1413 lines
63 KiB
JavaScript
1413 lines
63 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* capability-source.test.cjs — ADR-1244 Phase 3, Decision D3.
|
|
*
|
|
* Tests for resolveCapabilitySource + parseSpec:
|
|
* - parseSpec kind-detection table (all kinds + error cases)
|
|
* - local adapter: happy path, invalid manifest, engines.gsd incompatibility
|
|
* - registry kind: throws 'not yet implemented'
|
|
* - tarball adapter: integrity matching / mismatching (via injected HTTP seam)
|
|
* - security: shell metacharacters in specs/args → only reach exec override as
|
|
* argv array (not interpolated into a shell string)
|
|
* - security: capability id containing ../ → rejected
|
|
* - staging atomicity: validation failure leaves no dir under capabilities/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const { describe, test, beforeEach, afterEach } = require('node:test');
|
|
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
|
|
const fs = require('node:fs');
|
|
const os = require('node:os');
|
|
const path = require('node:path');
|
|
const crypto = require('node:crypto');
|
|
|
|
const { cleanup, createTempDir } = require('./helpers.cjs');
|
|
|
|
// The module under test — loaded from the built .cjs artifact.
|
|
const capSource = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/capability-source.cjs');
|
|
const {
|
|
resolveCapabilitySource,
|
|
parseSpec,
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet,
|
|
_setHttpsGetImpl,
|
|
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
|
MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES,
|
|
MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES,
|
|
MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES,
|
|
} = capSource;
|
|
const { EventEmitter } = require('node:events');
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Helpers
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
/** Build a minimal but valid capability manifest for tests. */
|
|
function featureCap(id, extra = {}) {
|
|
return {
|
|
id,
|
|
role: 'feature',
|
|
version: '1.0.0',
|
|
title: id,
|
|
description: 'test capability',
|
|
tier: 'standard',
|
|
requires: [],
|
|
engines: { gsd: '>=1.0.0' },
|
|
runtimeCompat: { supported: ['*'], unsupported: [] },
|
|
skills: [],
|
|
agents: [],
|
|
hooks: [],
|
|
config: {},
|
|
steps: [],
|
|
contributions: [],
|
|
gates: [],
|
|
...extra,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Create a temp directory with a capability.json inside.
|
|
* Returns the directory path.
|
|
*/
|
|
function makeLocalCap(cap) {
|
|
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-cap-local-'));
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
|
return dir;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Compute sha512-<base64> from a Buffer. */
|
|
function sha512b64(buf) {
|
|
return 'sha512-' + crypto.createHash('sha512').update(buf).digest('base64');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A minimal fs.Dirent-shaped object for synthetic streaming-opendir tests. */
|
|
function makeDirent(name, { file = false, dir = false, symlink = false } = {}) {
|
|
return {
|
|
name,
|
|
isSymbolicLink: () => symlink,
|
|
isDirectory: () => dir,
|
|
isFile: () => file,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// parseSpec — kind detection
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('parseSpec — kind detection', () => {
|
|
test('relative path ./foo → local', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('./my-cap');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'local');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.raw, './my-cap');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('relative path ../foo → local', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('../my-cap');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'local');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('absolute path /home/user/my-cap → local', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('/home/user/my-cap');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'local');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('npm: prefix → npm', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('npm:my-capability@1.0.0');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'npm');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.target, 'my-capability@1.0.0');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('tarball https URL ending .tgz → tarball', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('https://example.com/cap.tgz');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'tarball');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.target, 'https://example.com/cap.tgz');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('tarball https URL ending .tar.gz → tarball', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('https://example.com/cap.tar.gz');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'tarball');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('git https URL ending .git → git', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('https://github.com/org/repo.git');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'git');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.target, 'https://github.com/org/repo.git');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.ref, undefined);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('git URL with #<ref> → git with ref extracted', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('https://github.com/org/repo#v1.2.3');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'git');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.ref, 'v1.2.3');
|
|
assert.ok(!p.target.includes('#'), 'URL must not include # fragment');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('git+ prefix → git', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('git+https://github.com/org/repo.git');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'git');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('registry-style name@version (no scheme) → registry', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('my-org/capability@2.0.0');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'registry');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('bare package name → registry', () => {
|
|
const p = parseSpec('my-capability');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(p.kind, 'registry');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('empty string → throws', () => {
|
|
assert.throws(() => parseSpec(''), /non-empty/i);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('whitespace-only string → throws', () => {
|
|
assert.throws(() => parseSpec(' '), /non-empty/i);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('null coerced (wrong type) → throws', () => {
|
|
// @ts-expect-error intentional wrong type for test
|
|
assert.throws(() => parseSpec(null), /non-empty|string/i);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('npm: with empty package spec → throws', () => {
|
|
assert.throws(() => parseSpec('npm:'), /empty after "npm:"/i);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// local adapter
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('local adapter — happy path', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
let capDir = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-');
|
|
capDir = makeLocalCap(featureCap('test-cap-local'));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('resolves a valid local capability — staged dir exists with capability.json', async () => {
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'test-cap-local');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.version, '1.0.0');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir), 'staged dir must exist');
|
|
assert.ok(
|
|
fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')),
|
|
'capability.json must be present in staged dir'
|
|
);
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.source, capDir);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('staging creates the capability under <gsdHome>/.gsd/capabilities/<id>/', async () => {
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
|
const expectedDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'test-cap-local');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.stagedDir, expectedDir);
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(expectedDir));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('skipEnginesGate:true stages an engines-incompatible capability without throwing', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('test-cap-local');
|
|
cap.engines = { gsd: '>=99.0.0' };
|
|
const incompatDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
// Default: the engines gate throws.
