/** * prohibition-enforcement — the deterministic PRODUCER for test-tier prohibition verification * (#1259, ADR-550 Decision 5d "heavy half"; the D1 seam — a NEW deterministic gsd-tools * sub-command, NOT free-form workflow prose). * * Today `dispositionForProhibition()` (src/probe-core.cts) already carries the POLICY seam: with * non-empty `enforcementEvidence` AND `tier === 'test'` it returns `{ status: 'green' }` (the * branch at probe-core 420-427); with empty evidence it fails closed to flagged-unverified. But * NOTHING in the live pipeline ever produced `enforcementEvidence`, so the green branch was * unreachable. This module is the missing producer: it LOCATES the wired mechanical check from a * check descriptor, RUNS it and requires a genuine NON-VACUOUS pass, builds a typed * `enforcementEvidence` array on PASS, and emits the `dispositionForProhibition` verdict as JSON. * The green/fail-closed policy itself is untouched (no src/probe-core.cts edit). * * Accepts BOTH wired-check kinds (ADR-550 D2): a `node --test` negative test OR a lint/AST rule * (e.g. the in-tree `local/no-source-grep` rule — the D4 dogfood anchor, run via the project flat * config so the plugin loads). A missing, non-attested, or genuinely-non-passing check hard-gates * (flagged, non-green) in BOTH interactive and autonomous modes (ADR-550 D4 / D3) — never a silent * green. * * FAIL-FIRST IS CALLER-ATTESTED (honest scope, #1259): the producer requires the caller to ATTEST * `failFirst: true` AND requires the runner to observe a real non-vacuous pass — but it does NOT * independently prove the check fails-on-violation. Genuine fail-first confirmation needs running * the check against a known violation fixture and is a tracked follow-up (recorded in ADR-550's D5d * note). What ships here closes the permanent-`gaps_found` dead-end with a genuinely-executed gate; * it does not yet replace caller attestation with machine proof of the red-first property. * * Authored as strict TypeScript (`src/prohibition-enforcement.cts`) and compiled by * `tsc -p tsconfig.build.json` (`npm run build:lib`) to the gitignored runtime artifact * `gsd-core/bin/lib/prohibition-enforcement.cjs`. Do NOT hand-write the `.cjs`; it is emitted. * * DETERMINISM SCOPE: the DECISION layer is pure/deterministic and no-LLM — given a `runCheck` result * the disposition is same-input-same-output and mutation-survivable, and the parse/filter helpers * (`parseNodeTestSummary`, `tapTestNames`, `eslintJsonHasRule`, `eslintHasFatalError`, …) are pure. * The DEFAULT REAL runner is NOT pure — it spawns `node --test` / eslint, so its result depends on the * environment (eslint version + flat config, node version, the target file). That is why the runner is * an injectable seam (`runCheck`): the contract is unit-tested against injected results, mirroring the * injectable I/O pattern in `runProbeCli` / `ProbeCliOptions`. */ import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; // Import the leaf I/O module directly (core.cjs re-export spine retired in epic #1267). // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports import io = require('./io.cjs'); const { output, error, ERROR_REASON } = io; import { dispositionForProhibition } from './probe-core.cjs'; import type { ProhibitionDisposition } from './probe-core.cjs'; /** The two accepted wired-check kinds (ADR-550 D2). */ export type CheckKind = 'node-test' | 'lint-rule'; /** * A descriptor of the wired mechanical check that asserts the must-NOT. `kind` selects the * runner family; `target` is the negative-test file path (node-test) or the PATH to lint * (lint-rule); `rule` is the eslint rule id (lint-rule only — e.g. `local/no-source-grep`) and is * REQUIRED for the lint-rule kind (a lint-rule descriptor without it is not a valid wired check); * `failFirst` is the caller's ATTESTATION that the check is a genuine `regression-must-fail-first` * proof (caller-declared — see the module docstring; not independently confirmed at verify time). */ export interface CheckDescriptor { kind: CheckKind; target: string; rule?: string; failFirst?: boolean; } /** * READ-BACK ADAPTER (#1278, plan 01-03): reconstruct a `CheckDescriptor` from the flat scalar keys * `projectProhibitions` emits onto a prohibition item (`check_kind` / `check_target` / `check_rule`, * src/probe-core.cts). This is the deterministic bridge