Files

Jakub Zych a9a7a328e6 refactor: hard-fork GSD -> MSD (Make Software Done)

Mechanical rename produced by scripts/msd-rename.cjs: gsd/Gsd/GSD -> msd/Msd/MSD
across contents and paths, upstream package/repo coordinates -> @golem15/msd-core
and golem15com/msd-core. Deep links into upstream history, sibling upstream
packages, the GSD-2 import feature, CHANGELOG.md and .changeset/ are kept as-is.

Hand edits on top: MSD block-letter banner and logos, LICENSE copyright line,
package/plugin identity, regenerated lockfile, install-tree fixtures, derived
registries and benchmark baseline; migration checksum baseline re-locked
(MSD keeps its own install state, so no install had applied the old sums);
sort-order and regex-escaped expectations in tests adjusted.

2026-10-06 01:47:40 +02:00

context-instruction-override.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

context-invisible-unicode.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

context-malicious-markdown-link.md

feat(113): detect javascript:/data:/userinfo/token-in-query in markdown links (#133 )

2026-05-23 10:15:03 -04:00

plan-fake-frontmatter.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

plan-fake-system-tags.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

README.md

refactor: hard-fork GSD -> MSD (Make Software Done)

2026-10-06 01:47:40 +02:00

roadmap-heredoc-breakout.md

test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite (#3654 )

2026-05-17 00:34:53 -04:00

README.md

Adversarial security fixtures (#3596)

Reusable hostile payloads consumed by tests/security-prompt-injection.security.test.cjs.

The fixtures here are pure data — they are loaded by the test as input to the production code under test (hooks, validators, sanitizers, CLI). They are not executed and contain no real secrets.

File	Attack class	Consumed by
`context-instruction-override.md`	Fake instruction override + role manipulation	msd-read-injection-scanner.js, msd-prompt-guard.js
`plan-fake-system-tags.md`	`<system>`/`<assistant>` boundary mimicry	sanitizeForPrompt, msd-prompt-guard.js
`roadmap-heredoc-breakout.md`	Heredoc-shaped payload inside a planning doc	msd-read-injection-scanner.js
`plan-fake-frontmatter.md`	Frontmatter fields that try to override intent	msd-read-injection-scanner.js
`context-malicious-markdown-link.md`	Markdown links with `javascript:` and embedded creds	msd-read-injection-scanner.js
`context-invisible-unicode.md`	Zero-width chars hiding instructions	msd-read-injection-scanner.js, sanitizeForPrompt

The fake-token values used in CLI redaction probes (ghp_AAAA…, sk-AAAA…) are constructed inline by the test, not stored here, so an editor or grep that scans this directory does not surface plausible-looking credentials.