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(incompatDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.6.0' }),
|
|
/engines\.gsd/,
|
|
);
|
|
// skipEnginesGate: the resolver stages it (copy-only) and leaves the gate to the caller.
|
|
const r = await resolveCapabilitySource(incompatDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.6.0', skipEnginesGate: true, promote: false });
|
|
assert.strictEqual(r.id, 'test-cap-local');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(r.stagedDir, 'capability.json')));
|
|
cleanup(incompatDir);
|
|
cleanup(r.stagedDir);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('promote:false validates but does NOT promote — returns the staging dir, final dir absent', async () => {
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0', promote: false });
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'test-cap-local');
|
|
const stagingRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.staging');
|
|
assert.notStrictEqual(result.stagedDir, finalDir, 'must not be the final dir');
|
|
assert.ok(result.stagedDir.startsWith(stagingRoot), 'staged dir is under .staging');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'final dir must NOT be created when promote:false');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('local adapter — invalid manifest', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('manifest missing "version" field → throws AND no staged dir remains', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('no-version-cap');
|
|
delete cap.version;
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
(err) => {
|
|
assert.ok(err instanceof Error, 'must throw an Error');
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No staged dir should remain.
|
|
const capabilitiesDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
if (fs.existsSync(capabilitiesDir)) {
|
|
const entries = fs.readdirSync(capabilitiesDir).filter((e) => e !== '.staging');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(entries.length, 0, 'No capability dirs must remain after failure');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('manifest with invalid role → throws AND no staged dir remains', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('bad-role-cap');
|
|
cap.role = 'totally-invalid-role-xyz';
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/valid|role|validation/i
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const capabilitiesDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
if (fs.existsSync(capabilitiesDir)) {
|
|
const entries = fs.readdirSync(capabilitiesDir).filter((e) => e !== '.staging');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(entries.length, 0, 'No capability dirs must remain after failure');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('missing capability.json → throws', async () => {
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('no-manifest-');
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/capability\.json/i
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('local adapter — engines.gsd incompatibility', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('engines.gsd ">=99.0.0" with hostVersion 1.5.0 → throws before staging', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('incompat-cap', { engines: { gsd: '>=99.0.0' } });
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/engines\.gsd|requires|incompatible/i
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No staged directory should exist.
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'incompat-cap');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'staged dir must not exist for incompatible capability');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// registry kind — explicit stub
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('registry kind', () => {
|
|
test('throws "not yet implemented" for registry specs', async () => {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('my-cap@1.0.0', { gsdHome: os.tmpdir(), hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/not yet implemented/i
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// tarball adapter — integrity verification via injected HTTP seam
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('tarball adapter — integrity via _setCapabilitySourceHttpGet', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null); // restore real transport
|
|
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('matching integrity → resolves successfully', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('tarball-cap');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
const integrity = sha512b64(tgzBuf);
|
|
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
|
|
|
// Inject a tar extractor that writes the capability.json to extractDir.
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(
|
|
'https://example.com/tarball-cap.tgz',
|
|
{
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
integrity,
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args, _opts) => {
|
|
// Name listing (assertSafeTarMembers step 1): safe member names.
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
// Verbose listing (assertSafeTarMembers step 2): regular file, no link.
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
// Extraction pass: args = ['-xzf', tgzPath, '-C', extractDir]
|
|
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(
|
|
path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'),
|
|
JSON.stringify(cap),
|
|
'utf8'
|
|
);
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'tarball-cap');
|
|
assert.ok(result.integrity && result.integrity.startsWith('sha512-'), 'integrity must be set');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('mismatching integrity → throws BEFORE staging (no staged dir)', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('tarball-mismatch');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
const badIntegrity = 'sha512-' + Buffer.from('totally-wrong').toString('base64');
|
|
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
|
|
|
let tarCalls = 0;
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() =>
|
|
resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/tarball-mismatch.tgz', {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
integrity: badIntegrity,
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args, _opts) => {
|
|
// Must never be reached — integrity check fires before any tar invocation.
|
|
tarCalls++;
|
|
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(
|
|
path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'),
|
|
JSON.stringify(cap),
|
|
'utf8'
|
|
);
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
/integrity mismatch|mismatch/i
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Integrity is verified over the raw .tgz bytes BEFORE any tar call — ordering invariant.
|
|
assert.strictEqual(tarCalls, 0, 'tar must NOT be invoked — integrity verified over the .tgz bytes before extraction');
|
|
|
|
// No staged directory must exist.
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'tarball-mismatch');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'staged dir must NOT exist after integrity mismatch');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// #1460 CS-1 — a supplied --integrity is NEVER silently ignored.
|
|
// - npm: verified over the produced .tgz bytes (same SRI sha512 domain as tarball).
|
|
// - git / local: REJECTED with an actionable error (no single byte-SRI artifact).
|
|
// revert-fails: with stageValidated's `integrity: null` restored on these adapters
|
|
// (the pre-fix behaviour), the npm-mismatch case would silently resolve and the
|
|
// git/local cases would silently resolve with integrity:null — every assert below
|
|
// would then fail.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('#1460 CS-1 — supplied --integrity is verified or rejected per source (never silently dropped)', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
/** Build a fake `npm pack` that writes a real .tgz of `tgzBytes` to the --pack-destination. */
|
|
function fakeNpmPack(tgzBytes) {
|
|
return (args) => {
|
|
const destIdx = args.indexOf('--pack-destination');
|
|
const dest = destIdx >= 0 ? args[destIdx + 1] : '';
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dest, 'cap.tgz'), tgzBytes);
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'cap.tgz\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A tar override that lists safe members and writes `cap`'s capability.json on extract. */
|
|
function fakeTar(cap) {
|
|
return (_prog, args) => {
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'package/capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 package/capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
|
const pkgDir = path.join(extractDir, 'package');
|
|
fs.mkdirSync(pkgDir, { recursive: true });
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test('npm + matching --integrity (over the .tgz bytes) → resolves', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('npm-int-ok');
|
|
const tgzBytes = Buffer.from('a deterministic npm tarball payload for integrity', 'utf8');
|
|
const integrity = sha512b64(tgzBytes);
|
|
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource('npm:@org/npm-int-ok@^1.0.0', {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
integrity,
|
|
execOverrides: { npm: fakeNpmPack(tgzBytes), tar: fakeTar(cap) },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'npm-int-ok');
|
|
assert.ok(result.integrity && result.integrity.startsWith('sha512-'), 'integrity must be recorded');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir), 'staged dir must exist');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('npm + MISMATCHING --integrity → throws BEFORE promote/staging (no final dir)', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('npm-int-bad');
|
|
const tgzBytes = Buffer.from('the real npm tarball bytes', 'utf8');
|
|
const badIntegrity = 'sha512-' + Buffer.from('not-the-real-hash').toString('base64');
|
|
|
|
let tarCalls = 0;
|
|
const instrumentedTar = (_prog, args) => {
|
|
// Must never be reached — integrity is verified over the .tgz bytes before any tar call.
