f7df920681f233ae0fe064ee659550bdf41ff708
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Tom Boucher
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66ad3d6250 |
test(#3523): rewrite two undetected source-greps as behavioral tests (#3548)
* test(#3523): rewrite two undetected source-greps as behavioral tests Both sites read a real shipped hook and text-searched it, and both were invisible to local/no-source-grep because the path was bound to a separate const the rule never resolves back to its literal. tests/check-update-config-dir.test.cjs carried three such reads, not the one the issue cites. All three are replaced by a harness that runs the real hooks/gsd-check-update.js under a fake HOME and observes the config dirs detectConfigDir resolved, via the env the hook hands its worker. Coverage now includes the CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR precedence cases and the full adjacent-pair search order the deleted static grep only asserted for one pair. tests/security-prompt-injection.security.test.cjs asserted the scanner hook's SOURCE TEXT contained each canonical MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS regex source. It now drives probes through the real hook and asserts the emitted ruleId, with a completeness gate so a new canonical pattern without a probe fails loudly, plus safePredicate parity the text grep never checked. No allow-test-rule marker is added. The now-false marker on check-update-config-dir.test.cjs is removed and its identity-allowlist entry pruned, which the ratchet requires. Refs #3464 * feat(#3523): emit typed findings IR from the read-injection scanner The scanner built a structured findings array internally and discarded the structure when rendering its advisory sentence, so the only thing a test could assert on was that prose. CONTRIBUTING's 'Prohibited: Raw Text Matching on Test Outputs' names that exact situation and prescribes adding the typed surface rather than matching the text. findings is now an array of {ruleId, match} records and the advisory is derived from it through a single renderFinding mapper, so the rendered text and the IR cannot drift. The array is emitted additively on hookSpecificOutput for both the advisory and blocking output shapes. The advisory string itself is unchanged, byte for byte: verified across six payload shapes (single markdown-link hit, 3+ finding HIGH, invisible unicode, unicode tag block, injection-pattern-only, mixed) by running the pristine and modified hooks against identical stdin and comparing. 28 existing assertions across four suites substring-match that string. The #3523 parity assertions now read the IR, and a new test binds the two surfaces together by asserting every MD-LINK ruleId in findings appears in the advisory and that the reported pattern count matches findings.length. Refs #3464 * docs(#3523): document the read-injection scanner output contract The scanner had no subsection under Security Hooks, only a one-line table row. Documents its trigger events, severity thresholds, skip conditions, rule ids, and the findings IR added alongside the advisory. Refs #3464 * fix(#3523): bind every finding family to the advisory, freeze rule ids Two review findings on the typed-IR commit. The parity test filtered on MD-LINK- and so bound only one of the four finding families to the rendered advisory; the other three were covered only by the pattern count, which catches a length mismatch but not wrong text. It now drives a payload producing all four families at once, asserts all four are present so it cannot silently degrade, and checks each one's expected rendering against an expectation table coded independently of the hook's own mapper. The three synthetic rule ids were written twice each — once at the push site, once in renderFinding — so a rename at one site would fall through the generic render branch with no signal. They are now a frozen RULE_IDS constant referenced from both. No string value changed; the advisory remains byte-identical across all six proof payloads. Refs #3464 * chore: pin changeset pr field to #3548 --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Tom Boucher
|
268ca7e32d |
fix(#3504): harden hook injection patterns and force-add guard (#3510)
* test(#3504): add failing-first parity, fail-closed, and bypass suites * fix(#3504): harden hook injection patterns and force-add guard * test(#3504): stage the scanner lib dependency in shared-hooks fixture * chore(#3504): backfill changeset pr number * test(#3504): build parity samples from fragments for the ci scan --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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Tom Boucher
|
27aa40f65e |
fix(#3023): stage pi's shared hook bundle outside pi's reserved hooks/ directory (#3175)
* test(#3023): failing-first guard — pi must not stage hooks in its reserved dir pi reserves <configDir>/hooks as its deprecated extension location and warns on every startup when it exists. Assert a pi install stages the shared hook bundle under gsd-hooks/ instead, manifests it there, and never creates hooks/. Also adds pi to the local-scope dir table in install-shared.cjs: pi was in RUNTIME_META but not LOCAL_DIR_NAME, so scope:'local' resolved path.join(root, undefined) and no local pi install could be exercised. Fails before the fix. Verified via the remote runner. * fix(#3023): stage pi's shared hook bundle outside pi's reserved hooks/ dir pi reserves <configDir>/hooks as its now-deprecated extension location and warns on every startup when that directory merely exists — checkDeprecatedExtensionDirs() guards the warning with a bare existsSync(), unlike its tools/ sibling. GSD staged its shared hook bundle exactly there, and pi's advised remediation (move it to extensions/) would break the adapter's paths and expose GSD's .js helpers to pi's extension auto-discovery. The bundle directory name is now runtime-descriptor-driven: hostBehaviors .sharedHooksDirName, defaulting to 'hooks' so all 18 other runtimes are byte-identical. pi sets 'gsd-hooks'. The name is validated as a single path segment — separators, dot-only segments, trailing dots, absolute paths, NUL, and Windows reserved device names all fall back to the default, because the value is joined onto a user's config root and written to. Renamed in place rather than relocated: hook scripts resolve siblings via __dirname/.., so a depth change would silently break them. - install / uninstall / manifest sites all read the resolved name - pi/gsd.cjs probes gsd-hooks then hooks, so dev checkouts and half-upgraded trees still resolve; the never-throws contract is preserved - new migration 009 retires the legacy pi hooks/ dir on upgrade, using a new non-recursive remove-empty-dir engine primitive (rmdirSync only, symlink-refusing, containment-guarded); ADR-0008 amended accordingly - fixes two latent name-dependencies the rename exposed: the stale-hook scan and the injection scanner's self-exclusion both hardcoded 'hooks' Verified on the remote runner. Closes #3023 * fix(#3023): close review findings and