'use strict';

const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const os = require('node:os');
const path = require('node:path');
const test = require('node:test');

const helpers = require('./helpers.cjs');

const hooksSurface = require('../msd-core/bin/lib/runtime-hooks-surface.cjs');
const { install, installAllRuntimes, finishInstall } = require('../bin/install.js');

/**
 * Run `fn` with HOME/USERPROFILE pointed at a fresh temp dir and every
 * config-location env var scrubbed, so a real install() never touches the
 * developer's own config. Restores all of it, and cleans the dir, afterwards.
 */
function withSandboxedHome(t, prefix, fn) {
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), prefix));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const savedHome = process.env.HOME;
  const savedUserProfile = process.env.USERPROFILE;
  process.env.HOME = root;
  process.env.USERPROFILE = root;
  const restoreConfigLocationEnv = helpers.scrubConfigLocationEnv();
  try {
    return fn(root);
  } finally {
    if (savedHome === undefined) delete process.env.HOME;
    else process.env.HOME = savedHome;
    if (savedUserProfile === undefined) delete process.env.USERPROFILE;
    else process.env.USERPROFILE = savedUserProfile;
    restoreConfigLocationEnv();
  }
}

test('configured entrypoint validation exposes an aggregate typed boundary', () => {
  assert.equal(
    typeof hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints,
    'function',
    'the Runtime Hooks Surface must export configured-entrypoint validation',
  );
});

test('finishInstall rejects an invalid configured entrypoint before Done output', (t) => {
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-finish-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const logs = [];
  const originalLog = console.log;
  console.log = (...args) => logs.push(args.join(' '));
  // #2665/#4249: finishInstall asserts configured entrypoints before any of its
  // own writes now, but still sandbox HOME (+ USERPROFILE for os.homedir() on
  // Windows) and config-location env defensively, so a future reordering that
  // reintroduces a pre-assertion write can never redirect it to a live config dir.
  const savedHome = process.env.HOME;
  const savedUserProfile = process.env.USERPROFILE;
  process.env.HOME = root;
  process.env.USERPROFILE = root;
  const restoreConfigLocationEnv = helpers.scrubConfigLocationEnv();
  try {
    assert.throws(() => finishInstall(null, null, null, false, 'cursor', false, root, {
      configuredEntrypoints: [{ runtime: 'cursor', configPath: path.join(root, 'config'), scriptPath: path.join(root, 'missing.js') }],
    }), /Configured entrypoint validation failed/);
    // #4249 review, Major: the message must name the actual consequence for
    // the failing runtime, not just that something failed — Cursor has no
    // revert path, so its entry must be flagged "NOT reverted".
    assert.throws(() => finishInstall(null, null, null, false, 'cursor', false, root, {
      configuredEntrypoints: [{ runtime: 'cursor', configPath: path.join(root, 'config'), scriptPath: path.join(root, 'missing.js') }],
    }), /NOT reverted/);
  } finally {
    console.log = originalLog;
    restoreConfigLocationEnv();
    if (savedHome === undefined) delete process.env.HOME;
    else process.env.HOME = savedHome;
    if (savedUserProfile === undefined) delete process.env.USERPROFILE;
    else process.env.USERPROFILE = savedUserProfile;
  }
  assert.equal(logs.some(line => line.includes('Done!')), false);
});

test('a hook already registered under a stale command is still tracked for validation on re-install (#4154 Blocker)', (t) => {
  withSandboxedHome(t, 'configured-entrypoint-stale-', () => {
    const first = install(true, 'claude');
    assert.ok(first.settingsPath, 'a fresh global install must produce a settings path');
    finishInstall(first.settingsPath, first.settings, first.statuslineCommand, false, 'claude', true, first.configDir, {
      configuredEntrypoints: first.configuredEntrypoints,
    });

    // Simulate an entry registered by an older installer under a DIFFERENT
    // node install (e.g. an nvm switch, #4087/#4098/#4137): same real
    // scriptPath under <configDir>/hooks/ (that never changes across
    // installer versions) and still shaped as the modern runtime-resolving
    // chain (rewriteLegacyManagedNodeHookCommands deliberately never touches
    // an already-current-format entry — #3662), but baked with a node path
    // this install would never produce. `hasMsdUpdateHook` still finds it and
    // applySettingsJsonHooks takes its register-only-if-absent branch on the
    // next install (never rewriting it).
    const onDisk = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(first.settingsPath, 'utf8'));
    const staleEntry = (onDisk.hooks.SessionStart || []).find(entry =>
      entry.hooks && entry.hooks.some(h => h.command && h.command.includes('msd-check-update.js'))
    );
    assert.ok(staleEntry, 'a fresh install must register the check-update hook');
    const staleCommand = hooksSurface.buildHookCommand(first.configDir, 'msd-check-update.js', {
      execPath: '/old/nvm/pinned/node',
      platform: process.platform,
      runtime: 'claude',
    });
    for (const h of staleEntry.hooks) {
      if (h.command && h.command.includes('msd-check-update.js')) {
        h.command = staleCommand;
      }
    }
    fs.writeFileSync(first.settingsPath, JSON.stringify(onDisk, null, 2));