|
|
tarCalls++;
|
|
return fakeTar(cap)(_prog, args);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('npm:@org/npm-int-bad@^1.0.0', {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
integrity: badIntegrity,
|
|
execOverrides: { npm: fakeNpmPack(tgzBytes), tar: instrumentedTar },
|
|
}),
|
|
/integrity mismatch|mismatch/i,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Integrity is verified over the raw .tgz bytes BEFORE any tar call — ordering invariant.
|
|
assert.strictEqual(tarCalls, 0, 'tar extraction must NOT run — integrity verified over the .tgz bytes before extraction');
|
|
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'npm-int-bad');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'no final dir after integrity mismatch');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('git + any --integrity → throws an actionable error (no silent resolve)', async () => {
|
|
// The integrity reject must fire BEFORE the clone — so execGit is never called.
|
|
const gitCalls = [];
|
|
const fakeGit = (...callArgs) => {
|
|
gitCalls.push(callArgs);
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://github.com/org/repo.git#v1.0.0', {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
integrity: 'sha512-' + Buffer.from('anything').toString('base64'),
|
|
execOverrides: { git: fakeGit },
|
|
}),
|
|
/integrity pinning is not supported for git sources|#sha:/i,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
assert.strictEqual(gitCalls.length, 0, 'execGit must NOT run — rejection fires before the clone');
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'repo');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'no final dir after git integrity rejection');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('local + --integrity → throws an actionable error (no silent resolve)', async () => {
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(featureCap('local-int-cap'));
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
integrity: 'sha512-' + Buffer.from('anything').toString('base64'),
|
|
}),
|
|
/integrity pinning is not supported for local sources/i,
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'local-int-cap');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'no final dir after local integrity rejection');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Security: shell metacharacters in spec / args → arrive as argv array
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('security: shell metacharacters do not escape into a shell string', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('git spec with shell metacharacters — captured as argv array, not shell string', async () => {
|
|
const capturedCalls = [];
|
|
|
|
// The injected execGit captures every call; we verify the spec appears verbatim
|
|
// as an array element, never interpolated into a string with shell operators.
|
|
const maliciousUrl = 'https://github.com/org/repo.git; rm -rf /tmp/evil';
|
|
|
|
const fakeGit = (args, _opts) => {
|
|
capturedCalls.push([...args]);
|
|
// Simulate failing clone so we don't need a real repo.
|
|
return { exitCode: 128, stdout: '', stderr: 'not a git repository', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() =>
|
|
resolveCapabilitySource(`git+${maliciousUrl}`, {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
execOverrides: { git: fakeGit },
|
|
}),
|
|
/clone failed|git/i
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// The call must have been made with the URL as a discrete argv element.
|
|
assert.ok(capturedCalls.length > 0, 'execGit must have been called');
|
|
const cloneCall = capturedCalls[0];
|
|
// Argv must include the URL as a single token — never split or shell-interpolated.
|
|
// The semicolon and "rm -rf" must be a single string element, not two elements.
|
|
// The key security property: if we ran this in a shell, `; rm -rf /tmp/evil` would
|
|
// be a separate command. By routing through argv array, it is inert.
|
|
assert.ok(
|
|
cloneCall.some((arg) => arg === maliciousUrl || arg.includes('rm -rf')),
|
|
'malicious characters must appear in argv array (inert), not as a parsed shell command'
|
|
);
|
|
// None of the individual args should be shell commands like just 'rm' or '-rf'.
|
|
const hasStandaloneRm = cloneCall.some((arg) => arg === 'rm');
|
|
assert.ok(!hasStandaloneRm, 'shell metacharacters must not be parsed into separate argv elements');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('npm spec with shell metacharacters is REJECTED before exec (execNpm uses a Windows shell)', async () => {
|
|
const capturedCalls = [];
|
|
const fakeNpm = (args) => {
|
|
capturedCalls.push([...args]);
|
|
return { exitCode: 1, stdout: '', stderr: 'not found', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
};
|
|
for (const evil of ['`rm -rf /`', 'pkg; rm -rf', 'pkg && calc', 'pkg|cat /etc/passwd', 'pkg$(whoami)', 'pkg >out', "pkg'", 'pkg"x']) {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(`npm:${evil}`, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0', execOverrides: { npm: fakeNpm } }),
|
|
/unsafe npm package spec/i,
|
|
`npm:${evil} must be rejected at parse`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
assert.equal(capturedCalls.length, 0, 'execNpm must NEVER be called for an unsafe npm spec');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('a valid npm spec reaches execNpm as a discrete argv element WITH --ignore-scripts', async () => {
|
|
const capturedCalls = [];
|
|
const fakeNpm = (args) => {
|
|
capturedCalls.push([...args]);
|
|
return { exitCode: 1, stdout: '', stderr: 'not found', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
};
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('npm:@org/cap@^1.2.0', { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0', execOverrides: { npm: fakeNpm } }),
|
|
/npm pack failed|not found/i
|
|
);
|
|
const packCall = capturedCalls[0];
|
|
assert.ok(packCall.includes('@org/cap@^1.2.0'), 'valid spec passed as a single discrete argv element');
|
|
assert.ok(packCall.includes('--ignore-scripts'), 'npm pack MUST pass --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle code execution)');
|
|
assert.ok(packCall.includes('pack'), 'must be `npm pack`, never `npm install`');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('git transport allowlist: ext::/file:// transports are rejected at parse', async () => {
|
|
for (const evil of ['git+ext::sh -c "evil"', 'git+file:///etc', 'git+fd::7']) {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(evil, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/unsupported git transport/i,
|
|
`${evil} must be rejected`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Security: symlink + tar-slip rejection
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('security: symlink and tar-slip rejection', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('local bundle containing a symlink is refused (copyFileSync would follow it)', async (t) => {
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-local-symlink-');
|
|
t.after(() => cleanup(dir));
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('symlink-cap')), 'utf8');
|
|
// Plant a symlink pointing at a host file.