align emitted provenance with the rename Adversarial review found two defects, and the remote runner found four failure clusters. All fixed here. Review BLOCKER — detect-custom-files was blind to the renamed bundle. GSD_PREFIX_MANAGED_DIRS in gsd-tools.cjs hardcoded 'hooks', so for pi the whole gsd-hooks/ tree was invisible to the custom-file scan and user-added files there were never backed up before the next update's clean-install wipe. The dir set now resolves via the .gsd-runtime marker plus the shipped capability registry (never bin/install.js, which is not shipped into installed trees), and falls back to scanning every known candidate when the runtime cannot be determined — over-scanning is safe, under-scanning is the data loss. Review MAJOR — the pi adapter bound to an empty bundle. resolveSharedHooksDir accepted any directory, so an interrupted install left gsd-hooks/ winning over a fully-staged legacy hooks/ and every hook silently no-opped. A candidate now qualifies only if it is non-empty. Remote-runner clusters: - emitted-provenance had no rule for the gsd-hooks/ family; added two pi-scoped rules pointing at the same sources the existing hooks/ rules use. The table is total, so an unattributed family is a hard failure by design. - pi tests in install-minimal-hooks and the install integration suite asserted the old layout; updated to derive the dir name from the descriptor rather than hardcoding either name. - 19 unrelated-looking failures on node22 only were a leaked fs mock: t.after() runs in registration order, cleanup was registered before mock.restoreAll(), and node22's JS rimraf calls the public fs.rmdirSync while node24's native path does not — so the EACCES stub leaked process-wide on one lane. Restore now runs first. Verified on the remote runner. * fix(#3023): honor PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR, ack the rename ripple, fix expandTilde pi resolves its agent dir as PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR ?? ~/<CONFIG_DIR_NAME>/agent (packages/coding-agent/src/config.ts). GSD's pi descriptor declared an empty configHome.env, so a user with that variable set had GSD installed where pi never looks. Added the env name; the dot-home-nested resolver already handled the override, so no resolver logic changed. Also fixes expandTilde in the shared runtime-homes resolver, found while adding that: it hardcoded os.homedir() and ignored the opts.home every caller threads, so EVERY runtime's tilde-valued env override (claude, antigravity, windsurf, pi) silently resolved against the real home. That is a correctness bug and a test-escape hazard — a sandboxed test asserting on a tilde override reached the developer's actual home directory. Now threaded through every branch; behavior with no injected home is unchanged. Adds the emitted-drift ack fragment for the 58 pi paths whose emitted location moved with the rename. The provenance rules satisfy the totality gate; the differential gate needs the ack because the hook sources are byte-unchanged — only the installer's target directory moved. The two hook files this branch genuinely edits stay attributed and are not double-acked. Note on piConfig.configDir: it is read from pi's OWN installed package.json (getPackageDir walks up from pi's __dirname), alongside piConfig.name — a white-label setting for a redistributed pi fork, not a per-project user setting. Documented accordingly rather than treated as an unsupported override. Verified on the remote runner. * fix(#3023): reject blank env overrides, pin adapter/descriptor parity Three review findings, all fixed. A whitespace-only config-dir override was accepted verbatim: the guard was `if (val)`, falsy only for the empty string, so PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR=' ' resolved to a literal three-space directory name instead of falling back to the descriptor default. Fixed across every env-consuming branch — dot-home, dot-home-nested, all three xdg steps, and generic-agents-root — not just pi's. Non-blank values are still never trimmed, so '~/My Agent Dir' keeps working. pi/gsd.cjs's probe list and the descriptor were two independent sources of truth for the bundle directory name; a future rename would have desynced them silently and left every pi hook quiet with no error. The probe list stays deliberate — it must resolve in a dev checkout and a half-upgraded tree, where the registry's answer would be wrong — so this adds the parity assertion the repo's generative-fix-divergence rule calls for: the descriptor value must be the FIRST candidate, and the default must remain present. Changeset body rewritten to cover the two later user-facing fixes it had not caught up with. Verified on the remote runner. * chore(#3023): backfill changeset PR number * fix(#3023): anchor injection-scan patterns and fix a macOS detection hole CI's security job flagged CONTEXT.md:124 — pre-existing prose reading 'not the same fact as a genuinely empty or absent one'. The match was the 'act as a' INSIDE 'f-act as a': the pattern had no left word boundary, so any word ending in act tripped it (fact, impact, contract, artifact, interact, redact, abstract). My four-line CONTEXT.md edit dragged the latent false positive into this PR because the scan is diff-scoped by file but reads whole files. Anchored with (^|[^[:alnum:]]) rather than rewording maintainer-owned prose, which would have left the class alive for the next PR touching any file saying 'fact as a'. Auditing the rest of the list for the same class surfaced a real detection hole: the eval/exec/Function patterns matched a quote via \x27, a GNU-grep-only hex escape. BSD/macOS grep reads it as four literal characters, so single-quoted eval('...')/exec('...') payloads were NEVER detected there while passing on GNU-grep CI. Replaced with a literal apostrophe class. Boundaries were added only where a real word-suffix collision exists; exec, jailbreak, developer mode and the role-manipulation family were audited and deliberately left unanchored. 22 new cases cover both directions — the false positives now scan clean, and every real payload still fires, including the quote/punctuation/start-of-line boundary forms. Also builds this branch's injection test fixture at runtime instead of carrying the literal phrase, so the payload keeps its teeth without tripping the scan. Verified on the remote runner. --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> |
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|
0xdhx
|
a8b40fa53f |
fix(#2547): fail closed on crashing and path-shadowing Kimi payloads (#2595)
* fix(#2547): fail closed on a malformed Kimi edit list in normalizeKimiPayload
`normalizeKimiPayload` rebuilt old_string/new_string with
`String(e.old ?? '')`. `??` guards the value, not the dereference, so a
nullish entry in a Kimi `edit` list threw a TypeError at the top of the
handler, before any tool dispatch. Each guard's outer
`catch { process.exit(0) }` swallowed that crash and emitted the same exit
code as "nothing to report" — turning a should-BLOCK call into a silent
allow.
