#!/usr/bin/env node // gsd-hook-version: {{GSD_VERSION}} // GSD Read Guard — PreToolUse hook // Injects advisory guidance when Write/Edit targets an existing file, // reminding the model to Read the file first. // // Background: Non-Claude models (e.g. MiniMax M2.5 on OpenCode) don't // natively follow the read-before-edit pattern. When they attempt to // Write/Edit an existing file without reading it, the runtime rejects // with "You must read file before overwriting it." The model retries // without reading, creating an infinite loop that burns through usage. // // This hook prevents that loop by injecting clear guidance BEFORE the // tool call reaches the runtime. The model sees the advisory and can // issue a Read call on the next turn. // // Triggers on: Write and Edit tool calls // Action: Advisory (does not block) — injects read-first guidance // Only fires when the target file already exists on disk. const fs = require('fs'); const path = require('path'); const { HOOK_ON_CRASH, allow, crash } = require('./lib/hook-exit.js'); // This guard is pure advisory UX — a reminder to Read before Write/Edit on // non-Claude-Code runtimes. A crash here must not block a legitimate Write/ // Edit; the worst outcome of failing open is the model hitting the runtime's // own read-before-edit rejection it was trying to help avoid (#3911). const ON_CRASH = HOOK_ON_CRASH.ALLOW; // #2304: Kimi's native hook bus delivers Kimi's tool vocabulary in the payload // (Write → WriteFile, Edit/MultiEdit → StrReplaceFile) while the [[hooks]] // matcher is registered pre-translated (runtime-hooks-surface.cts // buildKimiHooksTomlBlock) — so without normalizing the payload too, the // matcher fires but the tool_name check below exits 0 and the guard is dormant // on Kimi. The tool_input field names differ as well (kimi-cli // src/kimi_cli/tools/file/{write,replace}.py): WriteFile takes `path`/`content`, // StrReplaceFile takes `path` + `edit: Edit | list[Edit]` with `old`/`new` — // kimi-cli's hooks/events.py forwards tool_input verbatim, so both layers need // mapping. Accepts bare and module-qualified ('kimi_cli.tools.file:WriteFile') // names; unknown names fall through untouched. Inlined per guard (not // hooks/lib/): hook scripts are staged as standalone files, and a sibling // require is a staging dependency that can fail silently. // A Map, not an object literal: bare bracket lookup resolves prototype keys // ('constructor', '__proto__', 'toString') to truthy functions/objects, so the // !mapped fall-through never fires for them; Map.get returns undefined (same // shape as canonicalizeRuntimeName in src/runtime-name-policy.cts). const KIMI_TOOL_NAMES = new Map([['WriteFile', 'Write'], ['StrReplaceFile', 'Edit'], ['ReadFile', 'Read'], ['Shell', 'Bash']]); function normalizeKimiPayload(data) { // #2595 (review nit): `JSON.parse('null')` is null, and null/primitive // payloads reached the `data.tool_name` read below and threw — falsifying // this function's own "total over the inputs JSON can express" claim, which // property (e) now tests directly. Harmless in practice (a null payload has // nothing to guard, and the throw landed in the same fail-open catch as the // exit-0 it now takes deliberately) but the claim should be true as stated. if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') return data; const raw = data.tool_name; if (typeof raw !== 'string') return data; const mapped = KIMI_TOOL_NAMES.get(raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf(':') + 1)); if (!mapped) return data; data.tool_name = mapped; if (data.tool_response === undefined && data.tool_output !== undefined) { data.tool_response = data.tool_output; } const input = data.tool_input; if (input && typeof input === 'object') { // #2547 (review): Kimi's `path` is AUTHORITATIVE — it must win outright, // not merely fill in when `file_path` happens to be absent. kimi-cli's file // tools carry no `file_path` field at all (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/write.py, // replace.py, @ 4a550ef — the SHA #2547 pins), and soul/toolset.py hands the // model's raw json-parsed // arguments to PreToolUse verbatim, doing typed validation only later inside // tool.call() — after the hook has already decided. So a `file_path` in a // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, and under the old `=== undefined` // condition it SHADOWED the field kimi-cli actually executes on. A payload // pairing a cross-root `path` with a spurious `file_path: ""` left every // guard reading an empty string and exiting 0, while the identical write // without the extra key blocked — a bypass needing no crash at all. The same // shadowing also preserved a NON-STRING `file_path` (`[]`), which threw // inside gsd-worktree-path-guard's path.isAbsolute() and reached its outer // `catch { process.exit(0) }`: the same crash-to-allow this fix closes // elsewhere, reached through the guard's own read rather than through // normalization. Overwriting can only ever narrow what a guard inspects to // the path that will actually be written, so it cannot under-block. if (typeof input.path === 'string') { input.file_path = input.path; } const edits = Array.isArray(input.edit) ? input.edit : (input.edit && typeof input.edit === 'object') ? [input.edit] : []; if (edits.length) { // #2547: `e?.old`, not `e.old` — `??