Files
msd-core/tests/bug-3670-cursor-local-install-migration-lock.test.cjs
Tom Boucher 463cffd894 chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/ (#615)
* chore(#604): rename get-shit-done/ runtime directory to gsd-core/

Renames the installed runtime directory `get-shit-done/` to `gsd-core/` so the
on-disk name matches the package (`@opengsd/gsd-core`), repo, and binary
(`gsd-tools`). The npm package name and binary are unchanged; npx/npm consumers
are unaffected.

Mechanical (bulk, ~90% of the diff):
- `git mv get-shit-done gsd-core`
- Swept path/identifier references across the repo via
  `perl -pe 's/get-shit-done(?!-\w)/gsd-core/g'`. The negative lookahead
  preserves the five legitimate slug variants that are NOT the directory:
  get-shit-done-{OLD,cc,classic,cli,redux} (old package/repo names).
- Build/manifest wiring: package.json (bin, files, coverage globs),
  tsconfig.build.json (outDir), ~86 .gitignore build-output entries,
  stryker.config.mjs, scan-ignore files, install.js path strings.
- Frozen (not rewritten): CHANGELOG.md history; translated docs
  (README.<locale>.md and docs/{ja-JP,ko-KR,pt-BR,zh-CN}/).

New logic (review here):
- src/installer-migrations/003-rename-get-shit-done-to-gsd-core.cts: a proper
  ADR-0008 installer migration. On upgrade it walks the legacy
  `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` tree, classifies each file via the prior install
  manifest, and emits remove-managed / backup-and-remove for managed files
  while PRESERVING unknown user-added files. Symlink-safe (skips a symlinked
  root and symlinked entries; bounds-checks every path under configDir). The
  framework rolls back on install failure. Emptied dirs may remain (framework
  has no recursive dir-removal primitive) — documented.
- scripts/lint-legacy-dir-name.cjs: CI regression guard forbidding the bare
  `get-shit-done` directory token (split token to avoid self-match; case-
  insensitive; `(?!-\w)` lookahead allows the slug variants; allowlists
  CHANGELOG, translated docs, and `gsd-allow-legacy-name` marker lines).
  Wired into the lint-tests CI job.
- Restored scripts/lint-package-identity-drift.cjs detection regexes (the
  mechanical sweep had wrongly rewritten the old-name patterns it exists to
  detect) and marked them as intentional legacy references.
- TDD tests for the migration and the guard; do.md slash-command guard regex
  tightened so a `/gsd-core/bin` path segment is not mistaken for a command;
  changeset + docs/installer-migrations.md row added.

Breaking: the installed runtime path moves `~/.claude/get-shit-done/` ->
`~/.claude/gsd-core/`. Migration 003 removes the stale legacy dir's managed
files (preserving user files) on upgrade. Users with custom hooks/configs
hardcoding the old path must update them.

Closes #604

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unsweep pending changesets + allowlist injection-example docs

CI fixes for the rename PR:
- Do not sweep pending .changeset/*.md (ephemeral release-note fragments,
  like CHANGELOG); reverted those body edits so 5 pre-existing malformed
  fragments (missing type/pr) no longer enter the PR diff and trip docs-lint.
  Allowlisted .changeset/ in the legacy-name guard accordingly.
- Allowlisted TEST-EXAMPLES.md and docs/explanation/security-model.md in
  prompt-injection-scan.sh: they contain intentional injection examples /
  security-model prose; the path-reference rewrites are kept.

CodeQL alerts on this PR are pre-existing (alert lines unchanged by this PR;
none in the new migration/guard) and are out of scope for the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): resolve CodeQL alerts surfaced on this PR

The rename diff touched files carrying pre-existing CodeQL findings; per the
no-pre-existing-dismissal rule, fixing every surfaced alert rather than waving
them off. All behavior-preserving:

- scripts/ci-test-scope.cjs: build the config-path match from string
  .includes() instead of a RegExp over an arg-derived value (js/regex-injection).
- src/profile-output.cts: escape backslashes before pipe-escaping desc/safeName
  so the table-cell escape is complete (js/incomplete-sanitization).
- tests/{bug-2643,bug-2808,docs-parity-live-registry}: two-pass HTML-comment
  strip so a bare/unclosed `<!--` cannot survive (js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization).
- tests/inline-plan-threshold: drop the no-op `\s`->`\s` identity replace,
  keep the meaningful POSIX-class conversion (js/identity-replacement).

