* refactor(tests): standardize to node:assert/strict and t.after() per CONTRIBUTING.md
- Replace require('node:assert') with require('node:assert/strict') across
all 73 test files to enforce strict equality (no type coercion)
- Replace try/finally cleanup blocks with t.after() hooks in core.test.cjs
and hooks-opt-in.test.cjs per the test lifecycle standards
- Utility functions in codex-config and security-scan retain try/finally
as that is appropriate for per-function resource guards, not lifecycle hooks
Closes#1674
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(tests): add --test-concurrency=4 to test runner for parallel file execution
Node.js --test-concurrency controls how many test files run as parallel child
processes. Set to 4 by default, configurable via TEST_CONCURRENCY env var.
Fixes tests at a known level rather than inheriting os.availableParallelism()
which varies across CI environments.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): allowlist verify.test.cjs in prompt-injection scanner
tests/verify.test.cjs uses <human>...</human> as GSD phase task-type
XML (meaning "a human should verify this step"), which matches the
scanner's fake-message-boundary pattern for LLM APIs. This is a
false positive — add it to the allowlist alongside the other test files
that legitimately contain injection-adjacent patterns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add base64-scan.sh and secret-scan.sh to prompt injection scanner
allowlist (scanner was flagging its own pattern strings)
- Skip executable bit check on Windows (no Unix permissions)
- Skip bash script execution tests on Windows (requires Git Bash)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add CI security pipeline to catch prompt injection attacks, base64-obfuscated
payloads, leaked secrets, and .planning/ directory commits in PRs.
This is critical for get-shit-done because the entire codebase is markdown
prompts — a prompt injection in a workflow file IS the attack surface.
New files:
- scripts/prompt-injection-scan.sh: scans for instruction override, role
manipulation, system boundary injection, DAN/jailbreak, and tool call
injection patterns in changed files
- scripts/base64-scan.sh: extracts base64 blobs >= 40 chars, decodes them,
and checks decoded content against injection patterns (skips data URIs
and binary content)
- scripts/secret-scan.sh: detects AWS keys, OpenAI/Anthropic keys, GitHub
PATs, Stripe keys, private key headers, and generic credential patterns
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: runs all three scans plus a
.planning/ directory check on every PR
- .base64scanignore / .secretscanignore: per-repo false positive allowlists
- tests/security-scan.test.cjs: 51 tests covering script existence,
pattern matching, false positive avoidance, and workflow structure
All scripts support --diff (CI), --file, and --dir modes. Cross-platform
(macOS + Linux). SHA-pinned actions. Environment variables used for
github context in run blocks (no direct interpolation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