from the projected descriptor back into the * merged #1259 producer request — the verify-phase caller reads the projected scalars, this rebuilds * the `{ kind, target, rule? }` request, and `runProhibitionEnforcement`'s EXISTING fail-closed LOCATE * guard (validKind/validTarget/validRule, below) is the single source of fail-closed truth. * * Contract: * - `null`/`undefined`/non-object input -> `null`. * - `check_kind` ABSENT -> `null` (no descriptor -> producer locates nothing -> fail-closed). * - `check_kind` present -> `{ kind: check_kind, target: check_target }`, adding `rule: check_rule` * ONLY when `check_rule` is a non-empty string. * - `failFirst` is NEVER sourced from the projection — it stays a verify-time caller attestation * (#1279 machine-proves it; out of scope here). The returned descriptor carries no `failFirst`. * - The adapter does NOT strictly validate kind/target/rule: it faithfully reconstructs whatever * scalars are present (e.g. `{check_kind:'lint-rule', check_target:'src/'}` with no `check_rule` * reconstructs to `{kind:'lint-rule', target:'src/'}`), letting the existing LOCATE guard reject * an under-specified descriptor (located:false, never green). It does NOT re-implement that guard. * - Pure, deterministic, no-throw. */ export function descriptorFromProjection( projected: Record | null | undefined, ): CheckDescriptor | null { if (!projected || typeof projected !== 'object') return null; if (!('check_kind' in projected)) return null; // The shared `parseMustHavesBlock` (src/frontmatter.cts) coerces /^\d+$/ scalar values to NUMBERS on // round-trip, so a numeric-looking check_kind/check_target/check_rule arrives here as a number. Normalize // ONLY string|number scalars back to string — a non-scalar (object/array/bool) or absent value yields '' // (never an `[object Object]` stringification, no `as string` lie over a number). This keeps the // descriptor honestly typed and the round-trip lossless across the full string domain; an under-specified // '' target/kind is rejected by the producer's locate guard (fail-closed; never green). const scalar = (v: unknown): string => typeof v === 'string' ? v : typeof v === 'number' ? String(v) : ''; const kind = scalar(projected.check_kind) as CheckKind; const target = scalar(projected.check_target); const descriptor: CheckDescriptor = { kind, target }; // `rule` belongs only to the lint-rule kind; a stray check_rule on a node-test descriptor is dropped // (the projector never emits one there — defense in depth). failFirst is NOT sourced here (#1279). if (kind === 'lint-rule') { const rule = scalar(projected.check_rule); if (rule.trim().length > 0) descriptor.rule = rule; } return descriptor; } /** * The result a check-runner returns: whether the check genuinely, non-vacuously PASSED. The runner * reports only what it can OBSERVE (a real pass) — it does NOT determine fail-first. Whether the * check is a `regression-must-fail-first` proof is a CALLER-ATTESTED property of the descriptor * (`CheckDescriptor.failFirst`); the producer cannot independently confirm it at verify time without * a violation fixture (a tracked follow-up — see the module docstring). */ export interface CheckRunResult { passed: boolean; } /** A single typed enforcement-evidence record (the array `dispositionForProhibition` reads). */ export interface EnforcementEvidence { kind: CheckKind; target: string; rule?: string; failFirst: boolean; passed: boolean; } /** Injectable options for `runProhibitionEnforcement` (defaults wire to the real runner). */ export interface EnforcementOptions { /** Runs the located check; injected in tests so no real subprocess is spawned. */ runCheck?: (check: CheckDescriptor) => CheckRunResult; /** Verify mode — recorded for transparency; the hard-gate applies in BOTH modes (ADR-550 D4). */ mode?: string; /** Project root for the default real runner (defaults to process.cwd()). */ cwd?: string; /** Override the per-kind subprocess timeout (ms); defaults to 30s (node-test) / 60s (eslint). * Injected in tests to prove the fail-closed-on-timeout bound without a 30s wait. */ timeoutMs?: number; } /** The producer's verdict: the disposition PLUS the located/kind/evidence provenance. */ export interface EnforcementResult extends ProhibitionDisposition { located: boolean; kind: CheckKind | null; evidence: EnforcementEvidence[]; mode?: string; } /** node --test argv. Forces the TAP reporter so the summary counts are parseable + version-stable; * `--` before the target so a target starting with `-` is not parsed as a flag (option-injection). */ export function buildNodeTestArgs(check: CheckDescriptor): string[] { return ['--test', '--test-reporter=tap', '--', check.target]; } /** eslint argv (the args AFTER the eslint CLI path). Runs the project flat config so plugin rules * (e.g. `local/*`) load — `--rule` CANNOT load a plugin, so we lint the TARGET path as JSON and * filter by rule id. `--no-warn-ignored` makes an eslint-IGNORED target return `[]` (not a length-1 * "File ignored" result) so an ignored path fails closed via the vacuity guard, not a false green. * `--` before the target so a target starting with `-` is not parsed as a flag (option-injection). */ export function buildLintArgs(check: CheckDescriptor): string[] { return ['--no-warn-ignored', '--format', 'json', '--', check.target]; } /** * Resolve the project's eslint CLI entry portably (no `npx` — not spawnable via `execFileSync` on * Windows). Resolves eslint's package.json from the target project's `node_modules` and derives * `bin/eslint.js`, so it is run as `node ` (portable). Returns null if eslint is not installed * (→ the lint-rule check fails closed, never throws). */ function resolveEslintCli(cwd: string): string | null { try { const pkg = require.resolve('eslint/package.json', { paths: [cwd] }); const cli = path.join(path.dirname(pkg), 'bin', 'eslint.js'); return fs.existsSync(cli) ? cli : null; } catch { return null; } } /** Basename of a path, separator-agnostic (handles `\` and `/` so node-test names compare stably * across OSes / node versions that report the file-test by differing path forms). */ function baseOf(p: string): string { return typeof p === 'string' ? (p.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? p) : ''; } /** * Pure parser for the `node --test` TAP summary. A genuine pass is NON-VACUOUS: exit 0 is NOT enough * (an empty / all-skipped / deleted-negative-test file exits 0 with `# tests 0`). Mutation-pinned by * unit tests so a threshold flip is caught. */ export function parseNodeTestSummary(out: string): { tests: number; pass: number; fail: number; cancelled: number } { const num = (re: RegExp): number => { const m = typeof out === 'string' ? out.match(re) : null; return m ? Number(m[1]) : 0; }; return { tests: num(/^# tests (\d+)/m), pass: num(/^# pass (\d+)/m), fail: num(/^# fail (\d+)/m), cancelled: num(/^# cancelled (\d+)/m), }; } /** The names of REAL (run) tests from TAP `ok N - ` / `not ok N - ` lines. A line with a * `# SKIP` / `# TODO` directive is EXCLUDED — a skipped/todo negative test never executed, so it must * not count toward non-vacuity (#1259 m1). */ export function tapTestNames(out: string): string[] { if (typeof out !== 'string') return []; const names: string[] = []; const re = /^(?:not )?ok \d+ - (.+)$/gm; let m: RegExpExecArray | null; while ((m = re.exec(out)) !== null) { const rest = m[1]; if (/\s#\s*(?:SKIP|TODO)\b/i.test(rest)) continue; // skipped/todo did not run names.push(rest.replace(/\s+#\s.*$/, '').trim()); } return names; } /** * A non-vacuous node-test pass: at least one test, at least one pass, zero failures — AND at least * one reported test whose name is NOT merely the target file. `node --test ` counts a file * with ZERO `test()` calls as one passing "test" named after the file, so the counts alone cannot * tell an empty/deleted negative test from a real one (the #1259 BL-01 false-green). Requiring a * named test distinct from the file closes that hole. * * KNOWN CONSTRAINT (fail-closed, not a hole): a real test whose `test('...')` name is EXACTLY the * target file's basename emits TAP indistinguishable from an empty file and is conservatively * rejected (non-green). A wired negative test must carry a descriptive name, not be named after its * own file — a benign authoring constraint, and the safe direction if violated. */ export function isNonVacuousNodeTestPass(out: string, target: string): boolean { const s = parseNodeTestSummary(out); // >=1 test, >=1 pass, ZERO failures AND ZERO cancelled (a cancelled run is not a clean pass, m1). if (!