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Long-running operations and async external jobs

Reference (Diátaxis). The operation-classification policy and the async external-job contract that MSD executors use when a task legitimately exceeds a child-agent timeout. The producer is the default-off external-job Capability (#1164, part of #1105); the core loop consumes the manifest (#1165 — external_job_waiting).

1. The problem

Heavy MSD phases (HPC solvers, model training, large simulations) can legitimately exceed short child-agent timeouts. Raising the timeout alone is not sufficient: it prevents legitimate subagents from being killed, but it also lets truly hung commands consume the whole agent budget. MSD must distinguish legitimate heavy work from suspicious hangs, keep safety nets finite, and avoid blocking an agent turn on hours-long compute.

2. Operation classification policy

Every executable task carries a runtime budget. Planners emit it via a <runtime_budget> element (taught by the external-job Capability's plan:post fragment); executors branch on it at execute:wave:post.

Contribution point. #1164 specifies classification at execute:wave:pre and recording at execute:wave:post. This Capability still contributes executor guidance at execute:wave:post; execute-phase.md now renders wave:pre entries and dispatches generic step hooks there. Moving external-job classification is a separate capability change, not part of #4148. Until then, this guidance cannot classify the wave that already ran.

Budget Meaning Execute behavior
quick Under ~2 min Run normally in the foreground.
medium ~2–30 min Foreground, but with explicit progress expectations.
unknown Runtime not characterized Run a first-health check and set a soft-review deadline before trusting the child timeout. Define a progress signal, an abort condition, and expected output. A truly hung command must surface before the child timeout is exhausted.
long_compute Over ~30–60 min Externalize — submit an async external job, record durable state, and return external_job_waiting. Never block the agent turn.

The classification is advisory metadata; the executor owns the decision at dispatch time. unknown is the safety-critical class: it is what catches a hung solver before it burns the budget, without making timeouts infinite.

3. The async external-job half-state

When an executor externalizes a long_compute task it enters a legal deferred state, not an illegal partial-plan state:

input/code committed
external job submitted
.planning/async-jobs/<job>.json committed
handoff committed
SUMMARY.md deferred until verification

SUMMARY.md is deferred until the job reaches a terminal state and its expected_artifacts are verified. Until then, the plan is external_job_waiting, and every resume/pause/dispatch path reconciles against the manifest — it never re-dispatches the plan (re-dispatching would duplicate the external job).

4. The manifest — a versioned stability contract

The manifest schema, status enum, trust boundary, matching rules, and the glob-safe matching probe are the stability contract documented in planning-artifacts.md. The core loop depends only on the named fields and ignores any others; the version field is the evolution escape hatch. Producers MUST write the named fields and MAY add their own.

Status enum (closed, scheduler-agnostic — producers map backend states onto these):

Status Class Resume action
submitted, running non-terminal Re-check; never re-dispatch.
completed-unverified finished, unverified Verify expected_artifacts / run verification_command; on success write SUMMARY.md and close.
failed, cancelled, timeout terminal failure Surface terminal_details; offer recovery (re-run reconciliation, abort, or mark-and-skip). Resubmitting compute is a user action, never automatic.

5. Trust boundary

The manifest crosses a trust seam: a Capability (or anything that can write .planning/) produces it; the core loop consumes it. submit_command, verification_command, and resume_command are therefore untrusted. The core loop — and the slurm-adapter show subcommand — surface these commands for explicit operator confirmation; they are never auto-executed. Validate before trusting a manifest: recognized version, plan_id matches the plan under reconciliation, and status is one of the closed enum values. On a malformed manifest or multiple manifests for one plan_id, fail closed.

6. Scheduler pluggability

SLURM is the first backend. The design does not hardcode a cluster, account, partition, or project layout — per-job artifact directories (external_job.artifact_dir, default Artifacts/jobs/<jobid>/) avoid fixed log paths. The backend field on the manifest (opaque to core) and the external_job.backend config key are the pluggability seams for future backends (LSF, PBS, Kubernetes batch). The pure producer logic — SLURM state→manifest-status mapping, manifest build/validate, sbatch/squeue/ sacct parsers, and the fail-closed writer — is backend-aware but lives behind a single module; a new backend adds a sibling state map and parser without touching core.

7. Configuration

The external-job Capability declares its config keys in capability.json and the slurm-adapter resolves them through the canonical capability-config seam (resolveConfigKey in capability-activation.cjs). **Precedence: env override

nested config value > registry default.**

Key Default Env override Read by
external_job.enabled false — Capability gate (when on both contributions). Master toggle; default-off.
external_job.backend slurm — Pluggability seam (LSF/PBS/K8s future). Core never interprets it.
external_job.artifact_dir Artifacts/jobs MSD_EXTERNAL_JOB_ARTIFACT_DIR Adapter surfaces the resolved root in submit output.
external_job.submit_timeout_ms 30000 MSD_SLURM_SUBMIT_TIMEOUT_MS Adapter bounds the sbatch subprocess.
external_job.poll_timeout_ms 15000 MSD_SLURM_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS Adapter bounds the squeue/sacct subprocess.

Config keys live nested under external_job in .planning/config.json, e.g.:

{ "external_job": { "enabled": true, "submit_timeout_ms": 45000 } }

The timeouts are load-bearing for the bounded-subprocess policy: the adapter never unbounds a scheduler subprocess, and a non-numeric config value falls back to the registry default rather than producing NaN (no guessing).