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13 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Jakub Zych
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a9a7a328e6 |
refactor: hard-fork GSD -> MSD (Make Software Done)
Mechanical rename produced by scripts/msd-rename.cjs: gsd/Gsd/GSD -> msd/Msd/MSD across contents and paths, upstream package/repo coordinates -> @golem15/msd-core and golem15com/msd-core. Deep links into upstream history, sibling upstream packages, the GSD-2 import feature, CHANGELOG.md and .changeset/ are kept as-is. Hand edits on top: MSD block-letter banner and logos, LICENSE copyright line, package/plugin identity, regenerated lockfile, install-tree fixtures, derived registries and benchmark baseline; migration checksum baseline re-locked (MSD keeps its own install state, so no install had applied the old sums); sort-order and regex-escaped expectations in tests adjusted. |
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Tom Boucher
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bbdf7e8e84 |
chore(#4654): add local/no-unconfined-path-join and drain it to zero — Phase 4 of #4636 (#4674)
* chore(#4654): add local/no-unconfined-path-join and drain it to zero Phase 4 of epic #4636 — the ratchet, and the phase that makes the epic hold. THE MEASUREMENT THAT RESHAPED THE PHASE. An AST census (the repo's own parser, not grep) found what the epic never enumerated: ADR-4650 named seven containment implementations; `src/` alone held roughly 24 more hand-rolled gates across ~13 files, several guarding a write or an `fs.rmSync`. Two verified by reading rather than pattern-matching — `research-store.cts` comments its own as "ensure the resolved file path stays inside the store dir" immediately before a write, and `capability-lifecycle.cts` gates `fs.rmSync` with one. So the epic's Done-when "one containment predicate, used at every site" was FALSE when Phase 3 reported it satisfied. It is true now: the rule is clean across src/, scripts/, gsd-core/bin/ and hooks/ with an EMPTY allowlist. WHY NOT THE RULE THE ISSUE PROPOSED. #4654 proposed flagging `path.join` whose first argument is a managed root and whose later arguments derive from argv. That is a taint analysis over 2046 call sites, in ESLint, without type information; "derives from argv" is not locally decidable. Any approximation either floods or is trivially evaded, and a rule that fires on hundreds of correct sites earns an allowlist of hundreds — the opposite of a ratchet. What is actually duplicated is the COMPARISON, not the join, and that has one recognizable shape. Arm 1 X.startsWith(Y + sep) the hand-rolled containment idiom Arm 2 a containment predicate called as a bare statement, answer discarded Arm 2 is the issue's "asserts the result was narrowed, not merely that a helper was called". Its example `validatePath(x, root).resolved` is already structurally impossible — Phase 3 un-exported `validatePath` — so the remaining expressible failure is ignoring the answer, which is the defect that recurred five times in this epic. The census found exactly one live instance (`milestone.cts:1643`); it now returns the proven `ContainedPath` so consumers stop re-deriving the path the comment above it was extracted to stop them re-deriving. The rule deliberately does NOT try to catch validate-one-path-use-another where the answer is used but a different variable flows onward. That needs flow analysis; the branded `ContainedPath` from Phase 3 is the defense there, and the two are complementary. PER-SITE FAMILY CHOICE, NOT A DEFAULT. Phase 3's lesson binds: collapsing a lexical site onto the realpath family broke four tests and was caught only by the matrix. Every migrated site was triaged individually. The six installer-migrations tree-walks and the six capability-lifecycle gates take the LEXICAL family because their operands are already realpath-resolved and they deliberately treat the final component as a link; boundary sites take realpath. TWO SITES WITH AN INVERTED CONTRACT, which a mechanical swap would have broken. `installer-migrations.cts:127` and `runtime-artifact-install-plan.cts:144` REJECT `target === root` by contract, while the canonical comparison ACCEPTS it. Swapped naively, a migration could `rmdir` the user's config root and a third-party descriptor could write at configHome itself. Both keep `=== root` as an explicit additional arm alongside the predicate call — the predicate decides containment, the call site keeps its own extra condition (ADR-4650 decision 6). ONE DUPLICATE DELETED OUTRIGHT: `planning-inspect.cts`'s `isWithinRoot` was byte-identical to `isContainedIn` and said so in its own docstring. `isContainedIn` is now exported for callers that have already resolved both operands and need only the comparison, with a doc note that a caller which has NOT resolved them must use a full predicate instead. THE MARKER, AND WHY IT IS NOT THE ALLOWLIST. Nine sites are justified holdouts and carry `// allow-handrolled-containment: <reason>` with a mandatory, reviewable reason. Two justifications: (a) not a containment decision — an ancestor-walk loop condition, sub-repo grouping, worktree identity matching, declared-path coverage; (b) it IS containment but the canonical predicate is unreachable — `capability-validator.cjs` is a committed pre-build `.cjs` and the compiled `security.cjs` is untracked build output, so requiring it would break a fresh clone. `scripts/lib/drift-scan.cjs` runs under `lint:ci` with the same exposure. The marker was renamed from `allow-lexical-prefix-match` mid-phase because that name asserted only (a) and would have stated something