|
|
const secret = createTempDir('gsd-secret-');
|
|
t.after(() => cleanup(secret));
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(secret, 'id_rsa'), 'PRIVATE', 'utf8');
|
|
try {
|
|
fs.symlinkSync(path.join(secret, 'id_rsa'), path.join(dir, 'leaked'));
|
|
} catch {
|
|
t.skip('symlink not supported on this platform');
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/symlink/i
|
|
);
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'symlink-cap')), 'no staged dir after symlink refusal');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('tarball with a tar-slip member (..) is refused before extraction', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('slip-cap');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
|
let extracted = false;
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/slip.tgz', {
|
|
gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
// Listing reveals a traversal member → must be rejected.
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\n../../../etc/evil\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
extracted = true; // extraction must NOT happen
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
/unsafe member path/i
|
|
);
|
|
assert.equal(extracted, false, 'extraction must not run when a member path is unsafe');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('tarball containing a SYMLINK member is refused before extraction', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('symmember-cap');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
|
let extracted = false;
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/sym.tgz', {
|
|
gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
// Names look safe...
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\nleak\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
|
// ...but the verbose listing reveals a symlink member → reject.
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 u g 10 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\nlrwxr-xr-x 0 u g 0 Jan 1 2020 leak -> /etc/passwd\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
extracted = true;
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
/symlink or hardlink member/i
|
|
);
|
|
assert.equal(extracted, false, 'extraction must not run when a symlink member is present');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Security: capability id path traversal → rejected
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('security: path traversal in capability id', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('capability id containing ../ is rejected before staging', async () => {
|
|
// Build a local dir with a capability.json whose id contains path traversal.
|
|
const cap = featureCap('../evil-escape');
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/invalid|path separator|kebab-case|\.\./i
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Nothing must have been written under gsdHome.
|
|
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
if (fs.existsSync(capRoot)) {
|
|
const entries = fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(entries.length, 0, 'no capability must be staged with traversal id');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('capability id containing / is rejected', async () => {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('org/evil');
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/invalid|path separator|kebab-case/i
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Staging atomicity: validation failure leaves no directory
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('staging atomicity', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('validation failure leaves no directory under capabilities/ (only .staging may exist briefly)', async () => {
|
|
// Deliberately invalid cap: missing required fields beyond id/version.
|
|
const cap = { id: 'atomicity-test', version: '1.0.0', role: 'totally-invalid-role-xyz' };
|
|
const capDir = makeLocalCap(cap);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(capDir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
(err) => err instanceof Error
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(capDir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The final capability directory must NOT exist.
|
|
const finalDir = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', 'atomicity-test');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(finalDir), 'Final capability dir must be absent after validation failure');
|
|
|
|
// .staging dir should be cleaned up too (best-effort assertion — it's async).
|
|
const stagingRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities', '.staging');
|
|
if (fs.existsSync(stagingRoot)) {
|
|
const stagingEntries = fs.readdirSync(stagingRoot);
|
|
assert.strictEqual(stagingEntries.length, 0, '.staging must be empty after cleanup');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Fake tarball helper (not a real .tgz — the tar override bypasses extraction)
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Returns a Buffer that acts as a "tarball" for tests that inject a fake tar extractor.
|
|
* The content is arbitrary; tests use the execOverrides.tar hook to write fixture files
|
|
* into the extractDir instead of calling real tar.
|
|
*/
|
|
function _fakeTarball(cap) {
|
|
// We just need a buffer; the injected tar override does the actual "extraction".
|
|
return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ _fakeTarball: true, id: cap.id }), 'utf8');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// #1461 DOS-1 — realHttpsGet must BOUND the fetched response size. Without a cap,
|
|
// res.on('data') accumulates chunks and Buffer.concat'd into memory with no
|
|
// ceiling → a hostile/oversized tarball OOMs the process. Verified by injecting a
|
|
// fake low-level https.get (the _setHttpsGetImpl seam) that streams a response.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Build a fake https.get implementation that drives realHttpsGet's streaming path.
|
|
* @param chunks array of Buffers to emit on the response 'data' events
|
|
* @param headers response headers (e.g. { 'content-length': '...' })
|
|
* @param statusCode response status (default 200)
|
|
* Returns a function matching the https.get(url, opts, cb) shape. It captures whether
|
|
* req.destroy() / res.destroy() were called so a test can assert the cap aborts the stream.
|
|
*/
|
|
function makeFakeHttpsGet(chunks, headers = {}, statusCode = 200) {
|
|
const state = { reqDestroyed: false, resDestroyed: false, emittedBytes: 0, ended: false };
|
|
const fn = (_url, _opts, cb) => {
|
|
const req = new EventEmitter();
|
|
req.setTimeout = () => req;
|
|
req.destroy = () => { state.reqDestroyed = true; };
|
|
const res = new EventEmitter();
|
|
res.statusCode = statusCode;
|
|
res.headers = headers;
|
|
res.destroy = () => { state.resDestroyed = true; };
|
|
// Drive the response on the next tick so realHttpsGet has attached its listeners.
