Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Boucher
95eda5845e fix(tests): allowlist execute-phase.md in prompt-injection scan (#1835)
execute-phase.md grew to ~51K chars after the code-review gate step
was added in #1630, tripping the 50K size heuristic in the injection
scanner. The limit is calibrated for user-supplied input — trusted
workflow source files that legitimately exceed it are allowlisted
individually, following the same pattern as discuss-phase.md.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 20:03:47 -04:00
Tibsfox
dc2afa299b feat(i18n): add response_language config for cross-phase language consistency (#1412)
* feat(i18n): add response_language config for cross-phase language consistency

Adds `response_language` config key that propagates through all init
outputs via withProjectRoot(). Workflows read this field and instruct
agents to present user-facing questions in the configured language,
solving the problem of language preference resetting at phase boundaries.

Usage: gsd-tools config-set response_language "Portuguese"

Closes #1399

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): allowlist discuss-phase.md for size threshold

discuss-phase.md legitimately exceeds 50K chars due to power mode
and i18n directives — not prompt stuffing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 07:49:10 -04:00
Tom Boucher
46d9c26158 fix(agents): modular decomposition of gsd-planner.md to solve 50K char limit (#1612)
* test: add failing tests for planner modular decomposition

- Assert gsd-planner.md is under 45K after extraction (currently ~50K)
- Assert three reference files exist (gap-closure, revision, reviews)
- Assert planner contains reference pointers to each extracted file
- Assert each reference file contains key content from the original mode

* feat(agents): modular decomposition of gsd-planner.md to fix 50K char limit

Extracts three non-standard mode sections from gsd-planner.md into dedicated
reference files loaded on-demand, and calibrates the security scanner to use
a per-file-type threshold (100K for agent source files vs 50K for user input).

Structural changes:
- Extract <gap_closure_mode> → get-shit-done/references/planner-gap-closure.md
- Extract <revision_mode> → get-shit-done/references/planner-revision.md
- Extract <reviews_mode> → get-shit-done/references/planner-reviews.md
- Add <load_mode_context> step in execution_flow (conditional lazy loading)
- gsd-planner.md: 50,112 → 45,352 chars (well under new 45K target)

Security scanner fix:
- Split agent file check: injection patterns (unchanged) + separate 100K size limit
- The 50K strict-mode limit was designed for user-supplied input, not trusted source files
- Agent files still have a size guard to catch accidental bloat

Partially addresses #1495

* fix(tests): normalize CRLF before measuring planner file size

Windows git checkouts add \r per line, inflating String.length by ~1150 chars
for a 1,400-line file. The 45K threshold test failed on windows-latest because
45,352 chars (Linux) became 46,507 chars (Windows). Apply the same CRLF
normalization pattern used in tests/reachability-check.test.cjs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 13:32:05 -04:00
Tom Boucher
62db008570 security: add prompt injection guards, path traversal prevention, and input validation
Defense-in-depth security hardening for a codebase where markdown files become
LLM system prompts. Adds centralized security module, PreToolUse hook for
injection detection, and CI-ready codebase scan.

New files:
- security.cjs: path traversal prevention, prompt injection scanner/sanitizer,
  safe JSON parsing, field name validation, shell arg validation
- gsd-prompt-guard.js: PreToolUse hook scans .planning/ writes for injection
- security.test.cjs: 62 unit tests for all security functions
- prompt-injection-scan.test.cjs: CI scan of all agent/workflow/command files

Hardened code paths:
- readTextArgOrFile: path traversal guard (--prd, --text-file)
- cmdStateUpdate/Patch: field name validation prevents regex injection
- cmdCommit: sanitizeForPrompt strips invisible chars from commit messages
- gsd-tools --fields: safeJsonParse wraps unprotected JSON.parse
- cmdFrontmatterGet/Set: null byte rejection
- cmdVerifyPathExists: null byte rejection
- install.js: registers prompt guard hook, updates uninstaller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 11:38:26 -04:00