    const second = install(true, 'claude');
    const trackedNames = (second.configuredEntrypoints || []).map(entry => path.basename(entry.scriptPath));
    assert.ok(
      trackedNames.includes('msd-check-update.js'),
      `a hook already registered under a stale command must still be tracked for validation, got: ${trackedNames.join(', ')}`,
    );
  });
});

test('configured entrypoint validation aggregates file and interpreter failures without execution', (t) => {
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const directory = path.join(root, 'directory');
  fs.mkdirSync(directory);

  const unreadablePath = path.join(root, 'unreadable.js');
  const notExecutablePath = path.join(root, 'not-executable.js');

  const result = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([
    { runtime: 'claude', configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'), scriptPath: path.join(root, 'missing.js') },
    { runtime: 'claude', configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'), scriptPath: directory },
    { runtime: 'claude', configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'), scriptPath: __filename, interpreterCandidates: ['missing-node'] },
    { runtime: 'claude', configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'), scriptPath: unreadablePath },
    // #4249: selfExecutable means this entry is invoked directly via its own
    // shebang (e.g. a Windows-Claude .sh hook) — must itself be +x.
    // platform pinned to non-win32: the X_OK check itself is a POSIX-only
    // concept (skipped entirely on win32, matching production) — this case
    // must exercise it deterministically regardless of which OS runs the test.
    { runtime: 'claude', configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'), scriptPath: notExecutablePath, selfExecutable: true, platform: 'linux' },
  ], {
    resolveExecutableBinary: () => null,
    statSync: (p) => {
      if (p === unreadablePath) {
        const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
        err.code = 'EACCES';
        throw err;
      }
      return fs.statSync(p === notExecutablePath ? __filename : p);
    },
    accessSync: (p, mode) => {
      if (p === notExecutablePath && mode === fs.constants.X_OK) {
        const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
        err.code = 'EACCES';
        throw err;
      }
      // notExecutablePath is never written to disk (its statSync mock above
      // redirects to a real file instead) — its R_OK call must redirect too,
      // or this falls through to a real accessSync on a nonexistent path.
      return fs.accessSync(p === notExecutablePath ? __filename : p, mode);
    },
  });

  assert.equal(result.ok, false);
  assert.deepEqual(result.invalid.map(({ role, reason }) => [role, reason]), [
    ['script', 'missing'],
    ['script', 'wrong-file-type'],
    ['interpreter', 'unresolved-interpreter'],
    ['script', 'unreadable'],
    ['script', 'not-executable'],
  ]);
});

test('an interpreter-invoked script that exists but has no read permission is reported unreadable, not ok (#4249 agy review)', (t) => {
  // statSync only needs search (+x) permission on the parent directories, so
  // it succeeds on a chmod-000 file even though `node <script>` would fail
  // with EACCES at hook-fire time.
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-unreadable-interp-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const scriptPath = path.join(root, 'hook.js');
  fs.writeFileSync(scriptPath, '// unreadable to the invoking user at hook-fire time\n');

  const result = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([
    {
      runtime: 'claude',
      configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'),
      scriptPath,
      interpreterCandidates: ['/usr/bin/node'],
    },
  ], {
    resolveExecutableBinary: () => '/usr/bin/node',
    accessSync: (p, mode) => {
      if (p === scriptPath && mode === fs.constants.R_OK) {
        const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
        err.code = 'EACCES';
        throw err;
      }
      return fs.accessSync(p, mode);
    },
  });

  assert.equal(result.ok, false);
  assert.deepEqual(result.invalid.map(({ role, reason }) => [role, reason]), [
    ['script', 'unreadable'],
  ]);
});

test('an EPERM from statSync (Windows equivalent of EACCES on a parent directory) is also reported unreadable, not missing (#4249 agy review)', (t) => {
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-eperm-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const scriptPath = path.join(root, 'hook.js');

