golem15/msd-core
3
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions 1 Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

enhance(#4221): replace installer Read() deny rules with a managed secret-read guard hook (#4236)

Browse Source 
* feat(#4221): gsd-secret-read-guard PreToolUse hook + registration

Add hooks/gsd-secret-read-guard.js, a blocking PreToolUse guard on
Read|Grep|Bash that denies reads of .env, .env.<suffix> and .secrets
(the .env.example/.sample/.template/.dist templates stay readable).
Read checks file_path; Grep checks an explicit path and judges the glob
per brace alternative; Bash runs a two-pass token scan (quotes, comments,
redirects with fd digits, separators, $( )/backtick/<( ) recursion,
heredoc bodies never scanned as commands, nested bash -c/eval rescans,
git <ref>:<path> shapes) with a closed non-reading exemption set for
existence checks. Fail-open crash policy; 1 MiB commands are denied as
command-too-large; more than 64 glob alternatives as glob-too-complex.

Why: Claude Code 2.1.259 makes every `cd DIR && grep …` compound prompt
for approval whenever any Read() deny rule exists, even in auto mode. A
hook denial is not a permission rule and never arms that check. The
installer-written deny rules are retired in the follow-up commit.

Registration: hooks.json (Read|Grep|Bash, timeout 5), build-hooks
HOOKS_TO_COPY, managed-hooks-registry, runtime-hooks-surface (blocking
guard with BLOCKING_GUARD_TIMEOUT_S; Kimi ReadFile|Grep|Shell),
shell-command-projection managed sets, installer-migration-report,
OpenCode/Kilo plugin (grep tool mapping, include -> glob, dispatch),
docs tables in five locales, ADR-766 always-on list, regen:derived
fixtures, and a new table-driven unit suite.

* test(#4221): pin the secret-read guard in existing hook gates

Register gsd-secret-read-guard.js in every existing hook gate: the
hooks-crash-policy table (deny row; 6 -> 7 deny cases), plugin-manifest
REQUIRED_HOOKS and its Read|Grep|Bash group, docs-hooks-table-parity
EXPECTED_SURFACE_HOOKS, install.test MANAGED_JS_HOOKS, install-minimal-
hooks JS_HOOKS/BLOCKING_GUARDS, portable-node-runner GUARD_HOOKS,
kilo-upgrades PLUGIN_GUARD_HOOKS, the Kimi normalization-parity and
typed-payload floors, the OpenCode adapter (grep mapping, include ->
glob, three dispatch tests) and a Kimi TOML matcher assertion.

* fix(#4221): retire installer Read() deny rules (legacy filter)

Rename GSD_CLAUDE_DENY_PERMISSIONS to GSD_CLAUDE_LEGACY_DENY_PERMISSIONS
and stop adding the three Read(.env) / Read(.env.*) / Read(.secrets)
strings. mergeClaudePermissions now only filters them out of an existing
permissions.deny: an absent deny key stays absent, a malformed one is
still repaired to [], and an array emptied by the filter is deleted so
no `"deny": []` residue is left. Uninstall filters the same legacy list
and, symmetric with the Antigravity branch, drops an emptied allow or
deny key and an emptied permissions object.

Unlike the #2278 allow-side migration there is no surviving current
deny list, so the constant is renamed rather than mirrored. Removal is
byte-exact: a hand-written identical rule is indistinguishable from the
installer's and is removed too (the manifest never recorded permission
strings). USER-GUIDE and CONTEXT.md updated.

* test(#4221): flip install-regressions deny-rule assertions to the retired shape

The fresh-merge, non-destructive merge, idempotency, end-to-end install,
reinstall and uninstall assertions now expect no Read(.env*) deny rules
and no permissions.deny key on a fresh install; the deny:null repair case
is kept. A new describe block covers the legacy filter: retired strings
removed with a user entry kept, partial sets, near-miss strings
untouched, idempotency, GSD-only deny array deleted, a pre-existing
empty deny preserved, and uninstall symmetry for allow/deny/permissions.

