* test(#3248): failing-first suite for instruction-surface disclosure 28 matrix rows from 50-test-matrix.md. Rows requiring the new Disclosure.instructionSurfaces field fail today; rows 18-20/23-25 (the ADR-2363 D4 signature invariants) pass today by construction because the current code never reads skills/agents at all, and stand as regression guards for the implementation commit. Refs #3248 * feat(#3248): disclose capability skills and agents as an instruction surface ADR-2363 D5. A capability whose only contribution was skills disclosed nothing at install: summarizeDisclosure early-returned "ships no executable surfaces (declarative only)" because hasExecutable was false, while each SKILL.md body landed verbatim in the agent's instruction context. discloseExecutableSurfaces gains a fifth, NON-executable class, instructionSurfaces, collecting declared skills/agents stems through the same safeCollect wrapper as the four existing collectors, so a hostile value degrades only this class and the function stays total for any manifest shape. Nothing existing is edited: the collectors, hasExecutable, disclosureSignature and missingArtifacts are untouched. get_impact rates the symbol CRITICAL at 196 affected, which is why the design is strictly additive. D4 is implemented by omission and pinned rather than left incidental: adding, changing or removing skills/agents leaves disclosureSignature byte-identical, so no stored consent record is perturbed and no spurious re-consent fires. ADR-2782's conditional-append trick is deliberately NOT reused - it worked because no manifest could declare a reviewer body before that class existed, whereas skills predate this one, so a conditional append would re-sign every already-consented skill-bearing capability. The renderer is extracted as summarizeInstructionSurfaces and called from BOTH branches of summarizeDisclosure. Appending only at the end would never render for skill-only capabilities - the ones that need it - since those take the early return. That branch's "declarative only" claim is now conditional on there being no instruction surface either. The renderer iterates rather than spreading into push, so an unbounded stem count cannot throw RangeError, and tolerates the bare {} the CLI edge passes via `res.disclosure || {}`. Scope note: #3248's prose says "skill stems"; ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Shipping skills alone would leave an ADR deliverable owned by no phase, and the epic has no Phase 2. Agents are the same shape at no extra cost. Narrowing back is a two-line change. Ratifies ADR-2363 (Proposed -> Accepted) and adds the owed ADR-1244 back-link. Closes #3248 * fix(#3248): escape consent-prompt values and narrow disclosure to skills Two review findings, both of which made the previous commit wrong. BLOCKER (isolated adversarial review). Every manifest-supplied value interpolated into a consent-prompt line was rendered unescaped. Those lines are joined with \n and written RAW to stderr on the needs-consent path (capability-command-router -> cli-exit runMain), so a stem carrying a newline forged additional lines indistinguishable from genuine GSD disclosure text, and an ANSI escape could clear or rewrite lines already printed. That defeats the informed-consent guarantee this change exists to provide, and is a prompt-injection vector against any agent that reads the stderr text to decide whether to retry with --yes. The hole was not unique to the new class - hook event/script, command family/module/router, every MCP field, and every reviewer-lane field were equally unescaped. Fixing only the new one would have created the generative-fix divergence this repo tracks, so renderValueForPrompt is applied to all five classes through one helper, guarded by a parity test that fails if a future class skips it. Escaping is identity for ordinary names, so no well-formed manifest's output changes. The disclosure OBJECT stays verbatim - only the rendered LINE is escaped - because the signature and every consumer reasoning about identity depend on the declared value. NARROWED to skills only. The previous commit also collected agents, arguing ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Verified against staging: stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills takes a registry and unions third-party skills in via readInstalledCapabilitySkill, while stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter takes only a source directory and has no registry-aware path. Third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context, so disclosing them would have put a false claim in a security prompt - worse than the scope creep two reviewers flagged it as. D3's classification stands; D5 now records that Phase 1 implements the skills half and that whether agents should be staged at all is an open maintainer question. Also reverts the premature ADR-2363 ratification. The previous commit flipped it to Accepted and asserted "#3248 merged" while this branch IS #3248 and is unmerged. Status returns to Proposed, and the ADR-1244 back-link - owed only on ratification - is withdrawn. Adds the fast-check property suite CLAUDE.md requires and the direct precedent (reviewer-trust-disclosure) already had: totality, D4 signature invariance, D3 hasExecutable invariance, and renderer totality over adversarial manifests. Refs #3248 * chore(#3248): correct changeset scope claim and backfill pr number The fragment was written against the pre-narrowing commit and still advertised 'skills and agents'. 4d26887e narrowed disclosure to skills only - third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context - but did not touch the fragment, so the release notes would have carried a claim the code does not implement. Also backfills pr:0 -> 3253 and names the prompt-escaping fix, which is user-visible and was absent from the original body. Changeset-only; no code or test changed, so the gsd-test pass recorded for 4d26887e still describes this tree's behavior. Refs #3248 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
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Tom Boucher
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# ADR-2363: A capability's skill body is an instruction surface — trusted, unscanned, and disclosed
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- **Status:** Proposed — D1–D4 are decided; **D5's mechanism is unshipped** and is tracked by [#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248) (Phase 1). Per the corpus lifecycle rule, an ADR with an outstanding phase stays `Proposed`. Ratify when #3248 has merged and the consent summary renders the instruction surface.
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- **Status:** Proposed — D1–D4 are decided. D5's mechanism ships in [#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248), which is open and unmerged; this ADR ratifies to `Accepted` when that PR merges (see the ratification bar under Consequences).