|
|
setImmediate(() => {
|
|
cb(res);
|
|
for (const c of chunks) {
|
|
if (state.reqDestroyed || state.resDestroyed) break;
|
|
state.emittedBytes += c.length;
|
|
res.emit('data', c);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!state.reqDestroyed && !state.resDestroyed) {
|
|
state.ended = true;
|
|
res.emit('end');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
return req;
|
|
};
|
|
fn.state = state;
|
|
return fn;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describe('#1461 DOS-1 — realHttpsGet bounds the response size (MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES)', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-dos-home-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
_setHttpsGetImpl(null); // restore the real https.get
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
|
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES is a sane bounded cap (64 MiB)', () => {
|
|
assert.strictEqual(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, 64 * 1024 * 1024, 'cap is generous but bounded');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('a streamed body exceeding MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES is rejected and not buffered unboundedly', async () => {
|
|
// Stream chunks whose cumulative length exceeds the cap. Each chunk is 1 MiB; we emit cap+2
|
|
// chunks. With the cap in place the stream is destroyed after crossing MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, so
|
|
// far fewer than all chunks are ever emitted.
|
|
const ONE_MIB = 1024 * 1024;
|
|
const chunkCount = MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES / ONE_MIB + 2; // 66 chunks of 1 MiB
|
|
const chunks = Array.from({ length: chunkCount }, () => Buffer.alloc(ONE_MIB, 0x61));
|
|
const fake = makeFakeHttpsGet(chunks, {} /* no content-length → exercise the streaming guard */);
|
|
_setHttpsGetImpl(fake);
|
|
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: without the per-`data` size guard in realHttpsGet, all chunks are accumulated
|
|
// and the promise RESOLVES with an oversized body (then proceeds to integrity/extraction) —
|
|
// assert.rejects below fails because nothing rejected.
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/huge.tgz', { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/exceeds .*bytes/i,
|
|
'an oversized streamed body must reject with the size error'
|
|
);
|
|
// The stream was aborted: the request/response were destroyed and NOT every chunk was emitted.
|
|
assert.ok(fake.state.reqDestroyed || fake.state.resDestroyed, 'the request/response is destroyed on overflow');
|
|
assert.ok(fake.state.emittedBytes <= (MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + ONE_MIB),
|
|
'streaming stops shortly after crossing the cap (not all chunks buffered)');
|
|
assert.ok(!fake.state.ended, 'the response never reaches end — it was cut off');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('a content-length header over the cap is rejected BEFORE buffering any body', async () => {
|
|
// Advertise an oversized content-length but emit NO data — the early header check must reject.
|
|
const fake = makeFakeHttpsGet([], { 'content-length': String(MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1) });
|
|
_setHttpsGetImpl(fake);
|
|
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: without the content-length pre-check in realHttpsGet, the (empty) stream simply
|
|
// ends and the promise RESOLVES — assert.rejects fails because nothing rejected.
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/lying.tgz', { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/exceeds .*bytes|content-length/i,
|
|
'an over-cap content-length must reject before buffering'
|
|
);
|
|
assert.strictEqual(fake.state.emittedBytes, 0, 'no body bytes were buffered before rejection');
|
|
assert.ok(fake.state.reqDestroyed || fake.state.resDestroyed, 'the request/response is destroyed on the header check');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('CONTROL: a normal small tarball still fetches + installs through realHttpsGet', async () => {
|
|
// A small valid body that passes the cap. The high-level _httpGet seam is NOT used here — we go
|
|
// through the real realHttpsGet via the injected low-level https.get so the size-cap code path is
|
|
// exercised on the happy path too. A tar override performs the "extraction".
|
|
const cap = featureCap('dos-control-cap');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
const fake = makeFakeHttpsGet([tgzBuf], { 'content-length': String(tgzBuf.length) });
|
|
_setHttpsGetImpl(fake);
|
|
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/dos-control-cap.tgz', {
|
|
gsdHome,
|
|
hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'dos-control-cap', 'a normal small tarball resolves through the bounded fetch path');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir), 'staged dir exists after a normal fetch+install');
|
|
assert.ok(fake.state.ended, 'a within-cap body streams to completion');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// #1461 finding 2 (HIGH) — the resolver/staging must read every UNTRUSTED
|
|
// capability.json via the shared bounded reader (regular-file + size cap), NOT a
|
|
// raw fs.readFileSync. A repo-planted/extracted oversized (or FIFO/non-regular)
|
|
// manifest would otherwise read unbounded into memory (OOM) or BLOCK the resolver.
|
|
// A null/oversized/non-regular read → reject the source with a clear error.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
describe('#1461 finding 2 — untrusted capability.json reads are size-bounded (no OOM/hang)', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-manifest-bound-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => { cleanup(gsdHome); });
|
|
|
|
test('MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES is a sane bounded cap (8 MiB)', () => {
|
|
assert.strictEqual(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES, 8 * 1024 * 1024, 'manifest cap is generous but bounded');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('local: an OVERSIZED capability.json fails closed with a clear error (no OOM)', async () => {
|
|
// Build a local bundle whose capability.json EXCEEDS the cap. The bounded reader's fstat-size
|
|
// check refuses it WITHOUT reading the whole file into memory.
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-oversized-local-');
|
|
try {
|
|
// One byte over the cap is enough for the size check to refuse.
|
|
const oversized = Buffer.alloc(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES + 1, 0x20); // spaces (still "JSON-ish" length-wise)
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), oversized);
|
|
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: with a raw fs.readFileSync of capability.json, the whole oversized file is read
|
|
// into memory and JSON.parse fails with a SYNTAX error (not the bounded-reader size error). The
|
|
// bounded reader rejects on the fstat size BEFORE reading — so the error message names the size.