Verified: build:lib green; the touched test files + ci-test-scope + profile-output
suites pass; lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): correctly resolve remaining CodeQL alerts (regex-injection + sanitization)

The prior commit's fixes for two alerts were ineffective:
- ci-test-scope.cjs js/regex-injection: the alert is the CLI-arg-derived `file`
  reaching static regex `.test(file)` calls (not the config rule). Removed ALL
  regex over file/t — startsWith/includes/=== string checks + an isWindowsHint
  helper — so there is no regex sink for the tainted value.
- js/incomplete-multi-character-sanitization (3 test files): a single
  `.replace(/<!--...-->/g,'')` can let `<!--` re-form. Replaced with a fixpoint
  loop (replace until stable) plus a final bare-opener strip.

Verified: no regex over file/t remains; ci-test-scope + the 3 test suites pass;
lint:legacy-name clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): make ci-test-scope + comment-strippers regex-free to clear CodeQL

CodeQL flags the regex PATTERNS syntactically (regex-injection on the
--files arg split; incomplete-multi-character-sanitization on the <!--...-->
replace), so loop fixes do not satisfy it. Made these paths regex-free:
- ci-test-scope.cjs splitFiles: char-by-char separator tokenizer (no /[,\\s]+/).
- 3 test files: indexOf/slice HTML-comment stripper (no .replace(/<!--/)).
Behavior preserved; ci-test-scope + the 3 suites pass; guard clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): unblock security base64 scan on the large rename diff

The security job hit its 10m timeout: base64-scan.sh choked on the binary
test fixture tests/feat-3594-parser-property-style.test.cjs (embedded NUL/
non-UTF8 bytes -> thousands of bogus blobs + "ignored null byte" warnings),
and the ~800-file rename diff is slow to scan regardless.

- scripts/base64-scan.sh: skip binary-by-content files (grep -Iq .) — they
  can't carry base64-obfuscated *text* and feeding NUL bytes through the
  per-line scanner is pathologically slow. collect_files already filtered
  binary *extensions*; this catches binary *content* in text extensions.
- .github/workflows/security-scan.yml: raise the security job timeout 10m->30m
  to accommodate very large diffs (the scan itself is unchanged).

Verified locally: scan skips the fixture, 0 "ignored null byte" warnings,
0 findings, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): sweep get-shit-done refs introduced by merging next

The branch was updated with next (#614/#384/#618 etc.), which reference the
get-shit-done/ dir (still named that on next). Swept the stale references in
the merged files to gsd-core so the rename stays consistent and lint:legacy-name
passes:
- commands/gsd/discuss-phase.md (runtime-launcher shim paths)
- src/core.cts (getAgentsDir layout comments)
- tests/bug-384-agents-runtime-aware.test.cjs (require path to runtime lib)

Verified: guard 0 violations; build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): exclude gsd-core/ path segments from bug-3683 command cross-ref invariant

The #614 runtime-launcher shim added to discuss-phase.md references
`${_GSD_RUNTIME_ROOT}/gsd-core/bin/...`. bug-3683's REF_PATTERN excluded path-y
refs only via lookbehind, but `}` precedes `/gsd-core/` in the shim, so it
mis-read the directory path as a dangling `/gsd-core` command ref (same class as
the #604 bug-2954 fix). Added a trailing `(?![\w-]*\/)` so `/gsd-<x>/...` path
segments are not treated as slash-command references.

Verified locally on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22 image) full suite: 0 failures
- bug-3683 + bug-2954 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): lazily resolve findProjectRoot in gsd-tools (harden flaky CI)

CI intermittently failed state.test's gsd-tools subprocess with
"findProjectRoot is not a function" (flip-flopping across legs; not reproducible
on mac full suite, gsd-test linux full suite, test:unit, or state.test x8).
findProjectRoot is a re-export from core.cjs (sourced from project-root.cjs);
binding it via destructure at module-load can be undefined under a load-ordering
edge. Resolve it lazily at call time via a small wrapper so the lookup happens
after core.cjs is fully initialized.