Two hard blocks were bypassable:
* gsd-worktree-path-guard's cross-git-root write block (#260) — a
StrReplaceFile write whose path resolves to a different git root is
correctly blocked with a well-formed edit list, and silently allowed
with `edit: [null]`.
* gsd-workflow-guard's force-add block on agent-* branches — a Shell
payload carrying a spurious `edit: [null]` field walks past it. The
Bash path never reads `edit`; the field only has to be present to
trigger the crash.
Fixed with `e?.old` / `e?.new`, landed identically in all five copies so
tests/kimi-guard-normalization-parity.test.cjs's byte-identity assertion
still holds.
The crash boundary is nullish specifically, not "non-object": `('x').old`
and `(7).old` are legal reads yielding undefined, so string/number entries
never threw. Both are kept as controls proving the fix did not change
their behaviour.
Regression coverage is folded into the owning suites per CONTRIBUTING.md
(no new bug-* files). Negative-controlled: the nullish cases exit 0
against pre-fix guards and exit 2 after, with positive controls (the
equivalent well-formed payload blocks) and negative controls (in-worktree
writes and benign commands still pass) alongside.
Refs #2547
* test(#2547): exercise the production Kimi payload shape in read-guard tests
The `#2304: Kimi tool vocabulary engages the read guard` cases send
payloads with no `session_id`, and runHook injects none. A live Kimi turn
always carries one — kimi-cli's hooks/events.py `_base()` sets it
unconditionally, and soul/kimisoul.py calls `set_session_id()` at the top
of every turn before tool dispatch, so the ContextVar's `default=""` never
reaches a tool call.
gsd-read-guard treats any non-empty `data.session_id` as "Claude Code
already enforces read-before-edit, skip" (#2520). So the advisory those
tests assert fires only for a shape production never sends: the tests were
green, and the guard was dormant on Kimi. A sibling #2520 case in the same
file asserts the skip when `session_id` IS present — both passed, and the
production shape hits the skip.
Two changes, test-validity only:
* Retitle the #2304 block to say what it proves — the tool VOCABULARY is
normalized through to the Write/Edit branch — with a comment warning
not to read it as production evidence.
* Add a #2547 block asserting behaviour against the production shape
(session_id populated), including a case that pins the delta directly:
the same payload fires without session_id and is silent with it.
The #2547 block characterizes a known gap; it does not endorse it.
Redesigning how the guard discriminates runtimes is explicitly out of
scope for #2547. If a later change makes the advisory fire on Kimi these
tests are supposed to fail — update them then rather than dropping the
coverage.
Refs #2547
* docs(#2547): scope the Kimi guard-engagement claim to what Kimi enforces
#2518 engaged the guards' Kimi matchers and the release notes describe the
result as "All seven guard hooks now engage on Kimi", singling out the
prompt-injection read scanner as "the security-relevant guard" taken "from
silently dormant to engaged". That is not achievable for the scanner at
the emit layer.
gsd-read-injection-scanner.js is a PostToolUse hook, and kimi-cli's
dispatch never inspects PostToolUse hook results: src/kimi_cli/soul/
toolset.py awaits PreToolUse and honours `result.action == "block"`, but
fires PostToolUse via asyncio.create_task() and returns the ToolResult
without awaiting it — the done_callback only retrieves the task's own
exception. So no output shape the scanner emits can block or flag a Kimi
tool call, and `security.injection_blocking` cannot take effect there.
Reshaping the scanner's output would not change this; the enforcement gap
is in kimi-cli's PostToolUse handling, which is out of scope here.
This corrects the claim rather than the code — there is no gsd-core emit
fix that would make it true:
* .changeset/2304-kimi-guard-tool-name.md — the fragment is unreleased,
so it would otherwise ship this as a CHANGELOG security claim.
Headline narrowed to "normalize Kimi's payload shape" and a scope
paragraph added naming what actually blocks on Kimi (the two
PreToolUse blocks) versus what cannot.
* docs/migration/kimi-to-kimi-code.md — the scanner was listed under
"Every GSD `PreToolUse` guard"; it is PostToolUse. Corrected, and the
"What about the dormant guards?" section now splits enforceable from
not-enforceable instead of saying Phase 0 "fixed all seven".
* hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js — the same scope note in the
file's own Kimi rationale comment, where the next contributor to touch
the normalization will actually read it. Comment only; the shared
normalization block is untouched and byte-identity still holds.
Refs #2547
* chore(#2547): regenerate golden install-parity fixtures for the guard fix
The golden install-parity fixtures record a content hash per installed
file, so changing the five guard hooks changes their hashes across every
runtime's fixture. Regenerated with the full sweep (build, gen:golden,
size:baseline) rather than a single generator — running gen:golden alone
leaves tests/workflow-size-baseline.json stale and loses CI jobs to a
regeneration that looked complete.
The size baselines came out unchanged (no workflow or agent bodies
touched) and the hash delta is confined to exactly the five guards:
gsd-prompt-guard, gsd-read-guard, gsd-read-injection-scanner,
gsd-workflow-guard, gsd-worktree-path-guard.
Refs #2547
* fix(#2547): guard the String() coercion in normalizeKimiPayload too
Found by adversarial review of the first commit, then reproduced against
pristine next: `e?.old` closes the nullish dereference but leaves a second
route to the same crash-to-allow.
`{"toString": null}` is valid JSON, and coercing it throws
`TypeError: Cannot convert object to primitive value` — so an edit entry
that IS a well-formed object still crashes normalization, still lands in
the outer `catch { process.exit(0) }`, and still downgrades a should-BLOCK
call to a silent allow. Confirmed on both hard blocks:
{"tool_name":"Shell","tool_input":{
"command":"git add -f secret.env",
"edit":[{"old":{"toString":null},"new":"x"}]}} -> exit 0 (was)
{"tool_name":"StrReplaceFile","tool_input":{
"path":"<main-repo>/src/index.ts",
"edit":[{"old":{"toString":null},"new":"x"}]}} -> exit 0 (was)
Both exit 2 now.
