Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
sim
374300da17 fix(#4652): confine every boundary that joins argv to a managed root
Phase 2 of epic #4636, absorbing #4327 and #4354. Implements ADR-4650
decision 3: containment is a boundary concern — the predicate runs where
external input enters, not at whichever interior call site remembered.

Four boundaries now validate against their managed root and reject with a
USAGE-shaped error before touching the filesystem:

  todo complete <name>                 -> todosDir(cwd)
  check predicate --phase-dir <dir>    -> projectDir
  check decision-coverage-plan <dir>   -> projectDir   (via resolvePath)
  check gap-analysis.plan-post <dir>   -> projectDir

#4327 understated its own severity. It reports that a traversal name
"resolves outside the todos root", which reads as an information leak.
Measured, it was destructive: the command exited 0, MOVED the outside file
into completed/, and unlinked the original. cmdTodoComplete ends in
fs.unlinkSync(sourcePath), so an unconfined name consumed across the
boundary rather than merely reading across it. Validation now precedes every
fs call — existsSync, readFileSync, ensureDir, writeSync, unlinkSync — and
both halves of the move are confined, so neither source nor destination can
land outside the root. --dry-run is rejected on the same terms; a preview
must not leak a resolved outside path either.

#4354 reproduces exactly: a BLOCKING gate returned block:false sourced
entirely from a SECURITY.md in a caller-chosen directory outside the project.

THE HARDER HALF, found by the isolated adversarial review of the first
attempt: validating a path and then using a DIFFERENT one closes nothing.
The first fix validated `--phase-dir` joined against `--cwd`, then passed the
RAW unjoined value into the predicate context. gate-predicate-evaluator uses
it as-is and findPhaseArtifact resolves a relative path against the REAL
process cwd — so validation and the read used two different roots whenever
process.cwd() differed from --cwd. Reproduced: running from a directory
holding a plan with `secret_field: LEAKED_VALUE`, a predicate declared
against an empty --cwd project exited 0 and returned "actual":"LEAKED_VALUE".

The rule now applied at all three router sites: **use the validated resolved
path, never the raw input.** Independently re-verified after the fix — the
lookup resolves in the --cwd project and no value leaks.

gate-predicate-evaluator.cts is untouched and still imports no fs. Confining
in the router is what keeps that pure-leaf contract intact AND covers
${PHASE_DIR} interpolation into command-exit-zero, which an evaluator-local
fix would have missed entirely.

Also fixed, same review: `todo complete .` and `..` passed containment
(they resolve to the pending dir, which IS inside the root) and then threw an
uncaught EISDIR with an absolute-path stack trace. Now a clean USAGE
rejection naming the real reason — "todo name is not a file" — rather than
borrowing the escape message, which would have stated something false.

Ripples discharged BEFORE the verification checkpoint rather than after, per
the Phase 1 retrospective: docs/reference/gate-predicates.md and
docs/CLI-TOOLS.md document the new constraints, CONTEXT.md records why
containment lives at the router rather than the evaluator, the changeset is
written, and the install-tree goldens were regenerated to confirm unchanged
(no new shipped file) rather than assumed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-12 09:43:50 -04:00
Dennis Kim
d3ddcaba1c fix(#2785): implement missing gate predicate evaluators (#2816)
* fix(#2785): implement missing gate predicate evaluators

* fix(#2785): gate predicate numerical coercion

* fix(#2785): address evaluator review findings

* fix(#2785): use safe frontmatter read seam

---------

Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
2026-08-03 12:16:56 -04:00
Tom Boucher
8de2ff9121 feat(#2008): generic command-exit-zero gate-predicate evaluator (#2011)
* feat(#2008): add generic command-exit-zero gate-predicate evaluator

Third-party capability gates declared via check.predicate were rendered for
display but never evaluated (only built-in check.query gates fired; the
security capability's gate worked solely via a hard-coded ship.md branch).

Add a generic, deps-injected gate-predicate evaluator (src/gate-predicate-evaluator.cts)
that dispatches by predicate.kind. Built-in kind: command-exit-zero — runs a
bounded sh -c command at the project root (via shell-command-projection.execTool),
inherits env, exit 0 => pass, non-zero => block, timeout => block, fail-closed.

Wire a 'check predicate' subcommand into check-command-router.cts and extend
the three generic workflow gate-dispatch sites (execute:wave:post, execute:post,
plan:post) to route check.predicate gates to the new evaluator. The two-step
gate contract (command-failure => onError; block => halt) is unchanged.

- src/gate-predicate-evaluator.cts: pure leaf, KIND_TABLE extensible
- src/check-command-router.cts: cmdCheckPredicate + buildPredicateDeps + parsePredicateFlags
- docs/adr/2008-*, docs/reference/gate-predicates.md, docs/how-to/command-exit-zero-gate.md
- tests: 38 unit + integration tests (exit mapping, timeout, interpolation,
  property-based bijection, malformed-predicate fail-closed, real subprocess e2e)

Closes #2008

* docs(#2008): backfill changeset pr number 2011
2026-07-05 14:04:29 -04:00