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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jakub Zych
a9a7a328e6 refactor: hard-fork GSD -> MSD (Make Software Done) 
Mechanical rename produced by scripts/msd-rename.cjs: gsd/Gsd/GSD -> msd/Msd/MSD
across contents and paths, upstream package/repo coordinates -> @golem15/msd-core
and golem15com/msd-core. Deep links into upstream history, sibling upstream
packages, the GSD-2 import feature, CHANGELOG.md and .changeset/ are kept as-is.

Hand edits on top: MSD block-letter banner and logos, LICENSE copyright line,
package/plugin identity, regenerated lockfile, install-tree fixtures, derived
registries and benchmark baseline; migration checksum baseline re-locked
(MSD keeps its own install state, so no install had applied the old sums);
sort-order and regex-escaped expectations in tests adjusted.
 2026-10-06 01:47:40 +02:00
Tom Boucher
1e67ec9737 enhance(#3908): the scanners distinguish an empty diff from one they could not compute (#3937) 
* feat(#3908): the scanners distinguish an empty diff from one they could not compute

collect_files ended 2>/dev/null || true, which destroyed the evidence three ways: the redirect discarded git's diagnostic, the pipe replaced git's status with grep's, and || true forced success regardless. Four distinct conditions - an established-empty diff, a bad ref, no repository, and a repository with no commits - all reported clean, and a secret scanner reporting clean because git failed is indistinguishable from an all-clear to any gate consuming it.

git now runs separately from the filter so its status and diagnostic both survive. An established-empty diff exits NO_INPUT; a scope that could not be established exits UNAVAILABLE; the usage sites move off 2 to USAGE. || true is retained on the filter alone, where it is correct: a diff of only images is empty, not failed.

Codes are sourced from a generated shell fragment rather than written into three scripts, so a re-allocation cannot desync them, and a missing fragment fails loudly instead of falling back to literals. The security workflow is updated in the same change: without it, a docs-only PR would newly fail the job.

* fix(#3908): keep scanner stderr out of the file list, and drop try/finally from test bodies

Capturing git and find output with 2>&1 was right for the failure path but wrong for the success path: a warning emitted alongside a successful diff flowed into the file list and was treated as a filename. stderr is now captured separately, forwarded as a warning on success and as the diagnostic on failure, and never folded into the list.

Also converts the control tests' try/finally blocks to t.after(), which CONTRIBUTING bans inside a test body because it masks failures.

* chore(#3908): backfill changeset pr number

* docs(#3908): record the scanners' four-outcome exit contract

SECURITY.md is root-level, so the docs gate correctly held: a Changed fragment owes a file under docs/. The contract also belongs where the feature is described, as REQ-SCAN-INJ-05.

docs/FEATURES.md is GENERATED from per-feature fragments (#3840) - the first edit went into the generated file and gen-features --check caught it, which is the same edit-the-output drift this epic exists to close. The fragment is the source; FEATURES.md is regenerated.

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
 2026-08-27 13:11:13 -04:00
Colin
533b518553 fix(security-scan): update scanner self-exemption allowlists for renamed suite files 
The three shell scanners exempt their own adversarial test fixtures by exact
filename; the *.security.test.cjs renames broke those entries, so the PR diff
scan flagged the scanners' own test payloads. Verified locally with all three
scanners in --diff origin/next mode (0 findings) and the security suite
(207/207). The .sh files were missed in the original reference sweep because
the rename grep filtered to .cjs/.yml/.json/.md extensions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-10 00:15:02 -04:00
Tom Boucher
75287effb9 feat(115): secret-scan exclusion governance + --strict reduced-scan mode (#134) 
* test(115): add failing tests for secret-scan exclusion lint + strict mode

Adds tests/secret-scan-lint.test.cjs covering all 7 acceptance criteria
for issue #115 (secret-scan exclusion governance):

  1. Lint exits 0 on fully-annotated .secretscanignore fixture
  2. Lint exits 1 on fixture missing required key (reason/owner/expires)
  3. Lint exits 1 on fixture with expires date in the past
  4. Lint exits 1 on wildcard pattern without rule-id
  5. Lint exits 0 on grandfathered entry (default mode), exits 1 under --strict
  6. secret-scan --strict does not honour grandfathered exclusions
     (temp workspace fixture: file with real AWS-key pattern excluded by a
     grandfathered entry → default exits 0, strict exits 1)
  7. secret-scan default mode behaviour unchanged for existing .secretscanignore
     entries (regression test)

All 24 tests confirmed RED on origin/main before any implementation.
Test helpers use spawnSync throughout so both stdout and stderr are always
captured regardless of exit code (fixes the execFileSync/stderr gap from
the existing security-scan.test.cjs pattern).

