/** * Capability trust gate — ADR-1244 Phase 4 (Decision D5 + the compatibility half of D6), extended * by ADR-2782 Phase 3 (#2796) with a FOURTH executable-surface class (the reviewer lane), and by * ADR-2363 Phase 1 (#3248) with a FIFTH, NON-executable class: the instruction surface. * * PURE module. It computes *what* a capability would do and *whether* policy allows it; it * never mutates the filesystem and never performs I/O beyond reading staged files to confirm * declared executable artifacts exist. The actual consent decision (yes/no) is passed in by the * caller — GSD has no interactive-prompt layer in lib (the runtime/CLI edge owns that), so the * gate stays testable and side-effect-free. See docs/explanation/capability-trust-model.md. * * LEAF MODULE — imports ONLY: node:fs, node:path, and ./semver-compare.cjs. * * ADR-2782 D5 (#2796): a `reviewer` lane is piped the plan text, requirements, research findings * and CONTEXT.md decisions, then its output is read back into REVIEWS.md — making it an executable * surface exactly like a hook, command module, or MCP server, and it is disclosed and consent-bound * the same way. `disclosureSignature` appends the lane element to its output ONLY when at least one * lane is declared (D4.5) — a lane-free manifest's signature stays byte-identical to before this * class existed, so no already-consented capability re-prompts on upgrade. The RESOLVED host (as * opposed to the declared `hostConfigKey`) is disclosed to a human but deliberately EXCLUDED from * the signature — the loader has no config resolver and must compute the same signature as the * lifecycle (constraint 2, `.gsd/phase/chore-2796-reviewer-trust-disclosure/40-design.md`). * * ADR-2363 D5 (#3248): a capability's declared `skills` are INSTRUCTION surfaces — their bodies are * copied verbatim into the user's agent instruction context, so their reach is bounded only by what * the agent will do when told. They are disclosed BY NAME and never content-scanned (D2 — * Kerckhoffs: a shipped rule set is readable by the adversary who installs it). Unlike the four * executable classes they never set `hasExecutable` (D3) and never enter `disclosureSignature` (D4): * folding them in would perturb the stored signature of every already-consented skill-bearing * capability and fire a spurious re-consent on its next upgrade — the harm ADR-2782 D4 rule 5 * already forbids. Any future signature binding arrives as a versioned v2, never an in-place * re-encoding of v1. ADR-2363 D3's class table names "skills, agents", but third-party `agents[]` * are deliberately EXCLUDED here: `stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter` (`src/install-profiles.cts`) * takes only a source directory, with no registry-aware third-party staging path the way * `readInstalledCapabilitySkill` gives skills — so a declared agent is never actually staged into * the instruction context, and disclosing it would name a surface that does not exist. Agents stay * unimplemented pending a maintainer decision. * * Exports: * RESERVED_NAMESPACES — id prefixes third parties may not claim * discloseExecutableSurfaces(...) — enumerate the four executable classes + instruction surfaces * collectReviewerLaneSurfaces(...) — the reviewer-lane collector, independently testable * collectInstructionSurfaces(...) — the instruction-surface collector, independently testable * checkReservedNamespace(id) — is this id in a reserved namespace? * evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed,...) — strictKnownRegistries enforcement * checkEngines(manifest, host) — engines.gsd hard gate + compatVersions downgrade * evaluateInstallTrust(args) — compose: source + namespace + engines + disclosure * executableSetChanged(old, new) — did the executable surface set change between versions? * summarizeDisclosure(disclosure) — human-readable consent-prompt lines * summarizeInstructionSurfaces(d) — the instruction-surface section of the consent summary * UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER — the non-blank marker for an unresolved openai-http host * EGRESS_PAYLOAD_CLASSES — the named data classes every reviewer lane receives */ import fs from 'node:fs'; import path from 'node:path'; // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports const semverMod = require('./semver-compare.cjs') as { semverSatisfies: (version: string, range: string) => boolean; isSemverNewer: (a: string, b: string) => boolean; }; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Constants // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Id prefixes reserved for first-party / vendor capabilities. A third-party capability whose * id begins with any of these is rejected at install so it cannot impersonate a first-party * one. Match is case-insensitive on the normalized id. */ const RESERVED_NAMESPACES = ['gsd-', 'gsd-core-', 'anthropic-']; /** * ADR-2782 D5's gating requirement (#2796): every reviewer lane is piped the plan text, * requirements, research findings and CONTEXT.md decisions. Named explicitly here so disclosure * says exactly this — never the unhelpful "sends data to the tool" (design section B5). */ const EGRESS_PAYLOAD_CLASSES = ['plan text', 'requirements', 'research findings', 'CONTEXT.md decisions']; /** * B3 (#2796 matrix): `resolvedHost` must never be a blank string — a blank reads as "no * destination" rather than "not resolved". This marker is disclosed for an `openai-http` lane * when no resolver was supplied to `collectReviewerLaneSurfaces`, or the supplied resolver could * not resolve the declared `hostConfigKey`. Deliberately NOT part of `disclosureSignature`'s input * (see the lane signature line) — only the human-facing surface carries it. */ const UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER = '(unresolved — no host resolver was supplied at disclosure time)'; /** * Loopback hostnames recognized LITERALLY, never by substring (an evil host must not spoof this, * e.g. `notlocalhost.example`). D5: localhost is not "safe by default" — it is disclosed and * FLAGGED, never omitted (matrix B4). */ const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1', '[::1]', '0.0.0.0']); // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Types // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- interface CapabilityManifest { id?: unknown; version?: unknown; engines?: unknown; compatVersions?: unknown; hooks?: unknown; commands?: unknown; mcpServers?: unknown; /** ADR-2782 (#2796): a single reviewer-lane body — never an array (Phase 2's own validator rejects that shape). */ reviewer?: unknown; [k: string]: unknown; } interface HookSurface { event: string; script: string; } interface CommandModuleSurface { family: string; module: string; /** * TRUST2-3 (#1459): the exported function the host invokes from the module — WHICH code runs. A * version that keeps family+module but retargets `router` to a different exported function changes * what executes, so it is part of the disclosed + consent-bound surface. Empty when undeclared. */ router: string; } interface McpServerSurface { name: string; /** * The transport TYPE: 'stdio' (spawns command/argv), 'http', or 'sse' (connects to a URL). TRUST2-2 * (#1459): a non-stdio server was previously invisible to the disclosure/signature — its url/headers * could be swapped with no re-consent. Empty when undeclared (the host default is stdio). */ transport: string; /** The command the server spawns (the actual executable — disclosed for honest consent). stdio only. */ command: string; /** * Arguments passed to the command. TRUST2-4 (#1459): this is a stringified view for the human * summary; the consent SIGNATURE encodes the RAW args array (incl non-string members) via * `rawArgs` so a non-string arg change still forces re-consent (the host receives the raw args). */ argv: string[]; /** * The RAW args array as declared (may contain non-strings). Folded — stable-encoded — into the * signature so a change to ANY member (incl a number/object/bool the host would still pass) forces * re-consent (TRUST2-4). Empty array when none declared. */ rawArgs: unknown[]; /** * The URL an http/sse server connects to — TRUST2-2: WHERE the server talks to. A url change is a * different remote endpoint and must force re-consent. Empty when undeclared (stdio servers). */ url: string; /** * The HTTP headers an http/sse server is given (string→string, stable-sorted) — TRUST2-2: headers * carry auth/behavior and a change must force re-consent. Header VALUES are redacted in the human * summary but INCLUDED in the signature. Empty object when none. */ headers: Record; /** * Environment variables (string→string only) the server is spawned with — disclosed because * env can change WHAT a command does (e.g. NODE_OPTIONS=--require /tmp/evil.js) without touching * command/argv. Any add/change forces re-consent (TRUST-2, #1459). Empty object when none. */ env: Record; /** The working directory the server is spawned in (if declared) — also affects what runs. */ cwd?: string; /** * Finding 5 (MEDIUM, #1459): the FULL declared server config object (prototype-pollution-safe * shallow-cleaned copy). The writer persists the WHOLE config ({...config}), so the signature must * bind the WHOLE config — not only the whitelisted fields above — or an upgrade that changes a * host-honored field NOT in the whitelist (a future `envFile`/`workingDir`/launch option) would be * written verbatim yet leave the signature constant → no re-consent prompt. This is folded into the * signature as STABLE (recursively key-sorted) JSON, so any add/change forces re-consent while a * pure key reorder does not. NOT shown in the human summary (which stays readable via the key fields). */ rawConfig: Record; } /** * Resolves a reviewer lane's `hostConfigKey` (a dotted key into `.planning/config.json`) to its * configured destination host, for HUMAN disclosure only. Optional — the loader has no config * access and calls `discloseExecutableSurfaces`/`signatureForManifest` without one; the lifecycle * MAY supply one so the consent prompt shows a real destination instead of `UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER`. * MUST NOT throw is not required of the caller — `collectReviewerLaneSurfaces` treats any thrown * error or non-string/empty return as "could not resolve" and falls back to the marker. */ type ReviewerHostResolver = (hostConfigKey: string) => string | undefined; /** * ADR-2782 D5 (#2796): the reviewer-lane executable surface. A capability manifest carries AT MOST * ONE `reviewer` body (Phase 2's validator rejects an array), so this collector returns 0 or 1 * entries per manifest — the array return shape matches the other three collectors for a uniform * `Disclosure` and lets `disclosureSignature` sort/fold it the same way. */ interface ReviewerLaneSurface { /** The lane's declared identity (also its config/flag namer). Empty when undeclared/malformed. */ slug: string; /** `'spawn'` | `'openai-http'` as