false at the (b) sites. A marker suppresses BEFORE the violation counter increments, so a file whose every occurrence is marked still reports `staleAllowlistEntry` — otherwise a drained entry lingers and silently re-permits the site later. DEMONSTRATED RED, per #4654: a hand-rolled copy reintroduced into a real `src/` file made `npm run lint` fail with the rule's full guidance message; removing it returned the tree to clean. Both halves recorded — red alone proves nothing, since a rule red for an unrelated reason looks identical. DISCLOSED: `defaultRequireFromInstallRoot` (gsd-tools.cjs) previously carried two distinct rejection messages and two manual realpath calls; routing it through `tryWithinRoot` collapses them to one message, and a missing module now surfaces as MODULE_NOT_FOUND rather than ENOENT. No test asserts either message. The security property is preserved and slightly strengthened — the candidate is realpathed and containment re-checked, and the dangling-symlink oracle closure comes along with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#4654): record the containment ratchet in CONTEXT.md and the security model Both entries previously described the seam without the thing that keeps it a seam. They now state what the rule bans, and — more usefully for whoever reads this next — what it deliberately does NOT attempt: deciding per path.join call whether an argument came from user input. That question is not locally decidable, and an approximation across ~2000 join sites would earn an exemption list of hundreds, which is the opposite of a ratchet. Also records the marker's two legitimate justifications and that its reason is mandatory, so the escape stays reviewable rather than becoming a mute button. Glossary gate 270 refs exit 0; install-tree goldens and CONTEXT-INDEX.json regenerated and confirmed byte-identical rather than assumed — which also confirms eslint-rules/ is not a shipped path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#4654): close review findings and the two matrix failures MATRIX FAILURE 1 — a collapsed message broke a negative-proof test, and my evidence for collapsing it was wrong. I searched tests/ for the literal string "resolves outside its install root", found nothing, and reported that no test asserted it. The test matches a REGEX SUBSTRING, /outside its install root/, so the literal search missed it. What broke was "NEGATIVE PROOF: a symlinked module pointing OUTSIDE the install root is not loaded" — the test guarding the exact property I claimed was preserved. defaultRequireFromInstallRoot now does both checks again with both messages byte-identical, each routed through the canonical predicate, which is better than the original since that hand-rolled both comparisons. MATRIX FAILURE 2 — shipped migrations are checksum-locked, and a marker cannot serve there. migrationChecksum hashes plan.toString(), which INCLUDES comments, so a suppression marker inside a plan body drifts the baseline exactly as an edit does. Measured: with markers in place, two of the four still differed from their committed checksums. The four shipped bodies are now byte-identical to next, and the rule's config excludes those four paths BY NAME rather than by a directory wildcard, so a NEW migration is still covered. Six containment comparisons stay un-ratcheted there; that gap is recorded in the rule's Known gaps, in CONTEXT.md and in the security model rather than left implicit. Justification (c) is removed from the marker's documented reasons, because a marker was proven unable to express it. ADVERSARIAL REVIEW — the sharpest finding was that the rule banned the CORRECT shape while permitting the incorrect one: startsWith(root) with no separator is the genuinely unsafe form, since it accepts a sibling such as root-evil, and my own test blessed it as valid. Flagging every bare startsWith would swamp the rule, so that stays a STATED gap rather than a silent one. Closed for real: the template-literal spelling, which the census never saw because it only inspected plus-concatenation — that surfaced TWELVE more sites, now triaged and migrated. A separator reached through a const alias is now resolved via scope analysis. And isContainedIn, exported in Phase 3, was missing from the discarded-result set, so a bare no-op call went unflagged on the one function the epic funnels through. SECURITY REVIEW — the marker could over-suppress two ways: a block comment worked identically to a line comment, and one marker silently covered every violation sharing its line. It now requires a Line comment positioned after the flagged node ends, so it anchors to the node it trails. Four sites had dropped an unreachable-but-deliberate equality rejection against the root; each is restored as the call site's own arm. eslint.config.mjs still documented the OLD marker token, which my rename missed — it would have sent the next author in circles. A FALSE GREEN, recorded because it nearly stuck: lint:ci reported exit 0 from a stale eslint cache while twelve real violations existed. Every lint check here now clears the cache first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#4654): anchor a suppression marker to the violation it actually trails The matrix caught this; my own test caught it, on its first execution. The case "two violations on one line: trailing marker suppresses only the one it trails" expected 1 error and got 0 — both were suppressed. ROOT CAUSE: the anchoring accepted any Line comment on the node's line whose range started at or after the node's end. A trailing marker at the END of a line sits after EVERY node on that line, so that