* test(3596): adversarial security/prompt-injection abuse suite Adds `tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` and a fixtures directory at `tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/` covering the attack classes enumerated in #3596: - Command substitution / backticks / heredoc payloads in workstream names — sentinel-file probes prove no shell is spawned, slugifier neutralises the input. - Path traversal through `--ws` and slash-bearing workstream names — rejected with structured `--json-errors` payload, no stack trace, no filesystem mutation outside the project root. - Fake `<system>` / `[SYSTEM]` / `<<SYS>>` / `[INST]` boundary tags — sanitizeForPrompt neutralises every form; structural negative property locked across all six styles in one place. - Zero-width / bidi-override codepoints — stripped per the documented codepoint set; asserted via codePoint inspection, not regex literals. - Hostile read of CONTEXT.md / PLAN.md / ROADMAP.md fixtures — `gsd-read-injection-scanner.js` surfaces the advisory; excluded paths and non-Read tools stay silent; malformed JSON does not crash the hook. - Hostile write of `.planning/` files — `gsd-prompt-guard.js` emits a `PreToolUse` advisory; non-Write/Edit tools stay silent. - Fake `ghp_*` / `sk-*` env tokens — never echoed in CLI stdout or stderr under hostile inputs; covered under `// allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard` because the only way to assert byte-level absence is `.includes(token)` against the captured streams. - `validatePath`, `validateShellArg`, `validatePhaseNumber`, `validateFieldName` — focused negative-input contract pins. Pinned behavior gaps (documented, NOT fixed in this PR): - `<instructions>` is intentionally whitelisted by both the scanner and the sanitiser (GSD's own prompt scaffolding). Two REGRESSION GUARD tests lock that contract. - The current `scanForInjection` does NOT flag malicious markdown links (javascript:/data:/embedded-credentials URLs). PINNED with negative-proof so any future scope extension fails the assertion and forces a deliberate update to the acceptance map. - `prompt-builder.ts` does not yet wrap plan/context markdown in an "untrusted data" envelope. That seam lives on the TS side and is covered by `sdk/src/prompt-builder.test.ts`; out of scope for a CJS test file. Mentioned in the file header. Verification: - `node --test tests/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs` → 73 tests pass. - `node scripts/lint-no-source-grep.cjs` → 0 violations across 546 test files (one `allow-test-rule: structural-regression-guard` annotation on this file for the token-absence assertions). - `node scripts/run-tests.cjs` → 9730 tests pass, 0 fail. Refs #3596 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(3596): allow adversarial fixtures in scan + harden graphify status parse * fix(3596): skip adversarial security fixtures in secret scan --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
230 lines
6.7 KiB
Bash
Executable File
230 lines
6.7 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# secret-scan.sh — Check files for accidentally committed secrets/credentials
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#
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# Usage:
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# scripts/secret-scan.sh --diff origin/main # CI mode: scan changed files
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# scripts/secret-scan.sh --file path/to/file # Scan a single file
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# scripts/secret-scan.sh --dir agents/ # Scan all files in a directory
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#
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# Exit codes:
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# 0 = clean
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# 1 = findings detected
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# 2 = usage error
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set -euo pipefail
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# ─── Secret Patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Format: "LABEL:::REGEX"
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# Each entry is a human label paired with a POSIX extended regex.
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SECRET_PATTERNS=(
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# AWS
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"AWS Access Key:::AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
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"AWS Secret Key:::aws_secret_access_key[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}"
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# OpenAI / Anthropic / AI providers
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"OpenAI API Key:::sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"
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"Anthropic API Key:::sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"
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# GitHub
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"GitHub PAT:::ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
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"GitHub OAuth:::gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
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"GitHub App Token:::ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
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"GitHub Fine-grained PAT:::github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}"
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# Stripe
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"Stripe Secret Key:::sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}"
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"Stripe Publishable Key:::pk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}"
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# Generic patterns
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"Private Key Header:::-----BEGIN[[:space:]]+(RSA|EC|DSA|OPENSSH)?[[:space:]]*PRIVATE[[:space:]]+KEY-----"
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"Generic API Key Assignment:::api[_-]?key[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*['\"][A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}['\"]"
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"Generic Secret Assignment:::secret[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*['\"][A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}['\"]"
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"Generic Token Assignment:::token[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*['\"][A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}['\"]"
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"Generic Password Assignment:::password[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*['\"][^'\"]{8,}['\"]"
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# Slack
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"Slack Bot Token:::xoxb-[0-9]{10,}-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"
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"Slack Webhook:::hooks\.slack\.com/services/T[A-Z0-9]{8,}/B[A-Z0-9]{8,}/[A-Za-z0-9]{24}"
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# Google
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"Google API Key:::AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}"
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# NPM
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"NPM Token:::npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
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# .env file content (key=value with sensitive-looking keys)
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"Env Variable Leak:::(DATABASE_URL|DB_PASSWORD|REDIS_URL|MONGO_URI|JWT_SECRET|SESSION_SECRET|ENCRYPTION_KEY)[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]]{8,}"
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)
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# ─── Ignorelist ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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IGNOREFILE=".secretscanignore"
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IGNORED_FILES=()
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load_ignorelist() {
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if [[ -f "$IGNOREFILE" ]]; then
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while IFS= read -r line; do
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[[ "$line" =~ ^[[:space:]]*# ]] && continue
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[[ -z "${line// }" ]] && continue
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IGNORED_FILES+=("$line")
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done < "$IGNOREFILE"
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fi
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}
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is_ignored() {
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local file="$1"
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if [[ ${#IGNORED_FILES[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
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return 1
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fi
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for pattern in "${IGNORED_FILES[@]}"; do