declared, or '' when absent/malformed — disclosure never validates. */ transport: string; /** spawn: the executable name/path as declared. Empty for an openai-http lane or when undeclared. */ binary: string; /** spawn: the declared args, RENDERED (string-filtered) for the human summary — mirrors MCP's argv. */ args: string[]; /** * spawn: the FULL declared args array (may contain non-strings the host still receives) — folded * into the signature so ANY member change forces re-consent (matrix A6, the #1459 bug class: * `python3` with innocuous args later becoming `['-c', '']`). Empty when undeclared. */ rawArgs: unknown[]; /** openai-http: the dotted config key naming the destination host. Empty for a spawn lane. */ hostConfigKey: string; /** * openai-http: the resolved destination host when a resolver was supplied and could resolve * `hostConfigKey`; `UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER` when a resolver was not supplied or could not resolve * it. NEVER '' for an openai-http lane (matrix B3) — a blank reads as "no destination". '' for a * spawn lane (no destination concept — mirrors McpServerSurface's empty-when-inapplicable * convention). Deliberately EXCLUDED from `disclosureSignature`'s input (design constraint 2): the * loader has no resolver and must compute the SAME signature as the lifecycle. */ resolvedHost: string; /** * True when `resolvedHost` is a loopback/local destination. D5: localhost is disclosed like any * other destination, never treated as "safe by default" (matrix B4). Always false for a spawn * lane and for an unresolved openai-http host. */ isLocalDestination: boolean; /** How the review prompt reaches the lane (`'stdin'|'argv'|'argv-file-ref'|'none'`, or ''). */ promptChannel: string; /** The first-party handler module name that post-processes this lane's output, or '' when undeclared. */ handler: string; /** * spawn: the per-invocation environment pairs the lane declares (#2483), string-filtered for the * human summary exactly as `args` is. Folded into the signature, and rendered key-by-key in the * consent prompt, for the SAME reason MCP's `env` already is: env changes WHAT a command does * without touching the command (`NODE_OPTIONS=--require evil.js`, `LD_PRELOAD`). Empty when the * lane declares none, which keeps an env-free lane's signature byte-identical (D4.5). */ env: Record; /** * openai-http: the destination host the MANIFEST itself declares, used at runtime whenever * `hostConfigKey` resolves to nothing (`resolveLanePlan`: `configured ?? declaredDefault`). It is * NOT `resolvedHost` — that one is resolved from user config and is deliberately excluded from the * signature (design constraint 2). This one is a pure function of the manifest, so it both signs * and renders: without it a lane whose config key is unset discloses `(unresolved)` at consent * time while shipping the egress payload classes to an address of the manifest's own choosing. */ defaultHost: string; /** * Every OTHER own key the declared `invoke` object carries — the completeness backstop, and the * direct analogue of `McpServerSurface.rawConfig` (#1459 finding 5). The explicit fields above are * kept first for readability and stability; this catches the rest, so a field ADDED to the invoke * vocabulary later is signed from the day it exists rather than from the day someone remembers to * widen this list. The enumerated fields (`binary`/`args`/`hostConfigKey`/`promptChannel`) are * excluded because they are already bound above; `env` and `defaultHost` are deliberately NOT * excluded, mirroring the MCP line's own explicit-then-rawConfig overlap. */ residualInvoke: Record; /** * The same backstop for the lane body's OUTER fields, which `invoke`'s residual cannot reach. * `probe` is the reason it exists and is not a hypothetical: `probeLane` SPAWNS `probe.binary` * with `--help` (`review-lane-runner.cts`, `command-exists`/`command-capability`), so an overlay * naming an arbitrary probe binary executes it — the same class as `invoke.env`, one level out. * `requiresBinaries`, `emptyOutput`, `promptBudgetKey` and `modelConfigKey` ride along for the * same reason the invoke residual exists: enumerating "the ones that matter" is what failed. * * TWO fields are deliberately excluded, and the exclusion is a DECISION, not an oversight: * `reviewsSection` and `timeoutFloorMs` (D4.5 / matrix A10/A13 — cosmetic, and folding them in * would force a re-consent prompt carrying no security information, training click-through). * `slug`/`transport`/`handler`/`invoke` are excluded because they are already bound. */ residualLane: Record; /** * spawn: the binary this lane's availability probe touches, or '' when none. Paired with * `probeKind` because the two probe kinds do DIFFERENT things and the prompt must not conflate * them: `command-capability` SPAWNS ` --help` and parses the output, while * `command-exists` only asks `hasBinary` (a PATH/filesystem scan that spawns nothing). */ probeBinary: string; /** The declared probe `kind`, or '' — decides how `probeBinary` is described to the human. */ probeKind: string; /** * The data classes that egress to this lane on every run (`EGRESS_PAYLOAD_CLASSES`) — named * honestly (Kerckhoffs's Principle) rather than disclosed as an unhelpful "sends data to the tool". */ egressPayloadClasses: string[]; } /** * ADR-2363 D3 (#3248): an INSTRUCTION surface — an artifact whose body is copied verbatim into the * user's agent instruction context. Peer to the four executable-surface classes, and deliberately * NOT one of them: a skill body does not execute code, it instructs the thing that does. * * Disclosure NAMES the surface; it never inspects the body. Content scanning is rejected outright * by ADR-2363 D2 (Kerckhoffs — a shipped rule set is readable by the adversary who installs it). */ interface InstructionSurface { /** * Which declaration array the name came from — still a discriminator even with one member: a * future addition (see `INSTRUCTION_SURFACE_FIELDS`) is why this stays a field rather than being * dropped now. */ kind: 'skill'; /** The declared stem/name, VERBATIM — never normalized, truncated, or deduped. */ name: string; } interface Disclosure { /** Hook scripts the capability registers (each runs as a runtime hook command). */ hooks: HookSurface[]; /** Command modules the capability ships (each is require()'d into the GSD CLI process). */ commandModules: CommandModuleSurface[]; /** MCP servers the capability declares (each spawned by the host runtime) — name AND command. */ mcpServers: McpServerSurface[]; /** * ADR-2782 (#2796): the reviewer lane this capability declares — 0 or 1 entries (a manifest * carries at most one `reviewer` body). A fourth executable-surface class alongside the three * above; a standing egress channel to an external reviewer. */ reviewerLanes: ReviewerLaneSurface[]; /** * ADR-2363 D5 (#3248): the skills this capability contributes to the agent's instruction context * (agents are excluded — see the module header). A FIFTH disclosed class that is deliberately NOT * executable: it never contributes to `hasExecutable` (D3) and never enters `disclosureSignature` * (D4 — folding it in would perturb the stored signature of every already-consented skill-bearing * capability and fire a spurious re-consent on its next upgrade, which ADR-2782 D4 rule 5 forbids). */ instructionSurfaces: InstructionSurface[]; /** True when the capability ships ANY executable surface (=> consent required). */ hasExecutable: boolean; /** * Declared module/script files that were NOT found under the staged dir (defensive — a * manifest referencing a missing artifact is suspicious; surfaced, not silently dropped). * Empty when no stagedDir was supplied. */ missingArtifacts: string[]; /** * #3514 (epic #1900 F21c): what pinned the source content before staging — 'pinned' (a verified * sha512 `--integrity` pin), 'commit-pinned' (a git source checked out at a `#sha:<40-hex>` * commit), or 'unverified' (no pin). PROMPT-ONLY: set by evaluateInstallTrust when the caller * supplies `integrityPin`, rendered by summarizeDisclosure, and deliberately EXCLUDED from * `disclosureSignature` — consent's content binding is `bundleContentHash` (#1459), and a * rendered line must never read as a changed executable set (which would fire a spurious * re-consent on every upgrade). Mirrors the instructionSurfaces exclusion precedent (ADR-2363 * D4) one field over. */ integrityStatus?: 'pinned' | 'commit-pinned' | 'unverified'; } type StrictKnownRegistries = string[] | null | undefined; interface ParsedSpec { kind: 'registry' | 'git' | 'npm' | 'tarball' | 'local'; raw: string; target: string; ref?: string; } interface SourceVerdict { allowed: boolean; reason: string | null; } interface EnginesVerdict { /** Does the capability's *current* version run on this host? */ compatible: boolean; /** The declared engines.gsd range, or null if unconstrained. */ range: string | null; satisfiedBy: 'engines' | 'compatVersions' | 'unconstrained' | null; /** When the current version is incompatible but compatVersions names one that works. */ downgradeTo?: string; } interface InstallTrustArgs { parsed: ParsedSpec; manifest: CapabilityManifest; /** Optional staged dir — when given, declared artifacts are existence-checked. */ stagedDir?: string; strictKnownRegistries?: StrictKnownRegistries; hostVersion: string; /** * Optional (#2796): resolves a reviewer lane's `hostConfigKey` to its configured destination, for * HUMAN disclosure at install time only — never folds into the consent signature (design * constraint 2; see `ReviewerHostResolver`). */ resolveHost?: ReviewerHostResolver; /** * #3514 (epic #1900 F21c): what kind of pin the source content carries — 'sha512' (a supplied * `--integrity` pin, verified by the resolver before the verdict runs), 'git-commit' (a git * source pinned by `#sha:<40-hex-commit>`), or 'none'. Optional: absent ⇒ the disclosure * carries no `integrityStatus` and the prompt renders no integrity line (legacy callers see * byte-identical output). */ integrityPin?: 'sha512' | 'git-commit' | 'none'; } interface InstallTrustVerdict { /** True when no policy gate blocks the install. */ allowed: boolean; /** True when the install is allowed BUT ships executable surfaces => needs consent. */ requiresConsent: boolean; disclosure: Disclosure; engines: EnginesVerdict; /** Non-empty when allowed === false; each string is a human-readable block reason. */ blockReasons: string[]; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Disclosure // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- function asString(v: unknown): string { return typeof v === 'string' ? v : ''; } /** * Run `fn`, returning `fallback` instead of throwing. Makes each per-class collector total: a * hostile manifest (a Proxy with a throwing trap, a throwing getter, or a non-object/null root) * degrades ONE surface class to empty rather than crashing disclosure for the other three classes * behind it in the