(s.tests >= 1 && s.pass >= 1 && s.fail === 0 && s.cancelled === 0)) return false; // Compare BASENAMES: node reports the file-test by varying path forms across OS / node version // (absolute, relative, normalized), so an exact-string compare misfires. A real test name (e.g. // "guards the must-NOT") has no separators, so its basename never equals the target file's. const tgtBase = baseOf(target); return tapTestNames(out).some((n) => baseOf(n) !== tgtBase); } /** Number of file results in an eslint `--format json` report (0 if unparseable / not an array). */ export function eslintFileResultCount(jsonText: string): number { try { const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(jsonText); return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.length : 0; } catch { return 0; } } /** Messages array of a single eslint file-result (empty if absent / wrong shape). */ function eslintMessages(file: unknown, key: 'messages' | 'suppressedMessages'): Array<{ ruleId?: unknown; fatal?: unknown }> { return file && typeof file === 'object' && Array.isArray((file as Record)[key]) ? ((file as Record)[key] as Array<{ ruleId?: unknown; fatal?: unknown }>) : []; } /** * True if the eslint `--format json` report has a FATAL / parse error — meaning the rule never got * to run on the target. A prohibition gate must fail closed on "the rule didn't execute" (#1259 B1), * NOT treat a length-1 fatal result as "clean". Unparseable report -> true (fail-closed). */ export function eslintHasFatalError(jsonText: string): boolean { let parsed: unknown; try { parsed = JSON.parse(jsonText); } catch { return true; } if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return true; for (const file of parsed) { const fec = file && typeof file === 'object' ? (file as { fatalErrorCount?: unknown }).fatalErrorCount : undefined; if (typeof fec === 'number' && fec > 0) return true; if (eslintMessages(file, 'messages').some((m) => m && m.fatal === true)) return true; } return false; } /** True if the eslint `--format json` report has ANY message for `rule` — in EITHER `messages` or * `suppressedMessages` (an inline `// eslint-disable` of the rule is still a violation, #1259 B1). * Unparseable -> true (fail-closed: treat an unreadable report as a violation, not a silent pass). */ export function eslintJsonHasRule(jsonText: string, rule: string): boolean { let parsed: unknown; try { parsed = JSON.parse(jsonText); } catch { return true; } if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return true; for (const file of parsed) { for (const key of ['messages', 'suppressedMessages'] as const) { for (const msg of eslintMessages(file, key)) { if (msg && typeof msg === 'object' && msg.ruleId === rule) return true; } } } return false; } /** * The default REAL check runner (used when no `runCheck` is injected). Reports only an OBSERVED, * genuinely-non-vacuous pass; guarded so a missing tool / non-zero exit yields a non-passing result, * NEVER an uncaught throw (the no-throw contract). It does NOT determine fail-first (caller-attested). * - node-test: runs `node --test` (TAP) and requires a NON-VACUOUS pass (>=1 test, >=1 pass, 0 fail * AND a reported test named distinctly from the file). A bare exit 0 for an empty/zero-test file * — which `node --test` counts as one passing "test" named after the file — is NOT a pass (the * #1259 BL-01 false-green fix). * - lint-rule: runs the project eslint as `node --format json ` (flat config * loads `local/*` plugins) and requires the target to actually lint (>=1 file result) AND ZERO * messages for the specific rule id. `--rule` cannot load a plugin rule, so we filter the * structured report by `ruleId` instead (the #1259 SF-01 fix). * * Both kinds spawn via `process.execPath` (never bare `node`/`npx` — not portably spawnable via * `execFileSync` on Windows) with arg arrays (no shell → no injection from a caller-supplied target). */ /** * Env for spawned checks: strip `NODE_TEST_CONTEXT` and `NODE_OPTIONS` so an AMBIENT test-runner * context (e.g. running verify under `node --test`, which sets `NODE_TEST_CONTEXT=child-v8`) cannot * turn the child `node --test` into a silent v8-reporter worker that emits no parseable TAP — which * would otherwise corrupt the verdict. Deterministic, environment-independent execution. */ function childEnv(): NodeJS.ProcessEnv { const env = { ...process.env }; delete env.NODE_TEST_CONTEXT; delete env.NODE_OPTIONS; return env; } // Bounded subprocess limits (DEFECT.UNBOUNDED-SUBPROCESS): a stuck