* chore(#4221): add changeset fragment for PR #4236

* fix(#4221): case-fold names; scan shell stdin and xargs pipes

Review round 1 (trek-e):

- Blocker: secret-name matching is now case-insensitive in the Read,
  Grep (path and glob) and Bash paths, so `.ENV` / `.Secrets` on a
  case-insensitive filesystem are recognized as the same secret file.
- Major: a shell interpreter's script is now scanned wherever it comes
  from. The tokenizer keeps heredoc bodies as per-segment tokens and
  records separator operators; pass 2 groups by segment id and resolves
  bash/sh/zsh/dash/ksh/su invocation mode: `-c` (including combined
  `-lc`) scans the script operand, a file operand is checked as a file
  (a `<( )` operand's echo/printf output is reconstructed), otherwise
  stdin is the script and heredocs, here-strings and a piped echo/printf
  source are scanned. `eval` joins all its operands; `source`/`.` handle
  process substitution. Data heredocs (`cat <<EOF`, the commit-message
  shape) stay unscanned.
- Major: `… | xargs <cmd>` checks the upstream segment's operands as
  file names when the sub-command reads (`echo .env | xargs cat`,
  `find . -name .env | xargs cat`); `-a`/`--arg-file` suppresses the
  inference; a shell sub-command's `-c` script is scanned.

Header, USER-GUIDE bullet and changeset updated; documented gaps now
include piped scripts from non-echo sources and `exec`/`timeout`
wrappers. 60 new suite cases pin the block and allow shapes.

---------

Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
This commit is contained in:
Cody Anderson
2026-09-05 02:00:08 -06:00
committed by GitHub
parent d0d542e478
commit 77e2472ca0
50 changed files with 1862 additions and 71 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

48
tests/opencode-plugin-adapter.test.cjs
View File

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ test('mapToolName maps OpenCode tool names to Claude names', () => {
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolName('write'), 'Write');
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolName('edit'), 'Edit');
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolName('bash'), 'Bash');
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolName('grep'), 'Grep');
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolName('apply_patch'), 'MultiEdit');
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolName('webfetch'), 'WebFetch');
// Unknown tools pass through unchanged; empty is empty.
@@ -108,6 +109,11 @@ test('mapToolInput normalizes camelCase + snake_case arg keys', () => {
});
// path/file_path aliases also resolve to file_path.
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolInput({ path: '/p' }).file_path, '/p');
// #4221: OpenCode's grep `include` (and a literal `glob`) reach the secret
// read guard as Claude's `glob`.
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolInput({ include: '.env*' }).glob, '.env*');
assert.equal(_internals.mapToolInput({ glob: '**/*.ts' }).glob, '**/*.ts');
assert.equal('glob' in _internals.mapToolInput({ command: 'ls' }), false);
assert.deepEqual(_internals.mapToolInput(null), {});
});
@@ -256,6 +262,48 @@ test('tool.execute.before: a silent hook allows the tool call (no throw)', async
);
});
test('tool.execute.before: the secret read guard blocks a Bash read of .env (#4221)', async (t) => {
const { mod } = buildInstalledLayout(t, {
'gsd-workflow-guard.js': stubHook(''),
'gsd-secret-read-guard.js': stubHook(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'block', code: 'secret-read', reason: 'secret read denied' }), 2),
});
const handlers = await mod.server({ directory: process.cwd() });
await assert.rejects(
() => handlers['tool.execute.before']({ tool: 'bash' }, { args: { command: 'cat .env' } }),
/secret read denied/,
);
});
test('tool.execute.before: the secret read guard blocks a grep with a secret path (#4221)', async (t) => {
const { mod } = buildInstalledLayout(t, {
'gsd-secret-read-guard.js': stubHook(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'block', code: 'secret-read', reason: 'secret grep denied' }), 2),
});
const handlers = await mod.server({ directory: process.cwd() });
await assert.rejects(
() => handlers['tool.execute.before']({ tool: 'grep' }, { args: { pattern: 'KEY', path: '/p/.env' } }),
/secret grep denied/,
);
});
test('tool.execute.before: the secret read guard is dispatched for read, not for write (#4221)', async (t) => {
const { mod } = buildInstalledLayout(t, {
'gsd-prompt-guard.js': stubHook(''),
'gsd-read-guard.js': stubHook(''),
'gsd-worktree-path-guard.js': stubHook(''),
'gsd-workflow-guard.js': stubHook(''),
'gsd-write-guard.js': stubHook(''),
'gsd-secret-read-guard.js': stubHook(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'block', code: 'secret-read', reason: 'secret read denied' }), 2),
});
const handlers = await mod.server({ directory: process.cwd() });
await assert.rejects(
() => handlers['tool.execute.before']({ tool: 'read' }, { args: { filePath: '/p/.env' } }),
/secret read denied/,
);
await assert.doesNotReject(() =>
handlers['tool.execute.before']({ tool: 'write' }, { args: { filePath: '/p/.env', content: 'X=1' } }),
);
});
test('tool.execute.after: Read content rewriting maps ~/.claude/gsd-core paths', async (t) => {
const { root, mod } = buildInstalledLayout(t, {
'gsd-read-injection-scanner.js': stubHook(''),