Design references cited in test file:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(115): add secret-scan-lint.sh + --strict mode + annotation parser

Implements secret-scan exclusion governance for issue #115.

## secret-scan-lint.sh (new script)

Exit codes (match secret-scan.sh convention):
  0 = all exclusions valid (or grandfathered with warning)
  1 = annotation violation: missing key, expired date, wildcard without rule-id,
      or (under --strict) any grandfathered entry
  2 = config error (file not found, bad args)

Annotation format (sidecar comment, immediately preceding the path):
  # allow: <pattern>  reason="..."  owner="..."  expires="YYYY-MM-DD"  [rule-id="..."]
  <pattern>

Required keys: reason, owner, expires
Optional key:  rule-id — required when pattern contains * wildcards

Grandfathered entries (plain comment, no structured keys):
  - Default mode: exit 0 + deprecation warning to stderr
  - --strict mode: exit 1

## secret-scan.sh (modified: --strict flag)

--strict flag for release/security-review CI lanes:
  - Grandfathered entries are NOT applied (file is scanned, not skipped)
  - Exclusions whose expires date is past are NOT applied
  - Default mode behaviour is fully preserved

load_ignorelist() now parses annotations:
  - Reads prev_comment to determine annotation status per entry
  - Uses date comparison (YYYY-MM-DD lexicographic) for expires checks
  - Emits DEPRECATION WARNING to stderr for grandfathered entries in default mode
  - Emits WARNING under --strict when skipping a grandfathered entry

Design references:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md
  - TruffleHog / GitLeaks wildcard-exclusion risk informed the rule-id requirement
    for wildcard entries (unguarded wildcards can accidentally suppress real findings)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(115): annotate existing .secretscanignore entries + wire CI lint step

## .secretscanignore migration

Existing entry `get-shit-done/workflows/plan-phase.md` has been migrated
from a bare plain comment to a fully-structured annotation:

  # allow: get-shit-done/workflows/plan-phase.md
  #   reason="contains illustrative DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL example strings
  #           used as documentation placeholders — not real credentials"
  #   owner="@open-gsd/maintainers"
  #   expires="2027-06-30"

This entry now passes lint (exit 0) in both default and --strict modes.
The expiration date of 2027-06-30 gives the team ~13 months to review
whether the file still needs to be excluded before the entry expires.

## CI workflow change (.github/workflows/security-scan.yml)

Added step "Secret scan exclusion lint" immediately before the existing
"Planning directory check" step:

  - name: Secret scan exclusion lint
    run: |
      chmod +x scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh
      scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh --file .secretscanignore

The step has no ${{ }} context interpolation in its run block (no
injection surface). It runs on every PR targeting main, release/**, hotfix/**.

This implements CI acceptance criterion from issue #115:
"CI lint fails for unmanaged wildcard exclusions"
"CI enforces policy format"

## Header added to .secretscanignore

Added governance documentation block explaining annotation format,
required/optional keys, and references to design sources:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(115): document exclusion governance + periodic reduced-scan procedure

Updates SECURITY.md with a new section "Secret-Scan Exclusion Governance"
covering:

  1. Annotation format (required/optional keys, wildcard rule)
  2. Local lint command
  3. Periodic reduced-exclusion scan procedure using --strict mode

The procedure section explicitly states when to run (every release +
scheduled security review), what --strict does differently, and what to do
when --strict finds findings that default mode does not.

No runbooks/security-audit*.md exists in this repo. SECURITY.md is the
correct location as it is what secret-scan.sh references in its header
docstring (via the "See SECURITY.md" note pattern common in this codebase).

