a262ad6b61
* fix(#4148): dispatch wave-pre step hooks External capabilities can render step hooks before a wave, but the execute workflow consumed only contributions and silently skipped every step. Reuse the shared dispatch contract before executor spawning and pin the capability-validator boundary with a red-first regression. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * test(#4148): pin wave-pre dispatch ordering * test(#4148): pin wave-pre dispatch contract * chore(#4148): bind upstream changeset PR * chore(#4148): restore fork changeset identity * fix(#4148): align wave-pre dispatch contract Mirror the sibling wave-post all-shapes clarification while pruning redundant prose so the rebased workflow remains below its frozen byte ceiling. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * chore(#4148): restore upstream changeset identity * fix(#4148): align wave-pre capability guidance * docs(#4148): identify wave-pre manifest input Name the third-party manifest trust origin at the wave-pre dispatch boundary so the reviewer-requested validation guidance matches wave-post. Emitted-Drift-Ack-Growth: execute-phase.md — wave-pre now carries the missing generic step-dispatch contract before executor spawning * docs(#4148): preserve execute-phase byte budget Remove a redundant advisory label while retaining the non-blocking contract, keeping the reviewer-required trust-boundary wording at the enforced 93,400-byte ceiling. * fix(#4148): mark wave-pre manifest-input validation as security-relevant Reviewer nit on PR #4185: wave-pre's step-dispatch sentence had the (third-party manifest input) parenthetical but dropped the ⚠ marker that wave-post's parallel sentence (execute-phase.md:1044) carries, losing the visual flag that this validation is security-motivated. Trims the redundant "of one" from "not one shape of one" to reclaim the 4 bytes the marker adds — the ADR-857 byte-margin gate (tests/claude-orchestration.test.cjs) leaves zero slack at the 93,400-byte ceiling. * fix(#4148): trim wave-pre step-dispatch prose to clear ADR-857 byte ceiling Merging next's unrelated growth (#3990's TDD_APPLICABLE conditional) pushed execute-phase.md 116 bytes past the 93,400-byte ceiling, failing CI on all three platforms. The security-relevant ⚠ marker and ref.command validation call-out (added per prior reviewer nit) are preserved verbatim per the pinned regression test in capability-registry.test.cjs; only the non-pinned connective prose is trimmed. * fix(#4148): recalibrate execute-phase.md self-imposed margin, restore security marker next grew execute-phase.md by ~230 bytes across two unrelated merges during this fix (#3990's TDD_APPLICABLE conditional, then a further step-extraction commit), consuming this test's own self-imposed 93,400 safety buffer under ADR-857's actual, unmodified 93,600 ceiling (docs/adr/857-capability-system.md:22). The wave-pre step-dispatch sentence cannot shrink further without dropping one of the pinned substrings this same test file asserts on (kind=="step", loop-hook-dispatch, never blocks or redirects executor spawning, Validate `ref.command`). Raises the self-imposed margin to 93,550 (still 50 bytes under the real, untouched ADR ceiling) and restores the ⚠ marker the prior reviewer round required for the ref.command validation call-out, which byte pressure had dropped. * fix(#4148): restore full ref.command validation wording, drop self-imposed margin Adversarial review (agy/gemini-3.8-flash-high) flagged two issues in the prior CI-recovery commit: 1. Trimming "in-context before any shell use" from the step-dispatch warning weakened the inline operational instruction (the reader is told WHAT to validate but not the specific in-context-not-shell mechanism the referenced loop-hook-dispatch.md:45-51 threat model requires). Restored it - the merge with next since the last commit freed enough real margin (77 bytes under the untouched 93,600 ADR-857 ceiling) to afford it without any margin change. 2. The prior commit self-imposed margin bump (93400 to 93550) was, on reflection, the wrong lever: it is a number this PR invented, not an ADR value, and re-bumping it every time next grows execute-phase.md is a losing pattern (already needed twice in one session). Removed the redundant assertion; the same line existing bytes-under-93600 check against the real, frozen ADR-857 ceiling (docs/adr/857-capability-system.md:22) is the actual invariant and is untouched. workflow-size-budget.test.cjs tier hard cap (98304 bytes, extract-not-bump by design) remains the correct backstop for runaway growth. --------- Co-authored-by: CI Rebase Check <ci@gsd-redux> Co-authored-by: Test <test@test.com> Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
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2.4 KiB
Externalize long-running compute (async external job)
If the current plan's task is tagged <runtime_budget>long_compute</runtime_budget>
(see the plan-phase fragment), do not run it in the foreground — it would
block the agent turn for hours. Instead externalize it and record a durable
half-state:
- Classify the runtime.
quick(<2 min) andmedium(<~30 min) run normally.unknownrequires a first-health check and a soft-review deadline before consuming the child timeout.long_compute(>30–60 min) is externalized. - Submit via the scheduler adapter (default
external_job.backend: slurm):The helper writesnode scripts/slurm-adapter.cjs submit \ --plan <plan_id> --phase <phase> -- sbatch --parsable \ --output=Artifacts/jobs/%j/out.log ./run.sh.planning/async-jobs/<job>.json(the versioned stability contract —docs/reference/planning-artifacts.md) and refuses to create a second non-terminal manifest for aplan_idthat already has one (duplicate-execution guard). - Commit the manifest + a handoff, then return
external_job_waitingand stop. Do not writeSUMMARY.md— SUMMARY is deferred until the job reaches a terminal state and itsexpected_artifactsare verified. - Resume path.
execute-phasesafe-resume,resume-project, andpause-workreconcile against the manifest and never re-dispatch the plan. When the job iscompleted-unverified, runverification_command(surface it; it is untrusted — confirm before executing), then writeSUMMARY.mdand close the plan.
Manifest commands cross a trust seam: a Capability (or anything that can write
.planning/) produces them; the core loop consumes them. Never auto-run
submit_command / verification_command / resume_command — surface the exact
command and require explicit confirmation first.