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* feat(#3840): generate docs/FEATURES.md from per-feature fragments docs/FEATURES.md was hand-maintained, and every feature PR wrote into two shared mutable cells: the '### N.' heading whose integer was hand-allocated at authoring time, and the hand-maintained table of contents. Concurrent PRs all picked the same next integer, and two PRs adding differently numbered features still collided on the TOC. #3831 was renumbered 165 -> 166 -> 167 -> 168 across successive rebases, each collision also costing a full matrix verification run because the sha-keyed pass marker dies with the rebase. Mechanism: one fragment per feature at docs/features/<slug>.md carrying id/title/group (and an optional order) in frontmatter, consolidated by scripts/gen-features.cjs --write|--check into a marker-delimited region of docs/FEATURES.md that holds BOTH the TOC and every section body. Group headings and their order are derived too - a group sorts by its lowest-ordered member - so there is no shared registry to edit either; optional per-group prose lives in docs/features/_groups/<slug>.md. A contributor adds exactly one new file. Wired into regen:derived and lint:generated-sync alongside the eight existing generators, matching gen-adr-index.cjs's CLI shape and typed-REASON reporting. Migration froze all 168 existing numbers verbatim: identical section set, identical order, identical bodies. Two defects found in the tree are fixed inline rather than carried forward - the '## Related' block had been spliced into the middle of the document, orphaning §142's Reference line, and four inbound anchors were already broken on next (FEATURES.md#runtime-identity in two files, and #143-spec-phase-edge-completeness-probe off by one). Since the repo has no link checker, --check now validates every inbound FEATURES.md#anchor by resolved target, so that class cannot ship silently again; locale FEATURES.md files resolve elsewhere and stay out of scope. Refs #3840 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(#3840): carry upstream §69 delta into its fragment and harden the generator Review found section 69 missing '[--strict]' and REQ-STATE-05/06 versus origin/next. Root cause was a stale base, not extraction loss: those lines landed in394bf384b(#3844) AFTER this branch forked at63abcface, and 'git diff63abcfaceorigin/next -- docs/FEATURES.md' is exactly that hunk. Merging origin/next auto-applied the hunk into the GENERATED region, which --check immediately reported as stale; the delta is now carried in docs/features/statemd-consistency-gates.md and regenerated from there. --write is now fail-closed. It previously rendered the region even with violations outstanding, warning only on stderr and exiting 0, so a '--write && git commit' chain could commit a FEATURES.md carrying two colliding sections. It now refuses and exits 1; --force is the explicit override and says so in the report. The test that pinned the old behavior now pins the refusal, plus the --force override and its scoping. Marker forgery is rejected at two layers. A fragment body containing '<!-- FEATURES:START' or '<!-- FEATURES:END' is a typed body_forges_region_marker violation (fragments and group notes alike), and spliceIntoFeatures anchors the end boundary with lastIndexOf instead of indexOf, so a marker that reaches the document by any other route can only make the generated region grow, never shrink. Matching is on marker PREFIXES, so a decorated variant comment cannot slip past. Symlinked corpus entries are refused with a typed dirent_not_regular_file rather than read. A fork PR could otherwise commit docs/features/evil.md as a symlink to any readable path and have the generator inline those bytes into the committed docs/FEATURES.md on the next regen. Equivalence re-verified with a method that cannot cancel out. The first check extracted both operands with the same body-normalising helper, so anything that helper dropped was dropped on both sides. The replacement runs two independent passes: a global content-line multiset diff with no per-section logic at all (0 gained, 19 lost, all 19 the stale hand-written mini-TOC links this change deliberately deletes), and a per-section byte-exact body diff carrying a coverage assertion that fails loudly per file when the extractor accounts for fewer lines than the file contains. That assertion caught two blind spots in the checker itself. 168/168 sections present, order identical, one intended body difference (§142 regains the Reference line orphaned by the misplaced '## Related' block). Refs #3840 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(#3840): backfill changeset PR number Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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id, title, group
| id | title | group |
|---|---|---|
| 46 | Security Hardening | v1.27 Features |
Purpose: Defense-in-depth security for GSD's planning artifacts. Because GSD generates markdown files that become LLM system prompts, user-controlled text flowing into these files is a potential indirect prompt injection vector.
Components:
1. Centralized Security Module (security.cjs)
- Path traversal prevention — validates file paths resolve within the project directory
- Prompt injection detection — scans for known injection patterns in user-supplied text
- Safe JSON parsing — catches malformed input before state corruption
- Field name validation — prevents injection through config field names
- Shell argument validation — sanitizes user text before shell interpolation
2. Prompt Injection Guard Hook (gsd-prompt-guard.js)
PreToolUse hook that scans Write/Edit calls targeting .planning/ for injection patterns. Advisory-only — logs detection for awareness without blocking legitimate operations.
3. Workflow Guard Hook (gsd-workflow-guard.js)
PreToolUse hook that detects when Claude attempts file edits outside a GSD workflow context. Advises using /gsd-quick or /gsd-fast instead of direct edits. Configurable via hooks.workflow_guard (default: false).
4. CI-Ready Injection Scanner (prompt-injection-scan.security.test.cjs)
Test suite that scans all agent, workflow, and command files for embedded injection vectors.
Requirements:
- REQ-SEC-01: All user-supplied file paths MUST be validated against the project directory
- REQ-SEC-02: Prompt injection patterns MUST be detected before text enters planning artifacts
- REQ-SEC-03: Security hooks MUST be advisory-only (never block legitimate operations)
- REQ-SEC-04: JSON parsing of user input MUST catch malformed data gracefully
- REQ-SEC-05: macOS
/var→/private/varsymlink resolution MUST be handled in path validation