  const result = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([
    { runtime: 'claude', configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'), scriptPath },
  ], {
    statSync: () => {
      const err = new Error('EPERM: operation not permitted');
      err.code = 'EPERM';
      throw err;
    },
  });

  assert.equal(result.ok, false);
  assert.deepEqual(result.invalid.map(({ role, reason }) => [role, reason]), [
    ['script', 'unreadable'],
  ]);
});

test('a selfExecutable + interpreterCandidates entry checks both the execute bit and the interpreter (#4249 CodeRabbit review — hybrid `env node` shebang)', (t) => {
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-self-exec-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const okScript = path.join(root, 'ok.js');
  const notExecScript = path.join(root, 'not-exec.js');
  fs.writeFileSync(okScript, '#!/usr/bin/env node\n');
  fs.writeFileSync(notExecScript, '#!/usr/bin/env node\n');

  const makeEntry = (scriptPath) => ({
    runtime: 'cursor',
    configPath: path.join(root, '.cursor', 'hooks', 'PreToolUse'),
    scriptPath,
    interpreterCandidates: ['node'],
    selfExecutable: true,
    // X_OK is a POSIX-only concept (skipped entirely on win32, matching
    // production) — pinned here so the execute-bit case below is exercised
    // deterministically regardless of which OS runs the test.
    platform: 'linux',
  });

  // plain writeFileSync never sets the execute bit (and the repo bans chmod
  // in tests), so every case below stubs accessSync to simulate the exact
  // permission state under test rather than relying on the real filesystem.
  const alwaysOk = () => {};

  // node missing from PATH entirely: caught even though the script itself is fine.
  const missingInterpreter = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([makeEntry(okScript)], {
    resolveExecutableBinary: () => null,
    accessSync: alwaysOk,
  });
  assert.equal(missingInterpreter.ok, false);
  assert.deepEqual(missingInterpreter.invalid.map(({ role, reason }) => [role, reason]), [
    ['interpreter', 'unresolved-interpreter'],
  ]);

  // node resolves fine, but the script itself lost its execute bit: caught too —
  // interpreterCandidates being present must not skip the X_OK check here.
  const notExecutable = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([makeEntry(notExecScript)], {
    resolveExecutableBinary: () => '/usr/bin/node',
    accessSync: (p, mode) => {
      if (p === notExecScript && mode === fs.constants.X_OK) {
        const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
        err.code = 'EACCES';
        throw err;
      }
    },
  });
  assert.equal(notExecutable.ok, false);
  assert.deepEqual(notExecutable.invalid.map(({ role, reason }) => [role, reason]), [
    ['script', 'not-executable'],
  ]);

  // both hold: clean pass.
  const clean = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([makeEntry(okScript)], {
    resolveExecutableBinary: () => '/usr/bin/node',
    accessSync: alwaysOk,
  });
  assert.equal(clean.ok, true);
});

test('a win32 selfExecutable entry (Codex .cmd shim) skips the execute-bit check (#4249 agy review)', (t) => {
  // POSIX mode bits don't mean executable on win32 — this must not depend on
  // Node's own accessSync(X_OK)-as-F_OK no-op (which only protects a real
  // Windows machine), or a test simulating win32 on a POSIX runner would see
  // a spurious 'not-executable' for a .cmd shim that was never chmod'd +x.
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-win32-cmd-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const cmdPath = path.join(root, 'msd-check-update.cmd');
  fs.writeFileSync(cmdPath, '@echo off\r\n');

  const result = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints([
    {
      runtime: 'codex',
      configPath: path.join(root, 'hooks.json'),
      scriptPath: cmdPath,
      platform: 'win32',
      selfExecutable: true,
    },
  ], {
    accessSync: (p, mode) => {
      if (mode === fs.constants.X_OK) {
        const err = new Error('EACCES: permission denied');
        err.code = 'EACCES';
        throw err;
      }
    },
  });

  assert.equal(result.ok, true, JSON.stringify(result));
});

test('runtime config writers expose the exact configured entrypoints they emit', (t) => {
  const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configured-entrypoint-writers-'));
  t.after(() => helpers.cleanup(root));
  const sourceRoot = path.join(__dirname, '..');