wired test / eslint must not hang // verify forever. On timeout `execFileSync` throws -> caught -> fail-closed (degraded, non-passing). // `maxBuffer` caps output so a runaway producer throws (safe direction) rather than OOMs the verifier. const NODE_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000; const ESLINT_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000; const CHECK_MAX_BUFFER = 16 * 1024 * 1024; /** Resolve the effective timeout: only a POSITIVE override is honored — `0` (which Node treats as * "no timeout") or a negative value falls back to the bounded default, so the subprocess is ALWAYS * bounded (a `timeoutMs: 0` injection can never disable the bound). */ function posTimeout(timeoutMs: number | undefined, def: number): number { return typeof timeoutMs === 'number' && timeoutMs > 0 ? timeoutMs : def; } function defaultRunCheck(check: CheckDescriptor, cwd: string, timeoutMs?: number): CheckRunResult { try { if (check.kind === 'node-test') { let out = ''; try { out = execFileSync(process.execPath, buildNodeTestArgs(check), { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], windowsHide: true, env: childEnv(), timeout: posTimeout(timeoutMs, NODE_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS), maxBuffer: CHECK_MAX_BUFFER, }); } catch (e) { // A failing/timed-out run exits non-zero or is killed (partial TAP on stdout, no `# pass` // summary). Parse what we have: a real failure or timeout -> not a non-vacuous pass -> false. const stdout = e && typeof e === 'object' && 'stdout' in e ? (e as { stdout?: unknown }).stdout : ''; out = typeof stdout === 'string' ? stdout : ''; } return { passed: isNonVacuousNodeTestPass(out, check.target) }; } if (check.kind === 'lint-rule') { const eslintCli = resolveEslintCli(cwd); if (!eslintCli) return { passed: false }; // eslint not installed -> fail closed, never throw let json = ''; try { json = execFileSync(process.execPath, [eslintCli, ...buildLintArgs(check)], { cwd, encoding: 'utf-8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], windowsHide: true, env: childEnv(), timeout: posTimeout(timeoutMs, ESLINT_TIMEOUT_MS), maxBuffer: CHECK_MAX_BUFFER, }); } catch (e) { // eslint exits non-zero when ANY error is present; the JSON report is still on stdout. // A timeout/kill leaves no parseable JSON -> eslintHasFatalError(unparseable) -> fail-closed. const stdout = e && typeof e === 'object' && 'stdout' in e ? (e as { stdout?: unknown }).stdout : ''; json = typeof stdout === 'string' ? stdout : ''; } // PASS requires: the target actually linted (>=1 file result), NO fatal/parse error (the rule // must have RUN — #1259 B1), and ZERO messages for the rule (in messages OR suppressedMessages). const lintedSomething = eslintFileResultCount(json) >= 1; return { passed: lintedSomething && !eslintHasFatalError(json) && !eslintJsonHasRule(json, check.rule as string), }; } // Unknown kind — defensive; the LOCATE guard already rejects it. return { passed: false }; } catch { return { passed: false }; } } /** * LOCATE -> CONFIRM fail-first -> RUN -> build enforcementEvidence -> dispositionForProhibition. * * (1) LOCATE: if no well-formed check descriptor is locatable -> fail-closed * (`dispositionForProhibition` with empty evidence) plus `{ located: false, kind: null, evidence: [] }`. * (2) ATTEST + RUN: require the caller to attest `failFirst: true` and run it via `runCheck`. A check * the caller does not attest as fail-first, or that does not genuinely (non-vacuously) PASS -> * fail-closed disposition with `located: true` (a real located miss, non-green, flagged) in BOTH * modes. Fail-first is caller-attested, not independently proven (see module docstring). * (3) PASS: build a typed `enforcementEvidence` array and call `dispositionForProhibition` — the * non-empty array flips a test-tier item to green (the previously-unreachable branch). * * Pure/deterministic: same (prohibition, check, runCheck) -> same result. */ export function runProhibitionEnforcement( prohibition: unknown, check: CheckDescriptor | null | undefined, options: EnforcementOptions = {}, ): EnforcementResult { const mode = options.mode; // (1) LOCATE — no locatable, well-formed wired check -> fail-closed, located: false. The kind must // be one of the two known kinds; the target must be a non-empty string; a lint-rule descriptor MUST // also carry a non-empty `rule` id (its target is the lint PATH, not the rule). An under-specified // descriptor is not a valid wired check, so it is not locatable (does not rely on the runner failing). const c = check && typeof check === 'object' ? check : null; const validKind = !!c && (c.kind === 'node-test' || c.kind === 'lint-rule'); const validTarget = !!c && typeof c.target === 'string' && c.target.trim().length > 0; const validRule = !!c && (c.kind !