* test(#3248): failing-first suite for instruction-surface disclosure 28 matrix rows from 50-test-matrix.md. Rows requiring the new Disclosure.instructionSurfaces field fail today; rows 18-20/23-25 (the ADR-2363 D4 signature invariants) pass today by construction because the current code never reads skills/agents at all, and stand as regression guards for the implementation commit. Refs #3248 * feat(#3248): disclose capability skills and agents as an instruction surface ADR-2363 D5. A capability whose only contribution was skills disclosed nothing at install: summarizeDisclosure early-returned "ships no executable surfaces (declarative only)" because hasExecutable was false, while each SKILL.md body landed verbatim in the agent's instruction context. discloseExecutableSurfaces gains a fifth, NON-executable class, instructionSurfaces, collecting declared skills/agents stems through the same safeCollect wrapper as the four existing collectors, so a hostile value degrades only this class and the function stays total for any manifest shape. Nothing existing is edited: the collectors, hasExecutable, disclosureSignature and missingArtifacts are untouched. get_impact rates the symbol CRITICAL at 196 affected, which is why the design is strictly additive. D4 is implemented by omission and pinned rather than left incidental: adding, changing or removing skills/agents leaves disclosureSignature byte-identical, so no stored consent record is perturbed and no spurious re-consent fires. ADR-2782's conditional-append trick is deliberately NOT reused - it worked because no manifest could declare a reviewer body before that class existed, whereas skills predate this one, so a conditional append would re-sign every already-consented skill-bearing capability. The renderer is extracted as summarizeInstructionSurfaces and called from BOTH branches of summarizeDisclosure. Appending only at the end would never render for skill-only capabilities - the ones that need it - since those take the early return. That branch's "declarative only" claim is now conditional on there being no instruction surface either. The renderer iterates rather than spreading into push, so an unbounded stem count cannot throw RangeError, and tolerates the bare {} the CLI edge passes via `res.disclosure || {}`. Scope note: #3248's prose says "skill stems"; ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Shipping skills alone would leave an ADR deliverable owned by no phase, and the epic has no Phase 2. Agents are the same shape at no extra cost. Narrowing back is a two-line change. Ratifies ADR-2363 (Proposed -> Accepted) and adds the owed ADR-1244 back-link. Closes #3248 * fix(#3248): escape consent-prompt values and narrow disclosure to skills Two review findings, both of which made the previous commit wrong. BLOCKER (isolated adversarial review). Every manifest-supplied value interpolated into a consent-prompt line was rendered unescaped. Those lines are joined with \n and written RAW to stderr on the needs-consent path (capability-command-router -> cli-exit runMain), so a stem carrying a newline forged additional lines indistinguishable from genuine GSD disclosure text, and an ANSI escape could clear or rewrite lines already printed. That defeats the informed-consent guarantee this change exists to provide, and is a prompt-injection vector against any agent that reads the stderr text to decide whether to retry with --yes. The hole was not unique to the new class - hook event/script, command family/module/router, every MCP field, and every reviewer-lane field were equally unescaped. Fixing only the new one would have created the generative-fix divergence this repo tracks, so renderValueForPrompt is applied to all five classes through one helper, guarded by a parity test that fails if a future class skips it. Escaping is identity for ordinary names, so no well-formed manifest's output changes. The disclosure OBJECT stays verbatim - only the rendered LINE is escaped - because the signature and every consumer reasoning about identity depend on the declared value. NARROWED to skills only. The previous commit also collected agents, arguing ADR-2363 D3 classifies instruction surfaces as "skills, agents". Verified against staging: stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills takes a registry and unions third-party skills in via readInstalledCapabilitySkill, while stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter takes only a source directory and has no registry-aware path. Third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context, so disclosing them would have put a false claim in a security prompt - worse than the scope creep two reviewers flagged it as. D3's classification stands; D5 now records that Phase 1 implements the skills half and that whether agents should be staged at all is an open maintainer question. Also reverts the premature ADR-2363 ratification. The previous commit flipped it to Accepted and asserted "#3248 merged" while this branch IS #3248 and is unmerged. Status returns to Proposed, and the ADR-1244 back-link - owed only on ratification - is withdrawn. Adds the fast-check property suite CLAUDE.md requires and the direct precedent (reviewer-trust-disclosure) already had: totality, D4 signature invariance, D3 hasExecutable invariance, and renderer totality over adversarial manifests. Refs #3248 * chore(#3248): correct changeset scope claim and backfill pr number The fragment was written against the pre-narrowing commit and still advertised 'skills and agents'. 4d26887e narrowed disclosure to skills only - third-party agents are never staged into the instruction context - but did not touch the fragment, so the release notes would have carried a claim the code does not implement. Also backfills pr:0 -> 3253 and names the prompt-escaping fix, which is user-visible and was absent from the original body. Changeset-only; no code or test changed, so the gsd-test pass recorded for 4d26887e still describes this tree's behavior. Refs #3248 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
@@ -236,12 +236,21 @@ So there are three classes, not two:
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| **Instruction surface** | skills, agents | Instructions that will reach the agent. Reach bounded only by what the agent will do when told. |
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| **Inert artifact** | everything else in the bundle | Note only. |
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**Not yet itemized at the prompt.** Naming a capability's individual skills in the
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pre-install consent summary lands with
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[#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248); today a skill-bearing
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capability is covered by the bundle's integrity and by your consent to install it,
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but its skills are not listed for you one by one. The classification above is
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what GSD has decided; the itemized prompt is what it has not yet built.
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Both `skills` and `agents` are classified as instruction surfaces, but only
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`skills` are disclosed today. A third-party capability's declared `agents[]`
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are never staged into the agent's instruction context — the staging path that
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unions third-party skills into a runtime's skills directory has no equivalent
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for agents — so naming them at the consent prompt would claim a surface that
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does not exist. This is not a claim that agents are safe or inert: they are
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still classified as an instruction surface, they are simply not staged for
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third-party capabilities today, which is why they are not itemized below.
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**Itemized at the prompt.** [#3248](https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3248)
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made the pre-install consent summary name each contributed skill in its own
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section. A capability whose only contribution is skills — which used to
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disclose nothing at all beyond the bundle's integrity — is included: you see its
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skills listed before you consent to install it. The listing names the surface;
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it does not assert anything about what the surface contains.
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Installing a capability that ships skills grants it **instruction reach**. That is
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a real grant, and it is the same bargain this document already describes for code:
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@@ -255,11 +264,11 @@ Two things worth stating so you do not infer them:
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- **First-party skills are equally unscanned.** Their assurance is provenance —
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they are the shipped package — not content inspection. There is no content
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control on either side.
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- **Correcting this document did not disturb any consent you have already
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given.** No re-consent prompt follows from it. ADR-2363 D4 keeps instruction
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surfaces out of the v1 disclosure signature precisely so that recording the
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boundary honestly does not fire a spurious re-consent prompt on every
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skill-bearing capability you have installed.
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- **Naming the instruction surface did not disturb any consent you have
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already given.** No re-consent prompt follows from it. ADR-2363 D4 keeps
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instruction surfaces out of the v1 disclosure signature precisely so that
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disclosing the boundary honestly does not fire a spurious re-consent prompt
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on every skill-bearing capability you have installed.
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### Integrity pinning
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