Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
0xdhx
e2eed1c58a test(#2665): ship the hermeticity guard at report level, not fatal
Its first CI run found PRE-EXISTING leaks on the Windows lane —
C:\Users\runneradmin\.claude\gsd-core and skills\gsd-dev-preferences — with all
1196 Windows tests otherwise passing. os.homedir() reads USERPROFILE on Windows,
and ~190 test sites across 31 files sandbox HOME alone, so the suite has been
installing GSD into the runner's real home directory invisibly. That is exactly
the class the guard exists to surface, and exactly the class this PR's review
said CI could never catch.

It is also a different defect from the one #2665 closes, and too large to fold in
here. A brand-new gate that immediately reds an unrelated lane gets bypassed or
reverted rather than obeyed, so the guard reports by default and fails only under
GSD_STRICT_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1.

This is the repo's own established ratchet, not a hedge: the local/no-source-grep
ESLint rule shipped at `warn` and was promoted to `error` after its cleanup sweep
(ADR 452). Promote this the same way once the USERPROFILE sweep lands.
2026-08-08 05:50:17 -05:00
0xdhx
a02462e050 test(#2665): fail the suite when it writes into a live config dir
The recurrence guard, and #2665's own "Optional hardening". This class is silent
by construction: TEST_ENV_BASE cannot see an in-process caller, and CI cannot see
the class at all because CI never has these env vars set. It damages the
developer's machine and reports nothing -- which is how two prior authors each
diagnosed it and fixed only the instance in front of them.

run-tests.cjs snapshots GSD's install footprint in every live runtime config dir
before the suite and re-checks it after, failing the run on a create or a modify.
Roots come from the product's own getGlobalConfigDir, so the guard watches
wherever the product actually points, including through an ambient var.

Scope is ownership-based, not whole-root: the top-level install footprint plus
gsd-prefixed children of dirs GSD shares with the host agent. A config root like
~/.claude is shared, and watching it wholesale would false-positive on the host's
own history.jsonl or settings.json -- a guard that cries wolf gets disabled, and
then catches nothing. The prefix test is load-bearing: the first version watched
only the three top-level entries and MISSED a real leak into skills/gsd-*.

It earned its place immediately -- it is what found the fifth in-process leak in
runtime-artifact-layout.test.cjs, which no amount of reading the review would have
surfaced. Known gap documented in the module: a write to a file GSD does not own
is out of scope by construction.

Lives in scripts/, deliberately NOT scripts/lib/ -- the installer copies that dir
into every user's config dir wholesale while uninstall removes only an allowlist,
so a test-only module there would ship to users and survive uninstall.

Addresses review finding: Minor 8.
2026-08-08 05:50:17 -05:00