  const codexRoot = path.join(root, 'codex');
  // On win32, ensureCodexHooksJsonSessionStart writes a .cmd shim under
  // <codexRoot>/hooks/; the real installer only calls this once that dir
  // (and msd-check-update.js) already exist, so create it here too.
  fs.mkdirSync(path.join(codexRoot, 'hooks'), { recursive: true });
  const codex = hooksSurface.ensureCodexHooksJsonSessionStart(codexRoot, {
    absoluteRunner: JSON.stringify(process.execPath),
  });
  // win32 emits two entries (the .cmd shim plus the underlying script);
  // every other platform emits the script alone — assert the shape common
  // to both rather than a platform-fixed array.
  assert.ok(codex.configuredEntrypoints.length >= 1);
  assert.ok(codex.configuredEntrypoints.every(entry => entry.runtime === 'codex'
    && entry.configPath === path.join(codexRoot, 'hooks.json')
    && entry.platform === process.platform));
  assert.ok(codex.configuredEntrypoints.some(
    entry => path.basename(entry.scriptPath) === 'msd-check-update.js'
      && Array.isArray(entry.interpreterCandidates)
      && entry.interpreterCandidates.length === 1,
  ));

  const cursorRoot = path.join(root, 'cursor');
  const cursor = hooksSurface.writeCursorHooksJson(cursorRoot, sourceRoot, {
    managedHookEvents: ['sessionStart'],
  });
  assert.deepEqual(
    cursor.configuredEntrypoints.map(entry => path.basename(entry.scriptPath)),
    ['msd-cursor-session-start.js'],
  );
  assert.ok(cursor.configuredEntrypoints.every(entry => entry.configPath === cursor.hooksJsonPath));

  const portable = [];
  assert.ok(hooksSurface.buildHookCommand(root, 'msd-context-monitor.js', {
    runtime: 'claude',
    portableHooks: true,
    configPath: path.join(root, 'settings.json'),
    configuredEntrypoints: portable,
  }));
  assert.deepEqual(
    portable.map(entry => path.basename(entry.scriptPath)),
    ['msd-node-runner.sh', 'msd-context-monitor.js'],
  );
});

test('a minimal Codex rollback restores skills from the alternate skills home (#4249 CodeRabbit)', (t) => {
  withSandboxedHome(t, 'configured-entrypoint-codex-skills-', (root) => {
    const first = install(true, 'codex');
    // Codex resolves skills to $HOME/.agents/skills, NOT configDir (ADR-1239
    // skills-kind `home` override) — the surface #3245's own snapshot owns and
    // the manifest-driven pass deliberately leaves to it.
    const skillsRoot = path.join(root, '.agents', 'skills');
    const skillDir = fs.readdirSync(skillsRoot).find(name => name.startsWith('msd-'));
    assert.ok(skillDir, `a Codex install must write msd-* skills under ${skillsRoot}`);
    const skillFile = path.join(skillsRoot, skillDir, 'SKILL.md');

    const priorBytes = '# bytes only this test wrote\n';
    fs.writeFileSync(skillFile, priorBytes);

    // Marker-driven core profile — the `msd update` path into minimal mode.
    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(first.configDir, '.msd-profile'), 'core\n');
    const second = install(true, 'codex');
    second.rollbackPreInstallSnapshot();

    assert.equal(
      fs.existsSync(skillFile),
      true,
      'a minimal-mode rollback must not delete a skill dir it never snapshotted',
    );
    assert.equal(
      fs.readFileSync(skillFile, 'utf8'),
      priorBytes,
      'a minimal-mode rollback must restore alternate-home skills byte-for-byte',
    );
  });
});

// Drive a REAL aggregate failure through installAllRuntimes: delegate to the real
// validator, then append an invalid entry for the named runtime. Every real
// entrypoint is a path the installer just wrote, so there is no PATH trick left
// that fails one runtime's entry on its own.
function forceEntrypointFailureFor(runtime) {
  const real = hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints;
  hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints = (entries, deps) => {
    const result = real(entries, deps);
    const invalid = [...(result.invalid || []), {
      runtime, configPath: '/nonexistent/config', role: 'script', path: '/nonexistent/hook.js', reason: 'missing',
    }];
    return { ok: false, invalid };
  };
  return () => { hooksSurface.validateConfiguredEntrypoints = real; };
}

test('an aggregate entrypoint validation failure rolls the Codex install back (#4249)', (t) => {
  withSandboxedHome(t, 'configured-entrypoint-aggregate-', () => {
    const first = install(true, 'codex');
    // config.toml is the surface #3245's snapshot restores and the one this
    // runtime's writer rewrites on every install, so a sentinel surviving here
    // can only be the rollback's doing.
    const configPath = path.join(first.configDir, 'config.toml');
    const priorBytes = '# bytes only this test wrote\n';
    fs.writeFileSync(configPath, priorBytes);

