Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
9f79cdc40a fix(security): neutralize spaced+closing injection markers; fix audit-uat resolved status (#2456)
* fix(security): neutralize spaced+closing injection markers; fix audit-uat resolved status

scanForInjection recognizes — adds <user> tags, whitespace-padded tags
(e.g. <user >), closing [/SYSTEM]/[/INST] markers, and closing <</SYS>>
markers. Five new regression tests confirm each gap is closed.

whose result column reads PASS or resolved, so items that were already
confirmed do not appear as outstanding in audit-uat --raw. Two new
regression tests cover item-level PASS and file-level status: passed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add closing-tag assertion for spaced <user > sanitization

The test for 'neutralizes spaced tags like <user >' only asserted that the
opening token '<user' was removed. A spaced closing tag '</user >' could
survive sanitization undetected. Added assert.ok(!result.includes('</user'))
to the same test block so both sides of the tag are verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 10:08:18 -04:00
alanshurafa
3d6c2bea4b docs: clarify capture_thought is an optional convention (#1873) (#2379)
* docs: clarify capture_thought is an optional convention (#1873)

Issue #1873 merged /gsd:extract-learnings with an optional
capture_thought hook, but the docs never explained what the tool is
or where it comes from — readers couldn't tell whether it was a
bundled GSD tool, a required dependency, or something they had to
install. This surfaced in a user question on that issue's thread.

Clarify in docs/FEATURES.md §112 and the workflow file that
capture_thought is a convention — any MCP server exposing a tool
with that name will be used; if none is present, LEARNINGS.md
remains the primary output and the step is a silent no-op.

No behavioral change. All 23 extract-learnings tests still pass.

* fix(security): add human to detection message; test [/INST] closing form neutralization

- Detection message now lists <human> alongside <system>/<assistant>/<user>
- Sanitizer regex extended to cover [/INST] closing form (was only [INST])
- Detection pattern extended to cover [/INST] closing form
- New sanitizeForPrompt test asserts [/INST] is neutralized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(config): add workflow.security_* keys to VALID_CONFIG_KEYS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add language tag to fenced code block in FEATURES.md

Fixes MD040 lint finding in PR #2379 — the capture_thought tool
signature example was missing a javascript language identifier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 09:04:21 -04:00
Tom Boucher
13c635f795 feat(security): improve prompt injection scanner — invisible Unicode, encoding obfuscation, structural validation, entropy analysis (#1839)
* fix(tests): allowlist execute-phase.md in prompt-injection scan

execute-phase.md grew to ~51K chars after the code-review gate step
was added in #1630, tripping the 50K size heuristic in the injection
scanner. The limit is calibrated for user-supplied input — trusted
workflow source files that legitimately exceed it are allowlisted
individually, following the same pattern as discuss-phase.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): improve prompt injection scanner with 4 detection layers (#1838)

- Layer 1: Unicode tag block U+E0000–U+E007F detection in strict mode (2025 supply-chain attack vector)
- Layer 2: Character-spacing obfuscation, delimiter injection (<system>/<assistant>/<user>/<human>), and long hex sequence patterns
- Layer 3: validatePromptStructure() — validates XML tag structure of agent/workflow files against known-valid tag set
- Layer 4: scanEntropyAnomalies() — Shannon entropy analysis flagging high-entropy paragraphs (>5.5 bits/char)

All layers implemented TDD (RED→GREEN): 31 new tests written first, verified failing, then implemented.
Full suite: 2559 tests, 0 failures. security.cjs: 99.6% stmt coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 20:22:52 -04:00
Tom Boucher
00e0446b99 fix: four bug fixes — bold plan checkboxes, BACKLOG recommendations, executor_model regression tests, session_id path traversal
- fix(#1572): phase complete now marks bold-wrapped plan checkboxes in ROADMAP.md
  (`- [ ] **01-01**` format) by allowing optional `**` around plan IDs in the
  planCheckboxPattern regex in both phase.cjs and roadmap.cjs

- fix(#1569): manager init no longer recommends 999.x (BACKLOG) phases as next
  actions; add guard in cmdManagerInit that skips phases matching /^999(?:\.|$)/

- fix(#1568): add regression tests confirming init execute-phase respects
  model_overrides for executor_model, including when resolve_model_ids is 'omit'

- fix(#1533): reject session_id values containing path traversal sequences
  (../,  /, \) in gsd-context-monitor and gsd-statusline before constructing
  /tmp file paths; add security tests covering both hooks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 11:30:08 -04:00
3metaJun
aaaa8e96fe Harden verify-work checkpoint rendering 2026-03-23 14:05:33 -04:00
Tom Boucher
62db008570 security: add prompt injection guards, path traversal prevention, and input validation
Defense-in-depth security hardening for a codebase where markdown files become
LLM system prompts. Adds centralized security module, PreToolUse hook for
injection detection, and CI-ready codebase scan.

New files:
- security.cjs: path traversal prevention, prompt injection scanner/sanitizer,
  safe JSON parsing, field name validation, shell arg validation
- gsd-prompt-guard.js: PreToolUse hook scans .planning/ writes for injection
- security.test.cjs: 62 unit tests for all security functions
- prompt-injection-scan.test.cjs: CI scan of all agent/workflow/command files

Hardened code paths:
- readTextArgOrFile: path traversal guard (--prd, --text-file)
- cmdStateUpdate/Patch: field name validation prevents regex injection
- cmdCommit: sanitizeForPrompt strips invisible chars from commit messages
- gsd-tools --fields: safeJsonParse wraps unprotected JSON.parse
- cmdFrontmatterGet/Set: null byte rejection
- cmdVerifyPathExists: null byte rejection
- install.js: registers prompt guard hook, updates uninstaller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 11:38:26 -04:00