Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
463cffd894 chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ (#615)
* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/

Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the
on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary
(`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers
are unaffected.

Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff):
- `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core`
- Swept path/identifier references across the repo via
  `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead
  preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory:
  get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names).
- Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs),
  tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries,
  stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings.
- Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs
  (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/).

New logic (review here):
- src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper
  ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy
  `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install
  manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files
  while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked
  root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The
  framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework
  has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented.
- scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare
  `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case-
  insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists
  CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines).
  Wired into the lint-tests CI job.
- Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the
  mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to
  detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references.
- TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex
  tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command;
  changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added.

Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` ->
`~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed
files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs
hardcoding the old path must update them.

Closes #604

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs

CI fixes for the rename PR:
- Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments,
  like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed
  fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint.
  Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly.
- Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in
  prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples /
  security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept.

CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR;
none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR

The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the
no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving
them off. All behavior-preserving:

- scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string
  .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection).
- src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName
  so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization).
- tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment
  strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization).
- tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace,
  keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement).

Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output
suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization)

The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective:
- ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file`
  reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL
  regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint
  helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value.
- js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single
  `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint
  loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip.

Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass;
lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL

CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the
--files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...-->
replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free:
- ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/).
- 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)).
Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff

The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary
test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/
non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings),
and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless.

- scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they
  can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the
  per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered
  binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions.
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m
  to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged).

Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings,
0 findings, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next

The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the
get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in
the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name
passes:
- commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths)
- src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments)
- tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib)

Verified: guard 0 violations; build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant

The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references
`${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y
refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it
mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as
the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path
segments are not treated as slash-command references.

Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures
- bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI)

CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with
"findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible
on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8).
findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs);
binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering
edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens
after core.cjs is fully initialized.

Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures
- state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan

The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling
it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var
examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) —
not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation,
mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception.

Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next
exits 0 with 0 findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 18:35:29 -04:00
Tom Boucher
9f79cdc40a fix(security): neutralize spaced+closing injection markers; fix audit-uat resolved status (#2456)
* fix(security): neutralize spaced+closing injection markers; fix audit-uat resolved status

scanForInjection recognizes — adds <user> tags, whitespace-padded tags
(e.g. <user >), closing [/SYSTEM]/[/INST] markers, and closing <</SYS>>
markers. Five new regression tests confirm each gap is closed.

whose result column reads PASS or resolved, so items that were already
confirmed do not appear as outstanding in audit-uat --raw. Two new
regression tests cover item-level PASS and file-level status: passed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add closing-tag assertion for spaced <user > sanitization

The test for 'neutralizes spaced tags like <user >' only asserted that the
opening token '<user' was removed. A spaced closing tag '</user >' could
survive sanitization undetected. Added assert.ok(!result.includes('</user'))
to the same test block so both sides of the tag are verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 10:08:18 -04:00
alanshurafa
3d6c2bea4b docs: clarify capture_thought is an optional convention (#1873) (#2379)
* docs: clarify capture_thought is an optional convention (#1873)

Issue #1873 merged /gsd:extract-learnings with an optional
capture_thought hook, but the docs never explained what the tool is
or where it comes from — readers couldn't tell whether it was a
bundled GSD tool, a required dependency, or something they had to
install. This surfaced in a user question on that issue's thread.

Clarify in docs/FEATURES.md §112 and the workflow file that
capture_thought is a convention — any MCP server exposing a tool
with that name will be used; if none is present, LEARNINGS.md
remains the primary output and the step is a silent no-op.

No behavioral change. All 23 extract-learnings tests still pass.

* fix(security): add human to detection message; test [/INST] closing form neutralization

- Detection message now lists <human> alongside <system>/<assistant>/<user>
- Sanitizer regex extended to cover [/INST] closing form (was only [INST])
- Detection pattern extended to cover [/INST] closing form
- New sanitizeForPrompt test asserts [/INST] is neutralized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(config): add workflow.security_* keys to VALID_CONFIG_KEYS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add language tag to fenced code block in FEATURES.md

Fixes MD040 lint finding in PR #2379 — the capture_thought tool
signature example was missing a javascript language identifier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 09:04:21 -04:00
Tom Boucher
13c635f795 feat(security): improve prompt injection scanner — invisible Unicode, encoding obfuscation, structural validation, entropy analysis (#1839)
* fix(tests): allowlist execute-phase.md in prompt-injection scan

execute-phase.md grew to ~51K chars after the code-review gate step
was added in #1630, tripping the 50K size heuristic in the injection
scanner. The limit is calibrated for user-supplied input — trusted
workflow source files that legitimately exceed it are allowlisted
individually, following the same pattern as discuss-phase.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): improve prompt injection scanner with 4 detection layers (#1838)

- Layer 1: Unicode tag block U+E0000–U+E007F detection in strict mode (2025 supply-chain attack vector)
- Layer 2: Character-spacing obfuscation, delimiter injection (<system>/<assistant>/<user>/<human>), and long hex sequence patterns
- Layer 3: validatePromptStructure() — validates XML tag structure of agent/workflow files against known-valid tag set
- Layer 4: scanEntropyAnomalies() — Shannon entropy analysis flagging high-entropy paragraphs (>5.5 bits/char)

All layers implemented TDD (RED→GREEN): 31 new tests written first, verified failing, then implemented.
Full suite: 2559 tests, 0 failures. security.cjs: 99.6% stmt coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 20:22:52 -04:00
Tom Boucher
00e0446b99 fix: four bug fixes — bold plan checkboxes, BACKLOG recommendations, executor_model regression tests, session_id path traversal
- fix(#1572): phase complete now marks bold-wrapped plan checkboxes in ROADMAP.md
  (`- [ ] **01-01**` format) by allowing optional `**` around plan IDs in the
  planCheckboxPattern regex in both phase.cjs and roadmap.cjs

- fix(#1569): manager init no longer recommends 999.x (BACKLOG) phases as next
  actions; add guard in cmdManagerInit that skips phases matching /^999(?:\.|$)/

- fix(#1568): add regression tests confirming init execute-phase respects
  model_overrides for executor_model, including when resolve_model_ids is 'omit'

- fix(#1533): reject session_id values containing path traversal sequences
  (../,  /, \) in gsd-context-monitor and gsd-statusline before constructing
  /tmp file paths; add security tests covering both hooks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 11:30:08 -04:00
3metaJun
aaaa8e96fe Harden verify-work checkpoint rendering 2026-03-23 14:05:33 -04:00
Tom Boucher
62db008570 security: add prompt injection guards, path traversal prevention, and input validation
Defense-in-depth security hardening for a codebase where markdown files become
LLM system prompts. Adds centralized security module, PreToolUse hook for
injection detection, and CI-ready codebase scan.

New files:
- security.cjs: path traversal prevention, prompt injection scanner/sanitizer,
  safe JSON parsing, field name validation, shell arg validation
- gsd-prompt-guard.js: PreToolUse hook scans .planning/ writes for injection
- security.test.cjs: 62 unit tests for all security functions
- prompt-injection-scan.test.cjs: CI scan of all agent/workflow/command files

Hardened code paths:
- readTextArgOrFile: path traversal guard (--prd, --text-file)
- cmdStateUpdate/Patch: field name validation prevents regex injection
- cmdCommit: sanitizeForPrompt strips invisible chars from commit messages
- gsd-tools --fields: safeJsonParse wraps unprotected JSON.parse
- cmdFrontmatterGet/Set: null byte rejection
- cmdVerifyPathExists: null byte rejection
- install.js: registers prompt guard hook, updates uninstaller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 11:38:26 -04:00