condition held for all of them. "After the node" does not identify WHICH node the marker trails. The fix reads as correct and is not. FIX: deferred reporting. Violations accumulate during traversal instead of being reported immediately; at Program:exit each marker claims exactly ONE pending violation — the one on its line whose end is nearest before the marker begins — and every unclaimed violation is then counted and reported. One marker, one suppression. An earlier violation sharing the line is still reported, which is the property the security review asked for and the previous attempt only appeared to deliver. The counter now increments at flush time rather than during traversal, so a suppressed occurrence still does not keep an allowlist entry alive. AND A TOOL THAT SHOULD HAVE EXISTED BEFORE THE FIRST MATRIX RUN. `node --test` is hard-blocked here, so this rule's test file could only ever be executed on the remote matrix — which is why a broken anchoring shipped into a run. ESLint's programmatic Linter API is not a test runner, and exercising the rule through it verifies every case locally in seconds. All 24 now pass locally, including the two-on-one-line case that failed remotely. That loop should have been built before the rule was first sent to the matrix rather than after it failed twice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#4654): backfill PR 4674 into the changeset and complete 70-docs.json The phase gate requires enablementSequence and the Diataxis quadrants; 70-docs now carries both, with the how-to quadrant skipped for a stated reason rather than an empty field. The audience for this deliverable is a contributor who trips the rule, and the task-oriented guidance reaches them in the ESLint message itself — which names the correct predicate, says how to choose between the realpath and lexical families, cites the Phase 3 regression caused by choosing wrong, and gives the marker syntax. A docs/how-to page would be a second, driftable copy read by nobody at the moment of failure. enablementSequence is recorded as what it actually is: a VERIFICATION sequence, not an enablement one. The rule is never off, so there is no off-to-on transition to describe. scripts/lint-docs-required.cjs now passes (ok_docs_updated) — it could not evaluate against the mandated pr:0 placeholder. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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sim
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bbc3f131be |
refactor(#4653): make containment ONE decision, resolved two ways
Satisfies #4653 DW1 and DW9, which were the phase's outstanding acceptance criteria: every other implementation must be deleted or route its containment DECISION through the canonical predicate, and no surviving wrapper may decide WHETHER a path is contained. Three implementations were being retained with their own comparisons, on the argument that each needs LEXICAL resolution — a realpath-based predicate is the wrong tool wherever a symlink must be preserved rather than resolved. That argument is correct about RESOLUTION and was being used to justify owning the DECISION too. Those are separable, and separating them is what closes the criteria honestly rather than by reinterpretation. isContainedIn(resolvedTarget, resolvedRoot, pathImpl?) module-internal is now the single place this repo decides containment. It is separator-aware, so a sibling merely sharing a prefix (`<root>-evil` against `<root>`) is still rejected. Two exported families sit on it and differ ONLY in how a candidate is resolved before the decision: assertWithinRoot / tryWithinRoot realpath-resolving assertWithinRootLexical / tryWithinRootLexical path.resolve only, no I/O The lexical pair carries `opts.pathImpl`, so win32 separator semantics stay testable off Windows — that seam already existed in isPathConfined and would have been lost by a naive collapse. The three call sites now take their decision from the predicate and keep only what is genuinely theirs: external-descriptor-trust isPathConfined delegates outright; pathImpl forwarded installer-migrations ensureInsideConfig delegates; keeps its own message and its LEXICAL fullPath, which callers consume for existsSync and journal rows gsd-tools.cjs isInsideDir delegates; keeps its own `target !== root` condition, and the separate symlink refusal above it stands DW5 is not weakened by this. That criterion binds the symlink oracle and the ancestor canonicalization; both are untouched. The only change inside validatePath is three comparison lines becoming one call, and the rejection string `Path escapes allowed directory: <resolved> is outside <base>` stays byte-identical because it is an observable CLI contract. What this does NOT do, stated plainly: the lexical family still cannot see a symlink. That is a property of lexical resolution, not a gap in the seam, and the three callers that need it are the three that must pair it with their own symlink refusal — which is exactly what the fix earlier in this phase added at the install sites. The doc comment says so at the definition, and CONTEXT.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md are corrected: they previously described these three as deliberately NOT routed through the predicate, which is no longer true. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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sim
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6f0e5ccf85 |
fix(#4636,#4653): close the symlink hole, revert a wrong collapse, fix six review findings
The RED checkpoint and two orthogonal reviews found eight defects. All fixed here.