The coercion is wrapped rather than replaced with a `typeof === 'string'`
test on purpose. Degrading only the non-coercible entry keeps
stringification identical for every value that CAN coerce — numbers,
arrays, plain objects — which matters because gsd-prompt-guard scans
new_string for injection patterns, and a `typeof` test would silently stop
scanning content that reaches that scan today (e.g. `new: ["ignore all
previous instructions"]` currently stringifies and is scanned). Verified:
zero behaviour change across string, number, bool, null, array-of-strings,
nested array, plain object and `__proto__`-keyed input; only the throwing
case changes, from crash to ''.
Regression cases are negative-controlled against the previous commit: the
four new coercion-trap tests fail with only the `e?.old` fix in place and
pass with this one.
Refs #2547
* chore(#2547): cover the String() coercion vector in the changeset
The release note described only the nullish-dereference route. Both routes
reach the same fail-open, so both belong in the changelog entry, along with
why the coercion is wrapped rather than type-tested.
Refs #2547
* chore(#2547): point the changeset fragment at the real PR number
The fragment has to exist before `gh pr create` runs, so it carried the
issue number as a placeholder. Corrected to 2595 now that the PR is open.
Refs #2547
* fix(#2547): make Kimi's `path` authoritative over a model-supplied `file_path`
normalizeKimiPayload copied Kimi's `path` into `file_path` only when
`file_path === undefined`, so any `file_path` the model chose to include won
outright. Every guard reads `file_path`; kimi-cli executes on `path`. The guard
therefore inspected one file while the write landed on another.
This bypass needs no crash. A payload pairing a cross-root `path` with a
spurious `file_path: ""` left gsd-worktree-path-guard reading an empty string
and exiting 0, while the identical write without the extra key blocked — the
same cross-root write the #260 block exists to catch. The shadowing also
preserved a non-string `file_path` (`[]`), which threw inside that guard's
path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same
crash-to-allow the rest of #2547 closes, reached through the guard's own read
rather than through normalization.
Reachability is not speculative. kimi-cli's soul/toolset.py json-parses the
model's raw tool arguments and passes that dict verbatim as tool_input to
PreToolUse, performing typed validation only later inside tool.call() — after
the hook has already decided. So the model controls extra keys in tool_input at
the moment the guard runs. kimi-cli's file tools carry no `file_path` field at
all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py, replace.py), so a `file_path` in a Kimi
payload is always model-supplied.
`path` now wins outright. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects
to the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block.
Normalization returns early for non-Kimi tool names, so the native Claude Code
contract (file_path governs) is untouched.
Landed identically across all five inlined copies; the byte-identity assertion
in tests/kimi-guard-normalization-parity.test.cjs enforces that.
* test(#2547): cover the file_path-shadowing bypass in the #260 guard suite
Four cases, each exiting 0 (bypass) against the pre-fix guards: a spurious
empty-string file_path, an in-worktree decoy file_path, and non-string
file_path values (array and object) that additionally crashed
path.isAbsolute() into the outer catch.
Two controls that are not bypass cases and matter as much:
- an in-worktree write carrying a cross-root DECOY file_path must still exit
0. Pre-fix this blocked, because the decoy won; the guard now follows the
path kimi-cli executes on in both directions, so the fix narrows what is
inspected without over-blocking.
- a native Claude Edit (no `path` field) must still block on file_path alone.
normalizeKimiPayload returns early for non-Kimi tool names, and this pins
that the non-Kimi contract did not move. It passes both pre- and post-fix
by design.
Negative-controlled: run against the pre-fix hooks, the four bypass cases and
the decoy control fail, and the native-Claude control passes.
* test(#2547): back the totality claim with property tests over fc.anything()
This PR claims the fix "makes normalization total over the inputs JSON can
express" — a for-all guarantee — while the tests backing it are example-based,
each shape added reactively after a crash was found by hand (the String()
coercion trap was itself found by adversarial review after the first commit
shipped). Example-based tests cannot substantiate a for-all claim; they record
the counterexamples someone happened to think of.
Four properties over fc.anything(), which is exactly the JSON-expressible
domain the claim names:
(a) totality over any tool_input
(b) totality over any edit list — the crash surface both #2547 fixes targeted
(c) `path` always wins over any model-supplied `file_path` (the review blocker
invariant: a guard reading file_path can never be aimed at a file other
than the one kimi-cli writes)
(d) a non-Kimi tool_name passes through untouched — the native Claude contract
normalizeKimiPayload is inlined per hook with no runtime binding, so there is
nothing to require. The block is extracted from hook source and evaluated via
the SAME extraction contract kimi-guard-normalization-parity.test.cjs uses, so
a source edit that breaks one breaks both instead of silently testing a stale
block. An extraction floor test fails loudly if the extraction yields a no-op.
Non-vacuous, and checked rather than assumed: against pristine pre-#2547 `next`,
(a), (b) and (c) all FAIL and (d) passes. (a) needed the fix that makes it
meaningful — a bare fc.anything() for tool_input passed even against the live
defect, because arbitrary generation essentially never invents the `edit` key
the crash lives behind, so the generator is biased onto the keys normalization
actually reads and unioned back with unbiased input.
* chore(#2547): cover the shadowing vector in the changeset and regen goldens
Golden install-parity churn is hash-only, on exactly the five hook files this
round changed. gsd-phase-boundary.sh is deliberately unchanged.
* test(#2547): make the property test able to kill the coercion mutant
Review Major 1: the generative test added to stop the NEXT counterexample
could not kill the one it was written for. Reproduced the reviewer's matrix
independently — against the shipped generator, a mutant reverting `editText`
to the unguarded `String(v ?? '')` passed all four properties.