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/exceeds|size|maximum|not a regular file|cannot read/i,
|
|
'an oversized local capability.json must be refused by the bounded reader',
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities')) ||
|
|
fs.readdirSync(path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities')).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
|
'no capability is staged after an oversized manifest is refused');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('CONTROL: a small valid local capability.json still resolves through the bounded reader', async () => {
|
|
const dir = makeLocalCap(featureCap('bounded-control-cap'));
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'bounded-control-cap', 'a small valid manifest still resolves');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('local PRE-READ: an oversized capability.json is refused by the bounded reader (before any staging)', async () => {
|
|
// HONEST SCOPE (#1461 finding 3): for a LOCAL source the adapter's bounded pre-read of
|
|
// capability.json (to learn the id) runs FIRST and refuses an oversized manifest BEFORE staging —
|
|
// so this proves the LOCAL PRE-READ bound, NOT the stageValidated staged re-read (an earlier
|
|
// version of this test falsely claimed to exercise the staged re-read). The staged re-read is
|
|
// covered directly below via _readManifestBounded.
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-oversized-stage-');
|
|
try {
|
|
const cap = featureCap('oversized-stage-cap');
|
|
// A valid manifest padded past the cap via a large filler field — still parseable JSON shape but
|
|
// over the byte cap, so the bounded reader refuses it on size.
|
|
const padded = JSON.stringify({ ...cap, _filler: 'x'.repeat(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES) });
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), padded);
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/exceeds|size|maximum|cannot read/i,
|
|
'an oversized local capability.json must be refused by the bounded pre-read',
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('staged re-read: the bounded manifest reader refuses an oversized staged capability.json directly', () => {
|
|
// #1461 finding 3: exercise stageValidated's bounded re-read WITHOUT the local pre-read shadowing
|
|
// it. _readManifestBounded is the exact reader stageValidated uses on the COPIED manifest; an
|
|
// oversized staged file is refused on size (fail-closed), not read unbounded.
|
|
//
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: with a raw fs.readFileSync in the staged re-read, this would read the whole
|
|
// oversized file and either OOM or surface a JSON SyntaxError, not the bounded size refusal.
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-stagedread-direct-');
|
|
try {
|
|
const padded = Buffer.alloc(MANIFEST_MAX_BYTES + 1, 0x20); // spaces — over the cap by one byte.
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), padded);
|
|
assert.throws(
|
|
() => capSource._readManifestBounded(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), 'capability.json not found'),
|
|
/exceeds|size|maximum|not a regular file|cannot read|not found/i,
|
|
'the bounded staged re-read refuses an oversized manifest on size',
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH) — the STAGED bundle directory is byte-bounded UNIFORMLY.
|
|
// realHttpsGet is capped, but copyDirRecursive / git clone / npm pack / tar
|
|
// extraction RESULTS were only TIMEOUT-bounded, so a huge source tree / repo /
|
|
// package / tar bomb could fill disk during staging. stageValidated now enforces
|
|
// ONE aggregate byte-budget (MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES) over the staged dir via a
|
|
// BOUNDED streaming walk AFTER staging and BEFORE validation/promotion — a single
|
|
// chokepoint that covers EVERY adapter (tar / npm / git / local).
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
describe('#1461 finding 1 — the staged bundle dir is aggregate-byte-bounded (uniform DoS bound)', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-stagebudget-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
|
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES is a sane bounded cap (128 MiB)', () => {
|
|
assert.strictEqual(MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES, 128 * 1024 * 1024, 'staged-bundle cap is generous but bounded');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('local: a staged bundle whose TOTAL bytes exceed the budget is refused before promotion', async () => {
|
|
// A valid small manifest (so id/validation pass), plus a sibling artifact whose size pushes the
|
|
// bundle TOTAL over the budget. The bounded streaming walk in stageValidated sums regular-file
|
|
// bytes and fails closed BEFORE validation/promotion.
|
|
//
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: without the staged-dir aggregate budget, copyDirRecursive copies the oversized
|
|
// artifact into staging and the source resolves+promotes normally — the oversized bundle lands on
|
|
// disk. With the budget, the bounded walk throws and the source never resolves.
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-stagebudget-local-');
|
|
try {
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('stagebudget-cap')), 'utf8');
|
|
// One byte over the budget across a single artifact is enough for the cumulative counter to trip.
|
|
// ftruncate makes a sparse file so we don't actually write 128 MiB of real bytes (st.size still
|
|
// reports the full length, which is what the budget walk sums).
|
|
const big = path.join(dir, 'artifact.bin');
|
|
const fd = fs.openSync(big, 'w');
|
|
try { fs.ftruncateSync(fd, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES + 1); } finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/staged bundle|exceeds|budget|maximum|too large/i,
|
|
'an over-budget staged bundle must be refused before promotion',
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
|
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
|
'no capability is promoted after an over-budget bundle is refused');
|
|
// The staging dir for the rejected bundle must be cleaned up (atomicity).
|
|
const stagingRoot = path.join(capRoot, '.staging');
|
|
if (fs.existsSync(stagingRoot)) {
|
|
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(stagingRoot).length, 0, '.staging must be empty after an over-budget refusal');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('tarball: an extracted bundle over the budget is refused at the common staging chokepoint', async () => {
|
|
// Drives the budget via the tarball adapter to prove the chokepoint is adapter-agnostic: the tar
|
|
// override "extracts" an oversized artifact next to a valid manifest; stageValidated's budget walk
|
|
// (after copyDirRecursive) rejects it.
|
|
const cap = featureCap('stagebudget-tar-cap');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/big.tgz', {
|
|
gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\nbomb.bin\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
|
return {
|
|
exitCode: 0,
|
|
stdout:
|
|
'-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n' +
|
|
'-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 10 Jan 1 2020 bomb.bin\n',
|
|
stderr: '', signal: null, error: null,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
// "extraction": write a valid manifest + an oversized (sparse) artifact into extractDir.
