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Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
f08b177215 feat(#1726): G1-G6 portability AST rules; fix all offenders; delete the ratchet (Phase 4) (#1731) 
Phase 4 of epic #1702. Closes #1726.
 2026-06-25 18:24:39 -04:00
Tom Boucher
c57e0d56c2 feat(#1720): no-unguarded-nonportable-exec AST rule; retire the regex script (Phase 3) (#1723) 
Phase 3 of epic #1702. Closes #1720.
 2026-06-25 16:25:48 -04:00
Alex V.
a63684c222 enhance(#1577): WebFetch/WebSearch injection isolation + opt-in blocking (#1585) 
* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking

Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the
largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared
untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents
(randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring);
opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking).

arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth).

* fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized

- A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a
  circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already
  in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control.
- A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default
  false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads.
- A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention).
- A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale).
- A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input.
- Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) +
  drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as
  the noted pre-existing follow-up.

* fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate

The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions',
'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's
own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red
on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md,
TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS
scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it.

Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15.

* fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer

trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so
no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions
(gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10.
 - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset.
 - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source-
   document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools.
INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines
regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset
reworded 8 -> 10.

Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39.

* docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam

trek-e Major 2 + Minor:
 - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to
   the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from
   the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor
   framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model.
 - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry.

Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green.

* test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary

trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as
degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary
(git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep
the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File
now diffs/blames line-by-line.

Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain.

* docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs

Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner.

* docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count

Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
 2026-06-24 17:07:23 -04:00
Tom Boucher
c63fa35b0a fix(#1615): allowlist windsurf-conversion.test.cjs in prompt-injection-scan 
The commandName validation tests legitimately contain real injection payloads (newline + system-role override phrases, fake [SYSTEM] tags, jailbreak strings) to prove the validator rejects them. The scanner cannot distinguish a test fixture asserting rejection from an actual injection attempt, so CI failed on the test that adds the security control.

Added tests/windsurf-conversion.test.cjs to scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh ALLOWLIST with a comment citing the defect class.

Also added DEFECT.PROMPT-INJECTION-SCAN-COLLISION-WITH-TESTS to CONTEXT.md so the pattern is documented. Initial draft of that predicate ITSELF triggered the scanner (it quoted the literal injection phrase as an example) — reworded to use descriptive references ('scanner-matching payload', 'instruction-override phrase') since the scanner scans CONTEXT.md too. That meta-collision is now called out in the fix-forward and prevention subkeys.
 2026-06-23 15:05:07 -04:00
Joe
e12a2abfd8 feat(#441): add /gsd-capture --list-seeds for seed listing and audit (#722) 
* feat(#441): add /gsd-capture --list-seeds for seed listing and audit

Seeds (.planning/seeds/SEED-NNN-slug.md) could only be created (--seed),
enriched (--enrich), or auto-surfaced at /gsd-new-milestone. There was no way
to browse or audit parked seeds on demand. This adds a read-only listing,
following the established --list → workflow pattern (per the approved scope on

- gsd-tools `list-seeds [status]` (cmdListSeeds in src/commands.cts): scans the
  seeds dir, returns { count, seeds[], summary } JSON with each seed's id,
  slug, status, scope, trigger_when, planted, title. Optional case-insensitive
  status filter. User-controlled content is sanitized (sanitizeForDisplay) and
  every path validated (requireSafePath); read-only. Independent of
  audit.scanSeeds, which only returns unimplemented seeds for the milestone surface.
- /gsd-capture --list-seeds routes to a new read-only list-seeds workflow that
  renders the seed table.

Closes #441

* chore(#441): point changeset fragment at PR #722

* test(#441): allowlist list-seeds test in prompt-injection scan

The test asserts that list-seeds neutralizes injection payloads
(<system>, [INST]) embedded in seed content, so the fixtures legitimately
contain those patterns — same as the sibling security tests already on the
allowlist.

* fix(#441): use canonical /gsd:capture colon form in list-seeds workflow

Claude-facing source (commands/, agents/, gsd-core/workflows/, ...) must use
the /gsd:<cmd> colon form per ADR/CONTEXT.md; the hyphen /gsd-<cmd> form is
retired there (enforced by bug-2543-gsd-slash-namespace.test.cjs). The new
list-seeds workflow used the hyphen form.