Cause, confirmed by measurement: the edit-array ENTRIES were bare
`fc.anything()`, which essentially never invents an `old`/`new` key, so
`e?.old` was always undefined and `String(undefined ?? '')` never coerced
anything. That is the same vacuity the file's own comment describes one level
up, reproduced one level down.
The review's prescribed fix — bias the entry onto `{old, new}` — is necessary
but NOT sufficient, and this is the part worth recording: measured over 20,000
draws, bare `fc.anything()` yields a non-coercible value 3 times (0.015%). At
`numRuns: 200` an `old` key holding a hostile value essentially never
co-occurs, and the mutant survives the entry bias too. Both levels need
biasing — the entry onto the keys normalization reads, and the VALUE onto the
shape that actually throws.
`{"toString": <non-function>}` is that shape and stays inside the
"JSON-expressible" domain the claim names (JSON.parse produces it verbatim);
`fc.anything({withNullPrototype: true})` would also kill the mutant but widens
the domain past what the PR asserts, so it is not used.
Verified: M1 now dies at every seed tried (1/7/42/99/4242/31337, failing
within 3-31 cases) while HEAD stays green at all of them.
Also closes three coverage gaps the review listed as nits — properties (e)
totality over any JSON value as the WHOLE payload, (f) the tool_output →
tool_response mapping (including that an existing tool_response is not
clobbered), and (g) an empty edit list reconstructing nothing.
Property (e) required a one-line fix in the normalizer itself: `JSON.parse
('null')` is null, and null/primitive payloads threw on the `data.tool_name`
read — falsifying the "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim. Harmless
in practice (the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the exit 0 it now
takes deliberately), but the claim should be true as stated. Landed
byte-identically across all five copies.
Refs #2547
* fix(#2547): make old_string/new_string authoritative, not merely defaulted
Review Major 2: the shadowing class the prior round's BLOCKER closed for
`file_path` survived one field over. `old_string`/`new_string` were still
reconstructed only `if (input.<field> === undefined)`, so a model-supplied
value won.
The argument for making `path` authoritative applies verbatim here.
kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` + `edit` only
(src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) and carries no
`old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either key appearing in a Kimi payload is
always model-supplied — exactly like `file_path`.
Verified end-to-end against the reviewer's payload: a cross-root write
carrying `new_string: ""` alongside an injected `edit[].new` left
gsd-prompt-guard reading '' and returning at its `if (!content)` guard, so the
injection advisory never fired and the reconstructed content was never
scanned. `new_string: null` behaved identically. Negative-controlled: both
produce empty output against pre-fix source and fire the advisory after.
Chose unconditional reconstruction over the offered `typeof` alternative
deliberately. A type test closes `""`/`null` but leaves the interesting case
open — a benign NON-EMPTY decoy (`new_string: "chore: tidy"`) shadows just as
effectively and passes any type test. The new suite includes that case
specifically; it is what discriminates between the two candidate fixes.
Also pins the kimi-cli SHA in the authoritative-path comment, as requested —
it cited file names with no version while the issue pins 4a550ef.
Landed byte-identically across all five inlined copies; the parity test's
byte-identity assertion holds.
Refs #2547
* fix(#2547): close the non-string file_path crash-to-allow at every read site
Review Major 3: the crash-to-allow was closed only as a side effect of `path`
masking the bad value, while the changeset read as though it were closed
outright. Confirmed both of the review's reachability claims: `[]`/`{}`/`42`
are truthy, survive the `!rawFilePath` early-out, and throw inside
path.isAbsolute() into the outer `catch { process.exit(0) }`; and normalization
returns early for native Claude Code payloads (KIMI_TOOL_NAMES has no 'Edit'
entry), so `{"tool_name":"Edit","tool_input":{"file_path":[]}}` reached it
untouched — this guard's original #260 surface.
Reproduced on a real fixture: string cross-root path exits 2, the identical
payload with `[]` or `{}` exits 0.
Swept the class rather than the instance. Five more untyped read sites across
four other hooks, each one line from a type-strict or method-dependent call.
Census of what each can actually do:
gsd-worktree-path-guard.js:173 BLOCKS -> live bypass (the review's finding)
gsd-prompt-guard.js:128 scanner -> silenced the injection scan, the
same outcome as Major 2 by another
route; verified empirically
gsd-workflow-guard.js:206 advisory only (its exit-2 is the Bash
force-add path, which reads
`command`, not `file_path`)
gsd-read-guard.js:141 advisory only
gsd-read-injection-scanner.js:213 advisory only
gsd-windsurf-pre-write.js:75 ALREADY TYPED — the shape adopted here
All six now read typed. The workflow-guard site keeps its truthiness fallback
(`(typeof x === 'string' && x) || ...`) because a bare type test would let an
empty `file_path` shortcut the `path` fallback.
Also declares one swept hit NOT fixed: `gsd-workflow-guard.js:175` reads
`command` untyped on a genuinely blocking path. Same shape, but not
exploitable — unlike file_path/path there is no second field carrying the
executable value, so a non-string command cannot smuggle a real `git add -f`
past the block. Left alone rather than widen this PR into the Bash path.
The regression gate is a SOURCE-level invariant, not a behavioural one, and
that is deliberate: the fixed read and the crashing read are black-box
identical — both end at exit 0, one via the catch and one via the early-out.
A test asserting exit 0 on a non-string payload passes against the unfixed
code, which is the same false-green the review flagged in the existing
`['non-string file_path (array)', []]` cases. Repeating it one level up would
be no better. tests/kimi-guard-typed-payload-reads.test.cjs fails if any hook
regresses to an untyped read (negative-controlled: it reports all five
pre-fix sites with correct file:line).
The behavioural cases requested — non-string file_path with NO `path` key —
are added to worktree-safety.test.cjs and labelled honestly as documenting the
explicit fail-open rather than detecting a revert.
