fix(#1459): user-owned consent store gates third-party capability activation; env/cwd in disclosure; loader validator parity (#1473)
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@@ -390,7 +390,9 @@ Full listing: `gsd-core/bin/lib/*.cjs`.
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| `audit-command-router.cjs` | ADR-959 capability command router for `gsd-tools audit-uat` and `gsd-tools audit-open` — extracted from hardcoded cases in `gsd-tools.cjs`; dispatches to `uat.cjs:cmdAuditUat` and `audit.cjs:{auditOpenArtifacts,formatAuditReport}`; phase 4d-impl-3 |
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| `audit.cjs` | Audit dispatch, audit open sessions, audit storage helpers |
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| `capability-activation.cjs` | Capability activation resolver shared by config validation and capability-state consumers — resolves registry-owned config keys from raw runtime config without re-centralizing migrated settings |
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| `capability-ledger.cjs` | Per-runtime install ledger (ADR-1244 D4) — atomic read/write of `.gsd-capabilities.json` recording `{ id, version, source, integrity, files[], sharedEdits[] }` per installed capability; exports `readLedger`/`writeLedger`/`recordInstall`/`removeEntry`/`reconcile` (orphan detection); atomic commit point and reconciliation basis for Phase-4 upgrade/remove |
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| `capability-consent.cjs` | User-owned capability consent store (#1459) — bounded, non-throwing JSON store at `${GSD_HOME\|\|homedir()}/.gsd/consent.json` (NEVER under a repo) keyed by `${realpath(projectRoot)} <id>`; exports `consentStorePath`/`readConsentStore`/`hasProjectConsent` (matches iff integrity AND disclosureSignature both match)/`recordProjectConsent` (atomic+durable write)/`revokeProjectConsent`; the authoritative consent signal that gates PROJECT-scope third-party capability activation so a forged/cloned project ledger no longer activates anything until the user consents on THIS machine |
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| `capability-lock.cjs` | Shared cross-process lock primitive (#1459 finding 4) — the SINGLE hardened lockfile protocol used by BOTH capability-lifecycle (`.gsd/capabilities/.lock`) and capability-consent (`.consent.lock`); exports `acquireLock(lockPath, opts?)`/`releaseLock(handle)` with pid + process-start-time liveness identity, a hard deadman, and token+inode owner-safe release — NEVER stale-steals a verified-live same-host holder, reclaims only a provably-dead/unverifiable holder, never deadlocks; `opts.maxAttempts`/`opts.waitForFresh` let the consent store serialize genuinely-contended writers; `_setLockProbes`/`_resetLockProbes` are test seams |
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| `capability-ledger.cjs` | Per-runtime install ledger (ADR-1244 D4) — atomic read/write of `.gsd-capabilities.json` recording `{ id, version, source, integrity, files[], sharedEdits[] }` per installed capability; exports `readLedger`/`writeLedger`/`recordInstall`/`removeEntry`/`reconcile` (orphan detection)/`readSmallRegularFile` (utf8) + `readSmallRegularFileBuffer` (raw bytes, the byte-exact consent-hash reader, #1459 finding 1); atomic commit point and reconciliation basis for Phase-4 upgrade/remove |
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| `capability-lifecycle.cjs` | Capability lifecycle orchestration (ADR-1244 Phase 4, D5+D6) — composes the source resolver + ledger + trust gate into `installCapability`/`upgradeCapability`/`removeCapability`/`reconcileCapabilities`; ledger write is the commit point; upgrade is atomic stage-then-swap (old set aside, new swapped in, ledger committed, backup dropped) with deterministic crash recovery (`reconcileCapabilities` rolls forward/back to a fully-old-or-fully-new state); remove surgically strips only marker-stamped (`_gsdCapability`) shared-config entries, preserving user hand-edits; never executes capability code |
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| `capability-loader.cjs` | Runtime Capability Registry overlay (ADR-1244 D2) — `loadRegistry({ includeInstalled })` composes the frozen first-party registry with a validated installed overlay read from `$GSD_HOME/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/` (global) and `<projectRoot>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/` (project); first-party-wins on id/skill/agent/config collisions, reserved-namespace rejection, load-time `engines.gsd` re-gate (skip-with-warning), and gate-kind fail-closed via `_overlay.blockedGates`; composes through the canonical `buildRegistry` so derived views never drift |
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| `capability-registry.cjs` | Generated central Capability Registry — role-partitioned index of all co-located capability declarations (`capabilities/<id>/capability.json`); emitted by `scripts/gen-capability-registry.cjs --write` (ADR-894 §5) |
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