same manifest (ADR-2782 #2796 — disclosure runs before validation and must never * throw; matrix C5/E2). */ function safeCollect(fn: () => T, fallback: T): T { try { return fn(); } catch { return fallback; } } /** * Recognize a loopback/local destination from a RESOLVED openai-http host value (matrix B4). Matches * literally, never by substring — an evil host must not spoof `localhost` via e.g. * `notlocalhost.example`. Falls back to a scheme-less leading-segment match so a bare config value * like `localhost:1234` or `192.168.1.5:8080` (no `http://` prefix) is still recognized. * * The fallback triggers on EITHER `new URL()` throwing (a value that is not parseable as an absolute * URL at all, e.g. `192.168.1.5:8080` — WHATWG scheme names cannot start with a digit) OR it * succeeding with an EMPTY hostname: `new URL('localhost:1234')` does NOT throw — it mis-parses the * scheme-less `host:port` shape as an opaque URL whose "scheme" IS the hostname text * (`protocol: "localhost:"`, `hostname: ""`), which would otherwise silently fail to recognize a * bare local config value as local. */ function isLocalHostValue(hostValue: string): boolean { let hostname = ''; try { hostname = new URL(hostValue).hostname; } catch { hostname = ''; } if (!hostname) { hostname = extractBareHost(hostValue); } // WHATWG returns an IPv6 hostname bracketed; a bare config value may not be. const lower = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\[/, '').replace(/\]$/, ''); if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(lower)) return true; if (isLoopbackIpv6(lower)) return true; return isLoopbackIpv4(lower); } /** * Pull the host out of a value `new URL()` could not parse — a scheme-less * `host:port`, or one carrying a path/query/fragment. * * IPv6 needs explicit handling: splitting on `:` mangles `[::1]:8080` to `[`, * which then matches nothing and silently reports a loopback destination as * remote. A bracketed literal is taken through its closing bracket; an unbracketed * value with two or more colons is treated as a bare IPv6 address rather than * `host:port`, since a host:port has exactly one. */ function extractBareHost(hostValue: string): string { let s = String(hostValue).trim(); const schemeEnd = s.indexOf('://'); if (schemeEnd >= 0) s = s.slice(schemeEnd + 3); s = s.split(/[/?#]/)[0] || ''; if (s.startsWith('[')) { const close = s.indexOf(']'); return close > 0 ? s.slice(1, close) : s; } const colons = (s.match(/:/g) || []).length; if (colons >= 2) return s; return colons === 1 ? s.slice(0, s.indexOf(':')) : s; } /** * Render one declared argv member for the human consent prompt. * * A string prints as itself. Anything else prints in a form that makes its * presence and shape visible rather than vanishing: an argv member the host * still receives, but which the user was never shown, is a surface consented to * unseen. Never throws — a circular or BigInt member must not break the prompt. */ function renderArgForHuman(arg: unknown): string { if (typeof arg === 'string') return arg; if (typeof arg === 'bigint') return `<${String(arg)}n>`; try { const json = JSON.stringify(arg); return json === undefined ? `<${typeof arg}>` : `<${json}>`; } catch { return `<${typeof arg}>`; } } /** `::1`, its expanded forms, and IPv4-mapped loopback (`::ffff:127.0.0.1`). */ function isLoopbackIpv6(host: string): boolean { if (!host.includes(':')) return false; if (host === '::1') return true; const mapped = /^::ffff:(.+)$/i.exec(host); if (mapped) return isLoopbackIpv4(mapped[1]); const groups = host.split(':').filter((g) => g !== ''); if (groups.length === 0) return false; return groups.every((g, i) => (i === groups.length - 1 ? /^0*1$/.test(g) : /^0*$/.test(g))); } /** * 127.0.0.0/8 under inet_aton semantics, which is what a browser, curl and the * OS resolver all accept. `127.1`, `2130706433`, `0x7f000001` and `0177.0.0.1` * are every bit as loopback as `127.0.0.1`; a disclosure that flags only the * dotted-quad form understates a local destination for the other four. */ function isLoopbackIpv4(host: string): boolean { const parts = host.split('.'); if (parts.length < 1 || parts.length > 4) return false; const nums: number[] = []; for (const part of parts) { let n: number; if (/^0[xX][0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(part)) n = parseInt(part, 16); else if (/^0[0-7]+$/.test(part)) n = parseInt(part, 8); else if (/^\d+$/.test(part)) n = parseInt(part, 10); else return false; if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n < 0) return false; nums.push(n); } // inet_aton: the final part absorbs every remaining octet. let addr: number; if (nums.length === 1) addr = nums[0]; else if (nums.length === 2) addr = ((nums[0] & 0xff) * 0x1000000) + (nums[1] & 0xffffff); else if (nums.length === 3) addr = ((nums[0] & 0xff) * 0x1000000) + ((nums[1] & 0xff) * 0x10000) + (nums[2] & 0xffff); else addr = ((nums[0] & 0xff) * 0x1000000) + ((nums[1] & 0xff) * 0x10000) + ((nums[2] & 0xff) * 0x100) + (nums[3] & 0xff); if (!Number.isFinite(addr) || addr < 0 || addr > 0xffffffff) return false; return Math.floor(addr / 0x1000000) === 127; } /** * Collect the `hooks` executable-surface class: [{ event, script }] — scripts run as runtime hook * commands. Extracted from the former monolithic `discloseExecutableSurfaces` (ADR-2782 #2796, * cyclomatic 51 / cognitive 99 / 110 lines / `risk_level: critical`) — BEHAVIOR UNCHANGED, only * isolated so it is independently testable and the orchestrator shrinks instead of growing a fourth * class inline. `missingArtifacts` is a shared accumulator the orchestrator passes to every collector * that can populate it. */ function collectHookSurfaces( manifest: CapabilityManifest, stagedDir: string | undefined, missingArtifacts: string[], ): HookSurface[] { const hooks: HookSurface[] = []; if (Array.isArray(manifest.hooks)) { for (const h of manifest.hooks) { if (typeof h !== 'object' || h === null) continue; const rec = h as Record; const script = asString(rec['script']); const event = asString(rec['event']); if (script) { hooks.push({ event, script }); if (stagedDir && !artifactExists(stagedDir, script)) { missingArtifacts.push(script); } } } } return hooks; } /** * Collect the `commands` executable-surface class: [{ family, module, router? }] — modules * require()'d into the GSD CLI process. Extracted, BEHAVIOR UNCHANGED — see `collectHookSurfaces`. */ function collectCommandSurfaces( manifest: CapabilityManifest, stagedDir: string | undefined, missingArtifacts: string[], ): CommandModuleSurface[] { const commandModules: CommandModuleSurface[] = []; if (Array.isArray(manifest.commands)) { for (const c of manifest.commands) { if (typeof c !== 'object' || c === null) continue; const rec = c as Record; const moduleName = asString(rec['module']); const family = asString(rec['family']); // TRUST2-3 (#1459): capture the router (which exported fn runs) so retargeting it forces re-consent. const router = asString(rec['router']); if (moduleName) { commandModules.push({ family, module: moduleName, router }); if (stagedDir && !artifactExists(stagedDir, moduleName)) { missingArtifacts.push(moduleName); } } } } return commandModules; } /** * Collect the `mcpServers` executable-surface class: object map { name: { command, args } } OR * array [{ name, command, args }] (or array [{ name, config: { command, args } }]). Captures the * COMMAND, not just the name — the command is the executable that actually runs, and consent must * disclose it (Codex R1 H1). Extracted, BEHAVIOR UNCHANGED — see `collectHookSurfaces`. Unlike * hooks/commands, an MCP server's command is never existence-checked against `stagedDir` (exactly * like a reviewer lane's `binary` — see `collectReviewerLaneSurfaces` — it may be any PATH * executable, not necessarily a bundle artifact), so this collector takes no `missingArtifacts` * accumulator. */ function collectMcpSurfaces(manifest: CapabilityManifest): McpServerSurface[] { const mcpServers: McpServerSurface[] = []; if (manifest.mcpServers && typeof manifest.mcpServers === 'object') { const pushServer = (name: string, config: unknown): void => { if (!name) return; const cfg = (typeof config === 'object' && config !== null) ? (config as Record) : {}; const command = asString(cfg['command']); // TRUST2-4 (#1459): the RAW args array (incl non-string members) is what the host receives, so it // is folded — stable-encoded — into the signature. `argv` is the string-filtered view for the // human summary; `rawArgs` is the full declared array bound into the signature. const rawArgs = Array.isArray(cfg['args']) ? (cfg['args'] as unknown[]) : []; const argv = rawArgs.filter((a): a is string => typeof a === 'string'); // TRUST2-2 (#1459): a non-stdio MCP server ({ type|transport, url, headers }) was previously // invisible to the disclosure/signature. Capture the transport TYPE, the URL, and the HEADERS // (string→string, prototype-pollution-safe) so a swapped endpoint or header forces re-consent. const transport = asString(cfg['type']) || asString(cfg['transport']); const url = asString(cfg['url']); const headers: Record = {}; const rawHeaders = cfg['headers']; if (rawHeaders && typeof rawHeaders === 'object' && !Array.isArray(rawHeaders)) { for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(rawHeaders as Record)) { if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue; if (typeof v === 'string') headers[k] = v; } } // TRUST-2 (#1459): env can change WHAT a command does without touching command/argv, so it is // part of the disclosed (and consent-bound) surface. Filter to string→string entries only — // a non-string env value cannot be exported as a real environment variable, and including it // would make the signature depend on un-runnable junk. Prototype-pollution-safe: copy only // own enumerable string keys, never __proto__/constructor/prototype. const env: Record = {}; const rawEnv = cfg['env']; if (rawEnv && typeof rawEnv === 'object' && !Array.isArray(rawEnv)) { for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(rawEnv as Record)) { if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue; if (typeof v === 'string') env[k] = v; } } const cwd = asString(cfg['cwd']); // Finding 5 (MEDIUM, #1459): capture the FULL config (every declared field the writer persists), // not just the whitelisted ones. Prototype-pollution-safe: copy only own enumerable keys and // never the dangerous keys. The CAP_MARKER the writer stamps on persist (`_gsdCapability`) is the // capability id (constant per cap), so it does not perturb the signature; we copy config as // DECLARED here (pre-stamp) and the writer adds the marker at write time. const rawConfig: Record = {}; for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(cfg)) { if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue; rawConfig[k] = v; } const surface: McpServerSurface = { name, transport, command, argv, rawArgs, url, headers, env, rawConfig }; if (cwd) surface.cwd = cwd; mcpServers.push(surface); }; if (Array.isArray(manifest.mcpServers)) { for (const s of manifest.mcpServers) { if (typeof s === 'object' && s !