Verified green on BOTH platforms before pushing:
- mac (node 26) full suite: 0 failures
- gsd-test-runner (linux, node22) full suite: 0 failures
- state.test.cjs: 106/106; gsd-tools loads cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(#604): allowlist verification-patterns.md placeholder examples in secret scan

The rename git-mv'd references/verification-patterns.md into gsd-core/, pulling
it into the secret-scan diff. It documents stub/placeholder RED-FLAG env-var
examples (illustrative Stripe test-key / database-URL / API-key placeholders) —
not real credentials. Added it to .secretscanignore with the strict annotation,
mirroring the existing gsd-core/workflows/plan-phase.md exception.

Verified locally: secret-scan-lint --strict OK; secret-scan --diff origin/next
exits 0 with 0 findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 18:35:29 -04:00

314 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Regression tests for issue #3670: --cursor --local install self-deadlocks
* on gsd-install-migration.lock.
*
* Root cause: On Windows, `fs.rmSync(lockPath, { force: true })` in the lock
* release closure silently swallows EPERM errors that NTFS returns when a
* recently-closed file descriptor's handle has not yet been fully released by
* the OS. The lock file is left on disk. The next `runInstallerMigrations`
* call in the same install() invocation hits EEXIST, spins for
* DEFAULT_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS (30 s), then throws "installer migration lock is
* held". There is also no stale-PID reclamation: if the lock names the
* current process's PID, the helper should reclaim rather than spin.
*
* Windows wall-clock deadlock repro depends on Docker matrix Windows runners.
* These tests reproduce the failure modes via mock-injected fs faults on any
* platform (macOS/Linux/Windows). They fail deterministically WITHOUT the fix
* and pass WITH it.
*
* Test plan:
* T1 (same-process re-entry / stale-PID reclamation — primary regression)
* Pre-seed the lock file with {pid: process.pid, ...}. Verify that a
* runInstallerMigrations call reclaims the lock and succeeds rather than
* spinning 30 s and throwing.
*
* T2 (dead-PID reclamation — cross-invocation stale lock)
* Pre-seed the lock file with a PID known to be dead. Verify that acquire
* reclaims rather than throws.
*
* T3 (silent rmSync swallow / Windows EPERM simulation)
* Inject a fault that makes fs.rmSync throw EPERM for the lock file only
* (simulating Windows NTFS delete-pending). Verify that the lock file IS
* removed by an alternative path (or that the error propagates) — i.e.
* verify that the fix does not silently leave the lock on disk.
*
* T4 (counter-test: normal single acquire/release round-trip still works)
* No pre-seeded lock. One runInstallerMigrations call. Must succeed and
* leave no lock file behind.
*
* T5 (counter-test: genuinely-held live lock still surfaces an error)
* Pre-seed lock with a live PID (process.pid) AND simulate a lock that
* has been "truly acquired" (fd still open). With lockTimeoutMs: 0 and a
* truly un-reclaimable lock, must still throw with a useful message naming
* the holder PID. (This guards against over-reclamation.)
*
* @see https://github.com/open-gsd/gsd-core/issues/3670
*/
'use strict';
const { test, mock } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const os = require('node:os');
const path = require('node:path');
const {
INSTALL_MIGRATION_LOCK_NAME,
runInstallerMigrations,
} = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/installer-migrations.cjs');
const { cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function createTempDir() {
return fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gsd-3670-'));
}
function lockPath(dir) {
return path.join(dir, INSTALL_MIGRATION_LOCK_NAME);
}
function writeLockFile(dir, pid, acquiredAt) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(
lockPath(dir),
JSON.stringify({ pid, acquiredAt: acquiredAt || new Date().toISOString() }) + '\n',
'utf8'
);
}
/**
* Find a PID that is guaranteed to be dead on this host.
* We probe a set of high candidate PIDs (far outside the running set) and
* pick the first one for which process.kill(pid, 0) throws ESRCH.
* Falls back to 99999 if the probe loop exhausts (extremely unlikely).
*/
function findDeadPid() {
// Avoid process.pid ± small numbers — those could be live siblings.