Also states the relative-path premise (review Minor 5) at the early-out that
depends on it: "always safe" holds only while every runtime reaching there
resolves relative paths against the tool CWD. Claude Code satisfies it by
requiring absolute paths; kimi-cli's resolution behaviour is NOT verified here
and is recorded as an unverified premise rather than an asserted bypass.
Refs #2547
* docs(#2547): correct the changeset's closed-claim and fold the misattributed note
Review Major 3 also flagged the fragment: it said the non-string vector "threw
inside that guard's path.isAbsolute() ... `path` now wins outright", which
reads as closed when it was closed only conditionally. Rewritten to state what
is now true — closed unconditionally at all six read sites — and extended with
the Major 2 finding.
Review Minor 6 (the #2547 scope note living in a `pr: 2518` fragment) turns out
to understate the problem. Rendering the changelog and re-parsing it shows the
note is not merely misattributed — it is DROPPED. serializeChangelog emits each
fragment as a single `- ` bullet, and parseChangelog terminates a bullet at the
first non-continuation line, so everything after a blank line is lost on
re-parse. Audited all 44 fragments: exactly one was lossy —
2304-kimi-guard-tool-name.md, losing 656 of 1730 characters, i.e. precisely
that second paragraph. Folding it into this PR's fragment fixes the
attribution and the silent loss together; all 44 now round-trip losslessly.
That same mechanism is why the remaining nit — reformat this fragment's
~2,000-character paragraph for readability — is NOT applied. A paragraph break
or a bullet list would silently truncate the entry at the first blank line
(verified for both). The single-paragraph form is load-bearing under the
current serializer, not an authoring preference. Worth its own issue; noted in
the PR thread rather than worked around here.
Refs #2547
* chore(#2547): regenerate golden install parity after rebase onto next
Rebased onto `next` @
|
||
|
Tom Boucher
|
7e905aa137 |
feat(#2505): Phase 0 — Kimi PreToolUse guard vocabulary normalization (precondition; carries PR #2326 forward) (#2518)
* fix(#2304): normalize Kimi tool vocabulary in PreToolUse guard payload checks
The Kimi [[hooks]] registrations translate the matcher to Kimi's tool
vocabulary (WriteFile|StrReplaceFile) but the guard scripts early-exit
unless the payload's tool_name is a Claude name (Write/Edit/MultiEdit),
so every guard was dormant on Kimi: the matcher fired, the script saw
WriteFile, and exit(0)'d.
Normalize the payload's tool_name at the top of each guard
(WriteFile -> Write, StrReplaceFile -> Edit; bare or module-qualified
kimi_cli.tools.file:* forms) before the check. Inlined per guard rather
than a hooks/lib/ helper because hook scripts are staged as standalone
files on every hook surface, and a sibling require is a staging
dependency that can fail silently.
Regression tests pipe Kimi-vocabulary payloads at each guard and assert
it engages (typed fields: exit status, decision, hookSpecificOutput) —
verified red against the pre-fix scripts, green after.
* fix(#2304): normalize Kimi tool_input fields and route block reasons to stderr
Cross-AI review of the initial fix, verified against kimi-cli source,
found the tool_name normalization alone leaves the guards dormant on a
real Kimi runtime: kimi-cli forwards tool_input verbatim
(src/kimi_cli/hooks/events.py), and its tool schemas
(src/kimi_cli/tools/file/{write,replace}.py) use path/content and
edit.old/edit.new (single Edit or list) — not Claude's
file_path/old_string/new_string. The guards read file_path, got '',
and exited 0 past the now-open tool_name gate.
Extend the per-guard normalization to the payload fields
(path -> file_path, edit -> old_string/new_string with list flattening),
and write the worktree guard's block reason to stderr as well as the
stdout JSON — Kimi feeds stderr, not stdout, back to the model on
exit 2 (docs/en/customization/hooks.md exit-code table).
Regression tests rewritten to Kimi's actual payload shapes (plus an
edit-list case and a stderr-reason assertion) — verified red against
the name-only fix, green after.
* fix(#2304): join all edit[] entries into old_string, matching new_string
Review nit on #2326: old_string took only edits[0].old while new_string
joined the whole list. Symmetric join removes the latent trap for any
future consumer sizing before/after content (e.g. the #2255 write guard).
* fix(#2304): normalize Kimi ReadFile vocabulary in read-injection scanner
Review Major 2 on #2326: gsd-read-injection-scanner.js had the identical
dormancy — its Kimi matcher fires on 'ReadFile' but the SCANNED_TOOLS
check only knew 'Read', so injected content in read files was never
flagged on Kimi installs.
Folds the same inlined normalization block into the scanner and extends
the shared KIMI_TOOL_NAMES map with ReadFile:'Read' in all four copies so
they stay byte-identical. Harmless in the three write guards: a
normalized 'Read' falls out of their Write/Edit allowlist exactly as the
unmapped name did. Field mapping verified against kimi-cli upstream
(src/kimi_cli/tools/file/read.py Params.path); the existing
path->file_path copy covers the scanner's file_path read.
* test(#2304): parity test binding the four inlined Kimi normalization copies
Review Major 1 on #2326: KIMI_TOOL_NAMES + normalizeKimiPayload is
deliberately inlined in four hook scripts (staging-dependency rationale,
unchanged), with the inverse table in bin/install.js — five
hand-maintained surfaces and nothing binding them.
Static binding, zero runtime coupling:
- the four inlined blocks must be byte-identical;
- each guard-map entry must be the value-inverse of
convertKimiToolName() for its Claude name;
- every guard-relevant Claude tool (Write/Edit/MultiEdit/Read) must have
a reverse entry — a vocabulary rename or extension that updates the
installer without updating the guards now fails in CI instead of
leaving a guard silently dormant (the #2304 recurrence door).
Negative-controlled: diverging one copy or dropping a map entry fails
the suite against the fixed code.
