* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking
Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the
largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared
untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents
(randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring);
opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking).
arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth).
* fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized
- A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a
circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already
in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control.
- A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default
false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads.
- A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention).
- A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale).
- A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input.
- Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) +
drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as
the noted pre-existing follow-up.
* fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate
The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions',
'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's
own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red
on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md,
TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS
scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it.
Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15.
* fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer
trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so
no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions
(gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10.
- gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset.
- gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source-
document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools.
INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines
regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset
reworded 8 -> 10.
Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39.
* docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam
trek-e Major 2 + Minor:
- docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to
the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from
the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor
framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model.
- CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry.
Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green.
* test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary
trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as
degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary
(git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep
the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File
now diffs/blames line-by-line.
Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain.
* docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs
Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner.
* docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count
Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs.
---------
Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
Two new specialist agents for /gsd-ingest-docs (#2387):
- gsd-doc-classifier: reads one doc, writes JSON classification
({ADR|PRD|SPEC|DOC|UNKNOWN} + title + scope + cross-refs + locked).
Heuristic-first, LLM on ambiguous. Designed for parallel fan-out per doc.
- gsd-doc-synthesizer: consumes all classifications + sources, applies
precedence rules (ADR>SPEC>PRD>DOC, manifest-overridable), runs cycle
detection on cross-ref graph, enforces LOCKED-vs-LOCKED hard-blocks
in both modes, writes INGEST-CONFLICTS.md with three buckets
(auto-resolved, competing-variants, unresolved-blockers) and
per-type intel staging files for gsd-roadmapper.
Also updates docs/ARCHITECTURE.md total-agents count (31 → 33) and the
copilot-install expected agent list.
Refs #2387
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