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# Support glob-style matching
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# shellcheck disable=SC2254
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case "$file" in
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$pattern) return 0 ;;
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esac
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done
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return 1
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}
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# ─── Skip Rules ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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should_skip_file() {
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local file="$1"
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# Skip binary files
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case "$file" in
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*.png|*.jpg|*.jpeg|*.gif|*.ico|*.woff|*.woff2|*.ttf|*.eot|*.otf) return 0 ;;
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*.zip|*.tar|*.gz|*.bz2|*.xz|*.7z) return 0 ;;
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*.pdf|*.doc|*.docx|*.xls|*.xlsx) return 0 ;;
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esac
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# Skip lockfiles and node_modules
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case "$file" in
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*/node_modules/*) return 0 ;;
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*/package-lock.json) return 0 ;;
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*/yarn.lock) return 0 ;;
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*/pnpm-lock.yaml) return 0 ;;
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esac
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# Skip the scan scripts themselves and test files
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case "$file" in
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*/secret-scan.sh) return 0 ;;
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*/security-scan.test.cjs) return 0 ;;
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*/security-prompt-injection.test.cjs) return 0 ;;
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tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/*|*/tests/fixtures/adversarial/security/*) return 0 ;;
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esac
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return 1
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}
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# ─── File Collection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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collect_files() {
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local mode="$1"
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shift
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case "$mode" in
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--diff)
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local base="${1:-origin/main}"
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git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACMR "$base"...HEAD 2>/dev/null \
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| grep -vE '\.(png|jpg|jpeg|gif|ico|woff|woff2|ttf|eot|otf|zip|tar|gz|pdf)$' || true
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;;
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--file)
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if [[ -f "$1" ]]; then
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echo "$1"
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else
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echo "Error: file not found: $1" >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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;;
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--dir)
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local dir="$1"
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if [[ ! -d "$dir" ]]; then
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echo "Error: directory not found: $dir" >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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find "$dir" -type f ! -path '*/node_modules/*' ! -path '*/.git/*' ! -path '*/dist/*' \
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! -name '*.png' ! -name '*.jpg' ! -name '*.gif' ! -name '*.woff*' 2>/dev/null || true
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;;
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--stdin)
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cat
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;;
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*)
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echo "Usage: $0 --diff [base] | --file <path> | --dir <path> | --stdin" >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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}
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# ─── Scanner ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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scan_file() {
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local file="$1"
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local found=0
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if is_ignored "$file"; then
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return 0
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fi
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for entry in "${SECRET_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
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local label="${entry%%:::*}"
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local pattern="${entry#*:::}"
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local matches
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matches=$(grep -nE -e "$pattern" "$file" 2>/dev/null || true)
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if [[ -n "$matches" ]]; then
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if [[ $found -eq 0 ]]; then
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echo "FAIL: $file"
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found=1
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fi
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echo "$matches" | while IFS= read -r line; do
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echo " [$label] $line"
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done
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fi
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done
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return $found
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}
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# ─── Main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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main() {
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if [[ $# -eq 0 ]]; then
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echo "Usage: $0 --diff [base] | --file <path> | --dir <path>" >&2
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exit 2
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fi
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load_ignorelist
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local mode="$1"
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shift
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local files
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files=$(collect_files "$mode" "$@")
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if [[ -z "$files" ]]; then
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echo "secret-scan: no files to scan"
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exit 0
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fi
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local total=0
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local failed=0
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while IFS= read -r file; do
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[[ -z "$file" ]] && continue
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if should_skip_file "$file"; then
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continue
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fi
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total=$((total + 1))
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if ! scan_file "$file"; then
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failed=$((failed + 1))
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fi
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done <<< "$files"
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echo ""
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echo "secret-scan: scanned $total files, $failed with findings"
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if [[ $failed -gt 0 ]]; then
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exit 1
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fi
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exit 0
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}
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main "$@"
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