* test(#2304): regenerate golden parity fixtures for guard hook changes
CI red on #2326: all 10 golden-parity failures were the staged guard
hooks drifting from their fixtures. Regenerated with npm run gen:golden
(after npm run build) under throwaway HOME/CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR; diff
verified to change exactly the four PR-touched guard entries per
surface, nothing else.
* test(#2304): regression tests for Kimi ReadFile engaging the scanner
Mirrors the per-guard Kimi vocabulary tests the PR added for the three
write guards: bare and module-qualified ReadFile produce the advisory,
path exclusions still apply post-normalization, unknown Kimi names stay
fail-open. Negative-controlled against the pre-fold scanner (the two
positive cases fail there; exclusion/fall-through correctly pass on
both sides).
* fix(#2304): normalize Kimi Shell vocabulary in workflow guard
Withdraws the disclosed out-of-scope split: verification showed the
Bash->Shell case needs NO different mapping — kimi-cli's Shell.Params
names its field `command` (src/kimi_cli/tools/shell/__init__.py), same
as Claude's Bash — and the guard's write branch (Write/Edit/MultiEdit
allowlist) was ALSO dormant on Kimi under its Shell|WriteFile|
StrReplaceFile matcher. Same defect class as the other four hooks.
Folds the identical inlined block into gsd-workflow-guard.js and
extends the shared map with Shell:'Bash' in all five copies (harmless
outside the workflow guard: a normalized Bash falls out of the other
guards' checks as before). Parity test now binds five copies and adds
Bash to the dormancy alarm. New workflow-guard test file exercises the
observable block (force-add on a worktree-agent branch): Shell bare and
module-qualified block with WORKTREE_AGENT_FORCE_ADD_FORBIDDEN, benign
Shell passes, Claude Bash unchanged — negative-controlled against the
pre-fold guard (the two Kimi cases fail there). Golden parity fixtures
regenerated; diff verified to change exactly the five guard entries per
surface.
* fix(#2304): map Kimi tool_output and route workflow-guard block to stderr
Third-party review (cross-AI verifier) caught two gaps in the revision:
1. Kimi PostToolUse events carry `tool_output`, not `tool_response`
(kimi-cli src/kimi_cli/hooks/events.py post_tool_use()), so the
read-injection scanner — which reads data.tool_response — was STILL
dormant on real Kimi payloads; the earlier tests passed because they
sent Claude-shaped payloads. The shared normalization block now maps
tool_output -> tool_response (inert in PreToolUse guards, where the
field is absent), and the scanner's Kimi tests send the real shape.
2. The workflow guard's force-add block wrote its reason to stdout only.
Kimi's exit-2 protocol feeds stderr back to the model — the exact
fix this PR already applied to the other blocking guard — so the
newly-awakened block would have been a silent denial. Reason now
also routed to stderr, asserted in the test.
Also: the scanner's "unknown name" test now uses a genuinely unmapped
name (FetchURL) — Shell stopped qualifying when it entered the map —
and the workflow guard's write branch (WriteFile advisory,
StrReplaceFile .planning pass) gains behavioral coverage. All five
copies stay byte-identical (parity test green); golden fixtures
regenerated, diff verified to the five guard entries per surface.
Negative-controlled: 3 new assertions fail against the pre-fix hooks.
* docs(#2304): update changeset to cover the full five-guard fix
Review round 2 (2026-07-18) flagged the changeset as stale: it was
written for the first commit and still described only the three guards
named in the issue. The shipped diff grew to five guards plus two
payload dimensions the original body never mentioned. The body now
names gsd-read-injection-scanner and gsd-workflow-guard, the ReadFile
and Shell vocabulary entries, the tool_output -> tool_response mapping,
and the workflow guard's stderr block-reason routing.
* test(#2304): regenerate kilo golden fixture after #2305 landed on next
The branch's fixture sweep predates
|
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|
Alex V.
|
a63684c222 |
enhance(#1577): WebFetch/WebSearch injection isolation + opt-in blocking (#1585)
* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents (randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring); opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking). arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth). * fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized - A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control. - A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads. - A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention). - A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale). - A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input. - Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) + drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as the noted pre-existing follow-up. * fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions', 'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md, TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it. Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15. * fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions (gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10. - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset. - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source- document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools. INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset reworded 8 -> 10. Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39. * docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam trek-e Major 2 + Minor: - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model. - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry. Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green. * test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary (git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File now diffs/blames line-by-line. Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain. * docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner. * docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs. --------- Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com> |
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|
Tom Boucher
|
e32a53b974 |
feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (#133)