|
|
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
|
const fd = fs.openSync(path.join(extractDir, 'bomb.bin'), 'w');
|
|
try { fs.ftruncateSync(fd, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES + 1); } finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}),
|
|
/staged bundle|exceeds|budget|maximum|too large/i,
|
|
'an over-budget extracted tarball must be refused at the staging chokepoint',
|
|
);
|
|
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
|
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
|
'no capability is promoted after an over-budget tarball is refused');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('CONTROL: a within-budget bundle still resolves + promotes normally', async () => {
|
|
const dir = makeLocalCap(featureCap('stagebudget-control-cap'));
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'stagebudget-control-cap', 'a within-budget bundle resolves');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// #1461 finding 1 (HIGH, ROUND 2) — copyDirRecursive itself is STREAMING +
|
|
// BUDGETED, so the COPY can never materialize a whole hostile directory.
|
|
//
|
|
// The post-copy assertStagedBundleWithinBudget walk is bounded, but it runs
|
|
// AFTER copyDirRecursive. The OLD copyDirRecursive used
|
|
// `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true })`, which materializes the ENTIRE
|
|
// directory-entry array into memory BEFORE the budget walk can run — so a
|
|
// hostile source tree with a directory holding millions of tiny entries
|
|
// (fetch < 64 MiB, but a colossal dirent array) OOMs the process during the
|
|
// COPY, before the post-copy budget can fail closed. copyDirRecursive now
|
|
// streams each directory via fs.opendirSync + dir.readSync() and threads a
|
|
// cumulative entry + byte counter, throwing the MOMENT either cap is exceeded —
|
|
// DURING the copy, before reading/copying the rest.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
describe('#1461 finding 1 (ROUND 2) — copyDirRecursive streams + budgets the copy (no full materialization)', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
|
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES is exported as a sane bounded cap (100k)', () => {
|
|
assert.strictEqual(MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES, 100_000, 'staged-bundle entry cap is generous but bounded');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('a source dir with more than MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES entries is refused, and the copy NEVER readdirSyncs the source', async () => {
|
|
// ANTI-VACUOUS, two-pronged:
|
|
// (1) the bounded entry error fires (fail closed), AND
|
|
// (2) the COPY enumerated the source via opendirSync/readSync — it did NOT call the
|
|
// whole-array `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes:true })` materialization on the source.
|
|
//
|
|
// We don't actually create 100k real files (slow + disk). Instead we monkeypatch fs.opendirSync to
|
|
// return a SYNTHETIC Dir whose readSync() yields lazily-generated tiny-file dirents far past the cap,
|
|
// while a real on-disk capability.json + a few real files back the source so non-enumeration fs ops
|
|
// still work. We also spy fs.readdirSync to PROVE the whole-array materialization is never used on
|
|
// the source during the copy.
|
|
//
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: reverting copyDirRecursive to `fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes:true })` makes the
|
|
// copy call readdirSync on the source (assertion (2) fails) AND would materialize the entire (here
|
|
// synthetic, effectively unbounded) dirent array before any cap could trip.
|
|
const src = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-src-');
|
|
try {
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(src, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('copybudget-cap')), 'utf8');
|
|
|
|
const TOTAL_SYNTH = MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES + 50_000; // far past the cap
|
|
let readSyncCalls = 0;
|
|
let readdirOnSrc = 0;
|
|
let opendirOnSrc = 0;
|
|
|
|
const realOpendir = fs.opendirSync;
|
|
const realReaddir = fs.readdirSync;
|
|
const realLstat = fs.lstatSync;
|
|
const realCopyFile = fs.copyFileSync;
|
|
|
|
// Make any per-entry lstat/copy of a synthetic file a no-op (the files don't exist on disk).
|
|
fs.lstatSync = function patchedLstat(p, ...rest) {
|
|
if (typeof p === 'string' && /[/\\]synth-\d+\.txt$/.test(p)) {
|
|
return {
|
|
isSymbolicLink: () => false,
|
|
isDirectory: () => false,
|
|
isFile: () => true,
|
|
size: 1,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return realLstat.call(this, p, ...rest);
|
|
};
|
|
fs.copyFileSync = function patchedCopyFile(s, d, ...rest) {
|
|
if (typeof s === 'string' && /[/\\]synth-\d+\.txt$/.test(s)) return undefined;
|
|
return realCopyFile.call(this, s, d, ...rest);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
fs.readdirSync = function patchedReaddir(p, ...rest) {
|
|
if (p === src) readdirOnSrc++;
|
|
return realReaddir.call(this, p, ...rest);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
fs.opendirSync = function patchedOpendir(p, ...rest) {
|
|
if (p === src) {
|
|
opendirOnSrc++;
|
|
let i = 0;
|
|
// A streaming Dir that yields the real manifest first, then synthetic tiny files lazily.
|
|
return {
|
|
readSync() {
|
|
readSyncCalls++;
|
|
if (i === 0) { i++; return makeDirent('capability.json', { file: true }); }
|
|
if (i <= TOTAL_SYNTH) { const n = i++; return makeDirent(`synth-${n}.txt`, { file: true }); }
|
|
return null;
|
|
},
|
|
closeSync() {},
|
|
[Symbol.iterator]() { return this; },
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return realOpendir.call(this, p, ...rest);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(src, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/entry count exceeds|maximum of 100000|too many entries/i,
|
|
'a source with more than the entry cap must be refused during the streaming copy',
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
fs.opendirSync = realOpendir;
|
|
fs.readdirSync = realReaddir;
|
|
fs.lstatSync = realLstat;
|
|
fs.copyFileSync = realCopyFile;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// (2a) The copy enumerated the source via the streaming opendir/readSync path.
|
|
assert.ok(opendirOnSrc >= 1, 'copyDirRecursive must opendirSync the source (streaming)');
|
|
assert.ok(readSyncCalls >= 1, 'copyDirRecursive must readSync the source (streaming)');
|
|
// (2b) The copy did NOT use the whole-array readdirSync materialization on the source.
|
|
assert.strictEqual(readdirOnSrc, 0, 'copyDirRecursive must NOT readdirSync the source (no full materialization)');
|
|
// (2c) It aborted at ~the cap, NOT after enumerating all TOTAL_SYNTH entries.
|
|
assert.ok(
|
|
readSyncCalls <= MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES + 5,
|
|
`streaming copy must abort at ~the cap (readSync called ${readSyncCalls}, cap ${MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_ENTRIES})`,
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(src);
|
|
}
|
|
// Atomicity: nothing promoted; .staging cleaned up.
|
|
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
|
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
|
'no capability is promoted after an over-entry-budget bundle is refused');
|
|
const stagingRoot = path.join(capRoot, '.staging');
|
|
if (fs.existsSync(stagingRoot)) {
|
|
assert.strictEqual(fs.readdirSync(stagingRoot).length, 0, '.staging must be empty after an over-entry refusal');
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('a source whose copied bytes exceed the budget is refused DURING the copy (cumulative byte counter)', async () => {
|
|
// The streaming copy threads a cumulative BYTE counter too: an oversized regular file trips the byte
|
|
// cap during the copy, before the rest of the tree is read/copied.
|
|
//
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: the old copyDirRecursive copied everything unconditionally and relied solely on the
|
|
// post-copy walk; if that post-copy walk were ALSO removed (and copy not budgeted), the oversized
|
|
// artifact would land in staging. With the in-copy byte budget the copy itself fails closed.
|
|
const src = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-bytes-');
|
|
try {
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(src, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('copybudget-bytes-cap')), 'utf8');
|
|
const big = path.join(src, 'artifact.bin');
|
|
const fd = fs.openSync(big, 'w');
|
|
try { fs.ftruncateSync(fd, MAX_STAGED_BUNDLE_BYTES + 1); } finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
|
|
|
|
await assert.rejects(
|
|
() => resolveCapabilitySource(src, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' }),
|
|
/exceeds|budget|maximum|too large|staged bundle/i,
|
|
'an over-byte-budget source must be refused during the streaming copy',
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(src);
|
|
}
|
|
const capRoot = path.join(gsdHome, '.gsd', 'capabilities');
|
|
assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(capRoot) ||
|
|
fs.readdirSync(capRoot).filter((e) => e !== '.staging').length === 0,
|
|
'no capability is promoted after an over-byte-budget bundle is refused');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('CONTROL: a normal small source still stages through the streaming copy', async () => {
|
|
const dir = createTempDir('gsd-cap-copybudget-control-');
|
|
try {
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(featureCap('copybudget-control-cap')), 'utf8');
|
|
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, 'nested'), { recursive: true });
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'nested', 'extra.txt'), 'hello', 'utf8');
|
|
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource(dir, { gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0' });
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'copybudget-control-cap', 'a within-budget bundle resolves');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'capability.json')), 'staged manifest present');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'nested', 'extra.txt')), 'nested file copied through the streaming copy');
|
|
assert.strictEqual(fs.readFileSync(path.join(result.stagedDir, 'nested', 'extra.txt'), 'utf8'), 'hello', 'nested file bytes preserved');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
cleanup(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// #1461 finding 2 (MED) — the spoofable parseTarMemberSize header-size parse was
|
|
// REMOVED. The staged-dir aggregate budget (finding 1) is now the real bound on
|
|
// the extracted RESULT, so the fragile/spoofable BSD-vs-GNU date-token size scan
|
|
// is gone. The tar NAME/TYPE guards (traversal, symlink, hardlink) remain and a
|
|
// within-name/type tarball still resolves through extraction.
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
describe('#1461 finding 2 — tar header-size parse removed; NAME/TYPE guards remain', () => {
|
|
let gsdHome = '';
|
|
beforeEach(() => { gsdHome = createTempDir('gsd-cap-tarsize-removed-'); });
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(null);
|
|
cleanup(gsdHome);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('the spoofable per-member size cap export (MAX_TAR_MEMBER_BYTES) is REMOVED', () => {
|
|
// REVERT-FAILS: if parseTarMemberSize / its export are re-introduced, this asserts the constant
|
|
// is gone (the spoofable BSD-owner="Jan" mis-anchor fail-open is no longer relied upon).
|
|
assert.strictEqual(capSource.MAX_TAR_MEMBER_BYTES, undefined, 'the spoofable per-member tar size cap is removed');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test('a tar with a HUGE declared member size (formerly rejected by the size parse) now extracts — and the staged budget is the real bound', async () => {
|
|
// This listing once tripped the per-member size cap. With that removed, the NAME/TYPE guards pass
|
|
// and extraction proceeds; a WITHIN-budget extracted result resolves normally. (An over-budget
|
|
// result would be caught by finding 1's staged-dir budget, exercised in the finding-1 suite.)
|
|
const cap = featureCap('tarsize-removed-cap');
|
|
const tgzBuf = _fakeTarball(cap);
|
|
_setCapabilitySourceHttpGet(() => Promise.resolve({ statusCode: 200, body: tgzBuf }));
|
|
const result = await resolveCapabilitySource('https://example.com/huge-decl.tgz', {
|
|
gsdHome, hostVersion: '1.5.0',
|
|
execOverrides: {
|
|
tar: (_prog, args) => {
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tzf') {
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: 'capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[0] === '-tvzf') {
|
|
// A wildly large DECLARED size in the column — formerly rejected, now ignored.
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '-rw-r--r-- 0 user group 999999999999 Jan 1 2020 capability.json\n', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
}
|
|
const extractDir = args[args.indexOf('-C') + 1];
|
|
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(extractDir, 'capability.json'), JSON.stringify(cap), 'utf8');
|
|
return { exitCode: 0, stdout: '', stderr: '', signal: null, error: null };
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
assert.strictEqual(result.id, 'tarsize-removed-cap', 'a huge-declared-size tar with safe names/types now extracts');
|
|
assert.ok(fs.existsSync(result.stagedDir), 'staged dir exists after extraction');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|