== null) { const rec = s as Record; pushServer(asString(rec['name']), rec['config'] ?? rec); } } } else { for (const [name, config] of Object.entries(manifest.mcpServers as Record)) { pushServer(name, config); } } } return mcpServers; } /** * Collect the reviewer-lane executable-surface class (ADR-2782 D5, #2796): 0 or 1 entries, since a * capability manifest carries AT MOST ONE `reviewer` body (Phase 2's validator rejects an array * shape outright — matrix C2b). The array return shape matches the other three collectors so * `Disclosure`/`disclosureSignature` treat it uniformly (sort-then-fold), even though today it can * never hold more than one entry. * * TOTAL and absent-safe (matrix C1–C5): no `reviewer` key, `reviewer: null`, a non-object body * (array/boolean/number), a malformed `invoke`, non-array `flags`, or the whole manifest being a * throwing Proxy/getter all degrade to "no lane" rather than throwing — disclosure runs BEFORE * Phase 2's validation, on a manifest validation would reject outright. * * `resolveHost` is optional — supplied by the lifecycle (never the loader, which has no config * access) to disclose the REAL destination of an `openai-http` lane to a human at install/upgrade * time. Its return value is NEVER folded into `disclosureSignature` (design constraint 2: the * signature must stay a pure function of the manifest, or the loader and lifecycle would compute * different signatures for the same manifest and produce a permanent false re-consent loop). */ function collectReviewerLaneSurfaces( manifest: CapabilityManifest, resolveHost?: ReviewerHostResolver, ): ReviewerLaneSurface[] { return safeCollect(() => { const r = manifest.reviewer; // C1 (no reviewer key) / C2a (null) / C2b (non-object: array, boolean, number) all disclose no // lane — never an error at this layer. Validation of a malformed body is Phase 2's job. if (typeof r !== 'object' || r === null || Array.isArray(r)) return []; const rec = r as Record; const slug = asString(rec['slug']); const transport = asString(rec['transport']); const handler = asString(rec['handler']); // C3: `invoke` absent/malformed still discloses a lane, with empty binary/args/rawArgs rather // than crashing — validating `invoke`'s shape is Phase 2's job, not disclosure's. const invokeRaw = rec['invoke']; const invoke = (typeof invokeRaw === 'object' && invokeRaw !== null && !Array.isArray(invokeRaw)) ? (invokeRaw as Record) : {}; const binary = asString(invoke['binary']); // B1b: the RAW declared args (may contain non-strings the host still receives) is what the // signature binds; `args` is the string-filtered RENDERED view for a human summary — the exact // argv/rawArgs split MCP servers already use for the same reason (TRUST2-4, #1459). const rawArgsDeclared = Array.isArray(invoke['args']) ? (invoke['args'] as unknown[]) : []; const args = rawArgsDeclared.filter((a): a is string => typeof a === 'string'); const hostConfigKey = asString(invoke['hostConfigKey']); const promptChannel = asString(invoke['promptChannel']); // #2483: the declared env pairs. String-filtered for the human line exactly as `args` is, and // prototype-safe (own enumerable keys only, dangerous keys never copied) exactly as `rawConfig` // is. Disclosure runs BEFORE validation, so a non-object or non-string-valued `env` reaches here // and must degrade to "declares none" rather than throw. const env: Record = {}; const envRaw = invoke['env']; if (typeof envRaw === 'object' && envRaw !== null && !Array.isArray(envRaw)) { for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(envRaw as Record)) { if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue; if (typeof v === 'string') env[k] = v; } } const defaultHost = asString(invoke['defaultHost']); // The completeness backstop (mirrors rawConfig). Everything the invoke object declares that the // explicit fields above do not already bind. Same prototype-safe copy. const residualInvoke: Record = {}; for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(invoke)) { if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue; if (k === 'binary' || k === 'args' || k === 'hostConfigKey' || k === 'promptChannel') continue; residualInvoke[k] = v; } // The outer half of the same backstop. `probe` is the one that matters most — its `binary` is // spawned before dispatch — and the two exclusions below are ADR-2782's deliberate cosmetic // carve-outs, not fields nobody got round to. const residualLane: Record = {}; for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(rec)) { if (k === '__proto__' || k === 'constructor' || k === 'prototype') continue; if (k === 'slug' || k === 'transport' || k === 'handler' || k === 'invoke') continue; if (k === 'reviewsSection' || k === 'timeoutFloorMs') continue; residualLane[k] = v; } const probeRaw = rec['probe']; const probeIsObj = typeof probeRaw === 'object' && probeRaw !== null && !Array.isArray(probeRaw); const probeBinary = probeIsObj ? asString((probeRaw as Record)['binary']) : ''; const probeKind = probeIsObj ? asString((probeRaw as Record)['kind']) : ''; // An EMPTY (or wholly unrecognised) reviewer body declares no lane and must // not be treated as one. Without this, `reviewer: {}` alone flips // hasExecutable true and perturbs the disclosure signature — producing a // re-consent prompt whose only content is "(no binary declared)". That is a // prompt carrying no security information, which is exactly the // click-through-training harm this design refuses for reviewsSection and // timeoutFloorMs; refusing it there and permitting it here would be // inconsistent. // // The test is deliberately BROAD — any one recognised field with a value is // enough. Requiring specifically a binary, or specifically a slug, would let // a lane declaring only the other slip through unconsented, which is the far // worse failure. // `env`/`defaultHost` join the test for the reason the comment above gives for keeping it broad: // a lane declaring ONLY an `env` pair would otherwise declare "nothing", disclose nothing, and // still hand those pairs to a spawned child once #2927/#3062 made overlay lanes executable — // the exact slip-through the broad test exists to refuse. const declaresSomething = Boolean( slug || transport || handler || binary || hostConfigKey || promptChannel || rawArgsDeclared.length > 0 || Object.keys(env).length > 0 || defaultHost || probeBinary, ); if (!declaresSomething) return []; // B2/B3/B4: resolvedHost/isLocalDestination are only meaningful for an openai-http lane — a // spawn lane has no destination concept, so both stay at their inapplicable defaults ('' / // false), mirroring McpServerSurface's existing empty-when-inapplicable convention (e.g. // `url: ''` for a stdio server). For openai-http, resolvedHost never ends up '' — it is either a // real resolved value or the explicit UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER (never a blank read as "no // destination"). // The shape test is deliberately WIDER than an exact transport match, and the // human summary uses the same one. Disclosure runs BEFORE validation, so a // mis-cased or unrecognised `transport` reaches here; keying only on the exact // string would leave a lane that plainly declares a hostConfigKey with a BLANK // destination, which reads as "no destination" — the precise thing B3 forbids. const hasHttpShape = transport === 'openai-http' || (!binary && Boolean(hostConfigKey)); let resolvedHost = ''; let isLocalDestination = false; if (hasHttpShape) { resolvedHost = UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER; if (typeof resolveHost === 'function') { let resolved: string | undefined; try { resolved = resolveHost(hostConfigKey); } catch { resolved = undefined; } if (typeof resolved === 'string' && resolved) resolvedHost = resolved; } if (resolvedHost !== UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER) { isLocalDestination = isLocalHostValue(resolvedHost); } } const surface: ReviewerLaneSurface = { slug, transport, binary, args, rawArgs: rawArgsDeclared, hostConfigKey, resolvedHost, isLocalDestination, promptChannel, handler, env, defaultHost, residualInvoke, residualLane, probeBinary, probeKind, // B5: every lane receives the same named egress payload classes — a fresh copy per surface so // no caller can mutate the shared constant through a returned surface. egressPayloadClasses: [...EGRESS_PAYLOAD_CLASSES], }; return [surface]; }, []); } /** * The manifest fields whose declared names become instruction surfaces. Ordered data rather than a * hand-rolled loop per field, so a future second member of the class is one row, not a second copy * of the same filter. Deliberately a ONE-row table today: third-party `agents[]` are never staged * into the instruction context — `stageAgentsForRuntimeWithConverter` (`src/install-profiles.cts`) * takes only a source directory, with no registry-aware staging path the way * `readInstalledCapabilitySkill` gives skills — so disclosing them would name a surface that does * not exist. ADR-2363 D3's class table says "skills, agents"; the agents half is therefore * deliberately unimplemented pending a maintainer decision. */ const INSTRUCTION_SURFACE_FIELDS: ReadonlyArray<{ field: string; kind: InstructionSurface['kind'] }> = [ { field: 'skills', kind: 'skill' }, ]; /** * Collect the instruction surfaces a manifest declares (ADR-2363 D5, #3248) — peer to the four * executable-surface collectors, and invoked through the same `safeCollect` wrapper so a hostile * value here degrades ONLY this class to empty rather than losing the other four. * * Liberal in what it accepts, exactly like the existing collectors: a non-object manifest, an * absent field, a non-array field, and a non-string/blank member each degrade quietly. A non-array * `skills` is NOT a partial success — it yields nothing, because a scalar declares no set. * * Deliberately does NOT: * - dedup (a manifest declaring a stem twice discloses it twice — disclosure reports what the * manifest SAYS; collapsing would misreport it, and dedup is the registry's job); * - normalize or truncate a name (it is disclosed verbatim so the user sees what was declared); * - existence-check the stem against `stagedDir`. A stem is a REGISTRY name, not a bundle-relative * artifact path — checking it would repeat the reviewer-lane `binary` mistake (matrix C6) and * put registry names into `missingArtifacts`, which is for declared bundle FILES only. */ function collectInstructionSurfaces(manifest: CapabilityManifest): InstructionSurface[] { const surfaces: InstructionSurface[] = []; if (typeof manifest !== 'object' || manifest === null) return surfaces; for (const { field, kind } of INSTRUCTION_SURFACE_FIELDS) { const declared = (manifest as Record)[field]; if (!Array.isArray(declared)) continue; for (const entry of declared) { // A non-string or blank member is dropped INDIVIDUALLY — the valid siblings around it still // disclose, mirroring how collectHookSurfaces skips a malformed entry rather than the array. if (typeof entry !