#!/usr/bin/env node 'use strict'; /** * #2665 — post-suite hermeticity guard. * * The test suite must never write into a runtime's LIVE config directory. Two * mechanisms defend that, and neither one can see this failure: * * - `TEST_ENV_BASE` (tests/helpers.cjs) blanks every config-location env var, * but only for CHILD processes. A test that calls the installer IN-PROCESS * is untouched by it. * - CI is blind to the ambient-env half of the class outright, because CI * never has `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` and friends set. * * So the class is silent by construction: it damages the developer's machine and * reports nothing. #2665 records two prior authors each diagnosing it and fixing * only the instance in front of them. This module converts it from silent to * loud by snapshotting GSD's own install footprint before the suite and * re-checking it after. * * LOCATION — `scripts/`, deliberately NOT `scripts/lib/`. The installer copies * `scripts/lib/` into every user's config dir wholesale (readdirSync), while * uninstall removes only an explicit allowlist, so a test-only module placed * there would ship to users AND survive uninstall. `scripts/affected-tests-lib.cjs` * is the precedent for a non-shipped helper at this level. * * SCOPE — ownership-based, not whole-root. It watches entries GSD unambiguously * owns: the top-level install footprint (`GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES`) plus `gsd-`-prefixed * children of the dirs GSD shares with the host agent (`GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS`). * It does NOT watch whole config roots. A root such as `~/.claude` is shared with * the host agent, which may legitimately write `history.jsonl`, `todos/`, or * `settings.json` while the suite runs; watching the root would turn that into a * false failure, and a guard that cries wolf gets disabled — after which it * catches nothing at all. * * The ownership test is the prefix, not the location. That distinction is load * bearing: the first version of this guard watched only the three top-level * entries and MISSED a real leak into `/skills/gsd-dev-preferences/`. * * KNOWN GAP — a leak into a file GSD does not own (e.g. mutating the host's own * `.claude.json`) is outside this guard by construction. Closing it would require * watching shared files, which is the false-positive trap above. * * SEVERITY — reports by default, fails only under GSD_STRICT_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1. * Not timidity: on its first CI run this guard found PRE-EXISTING leaks on the * Windows lane (`C:\Users\runneradmin\.claude\gsd-core` and * `skills\gsd-dev-preferences`), because os.homedir() reads USERPROFILE there and * ~190 test sites sandbox HOME alone. Those are real and worth fixing, but they * are a different defect class from the one #2665 closes, and a brand-new gate * that immediately reds an unrelated lane gets bypassed or reverted rather than * obeyed. This repo already has the pattern: the local/no-source-grep ESLint rule * shipped at `warn` and was promoted to `error` after its cleanup sweep (ADR 452). * Promote this the same way once the USERPROFILE sweep lands. */ const fs = require('fs'); const os = require('os'); const path = require('path'); /** Top-level entries only a GSD install creates. See SCOPE above before widening. */ const GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES = ['gsd-core', 'gsd-file-manifest.json', 'gsd-pristine']; /** * Directories GSD SHARES with the host agent. Watching them wholesale would * false-positive on the host's own writes, so only `gsd-`-prefixed children are * watched — those are unambiguously ours. * * Added after the first version of this guard MISSED a real leak: a raw * `spawnSync` that sandboxed HOME but inherited an ambient CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR * wrote `/skills/gsd-dev-preferences/SKILL.md`, which sits under none of * the three top-level entries above. */ const GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS = ['agents', 'commands', 'skills']; const GSD_ARTIFACT_PREFIX = 'gsd-'; /** Bounds on the recursive walk, so a pathological tree cannot stall the suite. */ const MAX_ENTRIES = 20000; const MAX_DEPTH = 12; /** * Resolve every runtime config root the product could write to, using the REAL * resolver rather than a reimplementation — the guard must watch wherever the * product actually points, including through an ambient env var. * * @returns {string[]} deduped, sorted roots; empty if the built lib is absent. */ function resolveLiveConfigRoots(deps = {}) { const libDir = deps.libDir || path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib'); let getGlobalConfigDir; let runtimes; try { ({ getGlobalConfigDir } = require(path.join(libDir, 'runtime-homes.cjs'))); ({ runtimes } = require(path.join(libDir, 'capability-registry.cjs'))); } catch { // Unbuilt tree: the guard is advisory infrastructure and must never be the // reason a test run cannot start. Callers treat [] as "guard unavailable". return []; } const roots = new Set(); // 'grok' is a hardcoded branch of getGlobalConfigDir with no registry entry. for (const runtime of [...Object.keys(runtimes || {}), 'grok']) { try { const dir = getGlobalConfigDir(runtime); if (typeof dir === 'string' && dir.length > 0) roots.add(path.resolve(dir)); } catch { // A descriptor the resolver cannot satisfy is not this module's problem. } } return [...roots].sort(); } /** * Watch targets that are NOT runtime config roots, and so cannot be expressed as * `root x GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES`. * * #2665 round 3: resolveLiveConfigRoots enumerates getGlobalConfigDir per registry * runtime plus grok. Two live write surfaces are invisible to that shape, so a leak * on either passed through this guard — the PR's own safety net — silently: * * $GSD_HOME/.gsd — GSD's user-owned store (consent.json, defaults.json, capability * overlays). Watched WHOLESALE: unlike ~/.claude this root is * exclusively ours, so the shared-root false-positive trap in * SCOPE above does not apply and an ownership filter would only * narrow the guard for nothing. * /config.toml — the file GSD writes its native [[hooks]] block into * (resolveKimiHooksTomlDir, KIMI_SHARE_DIR). The INVERSE case: * ~/.kimi belongs to Kimi CLI, so only the one file GSD writes is * watched, never the root. This is the KNOWN GAP above accepted * deliberately in one direction — GSD demonstrably writes this * file (bin/install.js calls resolveKimiHooksTomlDir at two sites), * so a concurrent Kimi CLI write is the only false positive, and * Kimi is not running during the suite. * * @returns {string[]} absolute paths; empty if the built lib is absent. */ function resolveExtraWatchTargets(deps = {}) { const libDir = deps.libDir || path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib'); const env = deps.env || process.env; const homedir = (deps.os || os).homedir; const targets = [path.resolve(path.join(env.GSD_HOME || homedir(), '.gsd'))]; try { const { resolveKimiHooksTomlDir } = require(path.join(libDir, 'runtime-homes.cjs')); // Thread the SAME injected env/home the GSD_HOME line above uses. Calling it // bare reads process.env and os.homedir() regardless of `deps`, which leaves // the seam untestable and the two targets resolved against different worlds. const kimiDir = resolveKimiHooksTomlDir({ env, home: homedir() }); targets.push(path.resolve(path.join(kimiDir, 'config.toml'))); } catch { // Unbuilt tree — same posture as resolveLiveConfigRoots: advisory, never fatal. } return targets; } /** * Newest mtime within a tree, bounded. Returns `truncated: true` when a bound * was hit — the caller must NOT report such a result as clean, on the same * principle that an existence probe passing vacuously is worse than no probe. */ function newestMtime(target, budget) { let newest = 0; let truncated = false; const walk = (current, depth) => { if (budget.remaining <= 0) { truncated = true; return; } if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) { truncated = true; return; } let st; try { st = fs.lstatSync(current); } catch { return; } budget.remaining -= 1; if (st.mtimeMs > newest) newest = st.mtimeMs; if (!st.isDirectory()) return; let entries; try { entries = fs.readdirSync(current); } catch { return; } for (const entry of entries) walk(path.join(current, entry), depth + 1); }; walk(target, 0); return { newest, truncated }; } /** * Snapshot GSD-owned entries under each root. * * @returns {Record} * keyed by absolute entry path. */ function snapshotLiveConfig(roots, extraTargets = []) { const budget = { remaining: MAX_ENTRIES }; const snap = {}; const record = (target) => { if (!fs.existsSync(target)) { snap[target] = { exists: false, newest: 0, truncated: false }; return; } const { newest, truncated } = newestMtime(target, budget); snap[target] = { exists: true, newest, truncated }; }; // Non-root targets (resolveExtraWatchTargets) are recorded verbatim — they are // already the exact path to watch, whole-dir or single-file. Passed explicitly // rather than resolved here so a caller testing a fixture root does not silently // pull the developer's real ~/.gsd into its snapshot. for (const target of extraTargets) record(path.resolve(target)); for (const root of roots) { for (const entry of GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES) record(path.join(root, entry)); // Shared dirs: enumerate only gsd-prefixed children. A child that appears // between the two snapshots is absent from `before` entirely — diffLiveConfig // treats after-only paths as created, which is exactly the leak signal. for (const parent of GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS) { const parentDir = path.join(root, parent); let children; try { children = fs.readdirSync(parentDir); } catch { continue; // parent absent — nothing of ours can be in it yet } for (const child of children) { if (child.startsWith(GSD_ARTIFACT_PREFIX)) record(path.join(parentDir, child)); } } } return snap; } /** * Compare two snapshots. A path is a violation when it was created during the * run, or when its newest mtime advanced. * * @returns {{path: string, kind: 'created'|'modified'|'unverified'}[]} */ function diffLiveConfig(before, after) { const violations = []; for (const [target, post] of Object.entries(after)) { const pre = before[target]; // Absent from `before` entirely: a gsd-prefixed child that did not exist // when the run started. Both snapshots cover the same roots, so an // after-only path was created BY the run — never skip it. if (!pre) { if (post.exists) violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'created' }); continue; } if (!pre.exists && post.exists) { violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'created' }); } else if (pre.exists && post.exists && post.newest > pre.newest) { violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'modified' }); } else if (pre.truncated || post.truncated) { // Bound hit: we cannot attest this path either way, and saying nothing // would let a truncated scan read as a clean one. violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'unverified' }); } } return violations; } /** Human-facing report for a non-empty violation set. */ function formatViolations(violations) { const lines = [ '', 'run-tests: HERMETICITY WARNING — the suite wrote into a LIVE config directory.', '', 'A test resolved a runtime config dir from the ambient environment instead of a', 'sandbox. The usual cause is an IN-PROCESS install() call: tests/helpers.cjs', 'TEST_ENV_BASE only scrubs CHILD process env, so an in-process caller must also', 'use scrubConfigLocationEnv() (see tests/install.test.cjs) alongside its HOME', 'sandbox. CI cannot catch this class — it never has these env vars set.', '', ]; for (const v of violations) { const label = v.kind === 'unverified' ? 'UNVERIFIED (scan bound hit — not attested clean)' : v.kind.toUpperCase(); lines.push(` ${label}: ${v.path}`); } lines.push(''); lines.push( 'Reporting only. Set GSD_STRICT_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1 to make this fail the run, ' + 'or GSD_SKIP_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1 to skip the check entirely.', ); lines.push(''); return lines.join('\n'); } module.exports = { GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES, GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS, GSD_ARTIFACT_PREFIX, MAX_ENTRIES, MAX_DEPTH, resolveLiveConfigRoots, resolveExtraWatchTargets, snapshotLiveConfig, diffLiveConfig, formatViolations, newestMtime, os, // exported for test seams only };