* docs(#441): sync help full.md + INVENTORY for --list-seeds

Adds the --list-seeds entry to the help reference (help/modes/full.md, per
bug-2954 argument-hint↔help parity) and registers the new list-seeds workflow
in docs/INVENTORY.md (88→89) and the generated INVENTORY-MANIFEST.json.

* docs(#441): add --list-seeds how-to + drop phantom statuses

Addresses CHANGES_REQUESTED on PR #722 (two documentation blockers):

- USER-GUIDE.md Seeds section (how-to): extend the task to cover
  auditing parked seeds on demand via --list-seeds, including the
  status filter — kept task-oriented per Diataxis how-to mode.
- CLI-TOOLS.md (reference): drop phantom statuses implemented|rejected
  from the list-seeds filter vocabulary; the system only produces
  dormant|active|triggered (src/audit.cts scanSeeds). Reference must
  be factually accurate and complete.

* fix(#441): guard non-scalar status frontmatter in cmdListSeeds

A seed with a bare `status:` line (extractFrontmatter yields {}) or a
`status: [a, b]` value (yields an array) crashed the whole audit list:
`(fm.status || 'dormant').toLowerCase()` throws a TypeError on a non-string.
Coerce every frontmatter read through a `fmStr` helper (mirrors the existing
`typeof fm.id === 'string'` guard), so a non-scalar status falls back to
dormant and non-scalar scope/trigger_when/title can no longer leak a raw
array/object into the JSON contract. Title is now capped symmetrically.

Adds regression coverage for empty and array `status:` and non-scalar fields.

Refs #441

* docs(#441): align list-seeds workflow status vocabulary

The load_seeds step listed `implemented` as an example status filter, but the
real seed vocabulary is dormant|active|triggered (src/audit.cts scanSeeds);
`implemented` has no producer. Matches the earlier CLI-TOOLS.md correction.

Refs #441

* refactor(#441): extract pure deriveSeedIdentity; match raw status in list-seeds

Pull the seed_id/slug derivation out of cmdListSeeds into a pure, exported
deriveSeedIdentity(stem, rawFmId) so the parsing contract can be property-tested
in-process (review minor #1). No behavior change.

Filter comparison now matches the raw lowercased status (both sides already
normalized) instead of sanitizeForDisplay(status); sanitization is for output,
not matching (review nit #3).

* test(#441): add fast-check property coverage and count=1 boundary for list-seeds

Adds tests/list-seeds.property.test.cjs with four fast-check properties over
deriveSeedIdentity (never-throws, string-only contract, canonical id->seed_id/slug
invariant, filename-prefix fallback) per RULESET.TESTS.property-based-testing
(review minor #1).

Adds an N==1 status-filter boundary case to list-seeds.test.cjs (review minor #2).

* chore(#441): sync runtime launcher snippet into list-seeds workflow

Propagate the current _runtime-launcher.snippet.sh (with non-Claude
runtime home probes) into the new list-seeds.md workflow via
scripts/sync-runtime-launcher.cjs, satisfying bug-891 (E) propagation.

* test(#441): record list-seeds.md in workflow size baseline (#1074)

---------

Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
 2026-06-22 00:59:41 -04:00
Colin
533b518553 fix(security-scan): update scanner self-exemption allowlists for renamed suite files 
The three shell scanners exempt their own adversarial test fixtures by exact
filename; the *.security.test.cjs renames broke those entries, so the PR diff
scan flagged the scanners' own test payloads. Verified locally with all three
scanners in --diff origin/next mode (0 findings) and the security suite
(207/207). The .sh files were missed in the original reference sweep because
the rename grep filtered to .cjs/.yml/.json/.md extensions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-10 00:15:02 -04:00
Tom Boucher
b238baddbf fix(#663): resolve open CodeQL/Dependabot security alerts (ReDoS, prototype pollution, workflow perms, qs DoS) (#665) 
* fix(#663): resolve open CodeQL/Dependabot security alerts

- ReDoS: collapse ambiguous nested quantifiers in phase-heading regexes
  (verify/validate/commands) and the plan-filename lookahead (phase) to
  provably-equivalent non-backtracking forms
- prototype pollution: guard __proto__/constructor/prototype in setConfigValue
- remove dead no-op .replace(/-/g,'-') in phase.cts
- escape all regex metachars in bug-2839 test
- add contents:read permissions to security-scan + install-smoke workflows
- pin qs >= 6.15.2 via overrides (DoS GHSA)
- broaden prompt-injection allowlist to translated security-model docs

Closes #663

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(#663): regression tests for prototype-pollution guard and roadmap-phase ReDoS

Behavioral test that config-set rejects __proto__/constructor/prototype keys
without polluting Object.prototype, plus a ReDoS guard (timing-bound) and
behavior-preservation assertions for the collapsed phase-heading regexes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(#663): make ReDoS regression assert structured result, not elapsed time

Replace elapsed-time assertions (which tripped local/no-elapsed-assertion
ESLint rule and were unsound for synchronous ReDoS) with structured-result
assertions on adversarial inputs: assert that malformed phase headings/
unchecked-item lines without a terminating colon/space yield an empty Set,
which is both the correct behavior and an exercise of the fixed linear regex
on the catastrophic-backtracking input shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(#663): add Security changeset fragment for #665

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(#663): fold prototype-pollution regression into config.test.cjs

The standalone bug-663-config-prototype-pollution.test.cjs was a 9th
config-module test file, tripping lint-test-file-count (the allowlist is
ratcheted and must not grow). Consolidated into config.test.cjs instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-04 08:54:15 -04:00
Tom Boucher
463cffd894 chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ (#615) 
* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/

Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the
on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary
(`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers
are unaffected.

Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff):
- `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core`
- Swept path/identifier references across the repo via
  `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead
  preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory:
  get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names).
- Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs),
  tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries,
  stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings.
- Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs
  (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/).

New logic (review here):
- src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper
  ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy
  `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install
  manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files
  while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked
  root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The
  framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework
  has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented.
- scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare
  `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case-
  insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists
  CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines).
  Wired into the lint-tests CI job.
- Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the
  mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to
  detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references.
- TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex
  tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command;
  changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added.

Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` ->
`~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed
files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs
hardcoding the old path must update them.

Closes #604

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs

CI fixes for the rename PR:
- Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments,
  like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed
  fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint.
  Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly.
- Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in
  prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples /
  security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept.

CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR;
none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR

The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the
no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving
them off. All behavior-preserving:

- scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string
  .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection).
- src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName
  so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization).
- tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment
  strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization).
- tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace,
  keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement).

Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output
suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization)

The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective:
- ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file`
  reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL
  regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint
  helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value.
- js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single
  `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint
  loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip.

Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass;
lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL

CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the
--files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...-->
replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free:
- ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/).
- 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)).
Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff

The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary
test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/
non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings),
and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless.

- scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they
  can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the
  per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered
  binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions.
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m
  to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged).

Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings,
0 findings, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next

The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the
get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in
the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name
passes:
- commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths)
- src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments)
- tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib)

Verified: guard 0 violations; build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant

The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references
`${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y
refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it
mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as
the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path
segments are not treated as slash-command references.

Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures
- bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI)

CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with
"findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible
on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8).
findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs);
binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering
edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens
after core.cjs is fully initialized.

Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures
- state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan

The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling
it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var
examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) —
not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation,
mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception.

Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next
exits 0 with 0 findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-02 18:35:29 -04:00
Tom Boucher
835dd6ab44 test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654) 
* test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite

Adds `tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` and a fixtures
directory at `tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/` covering the
attack classes enumerated in #3596:

  - Command substitution / backticks / heredoc payloads in workstream
    names — sentinel-file probes prove no shell is spawned, slugifier
    neutralises the input.
  - Path traversal through `--ws` and slash-bearing workstream names —
    rejected with structured `--json-errors` payload, no stack trace,
    no filesystem mutation outside the project root.
  - Fake `<system>` / `[SYSTEM]` / `<<SYS>>` / `[INST]` boundary tags —
    sanitizeForPrompt neutralises every form; structural negative
    property locked across all six styles in one place.
  - Zero-width / bidi-override codepoints — stripped per the documented
    codepoint set; asserted via codePoint inspection, not regex
    literals.
  - Hostile read of CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md / ROADMAP.md fixtures —
    `gsd-read-injection-scanner.js` surfaces the advisory; excluded
    paths and non-Read tools stay silent; malformed JSON does not
    crash the hook.
  - Hostile write of `.planning/` files — `gsd-prompt-guard.js` emits
    a `PreToolUse` advisory; non-Write/Edit tools stay silent.
  - Fake `ghp_*` / `sk-*` env tokens — never echoed in CLI stdout or
    stderr under hostile inputs; covered under
    `// allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard` because the only
    way to assert byte-level absence is `.includes(token)` against the
    captured streams.
  - `validatePath`, `validateShellArg`, `validatePhaseNumber`,
    `validateFieldName` — focused negative-input contract pins.

Pinned behavior gaps (documented, NOT fixed in this PR):

  - `<instructions>` is intentionally whitelisted by both the scanner
    and the sanitiser (GSD's own prompt scaffolding). Two REGRESSION
    GUARD tests lock that contract.
  - The current `scanForInjection` does NOT flag malicious markdown
    links (javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs). PINNED with
    negative-proof so any future scope extension fails the assertion
    and forces a deliberate update to the acceptance map.
  - `prompt-builder.ts` does not yet wrap plan/context markdown in an
    "untrusted data" envelope. That seam lives on the TS side and is
    covered by `sdk/src/prompt-builder.test.ts`; out of scope for a
    CJS test file. Mentioned in the file header.

Verification:

  - `node --test tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` → 73 tests
    pass.
  - `node scripts/lint-no-source-grep.cjs` → 0 violations across
    546 test files (one `allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard`
    annotation on this file for the token-absence assertions).
  - `node scripts/run-tests.cjs` → 9730 tests pass, 0 fail.

Refs #3596

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(3596): allow adversarial fixtures in scan + harden graphify status parse

* fix(3596): skip adversarial security fixtures in secret scan

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00
Tom Boucher
c35997fb0b feat(hooks): add gsd-read-injection-scanner PostToolUse hook (#2201) (#2328) 
* feat: add /gsd-spec-phase — Socratic spec refinement with ambiguity scoring (#2213)

Introduces `/gsd-spec-phase <phase>` as an optional pre-step before discuss-phase.
Clarifies WHAT a phase delivers (requirements, boundaries, acceptance criteria) with
quantitative ambiguity scoring before discuss-phase handles HOW to implement.

- `commands/gsd/spec-phase.md` — slash command routing to workflow
- `get-shit-done/workflows/spec-phase.md` — full Socratic interview loop (up to 6
  rounds, 5 rotating perspectives: Researcher, Simplifier, Boundary Keeper, Failure
  Analyst, Seed Closer) with weighted 4-dimension ambiguity gate (≤ 0.20 to write SPEC.md)
- `get-shit-done/templates/spec.md` — SPEC.md template with falsifiable requirements
  (Current/Target/Acceptance per requirement), Boundaries, Acceptance Criteria,
  Ambiguity Report, and Interview Log; includes two full worked examples
- `get-shit-done/workflows/discuss-phase.md` — new `check_spec` step detects
  `{padded_phase}-SPEC.md` at startup; displays "Found SPEC.md — N requirements
  locked. Focusing on implementation decisions."; `analyze_phase` respects `spec_loaded`
  flag to skip "what/why" gray areas; `write_context` emits `<spec_lock>` section
  with boundary summary and canonical ref to SPEC.md
- `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` — update command/workflow counts (74→75, 71→72)

Closes #2213

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(hooks): add gsd-read-injection-scanner PostToolUse hook (#2201)

Adds a new PostToolUse hook that scans content returned by the Read tool
for prompt injection patterns, including four summarisation-specific patterns
(retention-directive, permanence-claim, etc.) that survive context compression.