== 'string') continue; if (entry.trim() === '') continue; surfaces.push({ kind, name: entry }); } } return surfaces; } /** * Enumerate every executable surface a capability manifest declares. * * Recognizes the FOUR executable surface kinds a capability can ship: * - `hooks`: [{ event, script }] — scripts run as runtime hook commands * - `commands`: [{ family, module, router? }] — modules require()'d into the CLI process * - `mcpServers`: { : {...} } | [{ name }] — servers spawned by the host runtime * - `reviewer`: { slug, transport, invoke, ... } — an external reviewer lane (ADR-2782 D5, #2796) * * plus ONE non-executable class (ADR-2363 D5, #3248): * - `skills`: string[] of owned stems — INSTRUCTION surfaces, whose bodies land in the agent's * instruction context. Disclosed by name; they never set `hasExecutable` (D3) and never enter * `disclosureSignature` (D4). Stems are registry names, so they are never existence-checked * against `stagedDir` and never appear in `missingArtifacts`. `agents` is excluded — see the * module header. * * `mcpServers` is not a first-party capability.json field today, but a third-party manifest may * declare it, so the trust gate discloses it whenever present (honest disclosure over the * narrower first-party schema). Pure: when `stagedDir` is provided, declared hook/command-module * files are existence-checked and any missing ones reported, but nothing is mutated. A reviewer * lane's `binary` is NEVER existence-checked against `stagedDir` (matrix C6) — like an MCP server's * command, it is a PATH lookup on the user's machine, never a bundle artifact; existence-checking it * would block every lane install. * * TOTAL: never throws, for any manifest shape — including a non-object manifest, a Proxy with * throwing traps, or a property with a throwing getter (matrix C5, E2). Disclosure runs BEFORE * Phase 2's validation, on a manifest validation would reject outright, so it must tolerate what * validation does not. Each surface class is collected independently (`safeCollect`) so a hostile * value in ONE class degrades only that class to empty rather than losing the others. * * `resolveHost` (optional, #2796) is forwarded to `collectReviewerLaneSurfaces` so a caller with * config access (the lifecycle, never the loader — see `signatureForManifest`) can disclose the REAL * destination of an `openai-http` lane. It never affects the returned signature. */ function discloseExecutableSurfaces( manifest: CapabilityManifest, stagedDir?: string, resolveHost?: ReviewerHostResolver, ): Disclosure { const missingArtifacts: string[] = []; const hooks = safeCollect(() => collectHookSurfaces(manifest, stagedDir, missingArtifacts), [] as HookSurface[]); const commandModules = safeCollect( () => collectCommandSurfaces(manifest, stagedDir, missingArtifacts), [] as CommandModuleSurface[], ); const mcpServers = safeCollect(() => collectMcpSurfaces(manifest), [] as McpServerSurface[]); const reviewerLanes = safeCollect( () => collectReviewerLaneSurfaces(manifest, resolveHost), [] as ReviewerLaneSurface[], ); const instructionSurfaces = safeCollect( () => collectInstructionSurfaces(manifest), [] as InstructionSurface[], ); // ADR-2363 D3: instruction surfaces are deliberately ABSENT from this expression. Adding them // would silently change `executableSetChanged` and the auto-update re-consent trigger. const hasExecutable = hooks.length > 0 || commandModules.length > 0 || mcpServers.length > 0 || reviewerLanes.length > 0; return { hooks, commandModules, mcpServers, reviewerLanes, instructionSurfaces, hasExecutable, missingArtifacts }; } /** * Existence-check a manifest-declared artifact path under stagedDir, refusing to follow it * outside the staged root (defense against `../` traversal in a hostile manifest). */ function artifactExists(stagedDir: string, relPath: string): boolean { if (!relPath || path.isAbsolute(relPath) || relPath.split(/[/\\]/).includes('..')) { // A traversal/absolute artifact path is treated as "not present" (and is independently // rejected by the validator / lifecycle); never resolve it. return false; } try { return fs.existsSync(path.join(stagedDir, relPath)); } catch { return false; } } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Namespace reservation // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Is `id` in a reserved namespace? Reserved prefixes are first-party/vendor-only so a * third-party capability cannot impersonate a first-party one. */ function checkReservedNamespace(id: unknown): { reserved: boolean; namespace: string | null } { if (typeof id !== 'string' || !id) return { reserved: false, namespace: null }; const lower = id.toLowerCase(); for (const ns of RESERVED_NAMESPACES) { if (lower.startsWith(ns)) return { reserved: true, namespace: ns }; } return { reserved: false, namespace: null }; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // strictKnownRegistries enforcement // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Extract the host of a URL-bearing spec for host-based allowlist matching. Returns '' when no * host can be parsed (caller treats '' as non-matching). */ function specHost(parsed: ParsedSpec): string { // git specs may be scp-style (git@host:path) or URL-style; tarball/registry are URLs. const raw = parsed.target || parsed.raw || ''; const scp = /^[^@/]+@([^:]+):/.exec(raw); if (scp) return scp[1].toLowerCase(); try { return new URL(raw).hostname.toLowerCase(); } catch { return ''; } } /** * True if `host` equals an allowlist entry or is a subdomain of it. Host-based, NOT substring: * `github.com` matches `github.com` and `api.github.com`, never `evilgithub.com`. */ function hostMatchesAllowlist(host: string, list: string[]): boolean { if (!host) return false; for (const entryRaw of list) { const entry = typeof entryRaw === 'string' ? entryRaw.trim().toLowerCase() : ''; if (!entry) continue; if (host === entry || host.endsWith('.' + entry)) return true; } return false; } /** * True for a Windows/UNC network path. Matches any two leading slash-or-backslash characters * (`\\`, `//`, and the mixed `\/` / `/\` forms Windows also treats as UNC-absolute). */ function isUncPath(p: string): boolean { return /^[\\/]{2}/.test(p); } /** Extract the server host of a UNC path (`\\server\share` -> `server`). */ function uncHost(p: string): string { const m = /^[\\/]{2}([^\\/]+)/.exec(p); return m ? m[1].toLowerCase() : ''; } /** * Apply the `capabilities.strict_known_registries` policy to a parsed spec. * * undefined/null -> permissive: external installs allowed (consent gate still applies). * [] -> lockdown: all EXTERNAL installs blocked (local-only). * non-empty list -> allowlist: only sources whose host matches an entry are allowed. * anything else -> FAIL CLOSED: a malformed policy value blocks the install. * * Local (filesystem) sources are never "external" and are always allowed — EXCEPT a UNC network * path (`\\server\share`), which is remote despite parsing as an "absolute"/local-kind spec and is * therefore subject to the policy. */ function evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed: ParsedSpec, strict: StrictKnownRegistries): SourceVerdict { const target = parsed.target || parsed.raw || ''; const unc = parsed.kind === 'local' && isUncPath(target); if (parsed.kind === 'local' && !unc) return { allowed: true, reason: null }; if (strict === undefined || strict === null) return { allowed: true, reason: null }; if (!Array.isArray(strict)) { // A security policy must never be silently ignored when it is the wrong type (e.g. a // string `"[]"` from a hand-edited config). Fail closed. return { allowed: false, reason: 'capabilities.strict_known_registries must be an array (or null/unset); refusing the install on a malformed policy value', }; } if (strict.length === 0) { return { allowed: false, reason: 'capabilities.strict_known_registries is [] — all external capability installs are disabled. ' + 'Install from a local path, or add an allowed host to the list.', }; } // npm specs carry no host; the "registry" is npm itself. Treat the allowlist token "npm" as // permitting the npm source kind. if (parsed.kind === 'npm') { if (strict.some((e) => typeof e === 'string' && e.trim().toLowerCase() === 'npm')) { return { allowed: true, reason: null }; } return { allowed: false, reason: `npm source is not in capabilities.strict_known_registries (add "npm" to allow it)`, }; } const host = unc ? uncHost(target) : specHost(parsed); if (hostMatchesAllowlist(host, strict)) return { allowed: true, reason: null }; return { allowed: false, reason: `source host "${host || '(unparseable)'}" is not in capabilities.strict_known_registries`, }; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // engines.gsd hard gate + compatVersions downgrade // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Hard-gate a manifest against the running host version via engines.gsd, consulting * compatVersions for a graceful-downgrade target when the current version is incompatible. */ function checkEngines(manifest: CapabilityManifest, hostVersion: string): EnginesVerdict { const engines = manifest.engines; let range: string | null = null; if (engines && typeof engines === 'object' && !Array.isArray(engines)) { const g = (engines as Record)['gsd']; if (typeof g === 'string' && g) range = g; } if (!range) return { compatible: true, range: null, satisfiedBy: 'unconstrained' }; if (semverMod.semverSatisfies(hostVersion, range)) { return { compatible: true, range, satisfiedBy: 'engines' }; } // Current version is incompatible — look for a compatVersions entry that works, picking the // newest such capability version (best graceful downgrade). const compat = manifest.compatVersions; let best: string | undefined; if (compat && typeof compat === 'object' && !Array.isArray(compat)) { for (const [capVer, gsdRange] of Object.entries(compat as Record)) { if (typeof gsdRange !== 'string' || !gsdRange) continue; if (!semverMod.semverSatisfies(hostVersion, gsdRange)) continue; if (best === undefined || semverMod.isSemverNewer(capVer, best)) best = capVer; } } if (best !== undefined) { return { compatible: false, range, satisfiedBy: 'compatVersions', downgradeTo: best }; } return { compatible: false, range, satisfiedBy: null }; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Composite install verdict // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Compose the full install trust verdict: source policy + reserved-namespace + engines gate + * executable-surface disclosure. `allowed` is true only when no gate blocks; `requiresConsent` * is true when allowed AND the capability ships any executable surface. * * engines.gsd is also enforced inside resolveCapabilitySource at resolve time; re-checking here * is defense-in-depth and lets callers surface a compatVersions downgrade hint. */ function evaluateInstallTrust(args: InstallTrustArgs): InstallTrustVerdict { const { parsed, manifest, stagedDir, strictKnownRegistries, hostVersion, resolveHost } = args; const blockReasons: string[] = []; const src = evaluateSourceAllowed(parsed, strictKnownRegistries); if (!src.allowed && src.reason) blockReasons.push(src.reason); const ns = checkReservedNamespace(manifest.id); if (ns.reserved) { blockReasons.push( `capability id "${asString(manifest.id)}" uses the reserved namespace "${ns.namespace}" — ` + 'reserved for first-party capabilities', ); } const engines = checkEngines(manifest, hostVersion); if (!engines.compatible) { const hint = engines.downgradeTo ? ` (compatVersions offers ${engines.downgradeTo} for this host)` : ''; blockReasons.push( `capability requires engines.gsd "${engines.range}" but host is ${hostVersion}${hint}`, ); } // #2796: resolveHost is optional and, when supplied, discloses the REAL destination of an // openai-http reviewer lane to the human at install/upgrade time — it never affects the // consent-binding signature (disclosureSignature never reads resolvedHost; design constraint 2). const disclosure = discloseExecutableSurfaces(manifest, stagedDir, resolveHost); // #3514 (F21c): prompt-only integrity status. Set AFTER discloseExecutableSurfaces so the // surface builder (and every signature computed from it) is untouched — see the field's // disclosure-interface comment for why this must never reach disclosureSignature. if (args.integrityPin === 'sha512') disclosure.integrityStatus = 'pinned'; else if (args.integrityPin === 'git-commit') disclosure.integrityStatus = 'commit-pinned'; else if (args.integrityPin === 'none') disclosure.integrityStatus = 'unverified'; // A manifest that declares a hook script or command module NOT present in the staged bundle // (missing, or escaping the bundle via an absolute/`..` path) is rejected: such an artifact // would run from outside the integrity-pinned, reversible install root. Only enforced when a // stagedDir was provided to existence-check against. if (stagedDir && disclosure.missingArtifacts.length > 0) { blockReasons.push( `capability declares executable artifacts not present in the staged bundle (or escaping it): ${disclosure.missingArtifacts.join(', ')}`, ); } const allowed = blockReasons.length === 0; const requiresConsent = allowed && disclosure.hasExecutable; return { allowed, requiresConsent, disclosure, engines, blockReasons }; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Executable-set change detection (auto-update re-prompt trigger) // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Serialize a value to JSON with object keys RECURSIVELY SORTED, so the result is stable under key * reordering. Used to fold an MCP server's `env` map into the disclosure signature: ADDING or * CHANGING any env entry changes the signature (forces re-consent), but merely REORDERING the keys * does NOT (no false re-prompt). TRUST-2 (#1459). * * TOTAL (#2796, matrix C5c/E2): a value declared inside an unvalidated manifest — e.g. a reviewer * lane's `invoke.args` — may contain a BigInt (which `JSON.stringify` throws on) or a circular * reference (which unguarded recursion stack-overflows on). Both are handled without throwing: * a BigInt renders as its decimal string; a cycle (an object that is its OWN ancestor in the current * recursion path — tracked via `seen`, added before recursing into children and removed once fully * processed) renders as the literal string `"[Circular]"`. Neither case is reachable for the golden * hooks/mods/mcp fixtures this phase's byte-identity tests pin down, so their output is unaffected. * * KNOWN LIMIT — signature collision on non-JSON numerics (#2796 isolated review, finding E). * `NaN`, `Infinity`, `-Infinity` and `undefined` all render as `null` here, inheriting * `JSON.stringify`'s own coercion. Two materially different manifests could therefore share a * consent signature. This is NOT reachable through any production path: every manifest arrives via * `readManifestBounded`'s strict `JSON.parse`, and the JSON grammar has no `NaN`/`Infinity`/ * `undefined` literal — such input throws before disclosure runs. `0` vs `-0` IS expressible in * valid JSON and does collide, but is inert: `String(0) === String(-0)`, so a spawned process * receives identical argv either way. * * Recorded here rather than only in the PR that found it: reachability rests entirely on the ingest * path staying `JSON.parse`-only. Anyone who adds a loader that builds a manifest by other means * (a JS config file, a deserializer, a test double promoted to production) re-opens this, and needs * to see it at the point they would break it. */ function stableJson(value: unknown, seen?: Set): string { if (typeof value === 'bigint') return JSON.stringify(`${value.toString()}n`); if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') { try { return JSON.stringify(value) ?? 'null'; } catch { // A non-object value whose serialization still throws (defensive; JSON.stringify does not // throw for any other typeof today, but this keeps the contract TOTAL against future engines). return 'null'; } } const seenSet = seen ?? new Set(); if (seenSet.has(value)) return '"[Circular]"'; try { seenSet.add(value); if (Array.isArray(value)) { return `[${value.map((v) => stableJson(v, seenSet)).join(',')}]`; } const obj = value as Record; const keys = Object.keys(obj).sort(); return `{${keys.map((k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${stableJson(obj[k], seenSet)}`).join(',')}}`; } catch { // A Proxy with a throwing trap, or a getter that throws on read — never propagate (matrix C5). return '"[unserializable]"'; } finally { seenSet.delete(value); } } function disclosureSignature(d: Disclosure): string { // TRUST2-1 (#1459): build EVERY surface line via stableJson of an ARRAY of its components, so each // component is encoded — a `:`-delimited concatenation let a delimiter inside a component (e.g. an // mcp name `x:a` vs command `b`) collide with a different decomposition. JSON-encoding every // component makes each line an injective function of its components (no delimiter injection). const hooks = d.hooks.map((h) => stableJson(['hook', h.event, h.script])).sort(); // TRUST2-3: include the router (which exported fn runs) so retargeting it forces re-consent. const mods = d.commandModules.map((m) => stableJson(['mod', m.family, m.module, m.router || ''])).sort(); // Include transport + command + RAW args + url + headers + env + cwd + the FULL declared config so a // version that: // - swaps the stdio executable it runs (command/args), OR // - changes the env it runs with (e.g. NODE_OPTIONS=--require evil.js), OR // - changes the cwd it runs in, OR // - (TRUST2-2) swaps the transport/url/headers of a non-stdio (http/sse) server, OR // - (TRUST2-4) changes a NON-STRING arg the host still receives, OR // - (finding 5) changes ANY OTHER declared field the writer persists (a future envFile/workingDir/ // launch option NOT in the explicit whitelist above) // is detected as a changed surface (forces re-consent). The explicit fields are kept FIRST for // readability/stability; `rawConfig` is the completeness backstop. All are STABLE-encoded (recursively // key-sorted JSON) so any add/change forces re-consent while a pure key reorder does NOT (no false // re-prompt). const mcp = d.mcpServers .map((s) => stableJson([ 'mcp', s.name, s.transport || '', s.command, s.rawArgs || [], s.url || '', s.headers || {}, s.env || {}, s.cwd || '', // Finding 5: the FULL declared config — completeness so any persisted field change re-consents. s.rawConfig || {}, ]), ) .sort(); // ADR-2782 D5 (#2796): fold in slug/transport/binary/rawArgs/hostConfigKey/promptChannel/handler — // every field that changes WHAT runs, WHERE it sends data, or WHAT CODE post-processes its output // (matrix A3–A9). Deliberately ABSENT from this line: `reviewsSection` and `timeoutFloorMs` (matrix // A10/A13 — cosmetic fields; folding them in would force a re-consent prompt that carries no // security information, training users to click through) and the RESOLVED host (design constraint // 2 — the loader has no config resolver and must compute the SAME signature as the lifecycle, or a // resolver-bearing caller and a resolver-less caller would permanently disagree on one manifest's // signature). // #2483: the eight-field enumeration above was a CLOSED list over an OPEN vocabulary, and it had // already fallen behind by EIGHT fields before `env` made the ninth — `defaultHost` (the manifest's // OWN fallback egress host), `path` (appended to it to build the URL), `outputChannel`, `outputArg`, // `modelArg`, `effortChannel`, `modelDiscovery` and `fallbackModel` all reach `resolveLanePlan` and // none was signed. Counted, because the number is easy to state ambiguously: `resolveLanePlan` // reads THIRTEEN distinct `inv.*` fields once `env` is included (twelve before this PR added it), // of which the pre-#2483 tuple bound four — so eight were unbound before `env`, nine including it. // So the fix is not a ninth name: it is a residual, the same completeness backstop `rawConfig` gives // the MCP line one screen up (#1459 finding 5). `env`/`defaultHost` are ALSO named explicitly, // mirroring that line's deliberate explicit-then-backstop overlap, because they are the two the // human summary renders and a reader should be able to find them in the signature by name. // // APPENDED ONLY WHEN NON-EMPTY, which is D4.5 one level down: a lane declaring nothing beyond the // eight already-bound fields keeps a BYTE-IDENTICAL signature, so this cannot re-prompt every // consented capability for a field it does not use. A lane that DOES declare one re-consents — which // is the correct outcome, not a cost: those fields were executable and undisclosed. const lanes = d.reviewerLanes .map((l) => { const tuple: unknown[] = [ 'lane', l.slug, l.transport, l.binary, l.rawArgs || [], l.hostConfigKey, l.promptChannel, l.handler, ]; const extra = { env: l.env || {}, defaultHost: l.defaultHost || '', residual: l.residualInvoke || {}, laneResidual: l.residualLane || {}, }; const declaresExtra = Object.keys(extra.env).length > 0 || extra.defaultHost !== '' || Object.keys(extra.residual).length > 0 || Object.keys(extra.laneResidual).length > 0; if (declaresExtra) tuple.push(extra); return stableJson(tuple); }) .sort(); // D4.5 (the highest-consequence line in this phase): the lane element is appended ONLY when at // least one lane is declared. A lane-free manifest's signature stays BYTE-IDENTICAL to before this // class existed (matrix A1a/A1b/A1c) — appending unconditionally would change every already- // installed capability's signature and re-prompt every user for every capability on next upgrade, // whether or not they use any reviewer lane at all. return lanes.length > 0 ? JSON.stringify([hooks, mods, mcp, lanes]) : JSON.stringify([hooks, mods, mcp]); } /** * Did the executable surface set change between two versions? Auto-update must re-prompt for * consent when it did (the user consented to one set of executable surfaces, not another). */ function executableSetChanged(oldD: Disclosure, newD: Disclosure): boolean { return disclosureSignature(oldD) !