fix(#1627): scale security rigor by ASVS level (planner disposition + auditor depth) (#1636)

workflow.security_asvs_level was display-only — the planner hardcoded
'mitigate if ASVS L1 requires it' and the auditor only echoed the level,
so L2/L3 behaved identically to L1.

- New reference gsd-core/references/security-asvs-levels.md defines L1
  (opportunistic), L2 (standard), L3 (comprehensive) for both planner
  threat disposition and auditor verification depth (higher = superset).
- planner: disposition now scales with the configured ASVS level (no
  hardcoded L1) + @-pointer to the reference.
- auditor: verification depth scales with asvs_level (L1 grep-presence,
  L2 boundary/vector check, L3 end-to-end trace + bypass check).
- planning-config.md + INVENTORY updated; planner kept under its 48K cap
  by extracting the goal-backward worked example to planner-guidance.md.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom Boucher
2026-06-23 18:48:58 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 94be6d5b60
commit f9d9dfb4bc
12 changed files with 349 additions and 59 deletions

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@@ -184,3 +184,69 @@ Execute: `/gsd:execute-phase {phase} --gaps-only`
## Checkpoint Reached / Revision Complete
Follow templates in checkpoints and revision_mode sections respectively.
---
## Goal-Backward Worked Example
### Step 2: Derive Observable Truths
For "working chat interface":
- User can see existing messages
- User can type a new message
- User can send the message
- Sent message appears in the list
- Messages persist across page refresh
**Test:** Each truth verifiable by a human using the application.
### Step 3: Derive Required Artifacts
"User can see existing messages" requires:
- Message list component (renders Message[])
- Messages state (loaded from somewhere)
- API route or data source (provides messages)
- Message type definition (shapes the data)
**Test:** Each artifact = a specific file or database object.
### Step 4: Derive Required Wiring
Message list component wiring:
- Imports Message type (not using `any`)
- Receives messages prop or fetches from API
- Maps over messages to render (not hardcoded)
- Handles empty state (not just crashes)
### Step 5: Identify Key Links
"Where is this most likely to break?" Key links = critical connections where breakage causes cascading failures.
### Must-Haves Output Format
```yaml
must_haves:
truths:
- "User can see existing messages"
- "User can send a message"
- "Messages persist across refresh"
artifacts:
- path: "src/components/Chat.tsx"
provides: "Message list rendering"
min_lines: 30
- path: "src/app/api/chat/route.ts"
provides: "Message CRUD operations"
exports: ["GET", "POST"]
- path: "prisma/schema.prisma"
provides: "Message model"
contains: "model Message"
key_links:
- from: "src/components/Chat.tsx"
to: "src/app/api/chat/route.ts"
via: "fetch in useEffect — calls /api/chat endpoint"
pattern: "fetch.*api/chat"
- from: "src/app/api/chat/route.ts"
to: "prisma/schema.prisma"
via: "database query via prisma.message"
pattern: "prisma\\.message\\.(find|create)"
```

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@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ Set via `workflow.*` namespace in config.json (e.g., `"workflow": { "research":
| `workflow.code_review_depth` | string | `"standard"` | `"light"`, `"standard"`, `"deep"` | Depth level for code review analysis in the ship workflow |
| `workflow._auto_chain_active` | boolean | `false` | `true`, `false` | Internal: tracks whether autonomous chaining is active |
| `workflow.security_enforcement` | boolean | `true` | `true`, `false` | Enable threat-model-anchored security verification via `/gsd:secure-phase`. When `false`, security checks are skipped entirely |
| `workflow.security_asvs_level` | number | `1` | `1`, `2`, `3` | OWASP ASVS verification level. Level 1 = opportunistic, Level 2 = standard, Level 3 = comprehensive |
| `workflow.security_asvs_level` | number | `1` | `1`, `2`, `3` | OWASP ASVS verification level. Level 1 = opportunistic, Level 2 = standard, Level 3 = comprehensive. Scales both planner threat-disposition rigor (which threats must be mitigated vs. accepted) and auditor verification depth (grep-level → boundary-placement check → full data-flow trace). See `gsd-core/references/security-asvs-levels.md`. |
| `workflow.security_block_on` | string | `"high"` | `"high"`, `"medium"`, `"low"` | Minimum severity that blocks phase advancement |
| `workflow.post_planning_gaps` | boolean | `true` | `true`, `false` | Post-planning gap report (#2493). After plans are generated, scans REQUIREMENTS.md and CONTEXT.md `<decisions>` against all PLAN.md files and emits a unified `Source \| Item \| Status` table. Non-blocking. Set to `false` to skip Step 13e of plan-phase. _Alias:_ `post_planning_gaps` is the flat-key form used in `CONFIG_DEFAULTS`; `workflow.post_planning_gaps` is the canonical namespaced form. |

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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
# Security ASVS Levels
GSD threat modeling maps OWASP ASVS levels to planner disposition rigor and auditor verification depth. Higher levels are supersets of lower — L3 includes all L2 and L1 requirements.
## L1 — Opportunistic (default)
**Scope:** Cover threats on primary trust boundaries and high-impact components.
**Planner disposition:** `mitigate` critical/high-severity threats. `mitigate` medium-severity threats if they occur on a primary trust boundary; otherwise `accept` with documented rationale explaining the specific risk tolerance. `accept` low-risk threats with a rationale statement. `transfer` when threat is third-party responsibility.
**Auditor verification depth:** Verify each declared mitigation is PRESENT in the cited file (grep-level check — find the pattern, confirm the call exists).
## L2 — Standard
**Scope:** Map ALL applicable STRIDE categories for every in-scope component.
**Planner disposition:** `mitigate` medium-severity-and-above threats. Every `accept` MUST have explicit documented rationale explaining why the risk is tolerable for this specific context.
**Auditor verification depth:** Verify the mitigation ACTUALLY ADDRESSES the threat vector (not just that some pattern is present) and is placed at the correct trust boundary. A login check in the wrong layer does not close the threat.
## L3 — Comprehensive
**Scope:** Exhaustive STRIDE × all components; defense-in-depth for critical threats.
**Planner disposition:** `mitigate` all threats except those explicitly accepted with documented sign-off. Defense-in-depth layers required for critical threats (multiple independent controls).
**Auditor verification depth:** Deep verification — trace data flow end-to-end, check edge cases and ordering, confirm the mitigation cannot be bypassed via alternate code paths or parameter manipulation.