Defense-in-depth for long GSD sessions where the context summariser cannot
distinguish user instructions from content read from external files.

- Advisory-only (warns without blocking), consistent with gsd-prompt-guard.js
- LOW severity for 1-2 patterns, HIGH for 3+
- Inlined pattern library (hook independence)
- Exclusion list: .planning/, REVIEW.md, CHECKPOINT, security docs, hook sources
- Wired in install.js as PostToolUse matcher: Read, timeout: 5s
- Added to MANAGED_HOOKS for staleness detection
- 19 tests covering all 13 acceptance criteria (SCAN-01–07, EXCL-01–06, EDGE-01–06)

Closes #2201

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): add read-injection-scanner files to prompt-injection-scan allowlist

Test payloads in tests/read-injection-scanner.test.cjs and inlined patterns
in hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js legitimately contain injection strings.
Add both to the CI script allowlist to prevent false-positive failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): assert exitCode, stdout, and signal explicitly in EDGE-05

Addresses CodeRabbit feedback: the success path discarded the return
value so a malformed-JSON input that produced stdout would still pass.
Now captures and asserts all three observable properties.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-16 17:22:31 -04:00
Tom Boucher
2703422be8 refactor(tests): standardize to node:assert/strict and t.after() per CONTRIBUTING.md (#1675) 
* refactor(tests): standardize to node:assert/strict and t.after() per CONTRIBUTING.md

- Replace require('node:assert') with require('node:assert/strict') across
  all 73 test files to enforce strict equality (no type coercion)
- Replace try/finally cleanup blocks with t.after() hooks in core.test.cjs
  and hooks-opt-in.test.cjs per the test lifecycle standards
- Utility functions in codex-config and security-scan retain try/finally
  as that is appropriate for per-function resource guards, not lifecycle hooks

Closes #1674

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(tests): add --test-concurrency=4 to test runner for parallel file execution

Node.js --test-concurrency controls how many test files run as parallel child
processes. Set to 4 by default, configurable via TEST_CONCURRENCY env var.
Fixes tests at a known level rather than inheriting os.availableParallelism()
which varies across CI environments.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): allowlist verify.test.cjs in prompt-injection scanner

tests/verify.test.cjs uses <human>...</human> as GSD phase task-type
XML (meaning "a human should verify this step"), which matches the
scanner's fake-message-boundary pattern for LLM APIs. This is a
false positive — add it to the allowlist alongside the other test files
that legitimately contain injection-adjacent patterns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-04 14:29:03 -04:00
Tom Boucher
98f05d43b8 fix: security scan self-detection and Windows test compatibility 
- Add base64-scan.sh and secret-scan.sh to prompt injection scanner
  allowlist (scanner was flagging its own pattern strings)
- Skip executable bit check on Windows (no Unix permissions)
- Skip bash script execution tests on Windows (requires Git Bash)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-24 13:30:15 -04:00
Tom Boucher
feec5a37a2 ci(security): add prompt injection, base64, and secret scanning 
Add CI security pipeline to catch prompt injection attacks, base64-obfuscated
payloads, leaked secrets, and .planning/ directory commits in PRs.

This is critical for get-shit-done because the entire codebase is markdown
prompts — a prompt injection in a workflow file IS the attack surface.

New files:
- scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh: scans for instruction override, role
  manipulation, system boundary injection, DAN/jailbreak, and tool call
  injection patterns in changed files
- scripts/base64-scan.sh: extracts base64 blobs >= 40 chars, decodes them,
  and checks decoded content against injection patterns (skips data URIs
  and binary content)
- scripts/secret-scan.sh: detects AWS keys, OpenAI/Anthropic keys, GitHub
  PATs, Stripe keys, private key headers, and generic credential patterns
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: runs all three scans plus a
  .planning/ directory check on every PR
- .base64scanignore / .secretscanignore: per-repo false positive allowlists
- tests/security-scan.test.cjs: 51 tests covering script existence,
  pattern matching, false positive avoidance, and workflow structure

All scripts support --diff (CI), --file, and --dir modes. Cross-platform
(macOS + Linux). SHA-pinned actions. Environment variables used for
github context in run blocks (no direct interpolation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-24 13:23:51 -04:00