== disclosureSignature(newD); } /** * THE single source of truth for the consent-binding signature of a capability manifest: run * `discloseExecutableSurfaces` then `disclosureSignature`. Both the loader (which checks whether a * previously-consented project cap still matches) and the lifecycle (which records the consent) * compute the binding through THIS helper so they can never drift. `stagedDir` is forwarded for * artifact existence-checking; the signature itself is over the executable SET (hooks/mods/mcp incl. * env/cwd), not the missingArtifacts list, so it is a stable key regardless of the stagedDir. */ function signatureForManifest(manifest: CapabilityManifest, stagedDir?: string): string { return disclosureSignature(discloseExecutableSurfaces(manifest, stagedDir)); } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Human-readable consent prompt // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** Max characters of an env VALUE shown in the human consent prompt before it is truncated. */ const ENV_VALUE_MAX = 60; /** * Environment names that turn a declared pair into arbitrary code execution in a spawned child * (#2483). This list drives the consent prompt's WARNING line. The capability validator carries its * own denylist that REFUSES these names outright (`DENIED_LANE_ENV_KEYS`); the two are deliberately * separate layers rather than one, because they answer different questions: the validator refuses a * manifest it can reject, and this list makes sure anything that DOES reach a prompt is read loudly. * Neither is the boundary — install-time consent is, since no enumeration of execution-primitive * names can be complete against an arbitrary third-party child. */ const EXECUTION_PRIMITIVE_ENV = new Set([ 'NODE_OPTIONS', 'NODE_REPL_EXTERNAL_MODULE', 'LD_PRELOAD', 'LD_AUDIT', 'LD_LIBRARY_PATH', 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES', 'DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH', 'PYTHONSTARTUP', 'PYTHONPATH', 'BASH_ENV', 'ENV', 'PERL5OPT', 'RUBYOPT', 'JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS', '_JAVA_OPTIONS', 'CLASSPATH', 'NODE_PATH', 'GIT_SSH_COMMAND', 'GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF', 'PATH', ]); /** Truncate a long env value for the human prompt (the full value is still in the signature). */ function truncateEnvValue(v: string): string { if (typeof v !== 'string') return ''; return v.length > ENV_VALUE_MAX ? `${v.slice(0, ENV_VALUE_MAX)}… (${v.length} chars)` : v; } /** * Characters that must never reach the consent prompt unescaped. `summarizeDisclosure`'s lines are * joined with `\n` and written RAW to stderr on the needs-consent path, and every value in them is * attacker-controlled manifest data. A raw newline forges a line indistinguishable from genuine * disclosure text; a raw ESC lets a value rewrite or clear lines already printed; a bidi override * visually reorders one. C0, DEL, C1, the bidi/isolate controls, and the line/paragraph separators * are all escaped to a visible `\uXXXX`, so the value stays identifiable and cannot forge output. */ const UNSAFE_PROMPT_CHARS = /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u200e\u200f\u2028\u2029\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\u2069]/g; /** Max characters of any single manifest-supplied value rendered into the consent prompt. */ const PROMPT_VALUE_MAX = 200; /** * Render one manifest-supplied value safely into a consent-prompt line: escape every character that * could forge or rewrite output, then bound the length so one oversized value cannot flood the * prompt and push the rest off screen. Escaping is IDENTITY for ordinary names, so this changes no * existing rendered output for any well-formed manifest — only the disclosure OBJECT is verbatim; * the rendered LINE is always escaped. */ function renderValueForPrompt(v: unknown): string { // `String(v)` on an arbitrary `unknown` risks Object's default `[object Object]` stringification // (@typescript-eslint/no-base-to-string) for a non-primitive; every call site here passes a string // in practice, but the parameter stays `unknown` for the same total-collector discipline as // `renderArgForHuman`, so a non-primitive is JSON-stringified instead of coerced. let s: string; if (typeof v === 'string') { s = v; } else if (v === null || v === undefined) { s = ''; } else if (typeof v === 'number' || typeof v === 'boolean' || typeof v === 'bigint') { s = String(v); } else { try { s = JSON.stringify(v) ?? ''; } catch { s = ''; } } const escaped = s.replace(UNSAFE_PROMPT_CHARS, (c) => `\\u${c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0')}`); return escaped.length > PROMPT_VALUE_MAX ? `${escaped.slice(0, PROMPT_VALUE_MAX)}… (${escaped.length} chars)` : escaped; } /** * Render the instruction-surface section of a consent summary (ADR-2363 D3/D5, #3248). * * Extracted as its own exported function for two reasons. It is called from BOTH branches of * `summarizeDisclosure` — a skill-only capability has `hasExecutable === false` and takes the early * return, so a section appended only at the end would never render for exactly the capabilities * that need it. And it gives tests a typed surface to assert on, instead of regex-matching prose out * of `summarizeDisclosure` (CONTRIBUTING — "Prohibited: Raw Text Matching on Test Outputs"). * * Returns `[]` when nothing is declared, so either caller can append unconditionally without * emitting an empty header. * * TOTAL for a partial disclosure object: the CLI edge calls `summarizeDisclosure(res.disclosure || {})` * (`capability-command-router.cjs`), so a bare `{}` — carrying no `instructionSurfaces` at all — * reaches this function whenever a lifecycle result has no disclosure. * * #3248: every manifest-supplied value rendered here (`kind`, `name`) goes through * `renderValueForPrompt` first — the CLI edge writes these lines RAW to stderr on the needs-consent * path, and an unescaped name could forge a line or rewrite output already printed (see that * function's comment). */ function summarizeInstructionSurfaces(disclosure: Disclosure): string[] { const declared = (disclosure as Partial | null | undefined)?.instructionSurfaces; const surfaces = Array.isArray(declared) ? declared : []; if (surfaces.length === 0) return []; const lines: string[] = [ ` instruction surfaces (${surfaces.length}): installed into your agent's instruction context`, ]; for (const s of surfaces) { // #3248: kind/name are manifest-supplied — escape+bound before rendering (see `renderValueForPrompt`). const kind = s?.kind ? renderValueForPrompt(s.kind) : '(kind?)'; const name = s?.name ? renderValueForPrompt(s.name) : '(name?)'; lines.push(` - ${kind}: ${name}`); } // ADR-2363 D1/D2, and Kerckhoffs: say plainly that nothing inspected these bodies. A summary that // named the surface while implying review would be worse than silence — a "looks checked" line // displaces the judgement this prompt exists to provoke (Goodhart, D2). lines.push(' these bodies are installed verbatim and are NOT content-scanned'); return lines; } /** * Render a disclosure as consent-prompt lines. Returned as an array so the CLI/runtime edge can * format it; the lib never writes to stdout. * * #3248: every manifest-supplied value interpolated into a line (hook event/script, command * family/module/router, MCP name/transport/url/command/argv/header-keys/env-keys+values/cwd, * reviewer-lane slug/hostConfigKey/resolvedHost/defaultHost/binary/rawArgs/handler/probe-binary/ * env-keys+values, missingArtifacts entries) * goes through `renderValueForPrompt` first, which escapes forging/rewriting control characters and * bounds the length. These lines are joined with `\n` and written RAW to stderr on the * needs-consent path (`capability-command-router.cjs`), so an unescaped value could forge a line or * rewrite/clear output already printed — defeating the informed-consent guarantee this function * exists to provide. GSD-authored literals (fallback placeholders, headings, ``) are never * escaped — only manifest-supplied data is. */ /** * #3515: one predicate for "this MCP server is remote (connects to a URL; nothing local is * spawned)" — shared by the section's confinement notice and the per-server rendering so the * consent-prompt claim cannot drift from what is actually disclosed per server. Branches on the * DECLARED SHAPE: an http/sse transport, or a server with no command but a url. */ function isRemoteMcpServer(s: McpServerSurface): boolean { return (s.transport === 'http' || s.transport === 'sse') || (!s.command && !!s.url); } function summarizeDisclosure(disclosure: Disclosure): string[] { const lines: string[] = []; const instructionLines = summarizeInstructionSurfaces(disclosure); // #3514 (F21c): computed once, appended before every return path so a future path cannot miss it. const integrity = integrityStatusLine(disclosure); if (!disclosure.hasExecutable) { // ADR-2363 D3: "declarative only" is true ONLY when there is no instruction surface either. // Claiming it unconditionally told a user their capability contributes nothing to weigh while // it was contributing agent instructions — the exact category error ADR-2363 was written to end. if (instructionLines.length === 0) { lines.push('This capability ships no executable surfaces (declarative only).'); if (integrity) lines.push(integrity); return lines; } lines.push('This capability ships no executable surfaces, but contributes agent instructions:'); for (const line of instructionLines) lines.push(line); if (integrity) lines.push(integrity); return lines; } lines.push('This capability ships executable surfaces that will run in your agent runtime:'); if (disclosure.hooks.length > 0) { lines.push(` hooks (${disclosure.hooks.length}): run as runtime hook commands`); for (const h of disclosure.hooks) { const event = h.event ? renderValueForPrompt(h.event) : '(event?)'; lines.push(` - ${event} -> ${renderValueForPrompt(h.script)}`); } } if (disclosure.commandModules.length > 0) { lines.push( ` command modules (${disclosure.commandModules.length}): require()'d into the GSD CLI process`, ); for (const m of disclosure.commandModules) { // TRUST2-3 (#1459): show the router (which exported fn runs) so the user consents to the exact entry point. const routerSuffix = m.router ? ` [router: ${renderValueForPrompt(m.router)}]` : ''; const family = m.family ? renderValueForPrompt(m.family) : '(family?)'; lines.push(` - ${family} -> ${renderValueForPrompt(m.module)}${routerSuffix}`); } } if (disclosure.mcpServers.length > 0) { lines.push(` MCP servers (${disclosure.mcpServers.length}): spawned/connected by the host runtime`); // #3515 (epic #1900 F20): the confinement-posture notice. Hook commands are