References cited:
  - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention:
    https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets
  - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle:
    https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md

Closes #115 (together with feat and chore commits on this branch)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#115): exclude scanner's own test fixtures from diff-mode scan

Add */secret-scan-lint.test.cjs to should_skip_file(), consistent with
the existing exclusions for security-scan.test.cjs and
security-prompt-injection.test.cjs. The test fixture at line 465
contains a DATABASE_URL credential-shaped string that exercises the
Env Variable Leak detector — scanning it as live code is a false positive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-23 10:58:14 -04:00
Tom Boucher
835dd6ab44 test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654) 
* test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite

Adds `tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` and a fixtures
directory at `tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/` covering the
attack classes enumerated in #3596:

  - Command substitution / backticks / heredoc payloads in workstream
    names — sentinel-file probes prove no shell is spawned, slugifier
    neutralises the input.
  - Path traversal through `--ws` and slash-bearing workstream names —
    rejected with structured `--json-errors` payload, no stack trace,
    no filesystem mutation outside the project root.
  - Fake `<system>` / `[SYSTEM]` / `<<SYS>>` / `[INST]` boundary tags —
    sanitizeForPrompt neutralises every form; structural negative
    property locked across all six styles in one place.
  - Zero-width / bidi-override codepoints — stripped per the documented
    codepoint set; asserted via codePoint inspection, not regex
    literals.
  - Hostile read of CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md / ROADMAP.md fixtures —
    `gsd-read-injection-scanner.js` surfaces the advisory; excluded
    paths and non-Read tools stay silent; malformed JSON does not
    crash the hook.
  - Hostile write of `.planning/` files — `gsd-prompt-guard.js` emits
    a `PreToolUse` advisory; non-Write/Edit tools stay silent.
  - Fake `ghp_*` / `sk-*` env tokens — never echoed in CLI stdout or
    stderr under hostile inputs; covered under
    `// allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard` because the only
    way to assert byte-level absence is `.includes(token)` against the
    captured streams.
  - `validatePath`, `validateShellArg`, `validatePhaseNumber`,
    `validateFieldName` — focused negative-input contract pins.

Pinned behavior gaps (documented, NOT fixed in this PR):

  - `<instructions>` is intentionally whitelisted by both the scanner
    and the sanitiser (GSD's own prompt scaffolding). Two REGRESSION
    GUARD tests lock that contract.
  - The current `scanForInjection` does NOT flag malicious markdown
    links (javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs). PINNED with
    negative-proof so any future scope extension fails the assertion
    and forces a deliberate update to the acceptance map.
  - `prompt-builder.ts` does not yet wrap plan/context markdown in an
    "untrusted data" envelope. That seam lives on the TS side and is
    covered by `sdk/src/prompt-builder.test.ts`; out of scope for a
    CJS test file. Mentioned in the file header.

Verification:

  - `node --test tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` → 73 tests
    pass.
  - `node scripts/lint-no-source-grep.cjs` → 0 violations across
    546 test files (one `allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard`
    annotation on this file for the token-absence assertions).
  - `node scripts/run-tests.cjs` → 9730 tests pass, 0 fail.

Refs #3596

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(3596): allow adversarial fixtures in scan + harden graphify status parse

* fix(3596): skip adversarial security fixtures in secret scan

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00
Tom Boucher
feec5a37a2 ci(security): add prompt injection, base64, and secret scanning 
Add CI security pipeline to catch prompt injection attacks, base64-obfuscated
payloads, leaked secrets, and .planning/ directory commits in PRs.

This is critical for get-shit-done because the entire codebase is markdown
prompts — a prompt injection in a workflow file IS the attack surface.

New files:
- scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh: scans for instruction override, role
  manipulation, system boundary injection, DAN/jailbreak, and tool call
  injection patterns in changed files
- scripts/base64-scan.sh: extracts base64 blobs >= 40 chars, decodes them,
  and checks decoded content against injection patterns (skips data URIs
  and binary content)
- scripts/secret-scan.sh: detects AWS keys, OpenAI/Anthropic keys, GitHub
  PATs, Stripe keys, private key headers, and generic credential patterns
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: runs all three scans plus a
  .planning/ directory check on every PR
- .base64scanignore / .secretscanignore: per-repo false positive allowlists
- tests/security-scan.test.cjs: 51 tests covering script existence,
  pattern matching, false positive avoidance, and workflow structure

All scripts support --diff (CI), --file, and --dir modes. Cross-platform
(macOS + Linux). SHA-pinned actions. Environment variables used for
github context in run blocks (no direct interpolation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-24 13:23:51 -04:00