579ad30eaec3fd0e1d83ebdbc19e2ce3444f2aba
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Tom Boucher
|
3c13903dcd |
feat(#1866): agent-side self-load of configured agent_skills
Each of the 22 consumer agents now self-loads its configured agent_skills in its mandatory init step, so .planning/config.json agent_skills.<type> reaches the agent on every runtime — including Cursor and /gsd-autonomous, where Skill()-delegated workflow bash init did not reliably execute. - gsd-core/references/agent-skills-bootstrap.md: shared contract (query + Read + dedup guard that skips when <agent_skills> is already in the prompt, so Claude's orchestrator-side injection never doubles) - 22 agents/gsd-*.md: one self-load line naming the agent's own type - gsd-core/workflows/autonomous.md: note that delegated agents self-load - tests/agent-skills-bootstrap.test.cjs: regression + parity (CONSUMER_AGENTS bijection + fast-check property) — Generative-Fix-Divergence guard - docs: ADR-1866, CONFIGURATION dual-injection How It Works, INVENTORY row, Changed changeset Closes #1866 |
||
|
Alex V.
|
a63684c222 |
enhance(#1577): WebFetch/WebSearch injection isolation + opt-in blocking (#1585)
* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents (randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring); opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking). arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth). * fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized - A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control. - A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads. - A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention). - A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale). - A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input. - Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) + drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as the noted pre-existing follow-up. * fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions', 'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md, TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it. Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15. * fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions (gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10. - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset. - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source- document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools. INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset reworded 8 -> 10. Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39. * docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam trek-e Major 2 + Minor: - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model. - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry. Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green. * test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary (git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File now diffs/blames line-by-line. Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain. * docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner. * docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs. --------- Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com> |
||
|
Tom Boucher
|
cf68841220 |
enh(#1243): consume Claude plugin-provided skills in agent_skills (epic #1258 Phase B) (#1261)
* feat(#1243): consume Claude plugin-provided skills via native Skill-tool directive + grant Skill to agent_skills-consumer agents - Relax global skill name validation to accept namespaced form `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+(:[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)*$` - Namespaced names (containing colon) on claude runtime emit a Skill-tool load directive instead of a @-include line - Namespaced names on non-claude runtimes are skipped with a warning - Bare unresolved names retain existing warn-and-skip behavior (no promotion to directive) - Grant `Skill` tool to all 22 agent_skills consumer agents; 5 generated agents updated via research-profiles.cjs + regen, 17 hand-authored agents edited directly - Add 16 TDD tests in describe('bug #1243') covering happy/mixed/precedence/negative/cross-runtime/regression/grant cases Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(#1243): document plugin-provided skills in agent_skills Update the Agent Skills Injection reference in CONFIGURATION.md with the three entry forms (project-relative, global:<name>, global:<plugin>:<skill>), the Claude-only runtime behaviour of the namespaced form and the warn-skip on other runtimes, the plugin pre-install prerequisite, and the consumer-agent Skill tool grant. Add docs/how-to/attach-a-plugin-skill-to-a-gsd-agent.md with a step-by-step guide for installing the plugin, locating the namespaced skill name, wiring it into agent_skills, and verifying injection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#1243): align agent_skills docs with emitted block format + mixed-block regression test (code-review) - Replace two-section mixed-block example (bogus "Load these plugin-provided skills using the Skill tool:" header) with the actual single-section inline format in CONFIGURATION.md and docs/how-to/attach-a-plugin-skill-to-a-gsd-agent.md - Fix quoted warning text in how-to doc to exactly match the emitted string: [agent-skills] WARNING: Plugin-namespaced skill "global:<name>" requires a Skill-tool-capable runtime (claude) — skipping on runtime "<runtime>" - Replace phantom agent slugs (gsd-checker, gsd-researcher, gsd-advisor, gsd-synthesizer) in CONFIGURATION.md Supported Agent Types with real agents/gsd-*.md examples (gsd-plan-checker, gsd-phase-researcher, gsd-code-reviewer, gsd-ui-auditor, gsd-research-synthesizer) - Add byte-identical mixed-block regression test: one path-resolvable global skill + one plugin-namespaced skill on claude runtime → asserts r.ir.block === single-section interleaved block, no secondary header Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#1243): regenerate agent-size baseline for the Skill-tool grant The 22 agent_skills-consumer agents each grew +7 bytes from adding `Skill` to their tools list; refresh the committed per-agent size baseline (#1074 guard). * chore(#1243): add Added changeset fragment * fix(#1243): traceable allow-test-rule ref + separator-agnostic byte-identical tests (CI) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Tom Boucher
|
18bb0149c8 |
feat: add workflow.discuss_mode assumptions config (#637)
Add codebase-first assumption-driven alternative to the interview-style discuss-phase. New `workflow.discuss_mode: "assumptions"` config routes to a separate workflow that spawns a gsd-assumptions-analyzer agent to read 5-15 codebase files, surface assumptions with evidence, and ask only for corrections (~2-4 interactions vs ~15-20). - New gsd-assumptions-analyzer agent for deep codebase analysis - New discuss-phase-assumptions.md workflow (15 steps) - Command-level routing via dual @reference + process gate - Identical CONTEXT.md output — downstream agents unaffected - Existing discuss-phase.md workflow untouched (zero diff) - Mode-aware plan-phase gate and progress display - User documentation and integration tests - Update agent count and list in copilot-install tests (17 → 18) Closes #637 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |