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Author SHA1 Message Date
Colin
cd5db1f8db test(suites): seed security/slow/integration suites via measured retags 
Renames (git mv) with all references updated (ci-test-scope RULES,
windows-parity allowlist, test-file-count allowlist, docs in 6 locales):

- 5 scanner tests -> *.security.test.cjs — the 'Run security tests' CI step
  ran zero files since the suite taxonomy landed; it is now honest.
- graphify-auto-update -> *.slow.test.cjs (36s, slowest file in the suite;
  e2e gsd-tools spawns) — runs on full-matrix lanes and push to next.
- installer-migration-install-integration -> *.integration.test.cjs
  (13s; an integration test by its own name).

Coverage gate measured after retags: 88.55% lines (gate 70%).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-09 23:50:41 -04:00
Tom Boucher
e32a53b974 feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (#133) 
* test(113): add per-rule failing tests + hostile fixture for markdown link payloads

RED phase for issue #113 — scanForInjection() currently returns { clean: true }
for markdown links containing javascript:, data:text/html, userinfo credentials,
and token-in-query payloads.

Changes:
- tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md:
  Extended to contain one hostile example per rule class (MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME,
  MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY) plus benign
  negative controls (data:image/png, mailto:, https://github.com, port-only URL).
- tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs:
  - Flipped PINNED "malicious-markdown-link fixture is NOT flagged" assertion
    to "malicious-markdown-link fixture is flagged by scanner" (forward-looking).
  - Added 4×positive + 4×negative per-rule unit tests asserting structuredFindings
    with ruleId, file, line, match fields.
  - Added parity guard: every MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS source string from
    security.cjs must appear in gsd-read-injection-scanner.js hook source.

D3 false-positive grep: 0 legitimate matches — no allowlist entries needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (security.cjs + hook)

GREEN phase for issue #113.

Rule details (all with primary source citations):

  MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME
    Flags ](javascript:...) regardless of case.
    Source: OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

  MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME
    Flags data: URIs NOT in the explicit safe-list.
    Safe-list: image/(png|jpeg|gif|webp|bmp|ico|avif|heic) and font/(woff2?|otf|ttf).
    data:image/svg+xml is intentionally BLOCKED — SVG can host <script>.
    Source: OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet — SVG Files
    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files

  MD-LINK-USERINFO
    Flags https?://user:pass@host in markdown link targets.
    Does NOT fire on: mailto:user@host (no :// before user) or https://host:443/path (port, not userinfo).
    Source: RFC 3986 §3.2.1 (userinfo syntax)
    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1
    RFC 9110 §4.2.4 (HTTP deprecates userinfo)
    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4

  MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY
    Flags key NAMES: token, access_token, id_token, refresh_token, api_key, apikey,
    secret, password, client_secret, code — regardless of value.
    Source: RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.3.1
    https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1
    D3 false-positive grep: 0 legitimate matches in codebase — no allowlist needed.

Architecture:
- scripts/security.cjs: canonical MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS export, scanForInjection()
  extended with structuredFindings (ruleId, file, line, match) via opts.file.
- hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js: patterns inlined for hook independence
  (same pattern sources, verified by parity test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(113): flip PINNED malicious-markdown-link assertion and add parity guard

REFACTOR phase — tightening test rigor after test-rigor skill review:

1. Fixture assertion now enumerates all 4 expected ruleIds explicitly:
   [MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME, MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY].
   Previously findings.length > 0 would pass even if 3 of 4 rules were broken.

2. line field assertions tightened: `f.line >= 1` (meaningful lower bound for
   1-based line numbers) instead of `typeof f.line === 'number'` (vacuous).

3. match field assertions tightened to check the hostile content is present:
   - MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME: /javascript:/i in match
   - MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: /data:/i in match
   - MD-LINK-USERINFO: /@/ in match (the @ character is the definitive userinfo marker)
   - MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: /token=/i in match

4. Parity test checks actual RegExp .source strings (not just lengths), verifying
   the hook contains the exact canonical pattern sources character-for-character.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#113): add changeset fragment + Windows/Node 24 state.test compatibility

1. .changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md — required Security fragment
   for the user-facing markdown-link scanner changes in this PR (changeset-lint
   was failing with FAIL_MISSING_FRAGMENT).

2. get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs — add OUTPUT_ON_SDK_ERROR
   set for mutation state subcommands whose CJS contract is always exit-0.
   On Windows/Node 24 the SDK bridge returns result.ok===false for validation
   failures (e.g. state record-metric --phase 1 with no --plan/--duration),
   causing dispatchViaSdk() to call error() (exit 1) instead of output({error})
   (exit 0). The fix maps SDK non-ok results to JSON output for the affected
   mutation commands (record-metric, advance-plan, record-session, add-decision,
   add-blocker, resolve-blocker, update-progress), restoring the exit-0 CJS
   contract on all platforms.

tests/state.test.cjs:1161 "returns error when required fields missing" passes
locally (104/104 pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-23 10:15:03 -04:00
Tom Boucher
835dd6ab44 test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654) 
* test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite

Adds `tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` and a fixtures
directory at `tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/` covering the
attack classes enumerated in #3596:

  - Command substitution / backticks / heredoc payloads in workstream
    names — sentinel-file probes prove no shell is spawned, slugifier
    neutralises the input.
  - Path traversal through `--ws` and slash-bearing workstream names —
    rejected with structured `--json-errors` payload, no stack trace,
    no filesystem mutation outside the project root.
  - Fake `<system>` / `[SYSTEM]` / `<<SYS>>` / `[INST]` boundary tags —
    sanitizeForPrompt neutralises every form; structural negative
    property locked across all six styles in one place.
  - Zero-width / bidi-override codepoints — stripped per the documented
    codepoint set; asserted via codePoint inspection, not regex
    literals.
  - Hostile read of CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md / ROADMAP.md fixtures —
    `gsd-read-injection-scanner.js` surfaces the advisory; excluded
    paths and non-Read tools stay silent; malformed JSON does not
    crash the hook.
  - Hostile write of `.planning/` files — `gsd-prompt-guard.js` emits
    a `PreToolUse` advisory; non-Write/Edit tools stay silent.
  - Fake `ghp_*` / `sk-*` env tokens — never echoed in CLI stdout or
    stderr under hostile inputs; covered under
    `// allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard` because the only
    way to assert byte-level absence is `.includes(token)` against the
    captured streams.
  - `validatePath`, `validateShellArg`, `validatePhaseNumber`,
    `validateFieldName` — focused negative-input contract pins.

Pinned behavior gaps (documented, NOT fixed in this PR):

  - `<instructions>` is intentionally whitelisted by both the scanner
    and the sanitiser (GSD's own prompt scaffolding). Two REGRESSION
    GUARD tests lock that contract.
  - The current `scanForInjection` does NOT flag malicious markdown
    links (javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs). PINNED with
    negative-proof so any future scope extension fails the assertion
    and forces a deliberate update to the acceptance map.
  - `prompt-builder.ts` does not yet wrap plan/context markdown in an
    "untrusted data" envelope. That seam lives on the TS side and is
    covered by `sdk/src/prompt-builder.test.ts`; out of scope for a
    CJS test file. Mentioned in the file header.

Verification:

  - `node --test tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` → 73 tests
    pass.
  - `node scripts/lint-no-source-grep.cjs` → 0 violations across
    546 test files (one `allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard`
    annotation on this file for the token-absence assertions).
  - `node scripts/run-tests.cjs` → 9730 tests pass, 0 fail.

Refs #3596

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(3596): allow adversarial fixtures in scan + harden graphify status parse

* fix(3596): skip adversarial security fixtures in secret scan

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00