THE COLLAPSE THAT WAS WRONG — installer-migrations. Routing ensureInsideConfig's
containment decision through the realpath-based canonical predicate broke four
tests, and the failure message says it plainly: "migration path escapes
configDir: extensions/gsd.cjs". That module's entire contract is that a
symlinked managed path is snapshotted, restored and backed up AS A LINK and
never dereferenced. The canonical predicate dereferences, then rejects the
result for escaping configDir — so it destroys exactly the thing the module
exists to preserve. Reverted to lexical, with the ruling recorded above the
function so it is not collapsed a third time. normalizeRelPath is the real
pre-gate there; it throws on absolute paths and '..' before this check runs.
That makes THREE deliberately-retained implementations, not two, and they share
one shape worth naming: a realpath-based predicate is the wrong tool wherever a
symlink must be PRESERVED rather than resolved. CONTEXT.md and
docs/explanation/security-model.md are corrected — both previously described
ensureInsideConfig as collapsed.
THE MISSED CONSUMER. tests/security-prompt-injection.security.test.cjs
destructures validatePath from the compiled lib; un-exporting it turned five
tests into TypeError. It appeared in my own earlier search output and I did not
follow it up. Translated under the same rule as the rest: assertions on the
rejection REASON go through assertWithinRoot, boolean-only through
tryWithinRoot.
VALIDATE-ONE-PATH-USE-ANOTHER, FOUND TWICE MORE. This is the fourth and fifth
occurrence in this epic of the exact defect it exists to prevent.
- scripts/check-glossary-refs.cjs decided containment on `token` and then
stat'd a separately re-joined path.join(ROOT, token). The ContainedPath is
now carried through to the probe, so the validated value is the probed one.
- src/init.cts computed skillPathContained and DISCARDED it, re-joining from
the raw input for the existsSync and read. The branded type exists to make
that a type error and here it was inert.
AND THE OVER-CORRECTION OF THAT FIX, caught before it shipped. The first attempt
also substituted the validated value into the EMITTED `ref` for a global skill.
That value is a display token, not a path anything reads through — the only fs
access in that branch runs on the lexical path beforehand — so substituting it
changed emitted output two ways: it is realpath-resolved, so a symlinked global
skills directory would have emitted its resolved target instead of the user's
own path, and it came from path.join, so Windows would have emitted a backslash
where the template has a literal '/'. Restored, with the distinction recorded:
the containment check there is a GATE, not a path producer.
A TEST THAT COULD NOT FAIL. The first symlink regression planted its symlink
from inside a hooked fs.readdirSync and never asserted the planting happened —
if the hook did not fire, the "nothing was written outside" assertion passed
trivially, green against vulnerable code. It now asserts the plant, matching its
sibling. The other two were re-checked: one already asserted its equivalent, the
other plants synchronously and cannot silently no-op.
THE SYMLINK FIX ITSELF, now that the tests are proven red on the matrix.
isPathConfined is lexical by design and structurally cannot see a symlink; three
callers relied on it with no defense of their own. install-engine.cts:1608 and
install-profiles.cts:880 refuse to mkdir/write through a link — mkdirSync with
recursive:true does NOT throw on an existing symlink-to-directory, so a planted
link redirected the SKILL.md write outside the install root.
install-profiles.cts:755 refuses to read through one — statSync FOLLOWS links,
so an outside file's contents were returned and installed as a skill body. Each
mirrors the guard retired-artifact-cleanup.cts:77 already uses.
