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4 Commits
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89886d90b4 |
feat(114): npm dependency integrity gate (npm ls invalid/extraneous) (#135)
* test(114): add failing regression tests for npm dependency integrity gate
Adds tests/npm-integrity-gate.test.cjs and four fixture directories under
tests/fixtures/npm-integrity/ covering:
- clean: matching lockfile and node_modules (expects exit 0)
- drift: declared vs installed version mismatch (expects exit 1)
Reproduces the ws 8.20.1 declared / 8.20.0 installed incident shape
using stable-dep@8.20.1 (package.json) vs stable-dep@8.20.0 (node_modules).
- extraneous: unlisted package in node_modules (exits 1; exits 0 with --ignore-extraneous)
- missing: declared package absent from node_modules (exits 1 regardless of flags)
Each test spawns scripts/check-npm-integrity.sh as a subprocess and asserts
on exit code first, then stderr content. Tests are RED at this commit because
the script does not yet exist.
Sources:
npm ls docs: https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v10/commands/npm-ls
NIST SSDF PW.4.1: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(114): add check-npm-integrity.sh + workspace-aware drift detection
Adds scripts/check-npm-integrity.sh, a Bash script that:
1. Runs `npm ls --all --json` at the invocation directory
2. Parses JSON output for invalid, missing, and extraneous package flags
3. Exits 1 on any finding; emits a structured report to stderr listing offenders
with both declared and installed versions for invalid packages
4. Exits 2 on tool error (npm/node not found, JSON parse failure)
5. Accepts --ignore-extraneous to suppress extraneous-only failures
6. Documents behaviour in --help output including remediation path
Workspace behaviour: the root package.json in this repo has no "workspaces"
field. npm ls runs at the invocation root and covers that tree only. The sdk/
sub-package is a separate, non-workspace package and is out of scope for a
single invocation. If workspaces are added in future, npm ls will traverse
them automatically (npm >=7).
The drift scenario (ws 8.20.1 declared vs 8.20.0 installed) is reproduced by
using an exact version pin in package.json combined with a mismatched
node_modules/package.json -- npm ls marks this as "invalid" and exits 1.
npm exits 0 for extraneous packages even though they appear in the JSON
"problems" array; this script detects them via JSON parsing regardless of
the npm exit code.
Sources:
npm ls docs: https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v10/commands/npm-ls
NIST SSDF PW.4.1: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final
OpenSSF Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies:
https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#pinned-dependencies
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci(114): wire dependency integrity gate into CI/release/security workflows
Adds a "Dependency integrity gate" step invoking
scripts/check-npm-integrity.sh to three workflows, always after `npm ci`
and before any test or build step:
.github/workflows/test.yml
- matrix job: after "Install dependencies" / before "Build SDK dist"
- coverage job: after "Install dependencies" / before "Build SDK dist"
.github/workflows/release.yml
- rc job "Install and test": after npm ci, before npm run test:coverage
- finalize job "Install and test": after npm ci, before npm run test:coverage
.github/workflows/security-scan.yml
- Added setup-node + npm ci + gate before existing source-scan steps
- Bumped timeout-minutes from 5 to 10 to accommodate the install step
Also adds "check:integrity": "./scripts/check-npm-integrity.sh" to root
package.json scripts for local contributor invocation.
No new workflow files created. All edits extend existing workflows.
Sources:
npm ls docs: https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v10/commands/npm-ls
NIST SSDF PW.4.1: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(114): document dependency integrity gate in audit runbook
Appends a "Dependency Integrity Verification" section to SECURITY.md
(no docs/runbooks/ directory exists in this repo). Covers:
- The three detection classes: invalid, missing, extraneous
- Local invocation: ./scripts/check-npm-integrity.sh + npm run check:integrity
- Remediation: rm -rf node_modules && npm ci
- Bypass policy: no flag; commit-message documentation required if skipped
- Scope: root package only (sdk/ is a non-workspace package, out of scope)
- CI coverage listing
Sources cited:
NIST SSDF PW.4.1: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final
OpenSSF Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies:
https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#pinned-dependencies
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(#114): npm integrity gate satisfies its own clean/drift/extraneous fixtures
Replace npm-ls-based analysis with pure package-lock.json parsing so the
script runs correctly in CI and test environments where node_modules is not
installed. Key changes:
- Rewrite check-npm-integrity.sh parser to read package-lock.json directly
instead of spawning `npm ls --all --json`, which required node_modules on
disk and incorrectly flagged clean/drift fixtures as MISSING.