== 'lint-rule' || (typeof c.rule === 'string' && c.rule.trim().length > 0)); if (!c || !validKind || !validTarget || !validRule) { const disposition = dispositionForProhibition(prohibition, { enforcementEvidence: [] }); return { ...disposition, located: false, kind: null, evidence: [], ...(mode ? { mode } : {}) }; } const runCheck = options.runCheck ?? ((toRun: CheckDescriptor) => defaultRunCheck(toRun, options.cwd ?? process.cwd(), options.timeoutMs)); // (2) ATTEST fail-first (CALLER-DECLARED) + RUN. The caller must attest `failFirst: true` AND the // runner must observe a genuine NON-VACUOUS pass. The producer does NOT independently prove // fail-first (that needs a violation fixture — tracked follow-up, ADR-550 D5d). A non-attested or // non-passing check hard-gates (never green) in BOTH modes. const attestedFailFirst = c.failFirst === true; // No-throw contract end-to-end: even a (test-injected) runCheck that throws must fail closed, // never propagate. The default real runner already never throws. let run: CheckRunResult; try { run = runCheck(c); } catch { run = { passed: false }; } const passed = attestedFailFirst && run.passed === true; if (!passed) { // NOT attested fail-first OR did not genuinely pass -> fail-closed, located: true (an actual // located miss/fail). Hard-gate applies in BOTH modes; the disposition stays non-green / flagged. const disposition = dispositionForProhibition(prohibition, { enforcementEvidence: [] }); return { ...disposition, located: true, kind: c.kind, evidence: [], ...(mode ? { mode } : {}), }; } // (3) PASS -> build typed enforcementEvidence and let the policy flip a test-tier item green. // `failFirst` here is the caller's attestation (recorded for provenance), not a machine proof. const evidence: EnforcementEvidence[] = [{ kind: c.kind, target: c.target, ...(typeof c.rule === 'string' ? { rule: c.rule } : {}), failFirst: true, passed: true, }]; const disposition = dispositionForProhibition(prohibition, { enforcementEvidence: evidence }); return { ...disposition, located: true, kind: c.kind, evidence, ...(mode ? { mode } : {}), }; } /** * Parse a `{ prohibition, check, mode }` request from a JSON file path or inline `--json` string. * Returns null on any parse failure (the caller surfaces a structured error, never a throw). */ function parseRequest(args: string[]): { prohibition: unknown; check: CheckDescriptor | null; mode?: string } | null { // args[0] = 'check', args[1] = 'prohibition-enforcement', args[2] = const jsonFlagIdx = args.indexOf('--json'); let payload = ''; if (jsonFlagIdx !== -1 && typeof args[jsonFlagIdx + 1] === 'string') { payload = args[jsonFlagIdx + 1]; } else if (typeof args[2] === 'string' && args[2]) { try { payload = fs.readFileSync(args[2], 'utf-8'); } catch { return null; } } else { return null; } try { const parsed = JSON.parse(payload) as Record; const checkRaw = parsed['check']; const check: CheckDescriptor | null = (checkRaw && typeof checkRaw === 'object') ? (checkRaw as CheckDescriptor) : null; const modeRaw = parsed['mode']; const mode = typeof modeRaw === 'string' ? modeRaw : undefined; return { prohibition: parsed['prohibition'] ?? null, check, ...(mode ? { mode } : {}) }; } catch { return null; } } /** * CLI surface: `gsd_run check prohibition-enforcement ` (or `--json ''`). * Parses the request, runs the producer, and emits the result as JSON. Honors the no-throw * contract: malformed input -> structured `error(...)`, never an uncaught throw. */ export function routeProhibitionEnforcement(args: string[], raw: boolean): void { const req = parseRequest(args); if (!req) { error( 'prohibition-enforcement requires a JSON request: check prohibition-enforcement | --json \'{"prohibition":{...},"check":{...}}\'', ERROR_REASON.SDK_MISSING_ARG, ); return; } const result = runProhibitionEnforcement(req.prohibition, req.check, req.mode ? { mode: req.mode } : {}); output(result, raw, undefined); } export {};