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- **Date:** 2026-08-09
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- **Issue:** [#2363](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/2363) (epic); Phase 0 tracked by [#3247](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3247), Phase 1 by [#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248)
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- **Amends (prospective — this ADR is `Proposed`, so no back-link is owed yet):** [ADR-1244](1244-capability-ecosystem.md) — D5's disclosure gains a **fifth** class, and it is the first that is *not* an executable surface. [ADR-2782](2782-reviewer-lane-capability-surface.md) added the fourth (reviewer lanes); this adds the first non-executable one, which is why it needs its own classification rather than a fifth entry in the same list.
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@@ -91,15 +91,17 @@ Point 3 is the part that makes this a decision rather than a punt: the door stay
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**The residual gap, stated plainly — and it is smaller than it first looks.** At **project** scope there is no gap at all: `bundleContentHash` walks every entry under the bundle with no exclusions and hashes every regular file (failing closed on symlinks and non-regular files), so a single changed byte in a skill body already deactivates a project-scoped capability until re-consent. At **global** scope there is no consent record in the first place — a global install is trusted because it sits under the user's own home ([ADR-1244](1244-capability-ecosystem.md) D5) — so a skill-body change on upgrade is not consent-gated there, and would not have been even if instruction surfaces were signature-bound. **The gap global scope has is the one it already had for code, and D4 neither widens nor narrows it.** What D4 declines to add is a re-consent *prompt* on skill-body change during an interactive upgrade; the v2 path above is where that would land if it is ever wanted.
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### D5 — The mechanism *(Phase 1, [#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248) — not shipped by this ADR)*
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### D5 — The mechanism *(Phase 1, implemented in [#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248), open and unmerged at time of writing — not shipped by this ADR itself)*
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`discloseExecutableSurfaces` gains an `instructionSurfaces` collector, enumerating each skill stem the manifest contributes, collected through the same `safeCollect` wrapper as the existing four classes so a hostile value degrades only that class and the function stays total for any manifest shape. The pre-install consent summary names those skills as an instruction surface. The signature behavior implements D4 exactly, pinned by a test that asserts what happens to a pre-existing consent record rather than leaving it incidental.
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The design is deliberately **additive** — a new independent collector and a new field, with no change to the four existing collectors and none to `hasExecutable` — because `get_impact` rates `discloseExecutableSurfaces` **CRITICAL** at 196 affected symbols.
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**Implementation note (Phase 1 scope).** The mechanism above discloses `skills` only. D3's class table names `skills, agents` as instruction surfaces, and that classification stands unchanged. `agents[]` are not disclosed by this mechanism, because third-party `agents[]` are never actually staged into the agent's instruction context: `stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills` (`src/install-profiles.cts`) unions third-party skills in via `readInstalledCapabilitySkill`, whereas `stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter` (same file) takes only a source directory and has no registry-aware third-party path. Disclosing agents here would have named a surface that does not exist. Whether third-party `agents[]` should be staged at all — and, if so, whether D3's agents half becomes reachable — is an open question for the maintainer, not a silent omission. Agents remain classified as an instruction surface either way; they are simply not yet a staged one.
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## Consequences
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**What improves.** The boundary is written down on both sides: a capability author reading [`docs/how-to/develop-a-capability.md`](../how-to/develop-a-capability.md) learns their skill body ships verbatim and unscanned, and a user reading [`capability-trust-model.md`](../explanation/capability-trust-model.md) learns what installing a skill-bearing capability grants. After Phase 1, a skill-only capability — which today discloses nothing at all — names its instruction surface at the consent moment.
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**What improves.** The boundary is written down on both sides: a capability author reading [`docs/how-to/develop-a-capability.md`](../how-to/develop-a-capability.md) learns their skill body ships verbatim and unscanned, and a user reading [`capability-trust-model.md`](../explanation/capability-trust-model.md) learns what installing a skill-bearing capability grants. A skill-only capability — which used to disclose nothing at all — now names its instruction surface at the consent moment.
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**What does not change.** No behavior changes in this ADR's phase. No stored consent record is perturbed and no spurious re-consent fires, now or under Phase 1 (D4). Skills remain the intended, low-friction contribution path; this is disclosure, not discouragement.
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@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ The design is deliberately **additive** — a new independent collector and a ne
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- **First-party skills are equally unscanned.** Their assurance is provenance — they are the shipped package, and the GSD Core release process is their control — not content inspection. No content control exists on the first-party side either, and no reader should infer one.
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- **Global-scope skill-body change on upgrade is not consent-gated.** That is true of a global install's code too, and D4 does not change it either way. See D4.
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**Ratification bar.** This ADR flips to `Accepted` when #3248 has merged, the consent summary renders instruction surfaces, and the D4 signature behavior is pinned by a passing test. Until then it is `Proposed` for a recorded reason, not through neglect.
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**Ratification bar.** This ADR flips to `Accepted` when #3248 has merged, the consent summary renders instruction surfaces, and the D4 signature behavior is pinned by a passing test. #3248, while open and unmerged, already delivers the second and third of these: the pre-install consent summary renders skill instruction surfaces by name, and a passing test pins the D4 signature behavior — instruction surfaces do not perturb `disclosureSignature`. The first condition, #3248's merge, has not yet occurred.
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## Alternatives considered
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