Files
msd-core/src/external-descriptor-trust.cts
Tom Boucher 23a65c4a3d fix(#2322): materialize installed third-party capability skills (#2340)
* test(#2322): fail-first tests for third-party capability skill materialization

Red phase: tests (1) and (6) fail — resolveSurface reports the third-party stem
surfaced (#2045) but no SKILL.md is ever written to disk. The other four are
controls that must keep holding: first-party-wins collision, profile-tier filter,
nested-router layout unperturbed, and absent/malformed capability must not throw.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SLufH5sDuqA1AiEGu45cuA

* fix(#2322): materialize installed third-party capability skills

A capability could report installed:true, surfaced:true, active:true and still
never exist as an invocable command. #2045 fixed the registry layer —
resolveSurface unions registry.capabilityClusters into the resolved skill set —
but the materialization layer never got the matching fix.
stageSkillsForRuntimeAsSkills only ever read gsd-core's own bundled
commands/gsd/*.md and silently skipped any stem it couldn't find there, so a
third-party skill living at <GSD_HOME>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/skills/<stem>/
was never copied. Registry said surfaced; disk had nothing.

Installed capability skills are now staged alongside the first-party ones, copied
verbatim (they are authored complete for their target runtime and need no
converter). First-party stems always win a collision, the profile filter still
applies, and an absent or malformed capability degrades rather than throwing.

Security: capability.json's skills[] entries are validated only as non-empty
non-reserved strings (capability-validator.cjs:503-514) — no path shape is
enforced upstream — so stems are sanitized (rejecting separators, '..', absolute
paths, NUL) with an independent isPathConfined check on both the read and write
paths. A '../../evil' stem writes nothing outside the capability's own dir.

Also fixes a defect this surfaced in pruneSkillDirs: a materialized capability
skill dir has no first-party manifest entry, so every apply logged
"preserving (user-owned or unknown)" for a live GSD-managed dir. The retained
check now precedes the manifest gate; no deletion outcome changes, and genuinely
unknown gsd-* dirs still warn and are preserved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SLufH5sDuqA1AiEGu45cuA

* fix(#2322): address security review — bind skills to declaring capability, fix full profile

An independent security review BLOCKED the first pass. Both blockers were mine.

BLOCKER 1 (security): readInstalledCapabilitySkill scanned every capability dir
and returned the first sorted match, never checking that a capability DECLARES
the stem — ownership was inferred from attacker-controlled filesystem layout.
Since install copies the whole bundle and the validator only checks DECLARED
entries, a capability declaring `skills: []` could ship an undeclared
skills/deploy/SKILL.md and win the `deploy` stem on sort order, supplying the
agent-invocable instructions the user believed came from the registered
capability. Stems are now bound to their owning capId via
registry.capabilityClusters, and only that capability's dir is read.

BLOCKER 2: the fill-in pass was gated `skills !== '*'` on the premise that
applySurface materializes `full` into a concrete Set. True for applySurface —
false for the installer, which is the default path: resolveProfile returns the
'*' sentinel and bin/install.js passes it straight to staging. So #2322 survived
on the default `full` profile, i.e. the fix didn't fix the reported bug. The
registry is now plumbed to staging, and '*' stages all capability-cluster stems.
Wiring this surfaced a second gap: the ADR-1239 imperative adapter (the primary
install path) never threaded its registry either, which would have silently
defeated the fix on the real default install.

HIGH: staged capability skills were never prunable — pruneSkillDirs gates on the
first-party manifest, so uninstalling a capability left its instructions live in
the agent's context forever. Staged skills now carry a marker making them
GSD-owned and prunable; genuinely unknown gsd-* dirs still warn and are preserved.

MEDIUM: the "staged verbatim" claim was false — applySurface rewrites bodies over
the whole stage dir. The tests asserted byte-equality and passed only because
their fixtures contained no rewrite triggers. Claim dropped; tests now assert the
rewrite against triggering content.

LOW: isPathConfined is lexical, not realpath (symlink-defeatable, currently
unreachable because install rejects symlinks) — comment corrected. The validator
does not enforce non-empty, so isSafeCapabilitySkillStem is the sole defense, not
a second layer — comment corrected and it now has traversal/NUL/absolute/empty
test coverage (previously mutating it to `return true` left every test green).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SLufH5sDuqA1AiEGu45cuA

* test(#2322): pin that the imperative adapter forwards a capability registry

The delegation-args test deep-equalled the exact argv to
installRuntimeArtifacts, so threading the composed capability registry through
the ADR-1239 imperative adapter (required for #2322 — without it the default
`full` install path never materializes third-party capability skills) failed it.

