync(path.join(targetDir, 'agents')); } catch { /* already gone */ }
cleanup(targetDir);
cleanup(outsideDir);
}
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// _copyStaged
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('_copyStaged write-confinement', () => {
test('8. escape rejected (regression): destDir escaping configDir → throws', () => {
const configDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-cfg-'));
const stagedDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-staged-'));
const outsideDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-outside-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(stagedDir, 'help.md'), '# help\n', 'utf8');
assert.throws(
() => _copyStaged(stagedDir, outsideDir, { kind: 'commands', destSubpath: 'commands', prefix: 'gsd-' }, configDir),
/escap|strict subpath|refusing|configHome/i,
);
} finally {
cleanup(configDir);
cleanup(stagedDir);
cleanup(outsideDir);
}
});
test('9. symlink escape rejected: destDir containing symlink to outside → throws', (t) => {
const configDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-syml-'));
const outside = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-syml-out-'));
const stagedDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-staged2-'));
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(stagedDir, 'help.md'), '# help\n', 'utf8');
const linkPath = path.join(configDir, 'link');
try {
fs.symlinkSync(outside, linkPath);
} catch (symlinkErr) {
// Symlink creation unsupported on this platform/privilege — skip
t.skip('symlink creation unsupported on this platform/privilege');
return;
}
const destDir = path.join(linkPath, 'sub');
assert.throws(
() => _copyStaged(stagedDir, destDir, { kind: 'commands', destSubpath: 'commands/link/sub', prefix: 'gsd-' }, configDir),
/symlink|escap|confinement|install root/i,
);
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(outside).length, 0, 'must not have written to outside dir');
} finally {
try { fs.unlinkSync(path.join(configDir, 'link')); } catch { /* already gone */ }
cleanup(configDir);
cleanup(outside);
cleanup(stagedDir);
}
});
test('11. fail-closed: omitting configDir throws with descriptive message', () => {
const stagedDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-fc-staged-'));
const destDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cs-fc-dest-' + Date.now());
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(stagedDir, 'help.md'), '# help\n', 'utf8');
assert.throws(
() => _copyStaged(stagedDir, destDir, { kind: 'commands', destSubpath: 'commands', prefix: 'gsd-' }, undefined),
/configDir.*required|required to confine/i,
);
} finally {
cleanup(stagedDir);
if (fs.existsSync(destDir)) cleanup(destDir);
}
});
});