    // Codex installs first, so the reversed rollback loop reaches its
    // restoreCodexSnapshot.
    const restore = forceEntrypointFailureFor('cursor');
    try {
      assert.throws(
        () => installAllRuntimes(['codex', 'cursor'], true, false),
        /Configured entrypoint validation failed/,
        'an invalid entrypoint must fail the aggregate gate',
      );
    } finally {
      restore();
    }

    assert.equal(
      fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8'),
      priorBytes,
      'the aggregate failure must reach restoreCodexSnapshot, not just throw',
    );
  });
});

test('an aggregate entrypoint validation failure leaves Cursor\'s own config file on disk, unreverted (#4249 review, Major)', (t) => {
  withSandboxedHome(t, 'configured-entrypoint-unreverted-', () => {
    // Cursor writes its config file inside install(), ahead of the validation
    // gate, with no snapshot/restore path — see the rollback-matrix paragraph
    // in the update-msd how-to. This asserts the POSITIVE case that paragraph
    // discloses in prose: the file the failing runtime itself just wrote is
    // still there afterward, broken and unreverted.
    const cursorFirst = install(true, 'cursor');
    const cursorHooksJson = path.join(cursorFirst.configDir, 'hooks.json');
    assert.equal(fs.existsSync(cursorHooksJson), true, 'precondition: Cursor hooks.json must exist before the failing install');

    const restore = forceEntrypointFailureFor('cursor');
    try {
      assert.throws(
        () => installAllRuntimes(['codex', 'cursor'], true, false),
        /Configured entrypoint validation failed[\s\S]*cursor[\s\S]*NOT reverted/,
        'an invalid entrypoint must fail the aggregate gate and flag Cursor as NOT reverted',
      );
    } finally {
      restore();
    }

    assert.equal(
      fs.existsSync(cursorHooksJson),
      true,
      'Cursor has no snapshot/restore path — its already-written hooks.json must remain on disk, not be deleted',
    );
  });
});

test('a NON-entrypoint finalize failure leaves an already-successful Codex install in place (#4249)', (t) => {
  withSandboxedHome(t, 'configured-entrypoint-nonentry-', () => {
    const first = install(true, 'codex');
    // config.toml sits inside surface #3245's pre-install snapshot, so these
    // bytes come back if — and only if — the full restoreCodexSnapshot() runs.
    const configPath = path.join(first.configDir, 'config.toml');
    const priorBytes = '# bytes only this test wrote\n';
    fs.writeFileSync(configPath, priorBytes);

    // Antigravity is the smallest real non-Codex runtime whose finishInstall
    // still writes: plan.finishPermissionWriter === 'antigravity' makes it call
    // configureAntigravityMcpConfig unconditionally (that writer, unlike
    // OpenCode's, is NOT MSD_TEST_MODE-gated), ending in an unguarded
    // fs.writeFileSync(<configDir>/mcp_config.json). EACCES on that write is
    // injected by monkeypatching
    // node:fs and restoring it in a finally — never chmod 0o000, which root
    // bypasses under Docker/CI and would give this test zero real coverage.
    const realWriteFileSync = fs.writeFileSync;
    fs.writeFileSync = function poisonedWriteFileSync(target, ...args) {
      const targetStr = typeof target === 'string' ? target : String(target);
      if (/[\\/]mcp_config\.json$/.test(targetStr)) {
        const injected = new Error(`EACCES: permission denied, open '${targetStr}'`);
        injected.code = 'EACCES';
        throw injected;
      }
      return realWriteFileSync.apply(fs, [target, ...args]);
    };
    try {
      assert.throws(
        () => installAllRuntimes(['codex', 'antigravity'], true, false),
        /EACCES: permission denied/,
        'a failed Antigravity MCP config write must abort the aggregate install',
      );
    } finally {
      fs.writeFileSync = realWriteFileSync;
    }

    // Codex installs first and finishInstall prints its "Done!" summary before
    // Antigravity's throws, so the reversed rollback loop does reach Codex's entry —
    // but with a non-entrypoint error it must take the installer-migrations-only
    // closure, not restoreCodexSnapshot. A configured-entrypoint validation
    // failure is the only trigger docs/how-to/update-msd.md documents for
    // reverting a runtime install that otherwise succeeded; un-installing (on
    // update, downgrading) Codex because an unrelated runtime hit EACCES would
    // contradict the "Done!" the user has already been shown.
    assert.notEqual(
      fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8'),
      priorBytes,
      'a non-entrypoint finalize failure must not restore the Codex pre-install snapshot',
    );
  });
});