fix(#3120): add register_authored_at_plan_time guard — prevent rubber-stamping legacy phases (#3142)

* fix(#3120): add register_authored_at_plan_time guard to secure-phase

Root cause: Step 3 short-circuit used threats_open: 0 as the sole
condition to skip directly to Step 6 (write clean SECURITY.md). It
did not distinguish empty-by-all-mitigated from empty-by-no-planning.
Legacy phases authored before <threat_model> blocks were canonical
received a rubber-stamped clean SECURITY.md with no audit performed.

Fix:
  Step 2c: track register_authored_at_plan_time (true iff >=1 PLAN
           file contained a parseable <threat_model> block)
  Step 3:  two-condition short-circuit:
           - threats_open:0 AND register_authored_at_plan_time:true
             -> skip to Step 6 (legitimate, all mitigated)
           - threats_open:0 AND register_authored_at_plan_time:false
             -> retroactive-STRIDE mode in Step 5 (build register
                from implementation, then verify)
  Step 5:  auditor constraint varies by mode:
           planned     -> Verify mitigations exist, do not scan
           retroactive -> Build STRIDE register first, then verify

Suite: 7039/7039. Closes #3120.

* fix(lint+changeset): allow-test-rule, drop dead regex branches, fix pr field to 3142
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-05-05 15:02:19 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7827e1ddee
commit 47ed26a01b
3 changed files with 76 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ Read SUMMARY.md — extract `## Threat Flags` entries.
Per threat: `{ threat_id, category, component, disposition, mitigation_pattern, files_to_check }`
Also set `register_authored_at_plan_time: true` if **at least one** PLAN file contained a parseable `<threat_model>` block; `false` if no PLAN files had any `<threat_model>` block (legacy phase authored before formal threat modelling was standard).
## 3. Threat Classification
Classify each threat:
@@ -69,7 +71,10 @@ Classify each threat:
Build: `{ threat_id, category, component, disposition, status, evidence }`
If `threats_open: 0` → skip to Step 6 directly.
**Short-circuit rule:**
- If `threats_open: 0 AND register_authored_at_plan_time: true` → skip to Step 6 directly. All plan-time threats are verified CLOSED.
- If `threats_open: 0 AND register_authored_at_plan_time: false` → **do NOT skip**. Empty-by-no-planning must not rubber-stamp a clean SECURITY.md. Proceed to Step 5 in **retroactive-STRIDE mode** — the auditor builds a register from implementation files first, then verifies mitigations.
- If `threats_open > 0` → proceed to Step 4 (present threat plan to user).
## 4. Present Threat Plan
@@ -82,6 +87,11 @@ Call AskUserQuestion with threat table and options:
## 5. Spawn gsd-security-auditor
**Auditor constraint — varies by register origin:**
- `register_authored_at_plan_time: true` — **Verify mitigations exist** — do not scan for new threats. The register is complete; verify each threat's mitigation is present in the implementation.
- `register_authored_at_plan_time: false` (retroactive-STRIDE mode) — **Retroactive-STRIDE: build a STRIDE register from implementation files first, then verify mitigations.** The phase was authored before formal threat modelling; the auditor must construct the register from scratch before verifying.
```
Task(
prompt="Read ~/.claude/agents/gsd-security-auditor.md for instructions.\n\n" +
@@ -158,7 +168,8 @@ Display `/clear` reminder.
- [ ] Input state detected (A/B/C) — state C exits cleanly
- [ ] PLAN.md threat model parsed, register built
- [ ] SUMMARY.md threat flags incorporated
- [ ] threats_open: 0 → skip directly to Step 6
- [ ] threats_open: 0 AND register_authored_at_plan_time: true → skip directly to Step 6
- [ ] threats_open: 0 AND register_authored_at_plan_time: false → retroactive-STRIDE mode (Step 5), not skipped
- [ ] User gate with threat table presented
- [ ] Auditor spawned with complete context
- [ ] All three return formats (SECURED/OPEN_THREATS/ESCALATE) handled