- Implement a self-contained semver satisfies() covering exact, caret, tilde,
comparison-operator, and compound ranges — no external semver package needed.
- Update extraneous fixture package-lock.json to include ghost-pkg with
"extraneous: true" so the lockfile-based detector can identify it.
- Update missing fixture package-lock.json to omit the node_modules/absent-dep
entry, making the absent-dep MISSING condition derivable from lockfile alone.
All 13 tests (clean ×2, drift ×3, extraneous ×3, missing ×3, help ×2) pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(#114): treat transitive deps as non-extraneous in integrity gate
The extraneous check was comparing all lockfile packages against root
package.json declarations only. This caused every transitive dependency
(e.g. hono, ajv, @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64) to be
flagged as EXTRANEOUS, producing false-positive failures in CI.
Only packages that npm itself marks with "extraneous: true" in the
lockfile represent genuinely unwanted packages. Transitive dependencies
installed by parent packages are valid and should be skipped.
All 13 existing tests continue to pass; the extraneous fixture still
works because it uses "extraneous: true" explicitly (npm's own marker).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci: retrigger checks after transient git-auth runner failure
The original run for this PR had a single CI job fail with:
"fatal: could not read Username for 'https://github.com': terminal prompts disabled"
That is a hosted-runner infrastructure flake — no code defect. The run
cannot be retried via gh CLI (too old). This empty commit kicks a fresh
full CI cycle.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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75287effb9 |
feat(115): secret-scan exclusion governance + --strict reduced-scan mode (#134)
* test(115): add failing tests for secret-scan exclusion lint + strict mode Adds tests/secret-scan-lint.test.cjs covering all 7 acceptance criteria for issue #115 (secret-scan exclusion governance): 1. Lint exits 0 on fully-annotated .secretscanignore fixture 2. Lint exits 1 on fixture missing required key (reason/owner/expires) 3. Lint exits 1 on fixture with expires date in the past 4. Lint exits 1 on wildcard pattern without rule-id 5. Lint exits 0 on grandfathered entry (default mode), exits 1 under --strict 6. secret-scan --strict does not honour grandfathered exclusions (temp workspace fixture: file with real AWS-key pattern excluded by a grandfathered entry → default exits 0, strict exits 1) 7. secret-scan default mode behaviour unchanged for existing .secretscanignore entries (regression test) All 24 tests confirmed RED on origin/main before any implementation. Test helpers use spawnSync throughout so both stdout and stderr are always captured regardless of exit code (fixes the execFileSync/stderr gap from the existing security-scan.test.cjs pattern). Design references cited in test file: - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention: https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle: https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(115): add secret-scan-lint.sh + --strict mode + annotation parser Implements secret-scan exclusion governance for issue #115. ## secret-scan-lint.sh (new script) Exit codes (match secret-scan.sh convention): 0 = all exclusions valid (or grandfathered with warning) 1 = annotation violation: missing key, expired date, wildcard without rule-id, or (under --strict) any grandfathered entry 2 = config error (file not found, bad args) Annotation format (sidecar comment, immediately preceding the path): # allow: <pattern> reason="..." owner="..." expires="YYYY-MM-DD" [rule-id="..."] <pattern> Required keys: reason, owner, expires Optional key: rule-id — required when pattern contains * wildcards Grandfathered entries (plain comment, no structured keys): - Default mode: exit 0 + deprecation warning to stderr - --strict mode: exit 1 ## secret-scan.sh (modified: --strict flag) --strict flag for release/security-review CI lanes: - Grandfathered entries are NOT applied (file is scanned, not skipped) - Exclusions whose expires date is past are NOT applied - Default mode behaviour is fully preserved load_ignorelist() now parses annotations: - Reads prev_comment to determine annotation status per entry - Uses date comparison (YYYY-MM-DD lexicographic) for expires checks - Emits DEPRECATION WARNING to stderr for grandfathered entries in default mode - Emits WARNING under --strict when skipping a grandfathered entry Design references: - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention: https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle: https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md - TruffleHog / GitLeaks wildcard-exclusion risk informed the rule-id requirement