confined to the // capability bundle (D5 rule 5); an MCP server's command/args/env/cwd are written VERBATIM and // may point anywhere on the machine — an intentional asymmetry (confining them would break // global/npx servers), disclosed here so the consent is informed rather than assumed. env is // named explicitly (isolated review finding): an execution-primitive env value changes WHAT // runs without touching command or argv — the classic vector — and omitting it would invite // the inference that env IS confined. Only SPAWNED (stdio) servers earn the line: a remote // (http/sse) server runs nothing locally, and the claim must be exact in a consent prompt. // One shared predicate (below) decides spawn-vs-remote for the notice AND the per-server // rendering, so the two cannot drift into an inexact claim. if (disclosure.mcpServers.some((s) => !isRemoteMcpServer(s))) { lines.push( ' intentionally NOT confined to the bundle: a server\'s command, args, env, and cwd are written ' + 'verbatim and may point anywhere on this machine — unlike hooks, which are confined to the capability bundle root' ); } for (const s of disclosure.mcpServers) { // TRUST2-2 (#1459): a non-stdio (http/sse) server connects to a URL; disclose the endpoint, not // a (nonexistent) command. A stdio server discloses command + args as before. const isRemote = isRemoteMcpServer(s); const name = renderValueForPrompt(s.name); if (isRemote) { const t = s.transport ? renderValueForPrompt(s.transport) : 'http'; const url = s.url ? renderValueForPrompt(s.url) : '(no url declared)'; lines.push(` - ${name} -> [${t}] ${url}`); // Header VALUES are redacted in the human summary (they may carry secrets); only the KEY set // is shown. The full values ARE in the signature, so a value change forces re-consent. const hdrKeys = s.headers ? Object.keys(s.headers) : []; if (hdrKeys.length > 0) { lines.push(` headers: ${hdrKeys.map((k) => `${renderValueForPrompt(k)}=`).join(', ')}`); } } else { // Command + args are each escaped individually (not the joined string) so a value that // embeds a newline cannot forge a line even when it lands mid-argv. const cmd = [s.command, ...s.argv].filter(Boolean).map(renderValueForPrompt).join(' '); lines.push(` - ${name} -> ${cmd || '(no command declared)'}`); } // TRUST-2 (#1459): env can change WHAT runs without touching the command, so show each env key // and its (truncated) value — the user is consenting to this exact environment. Truncate first // (keeps the prompt readable at the existing 60-char bound), then escape the result (#3248) so // the truncated value can still not forge or rewrite output. const envKeys = s.env ? Object.keys(s.env) : []; if (envKeys.length > 0) { lines.push( ` env: ${envKeys .map((k) => `${renderValueForPrompt(k)}=${renderValueForPrompt(truncateEnvValue(s.env[k]))}`) .join(', ')}`, ); } if (s.cwd) lines.push(` cwd: ${renderValueForPrompt(s.cwd)}`); } } if (disclosure.reviewerLanes.length > 0) { lines.push(` reviewer lane (${disclosure.reviewerLanes.length}): an external reviewer receives plan/review data on every run`); for (const l of disclosure.reviewerLanes) { // B1/B2/B3/B4: disclose binary+args for a spawn lane, or hostConfigKey+resolved destination // (flagged local when applicable, never omitted as "safe") for an openai-http lane — never // curl/the transport name alone, which would be true and useless (design B2). // Branch on the DECLARED SHAPE, not on an exact transport string. A lane // whose transport is mis-cased or unrecognised still has a hostConfigKey, // and falling through to the spawn branch would print "(no binary // declared)" for a lane that in fact egresses to a live remote host — // understating the disclosure precisely when it matters. Disclosure runs // BEFORE validation, so a non-canonical transport does reach this code. const slug = l.slug ? renderValueForPrompt(l.slug) : '(slug?)'; if (l.transport === 'openai-http' || (!l.binary && l.hostConfigKey)) { const localTag = l.isLocalDestination ? ' [local]' : ''; const hostConfigKey = l.hostConfigKey ? renderValueForPrompt(l.hostConfigKey) : '(hostConfigKey?)'; lines.push(` - ${slug} -> [openai-http] ${hostConfigKey} => ${renderValueForPrompt(l.resolvedHost)}${localTag}`); // #2483: the MANIFEST's own fallback host, which `resolveLanePlan` uses whenever the config // key resolves to nothing (`configured ?? declaredDefault`). Without this line a lane whose // key is unset renders as "(unresolved)" — which reads as "no destination" — while actually // shipping the egress payload classes below to an address the manifest chose. That is the // understating-the-disclosure failure the branch test one comment up already refuses. // Escaped like every other rendered value (#3248): it is manifest-supplied by the same route. if (l.defaultHost) { lines.push(` fallback destination declared by this capability: ${renderValueForPrompt(l.defaultHost)}`); } } else { // Render the RAW declared args, not the string-filtered view. The raw // array is what the host receives and what the consent signature binds, // so a non-string member that is invisible here is a surface the user // consented to without being shown — the opposite of the disclosure's // whole purpose. `renderArgForHuman` stringifies a non-string member; that // string is equally attacker-controlled, so it is escaped too (#3248). const cmd = [l.binary, ...l.rawArgs.map(renderArgForHuman)] .filter(Boolean) .map(renderValueForPrompt) .join(' '); lines.push(` - ${slug} -> ${cmd || '(no binary declared)'}`); } if (l.handler) lines.push(` handler: ${renderValueForPrompt(l.handler)}`); // The probe binary belongs in the prompt beside the dispatch binary when it differs — but the // two probe kinds are NOT the same disclosure and must not be rendered as one. // `command-capability` SPAWNS ` --help`; `command-exists` only asks `hasBinary`, which // scans PATH and spawns nothing. An earlier revision of this line asserted the spawn for both, // which is a FALSE statement in a consent prompt — the one place a claim must be exact. if (l.probeBinary && l.probeBinary !== l.binary) { const probeBinary = renderValueForPrompt(l.probeBinary); lines.push(l.probeKind === 'command-capability' ? ` probes by running: ${probeBinary} --help` : ` probes for the presence of: ${probeBinary} (no process is started)`); } // #2483: identical treatment to the MCP `env` line above, for the identical reason stated // there — env changes WHAT runs without touching the command, so the user consents to this // exact environment or not at all. The parity is byte-level and deliberate: since #3248 the // MCP line escapes BOTH key and value through `renderValueForPrompt`, and a lane's env is // manifest-supplied by the same route — so rendering it raw here would reintroduce, on the // newer surface, precisely the prompt-forging vector #3248 closed on the older one. const laneEnvKeys = l.env ? Object.keys(l.env) : []; if (laneEnvKeys.length > 0) { lines.push(` env: ${laneEnvKeys .map((k) => `${renderValueForPrompt(k)}=${renderValueForPrompt(truncateEnvValue(l.env[k]))}`) .join(', ')}`); // Names that make an environment pair an EXECUTION primitive rather than configuration. // The validator REFUSES these on a reviewer lane (`DENIED_LANE_ENV_KEYS`), so in practice a // first-party or freshly-validated manifest never reaches this line. It still earns its // place, and the reason is the reason to keep both layers: // - Disclosure runs BEFORE validation, and on manifests validation would reject outright. // A user consenting to an already-installed or hand-placed capability sees this line // whether or not the validator ever ran on it. // - No enumeration of execution-primitive names is complete against an arbitrary // third-party child, so consent — not either list — is the boundary. A name missing from // both costs a quieter line on a value that is still SHOWN, which is the only // incompleteness budget an enumeration like this can honestly carry. const flagged = laneEnvKeys.filter((k) => EXECUTION_PRIMITIVE_ENV.has(k)); if (flagged.length > 0) { lines.push(` WARNING — ${flagged.map(renderValueForPrompt).join(', ')} can make this lane run code of the capability's choosing`); } } lines.push(` sends: ${l.egressPayloadClasses.join(', ')}`); } } for (const line of instructionLines) lines.push(line); if (disclosure.missingArtifacts.length > 0) { lines.push(' WARNING — declared artifacts not found in the staged bundle:'); for (const a of disclosure.missingArtifacts) { lines.push(` - ${renderValueForPrompt(a)}`); } } if (integrity) lines.push(integrity); return lines; } /** * #3514 (F21c): the one-line integrity status for the consent prompt, or null when the caller * supplied no `integrityPin` (legacy — no line, byte-identical output). GSD-authored literals, * never manifest data — no escaping needed. A consent-prompt claim must be EXACT: a git * commit-pinned source renders its own line, never "sha512 pin" — no sha512 was supplied * (isolated review finding). */ function integrityStatusLine(disclosure: Disclosure): string | null { if (disclosure.integrityStatus === 'pinned') { return ' content: sha512 pin supplied and verified before staging'; } if (disclosure.integrityStatus === 'commit-pinned') { return ' content: pinned to a git commit, checked out before staging'; } if (disclosure.integrityStatus === 'unverified') { return ' content: NO PINNED HASH — staged unverified (a computed sha512 is recorded in the ledger at install)'; } return null; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Exports // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- export = { RESERVED_NAMESPACES, discloseExecutableSurfaces, // #2796: the reviewer-lane collector, exported for independent testability (ADR-2782's own // argument for extracting per-class collectors rather than growing the switch inline). collectReviewerLaneSurfaces, // ADR-2363 D5 (#3248): the instruction-surface collector, exported for independent testability — // same rationale as `collectReviewerLaneSurfaces` above. collectInstructionSurfaces, checkReservedNamespace, evaluateSourceAllowed, checkEngines, evaluateInstallTrust, executableSetChanged, summarizeDisclosure, // ADR-2363 D3/D5 (#3248): the instruction-surface section of the consent summary, exported so // callers/tests can assert on it directly — see `summarizeInstructionSurfaces`'s own JSDoc. summarizeInstructionSurfaces, // #3248: the consent-prompt escaping/bounding helper, exported so tests can assert directly that // control characters (newline, ESC, bidi overrides, etc.) never reach a rendered prompt line. renderValueForPrompt, // #1459: the consent-binding signature (single source of truth for loader + lifecycle consent). disclosureSignature, signatureForManifest, // #2796: the non-blank unresolved-host marker and the named egress payload classes, exported so // tests can assert exact equality rather than a loose substring match. UNRESOLVED_HOST_MARKER, EGRESS_PAYLOAD_CLASSES, };