` guards the value, not the // dereference, so a NULLISH entry (`edit: [null]`) threw a TypeError // here. normalizeKimiPayload runs before any tool dispatch, so that throw // reached each guard's outer `catch { process.exit(0) }` and silently // downgraded a should-BLOCK call into an allow. (A string/number entry // never threw — `('x').old` is a legal read yielding undefined.) // // The String() coercion is guarded for the same reason: `{"toString": // null}` is valid JSON that throws "Cannot convert object to primitive // value", which is the identical crash-to-allow with a different // trigger. Degrading only the non-coercible entry to '' keeps // stringification intact for every value that CAN coerce (numbers, // arrays, plain objects), so nothing downstream — including // gsd-prompt-guard's scan of new_string — loses content it saw before. const editText = (v) => { try { return String(v ?? ''); } catch { return ''; } }; // #2595 (review Major 2): reconstruct UNCONDITIONALLY, mirroring the // `path` decision above rather than merely filling in when the field // happens to be absent. kimi-cli's StrReplaceFile schema is `path` + // `edit` only (src/kimi_cli/tools/file/replace.py @ 4a550ef) — it carries // no `old_string`/`new_string` at all, so either field appearing in a // Kimi payload is ALWAYS model-supplied, exactly like `file_path`. Under // the old `=== undefined` condition a model-supplied `new_string: ""` // SHADOWED the reconstruction, leaving gsd-prompt-guard's injection scan // reading '' and exiting at its `if (!content)` before it ever saw the // real `edit[].new` — a one-key bypass of the very scan this fix's // guarded coercion exists to keep fed. A `typeof` test would NOT close // it: a benign non-empty string shadows just as effectively as ''. input.old_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.old)).join('\n'); input.new_string = edits.map((e) => editText(e?.new)).join('\n'); } } return data; } let input = ''; const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => allow(undefined), 3000); process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8'); process.stdin.on('data', chunk => input += chunk); process.stdin.on('end', () => { clearTimeout(stdinTimeout); try { const data = normalizeKimiPayload(JSON.parse(input)); const toolName = data.tool_name; // Only intercept Write and Edit tool calls if (toolName !== 'Write' && toolName !== 'Edit') { allow(undefined); } // Claude Code natively enforces read-before-edit — skip the advisory (#1984, #2344, #2520). // // Detection signals, in priority order: // 1. `data.session_id` on the hook's stdin payload — part of Claude // Code's documented PreToolUse hook-input schema, always present. // Reliable across Claude Code versions because it's schema, not env. // 2. `CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT` / `CLAUDE_CODE_SSE_PORT` — env vars that // Claude Code does propagate to hook subprocesses (verified on // Claude Code CLI 2.1.116). // 3. `CLAUDE_SESSION_ID` / `CLAUDECODE` — kept for back-compat and in // case future Claude Code versions propagate them to hook // subprocesses. On 2.1.116 they reach Bash tool subprocesses but // not hook subprocesses, which is why checking them alone is // insufficient (regression of #2344 fixed here as #2520). const isClaudeCode = (typeof data.session_id === 'string' && data.session_id.length > 0) || process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT || process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_SSE_PORT || process.env.CLAUDE_SESSION_ID || process.env.CLAUDECODE; if (isClaudeCode) { allow(undefined); } // #2595 (review Major 3, sibling sweep): typed read — same class as the // worktree guard's, advisory-only here (no exit(2) path in this hook). const filePath = typeof data.tool_input?.file_path === 'string' ? data.tool_input.file_path : ''; if (!filePath) { allow(undefined); } // Only inject guidance when the file already exists. // New files don't need a prior Read — the runtime allows creating them directly. let fileExists = false; try { fs.accessSync(filePath, fs.constants.F_OK); fileExists = true; } catch { // File does not exist — no guidance needed } if (!fileExists) { allow(undefined); } const fileName = path.basename(filePath); // Advisory guidance — does not block the operation const output = { hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: 'PreToolUse', additionalContext: `READ-BEFORE-EDIT REMINDER: You are about to modify "${fileName}" which already exists. ` + 'If you have not already used the Read tool to read this file in the current session, ' + 'you MUST Read it first before editing. The runtime will reject edits to files that ' + 'have not been read. Use the Read tool on this file path, then retry your edit.', }, }; process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(output)); } catch { // Silent fail — never block tool execution. // ON_CRASH is declared ALLOW at module top: this preserves today's // exit(0) fail-open behavior exactly (#3911). crash(ON_CRASH, undefined); } });