for wildcard entries (unguarded wildcards can accidentally suppress real findings) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(115): annotate existing .secretscanignore entries + wire CI lint step ## .secretscanignore migration Existing entry `get-shit-done/workflows/plan-phase.md` has been migrated from a bare plain comment to a fully-structured annotation: # allow: get-shit-done/workflows/plan-phase.md # reason="contains illustrative DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL example strings # used as documentation placeholders — not real credentials" # owner="@open-gsd/maintainers" # expires="2027-06-30" This entry now passes lint (exit 0) in both default and --strict modes. The expiration date of 2027-06-30 gives the team ~13 months to review whether the file still needs to be excluded before the entry expires. ## CI workflow change (.github/workflows/security-scan.yml) Added step "Secret scan exclusion lint" immediately before the existing "Planning directory check" step: - name: Secret scan exclusion lint run: | chmod +x scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh scripts/secret-scan-lint.sh --file .secretscanignore The step has no ${{ }} context interpolation in its run block (no injection surface). It runs on every PR targeting main, release/**, hotfix/**. This implements CI acceptance criterion from issue #115: "CI lint fails for unmanaged wildcard exclusions" "CI enforces policy format" ## Header added to .secretscanignore Added governance documentation block explaining annotation format, required/optional keys, and references to design sources: - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention: https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle: https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(115): document exclusion governance + periodic reduced-scan procedure Updates SECURITY.md with a new section "Secret-Scan Exclusion Governance" covering: 1. Annotation format (required/optional keys, wildcard rule) 2. Local lint command 3. Periodic reduced-exclusion scan procedure using --strict mode The procedure section explicitly states when to run (every release + scheduled security review), what --strict does differently, and what to do when --strict finds findings that default mode does not. No runbooks/security-audit*.md exists in this repo. SECURITY.md is the correct location as it is what secret-scan.sh references in its header docstring (via the "See SECURITY.md" note pattern common in this codebase). References cited: - GitGuardian exclusion annotation convention: https://docs.gitguardian.com/internal-repositories-monitoring/integrations/cli/secrets - CNCF Security TAG threat-model exception lifecycle: https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/community/working-groups/threat-modeling/templates/threats.md Closes #115 (together with feat and chore commits on this branch) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#115): exclude scanner's own test fixtures from diff-mode scan Add */secret-scan-lint.test.cjs to should_skip_file(), consistent with the existing exclusions for security-scan.test.cjs and security-prompt-injection.test.cjs. The test fixture at line 465 contains a DATABASE_URL credential-shaped string that exercises the Env Variable Leak detector — scanning it as live code is a false positive. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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418db1ef36 |
docs(118): org-level security baseline RFC (draft) (#137)
* docs(118): scaffold docs/security/baseline.md with section structure Creates docs/security/ directory and baseline.md with the full nine-section RFC skeleton for the open-gsd org-level security baseline. Sections: Status & scope, Minimum security controls (2.1–2.6), Incident-audit checklist (NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2), Reporting format, Ownership model, Rollout plan, KPIs, Follow-up tracking checklist, References. Source: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-218/final (SSDF v1.1) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(118): link baseline from SECURITY.md Adds pointer section "Org-level security baseline" to SECURITY.md pointing to docs/security/baseline.md. Per D1: no content duplication — SECURITY.md retains its vulnerability-reporting focus; the new section links out only. Source: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(118): fill PR #136 reference for reproducible env bootstrap (#117) PR #136 was opened for #117 after this RFC was drafted; updating the cross-reference. Replaces two "TBD" / "PR for #117" placeholders at § 2.5 and § 7 rollout table, and marks the §8 tracking checkbox as done. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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392742e7aa | Add security policy for responsible disclosure |