* test(113): add per-rule failing tests + hostile fixture for markdown link payloads RED phase for issue #113 — scanForInjection() currently returns { clean: true } for markdown links containing javascript:, data:text/html, userinfo credentials, and token-in-query payloads. Changes: - tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/context-malicious-markdown-link.md: Extended to contain one hostile example per rule class (MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME, MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY) plus benign negative controls (data:image/png, mailto:, https://github.com, port-only URL). - tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs: - Flipped PINNED "malicious-markdown-link fixture is NOT flagged" assertion to "malicious-markdown-link fixture is flagged by scanner" (forward-looking). - Added 4×positive + 4×negative per-rule unit tests asserting structuredFindings with ruleId, file, line, match fields. - Added parity guard: every MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS source string from security.cjs must appear in gsd-read-injection-scanner.js hook source. D3 false-positive grep: 0 legitimate matches — no allowlist entries needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (security.cjs + hook) GREEN phase for issue #113. Rule details (all with primary source citations): MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME Flags ](javascript:...) regardless of case. Source: OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME Flags data: URIs NOT in the explicit safe-list. Safe-list: image/(png|jpeg|gif|webp|bmp|ico|avif|heic) and font/(woff2?|otf|ttf). data:image/svg+xml is intentionally BLOCKED — SVG can host <script>. Source: OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet — SVG Files https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html#svg-files MD-LINK-USERINFO Flags https?://user:pass@host in markdown link targets. Does NOT fire on: mailto:user@host (no :// before user) or https://host:443/path (port, not userinfo). Source: RFC 3986 §3.2.1 (userinfo syntax) https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-3.2.1 RFC 9110 §4.2.4 (HTTP deprecates userinfo) https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-4.2.4 MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY Flags key NAMES: token, access_token, id_token, refresh_token, api_key, apikey, secret, password, client_secret, code — regardless of value. Source: RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP §4.3.1 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700#section-4.3.1 D3 false-positive grep: 0 legitimate matches in codebase — no allowlist needed. Architecture: - scripts/security.cjs: canonical MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS export, scanForInjection() extended with structuredFindings (ruleId, file, line, match) via opts.file. - hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js: patterns inlined for hook independence (same pattern sources, verified by parity test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(113): flip PINNED malicious-markdown-link assertion and add parity guard REFACTOR phase — tightening test rigor after test-rigor skill review: 1. Fixture assertion now enumerates all 4 expected ruleIds explicitly: [MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME, MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME, MD-LINK-USERINFO, MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY]. Previously findings.length > 0 would pass even if 3 of 4 rules were broken. 2. line field assertions tightened: `f.line >= 1` (meaningful lower bound for 1-based line numbers) instead of `typeof f.line === 'number'` (vacuous). 3. match field assertions tightened to check the hostile content is present: - MD-LINK-JS-SCHEME: /javascript:/i in match - MD-LINK-DATA-SCHEME: /data:/i in match - MD-LINK-USERINFO: /@/ in match (the @ character is the definitive userinfo marker) - MD-LINK-TOKEN-IN-QUERY: /token=/i in match 4. Parity test checks actual RegExp .source strings (not just lengths), verifying the hook contains the exact canonical pattern sources character-for-character. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#113): add changeset fragment + Windows/Node 24 state.test compatibility 1. .changeset/113-malicious-markdown-links.md — required Security fragment for the user-facing markdown-link scanner changes in this PR (changeset-lint was failing with FAIL_MISSING_FRAGMENT). 2. get-shit-done/bin/lib/state-command-router.cjs — add OUTPUT_ON_SDK_ERROR set for mutation state subcommands whose CJS contract is always exit-0. On Windows/Node 24 the SDK bridge returns result.ok===false for validation failures (e.g. state record-metric --phase 1 with no --plan/--duration), causing dispatchViaSdk() to call error() (exit 1) instead of output({error}) (exit 0). The fix maps SDK non-ok results to JSON output for the affected mutation commands (record-metric, advance-plan, record-session, add-decision, add-blocker, resolve-blocker, update-progress), restoring the exit-0 CJS contract on all platforms. tests/state.test.cjs:1161 "returns error when required fields missing" passes locally (104/104 pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jeremy McSpadden
|
3856b53098 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into fix/2406-ship-read-injection-scanner
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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Tom Boucher
|
c35997fb0b |
feat(hooks): add gsd-read-injection-scanner PostToolUse hook (#2201) (#2328)
* feat: add /gsd-spec-phase — Socratic spec refinement with ambiguity scoring (#2213) Introduces `/gsd-spec-phase <phase>` as an optional pre-step before discuss-phase. Clarifies WHAT a phase delivers (requirements, boundaries, acceptance criteria) with quantitative ambiguity scoring before discuss-phase handles HOW to implement. - `commands/gsd/spec-phase.md` — slash command routing to workflow - `get-shit-done/workflows/spec-phase.md` — full Socratic interview loop (up to 6 rounds, 5 rotating perspectives: Researcher, Simplifier, Boundary Keeper, Failure Analyst, Seed Closer) with weighted 4-dimension ambiguity gate (≤ 0.20 to write SPEC.md) - `get-shit-done/templates/spec.md` — SPEC.md template with falsifiable requirements (Current/Target/Acceptance per requirement), Boundaries, Acceptance Criteria, Ambiguity Report, and Interview Log; includes two full worked examples - `get-shit-done/workflows/discuss-phase.md` — new `check_spec` step detects `{padded_phase}-SPEC.md` at startup; displays "Found SPEC.md — N requirements locked. Focusing on implementation decisions."; `analyze_phase` respects `spec_loaded` flag to skip "what/why" gray areas; `write_context` emits `<spec_lock>` section with boundary summary and canonical ref to SPEC.md - `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` — update command/workflow counts (74→75, 71→72) Closes #2213 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(hooks): add gsd-read-injection-scanner PostToolUse hook (#2201) Adds a new PostToolUse hook that scans content returned by the Read tool for prompt injection patterns, including four summarisation-specific patterns (retention-directive, permanence-claim, etc.) that survive context compression. Defense-in-depth for long GSD sessions where the context summariser cannot distinguish user instructions from content read from external files. - Advisory-only (warns without blocking), consistent with gsd-prompt-guard.js - LOW severity for 1-2 patterns, HIGH for 3+ - Inlined pattern library (hook independence) - Exclusion list: .planning/, REVIEW.md, CHECKPOINT, security docs, hook sources - Wired in install.js as PostToolUse matcher: Read, timeout: 5s - Added to MANAGED_HOOKS for staleness detection - 19 tests covering all 13 acceptance criteria (SCAN-01–07, EXCL-01–06, EDGE-01–06) Closes #2201 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): add read-injection-scanner files to prompt-injection-scan allowlist Test payloads in tests/read-injection-scanner.test.cjs and inlined patterns in hooks/gsd-read-injection-scanner.js legitimately contain injection strings. Add both to the CI script allowlist to prevent false-positive failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): assert exitCode, stdout, and signal explicitly in EDGE-05 Addresses CodeRabbit feedback: the success path discarded the return value so a malformed-JSON input that produced stdout would still pass. Now captures and asserts all three observable properties. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |