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4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
13c635f795 feat(security): improve prompt injection scanner — invisible Unicode, encoding obfuscation, structural validation, entropy analysis (#1839) 
* fix(tests): allowlist execute-phase.md in prompt-injection scan

execute-phase.md grew to ~51K chars after the code-review gate step
was added in #1630, tripping the 50K size heuristic in the injection
scanner. The limit is calibrated for user-supplied input — trusted
workflow source files that legitimately exceed it are allowlisted
individually, following the same pattern as discuss-phase.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): improve prompt injection scanner with 4 detection layers (#1838)

- Layer 1: Unicode tag block U+E0000–U+E007F detection in strict mode (2025 supply-chain attack vector)
- Layer 2: Character-spacing obfuscation, delimiter injection (<system>/<assistant>/<user>/<human>), and long hex sequence patterns
- Layer 3: validatePromptStructure() — validates XML tag structure of agent/workflow files against known-valid tag set
- Layer 4: scanEntropyAnomalies() — Shannon entropy analysis flagging high-entropy paragraphs (>5.5 bits/char)

All layers implemented TDD (RED→GREEN): 31 new tests written first, verified failing, then implemented.
Full suite: 2559 tests, 0 failures. security.cjs: 99.6% stmt coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-05 20:22:52 -04:00
Tom Boucher
00e0446b99 fix: four bug fixes — bold plan checkboxes, BACKLOG recommendations, executor_model regression tests, session_id path traversal 
- fix(#1572): phase complete now marks bold-wrapped plan checkboxes in ROADMAP.md
  (`- [ ] **01-01**` format) by allowing optional `**` around plan IDs in the
  planCheckboxPattern regex in both phase.cjs and roadmap.cjs

- fix(#1569): manager init no longer recommends 999.x (BACKLOG) phases as next
  actions; add guard in cmdManagerInit that skips phases matching /^999(?:\.|$)/

- fix(#1568): add regression tests confirming init execute-phase respects
  model_overrides for executor_model, including when resolve_model_ids is 'omit'

- fix(#1533): reject session_id values containing path traversal sequences
  (../,  /, \) in gsd-context-monitor and gsd-statusline before constructing
  /tmp file paths; add security tests covering both hooks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-03 11:30:08 -04:00
3metaJun
aaaa8e96fe Harden verify-work checkpoint rendering 2026-03-23 14:05:33 -04:00
Tom Boucher
62db008570 security: add prompt injection guards, path traversal prevention, and input validation 
Defense-in-depth security hardening for a codebase where markdown files become
LLM system prompts. Adds centralized security module, PreToolUse hook for
injection detection, and CI-ready codebase scan.

New files:
- security.cjs: path traversal prevention, prompt injection scanner/sanitizer,
  safe JSON parsing, field name validation, shell arg validation
- gsd-prompt-guard.js: PreToolUse hook scans .planning/ writes for injection
- security.test.cjs: 62 unit tests for all security functions
- prompt-injection-scan.test.cjs: CI scan of all agent/workflow/command files

Hardened code paths:
- readTextArgOrFile: path traversal guard (--prd, --text-file)
- cmdStateUpdate/Patch: field name validation prevents regex injection
- cmdCommit: sanitizeForPrompt strips invisible chars from commit messages
- gsd-tools --fields: safeJsonParse wraps unprotected JSON.parse
- cmdFrontmatterGet/Set: null byte rejection
- cmdVerifyPathExists: null byte rejection
- install.js: registers prompt guard hook, updates uninstaller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-20 11:38:26 -04:00