The contract legitimately gained a parameter, so this is a stale-test
correction, not a regression. Rather than deep-equalling the whole composed
registry (brittle — it embeds the full agent/profile map), the test pins the
leading args exactly and asserts only that a registry-shaped value is forwarded.
That still fails if the adapter stops threading it, which is the regression the
test exists to catch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SLufH5sDuqA1AiEGu45cuA

* docs(#2322): backfill PR number 2340 into changeset

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SLufH5sDuqA1AiEGu45cuA

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 06:50:06 -04:00

95 lines
4.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* External-descriptor trust gate (ADR-1239 Phase C-2, #1681).
*
* Load-time `configHome` write-confinement for installed third-party host-plugin
* descriptors. The opt-in loader (`loadRegistry({includeInstalled:true})`) already
* applies schema validation + consent + first-party-wins + fail-closed gates;
* this adds defense-in-depth: **before** a third-party descriptor's install plan
* is ever executed, assert every destSubpath it declares resolves within the
* user-approved `configHome`. A path-escaping or malformed descriptor is
* rejected fail-closed.
*
* This is the load-time twin of Phase 2's install-time gate
* (`assertDestWithinConfigHome` in runtime-artifact-install-plan.cts, #1679 AC3).
* The two are defense-in-depth: load-time rejects malformed descriptors early
* (before consent even matters); install-time bounds the actual writes.
*
* Do NOT conflate with ADR-1577's prompt-injection circuit-breaker — separate
* concern sharing the word "trust".
*/
'use strict';
import path from 'node:path';
/**
* Pure LEXICAL path-containment check (cross-platform). `target` is confined
* to `root` iff resolving it relative to `root` (via `path.resolve` — string
* manipulation, no filesystem access) yields a path equal to or under `root`.
* Absolute paths outside `root` and `..`-escapes return false.
*
* NOT a realpath check: this function never calls `fs.realpathSync` and does
* not detect a symlink along `target` (or an existing path component of
* `root`) that would redirect the LEXICALLY-confined path to a physically
* different, unconfined location on disk. A caller relying on this for a
* write-confinement guarantee against a symlink-planting attacker must pair
* it with a symlink check (or refuse to follow symlinks at write time) — see
* capability-source.cts's install adapters (:491,577,675), which is what
* currently keeps every caller of this function's callers symlink-safe: they
* reject symlinks upstream, before a target ever reaches a lexical-only check
* like this one.
*/
export function isPathConfined(target: string, root: string): boolean {
if (typeof target !== 'string' || typeof root !== 'string' || target.length === 0 || root.length === 0) {
return false;
}
const rootResolved = path.resolve(root);
const targetResolved = path.resolve(root, target);
const prefix = rootResolved + path.sep;
return targetResolved === rootResolved || targetResolved.startsWith(prefix);
}
export interface DescriptorArtifactKind {
destSubpath?: unknown;
}
export interface DescriptorArtifactLayout {
global?: DescriptorArtifactKind[];
local?: DescriptorArtifactKind[];
}
export interface DescriptorRuntimeBlock {
artifactLayout?: DescriptorArtifactLayout;
}
export interface DescriptorLike {
id?: string;
runtime?: DescriptorRuntimeBlock;
}
/**
* Assert every destSubpath the descriptor declares (global + local artifact
* layout) resolves within `configHome`. Throws fail-closed naming the offending
* descriptor + path on the first escape. A descriptor with no artifact layout
* passes (nothing to confine).
*/
export function assertDescriptorConfined(descriptor: DescriptorLike, configHome: string): void {
if (!descriptor || typeof descriptor !== 'object') return;
const id = typeof descriptor.id === 'string' ? descriptor.id : '<unknown>';
const layout = descriptor.runtime?.artifactLayout;
if (!layout || typeof layout !== 'object') return;
const check = (scope: 'global' | 'local', kinds: DescriptorArtifactKind[] | undefined) => {
if (!Array.isArray(kinds)) return;
for (const kind of kinds) {
const dest = kind?.destSubpath;
if (typeof dest !== 'string' || dest.length === 0) continue;
if (!isPathConfined(dest, configHome)) {
throw new Error(
`external-descriptor-trust: descriptor '${id}' declares an unconfined ${scope} destSubpath ` +
`${JSON.stringify(dest)} (resolves outside configHome ${JSON.stringify(configHome)}) — rejected fail-closed.`,
);
}
}
};
check('global', layout.global);
check('local', layout.local);
}