Severity stated accurately rather than dramatically: only the read at :755 needs
no race. _removeGsdEntries sweeps a pre-planted link at :1608 before the write
loop, and :880's stageDir is a fresh mkdtemp, so both of those require winning a
window. They are fixed as defense-in-depth, not as live exploits.
ALSO: the Changed changeset claimed "every command's observable behavior [is]
unchanged". Three rejection messages are reworded. It now says so, and says that
none of them reveals a host path it previously hid. A stale comment in
verify.cts still named validatePath; an init.cts warning hardcoded "resolves
outside the project directory" for a check that also rejects absolute paths, NUL
bytes and empty strings; and the rationale deleted with check-glossary-refs'
retired helper is restored, noting honestly that a rejected token is now
realpath-resolved before rejection rather than rejected by string comparison.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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sim
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9953d02184 |
docs(#4653): describe the consolidated path-containment seam in the security model
The security model's input-validation section still described path traversal as a per-call check with a macOS symlink footnote. It now describes what actually exists: one predicate, a module-internal engine, three exported shapes none of which can hand back a usable path when the answer is unsafe, the branded return type, and the named acceptance policy — including the point the old wording invited a reader to get wrong, that allowing an absolute candidate does not relax containment. Also records the two checks deliberately NOT routed through the predicate and why each is narrower or stricter rather than a second opinion, so a later cleanup pass does not read them as stragglers. Required by the Changed changeset: scripts/lint-docs-required.cjs makes Added/Changed/Deprecated/Removed fragments demand a file under docs/, and CONTEXT.md is at the repo root, so the glossary entry alone would not have satisfied it. The lint currently reports invalid_pr against the mandated pr:0 placeholder and becomes meaningful after backfill. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Tom Boucher
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dacae92730 |
docs(#2845): record the inventory-provenance limits where readers meet them (#3746)
The limits shipped with #2845 were disclosed only in the PR body, which is read once at merge and then buried. They are properties of what the feature does, so they belong in the documentation. Three surfaces, each at the point a reader forms an expectation: docs/how-to/design-a-ui-phase.md gains a 'What this check is and is not' subsection under the provenance how-to; docs/explanation/security-model.md gains a residual-risk pair matching the section's existing shape; and docs/AGENTS.md notes them where gsd-ui-checker's behavior is described. The substance: a provenance line makes an inventory's origin falsifiable rather than verified, since nothing re-runs the command or compares the count; the rule is agent-applied like the other six dimensions, not a schema check; and 'the checker never runs the recorded command' is an instruction rather than a capability boundary, because the checker holds a Bash grant it genuinely needs for the agent-skills bootstrap and tool grants here are not command-scoped. Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Tom Boucher
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bf87dd4156 |
enhance(#3617): one canonical Windows binary resolver in the platform seam (epic #3411 Phase 1) (#3621)
* feat(#3411): one canonical Windows binary resolver in the platform seam CONTEXT.md declares src/shell-command-projection.cts the single OS-facing seam, but Windows binary resolution had grown four divergent implementations outside it. #3445 folded two of them together — inside gsd-core/bin/gsd-tools.cjs, not the seam — so the declaration stayed untrue and execTool still had no handling at all. Lift the resolver into the seam as resolveExecutableBinary, and export the half that actually executes as projectSpawnInvocation: CreateProcess cannot run a .cmd/.bat, so the cmd.exe mediation is inseparable from the lookup and splitting them is how the copies accumulated. cmd.exe is invoked with an explicit argv array, never shell:true — CVE-2024-27980's vector and Node 26's DEP0190. execTool now resolves on win32. POSIX is a strict no-op by construction, which matters: execTool rates CRITICAL blast radius (167 symbols, 53 files). gsd-tools.cjs deletes its private scan and its private mediation and delegates. Two semantics grown beyond #3445's resolver, both additive: a name already carrying a PATHEXT-listed extension is tried as-is before the append loop, and a suffix outside PATHEXT is not treated as an extension. Refs #3411 * fix(#3411): keep mediating a declared .cmd that PATH resolution misses Standards review caught a narrowing against the code this replaces. gsd-tools.cjs computed `target = resolveSpawnBinary(binary) || binary` and keyed the shim test on `target`, so a declared .cmd mediated whether or not PATH resolution found it. That is load-bearing: resolveExecutableBinary scans PATH only, while `cmd.exe /c` also finds a batch file in the current directory. Mediation now keys on the target — resolved path, else declared name. The ENOENT contract still holds for BARE unresolved names, which is the case it was written for. P9/P10 pin both halves. Spec review found E1/E2/E3/E5 promised by 50-test-matrix.md but never written; added. E3 is the integration proof that the CVE-relevant mediation fires through execTool, not only through projectSpawnInvocation in isolation. Also adds the CONTEXT.md glossary entry for the seam's new resolution ownership (a PR gate) and the changeset fragment. Refs #3411 * fix(#3617): pass mediated cmd.exe arguments verbatim so metacharacters cannot inject The isolated security pass found the mediation shape carried an argument-injection surface. libuv's quote_cmd_arg force-quotes an argv element only when it contains a space, tab, or quote — never for a cmd metacharacter — and cmd.exe re-parses everything after /c. So an arg of a&calc arrived unquoted and cmd ran calc. Node's own CVE-2024-27980 escaping cannot help: it fires only when the spawned FILE is the .bat/.cmd, and here the file is cmd.exe. Caret-escaping is not a fix. It is correct only when libuv does not quote, and libuv quotes whenever the arg also contains a space — no per-arg transform is right in both cases. So build the command line and pass it through verbatim, the shape Rust's std adopted for the sibling CVE-2024-24576: one outer quote pair that cmd /c strips, every token inside force-quoted, embedded quotes doubled. An argument containing CR or LF is refused rather than mediated — a newline cannot be represented in a Windows command line, so mediating would silently truncate. Failing visibly is correct. Known limit, documented at the seam: %VAR% still expands inside a /c string and has no escape outside a batch file. That is information disclosure, not arbitrary execution, and is the same limit Rust's std documents. This was byte-for-byte the shape #3445 shipped, so the fix closes it for the reviewer-lane spawn path too, not only for execTool's newly reachable route. Refs #3411 * docs(#3617): document the subprocess-execution security posture Adds Layer 4 to the security model: why GSD never uses shell:true for binary invocation (CVE-2024-27980, Node 26 DEP0190), why resolution is explicit and never tries the bare name on Windows (the npm extensionless-shim trap behind #3275), and why .cmd/.bat mediation builds a verbatim force-quoted command line rather than relying on default escaping — Node's own CVE protection cannot fire once the started program is cmd.exe. The residual %VAR% expansion limit is stated plainly under Trade-offs rather than left implicit: it is information disclosure, not arbitrary execution, and callers passing untrusted text to a Windows .cmd should not assume the value arrives byte-identical. Docs-only; no code change. Refs #3411 * chore(#3617): backfill changeset pr number 3621 * fix(#3617): read PATH, PATHEXT and ComSpec case-insensitively The Windows CI lane on #3621 failed E5, and the root cause was a defect in the implementation, not the assertion. Windows names the variable Path, not PATH. process.env is a case-insensitive proxy, so process.env.PATH works — but execTool builds { ...process.env, ...opts.env } whenever a caller supplies opts.env, and spreading discards the proxy while keeping the OS's actual casing. The exact-case env['PATH'] lookup then returned undefined, the PATH scan saw zero segments, resolution returned null, and the change degraded to precisely the spawn ENOENT it exists to fix. ComSpec and PATHEXT had the same exposure. #3445's tests never caught it because they pass uppercase keys explicitly, and neither did the Linux remote runner — this is a defect only the Windows lane could see. _envGet resolves a variable by exact match first (so a canonical caller pays no scan) and falls back to a case-insensitive sweep. R23 and P16 pin it and were proven RED by execution: with the fix stashed and build:lib re-run, R23 returned null and P16 returned the cmd.exe default. R24 was rewritten because the first version was vacuous — it staged foo.CMD, so the default PATHEXT already contained .CMD and it passed against the broken code for the wrong reason. It now stages foo.XYZ, an extension absent from the default, and carries a negative control asserting that dropping the Pathext key yields null. Re-proven RED the same way. E5's assertion was corrected alongside the fix: 'PATH' in options.env expressed the wrong contract. It now checks case-insensitively for the key. Refs #3411 * fix(#3617): execTool spawns the declared name unless mediation is required The Windows full-test lane on #3621 failed tests/graphify.test.cjs — the python3 identity check asserted 'python3' and got the absolute resolved path C:\hostedtoolcache\windows\Python\3.12.10\x64\python3.EXE instead. Those tests are correct and the change was wrong. They pin a long-standing contract — execTool spawns the program name it was given — by spying on spawnSync's first argument, and routing every win32 call through the projected invocation broke it. Resolving a .exe buys nothing. libuv's CreateProcess path already performs PATH + PATHEXT search, which is why spawning a bare 'node' has always worked on Windows. The only case the OS genuinely cannot spawn is a .cmd/.bat. So execTool now adopts the projection only when mediation actually happened — windowsVerbatimArguments is exactly that flag — and otherwise passes the declared program and args through untouched. 40-design.md already rejected gratuitous change for this reason: symmetry is not worth a behavior change to 53 files that fixes nothing. That reasoning was applied to POSIX and missed the win32 non-batch case. Rows 5 and 20 now record it, and the CONTEXT.md glossary states the caller-choice rule. deps.spawn deliberately still adopts the resolved path: its hasBinary probe answers from the same resolver, so probe and spawn must agree on the exact file (#3445). The asymmetry is now documented at both call sites rather than latent. E7 pins the restored contract and was verified by executing execTool against a monkeypatched spawnSync: python3 in, python3 spawned. Refs #3411 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Tom Boucher
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268ca7e32d |
fix(#3504): harden hook injection patterns and force-add guard (#3510)
* test(#3504): add failing-first parity, fail-closed, and bypass suites * fix(#3504): harden hook injection patterns and force-add guard * test(#3504): stage the scanner lib dependency in shared-hooks fixture * chore(#3504): backfill changeset pr number * test(#3504): build parity samples from fragments for the ci scan --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Tom Boucher
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de78f2eef2 |
docs(#2775): align package-legitimacy docs to the ADR-0656 registry-API gate (#3010)
* docs(#2775): align package-legitimacy docs to the ADR-0656 registry-API gate security-model.md, USER-GUIDE.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, COMMANDS.md, FEATURES.md, and gsd-planner.md's STRIDE template (+ ja-JP mirrors) described the pre-ADR-0656 design: slopcheck as the install-or-degrade gate, with unavailability degrading every package to [ASSUMED]. ADR-0656 inverted this months ago — registry-API verdicts (npm/PyPI/ crates.io) are the gate; slopcheck is an optional escalate-only adapter that no shipped configuration wires. Verified every replacement claim against src/package-legitimacy.cts (checkPackages, classifyPackage, lookupNpm/lookupPypi/lookupCrates) via Memtrace before writing it, so the corrected prose matches the live implementation rather than restating the ADR from memory. Restored docs/explanation/security-model.md:79-84 (and its ja-JP mirror) to original wording after an orthogonal spec review caught that an earlier draft had edited the "Why WebSearch packages are always [ASSUMED]" paragraph — inside the range issue #2775 explicitly named as correct and to leave alone. The ja-JP mirror was missing the closing clause present in the corrected English original ("its absence leaves registry-API verdicts intact rather than downgrading everything to [ASSUMED]") — added for parity. This completes the ja-JP mirror the issue's acceptance criteria named explicitly. zh-CN/ko-KR/pt-BR (not named by #2775, but carrying the same stale design) get the mechanical portion of the same fix: command-string swaps, table headers, ARCHITECTURE.md diagram labels, and technical- term swaps that reuse a word already attested elsewhere in the same file (合法性/적법성/legitimidade for "legitimacy") — surrounding prose untouched. The remainder in those three locales — full-paragraph rewrites of the corrected degrade-path mechanism, deleted "External dependency" bullets, and "manually install slopcheck" code blocks — needs prose composed by a fluent speaker of each language and is filed as open-gsd/gsd-core#3002 with an exact file:line inventory. * test(#2775): acknowledge gsd-planner.md byte growth from the STRIDE-row fix agents/gsd-planner.md grew 14 bytes (49309 -> 49323) from the STRIDE supply-chain row correction (slopcheck -> package-legitimacy gate). Emitted agent/workflow files are byte-tracked; this fragment acknowledges the growth per tests/emitted-attribution.test.cjs's "differential attribution over the real tree" check. * docs(#2775): close ja-JP FEATURES.md gap; fix a ko-KR transliterated heading docs/ja-JP/FEATURES.md:2808 still read the katakana transliteration "スロップチェック verdict" in REQ-PKG-GATE-01 — invisible to a literal "slopcheck" grep, so it was missed when ja-JP parity was checked and declared complete. Corrected to "正当性判定" (legitimacy verdict), matching the term already established in ja-JP/explanation/ security-model.md and ja-JP/USER-GUIDE.md. This was the only remaining ja-JP gap; a full sweep for the transliterated form across docs/ja-JP/ now returns zero hits, and the ja-JP mirror is genuinely at parity. docs/ko-KR/USER-GUIDE.md:398's heading "슬롭체크 판정:" had the same transliteration problem. Fixed inline to "적법성 판정:", reusing the 적법성/legitimacy word already attested two lines below in the same table. A parallel sweep of zh-CN and pt-BR found no transliterated forms of "slopcheck" in either locale. The remaining transliterated occurrence in ko-KR (USER-GUIDE.md:406, the lead-in to the pip-install code block) needs prose composition like the rest of that block and is added to open-gsd/gsd-core#3002's inventory. * chore(#2775): backfill changeset PR number to 3010 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Alex V.
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a63684c222 |
enhance(#1577): WebFetch/WebSearch injection isolation + opt-in blocking (#1585)
* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents (randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring); opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking). arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth). * fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized - A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control. - A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads. - A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention). - A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale). - A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input. - Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) + drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as the noted pre-existing follow-up. * fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions', 'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md, TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it. Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15. * fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions (gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10. - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset. - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source- document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools. INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset reworded 8 -> 10. Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39. * docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam trek-e Major 2 + Minor: - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model. - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry. Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green. * test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary (git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File now diffs/blames line-by-line. Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain. * docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner. * docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs. --------- Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com> |
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Colin
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cd5db1f8db |
test(suites): seed security/slow/integration suites via measured retags
Renames (git mv) with all references updated (ci-test-scope RULES, windows-parity allowlist, test-file-count allowlist, docs in 6 locales): - 5 scanner tests -> *.security.test.cjs — the 'Run security tests' CI step ran zero files since the suite taxonomy landed; it is now honest. - graphify-auto-update -> *.slow.test.cjs (36s, slowest file in the suite; e2e gsd-tools spawns) — runs on full-matrix lanes and push to next. - installer-migration-install-integration -> *.integration.test.cjs (13s; an integration test by its own name). Coverage gate measured after retags: 88.55% lines (gate 70%). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Tom Boucher
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463cffd894 |
chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ (#615)
* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary (`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers are unaffected. Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff): - `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core` - Swept path/identifier references across the repo via `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory: get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names). - Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs), tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries, stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings. - Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/). New logic (review here): - src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented. - scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case- insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines). Wired into the lint-tests CI job. - Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references. - TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command; changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added. Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` -> `~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs hardcoding the old path must update them. Closes #604 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs CI fixes for the rename PR: - Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments, like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint. Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly. - Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples / security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept. CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR; none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving them off. All behavior-preserving: - scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection). - src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization). - tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization). - tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace, keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement). Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization) The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective: - ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file` reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value. - js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip. Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the --files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...--> replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free: - ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/). - 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)). Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/ non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings), and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless. - scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions. - .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged). Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings, 0 findings, exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name passes: - commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths) - src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments) - tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib) Verified: guard 0 violations; build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references `${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path segments are not treated as slash-command references. Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing: - mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures - gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures - bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI) CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with "findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8). findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs); binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens after core.cjs is fully initialized. Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing: - mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures - gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures - state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) — not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation, mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception. Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next exits 0 with 0 findings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Tom Boucher
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3bb2f8f1c5 |
docs: rebrand to GSD Core and restructure docs with Diataxis (#605)
* chore: wire docs/agents config into AGENTS.md Agent skills section
Add the `## Agent skills` discovery block pointing the engineering
skills at the existing docs/agents/{issue-tracker,triage-labels,domain}.md
files (issue tracker, triage label mapping, single-context domain docs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: rebrand to GSD Core and restructure docs with Diataxis
Reorganise the root README and docs/ around the Diataxis framework
(tutorials, how-to guides, reference, explanation), add new how-to
guides and schema references (STATE.md / CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md /
planning artifacts), and cross-link the whole set. Update the lone
legacy gsd-build reference to open-gsd; keep internal get-shit-done/
filesystem paths unchanged (directory rename tracked separately in
open-gsd/gsd-core#604). Regenerate the ja-JP, ko-KR, pt-BR and zh-CN
localised trees to mirror the new structure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: backfill changeset PR number (#605)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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