for (let candidate = 600000; candidate < 700000; candidate += 1000) {
try {
process.kill(candidate, 0);
// Still alive (or permission denied but exists) — try next
} catch (err) {
if (err.code === 'ESRCH') return candidate;
}
}
return 99999; // fallback: extremely unlikely to be a live PID
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// T1: Same-process re-entry — stale lock with current process.pid reclaimed
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('T1: reclaims stale lock that names the current process PID (same-process re-entry)', (t) => {
const configDir = createTempDir();
t.after(() => cleanup(configDir));
// Pre-seed lock file with the CURRENT process's PID — exactly what happens
// on Windows when rmSync swallows EPERM after the first runInstallerMigrations
// call releases (or fails to release) the lock.
writeLockFile(configDir, process.pid);
// Without the fix: this would spin for lockTimeoutMs then throw.
// With the fix: detects own PID → reclaims → succeeds.
// lockTimeoutMs: 200 (fail fast so the test doesn't hang for 30 s without fix)
const result = runInstallerMigrations({
configDir,
migrations: [],
lockTimeoutMs: 200,
});
assert.ok(result, 'runInstallerMigrations must return a result object');
// Lock file must be removed after the call completes.
assert.equal(
fs.existsSync(lockPath(configDir)),
false,
'lock file must not remain on disk after successful runInstallerMigrations'
);
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// T2: Dead-PID reclamation — cross-invocation stale lock
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('T2: reclaims stale lock whose PID is no longer alive', (t) => {
const configDir = createTempDir();
t.after(() => cleanup(configDir));
const deadPid = findDeadPid();
writeLockFile(configDir, deadPid);
const result = runInstallerMigrations({
configDir,
migrations: [],
lockTimeoutMs: 200,
});
assert.ok(result, 'runInstallerMigrations must return a result object');
assert.equal(
fs.existsSync(lockPath(configDir)),
false,
'lock file must not remain on disk after stale-PID reclamation'
);
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// T3: Windows EPERM simulation — unlinkSync failure surfaces (not silently swallowed)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('T3: lock release does not silently leave lock file on disk when unlink fails (Windows EPERM simulation)', (t) => {
const configDir = createTempDir();
const originalUnlinkSync = fs.unlinkSync;
t.after(() => {
fs.unlinkSync = originalUnlinkSync;
cleanup(configDir);
});
// The fix uses fs.unlinkSync (not fs.rmSync with { force: true }) in the
// release closure. Inject EPERM on the lock file to simulate the Windows
// NTFS condition where the recently-closed handle has not been fully
// released by the OS.
//
// The fix's contract: EPERM must NOT be silently swallowed.
// Either (a) the error propagates as a releaseError, or (b) some alternative
// deletion path succeeds. Silent-swallow (no error + file still exists) is
// the failure condition we guard against.
let unlinkCallCount = 0;
fs.unlinkSync = function faultInjectUnlinkSync(targetPath) {
const isLock = path.basename(String(targetPath)) === INSTALL_MIGRATION_LOCK_NAME;
if (isLock) {
unlinkCallCount++;
// Simulate Windows EPERM (file handle not fully released by OS)
const err = Object.assign(
new Error('EPERM: operation not permitted, unlink ' + targetPath),
{ code: 'EPERM' }
);
throw err;
}
return originalUnlinkSync.call(fs, targetPath);
};
// With the fix: unlinkSync throws EPERM → releaseError is thrown by the
// release closure → runInstallerMigrations throws releaseError.
// With the buggy code (rmSync + force:true): EPERM was swallowed silently,
// no error thrown, lock file left on disk.
//
// Assert: if the call succeeds (no throw), the lock file must be gone.
// If the call throws, the error message must reference the lock.
let threw = false;
let thrownError = null;
try {
runInstallerMigrations({
configDir,
migrations: [],
lockTimeoutMs: 500,
});
} catch (err) {
threw = true;
thrownError = err;
}
if (threw) {
// Acceptable: error surfaced. Verify it's lock-related (not a bug elsewhere).
assert.match(
thrownError.message,
/lock/i,
'thrown error must reference the lock file'
);
} else {
// If no error was thrown, the lock file must have been removed by some
// alternative path (not left silently on disk).
assert.equal(
fs.existsSync(lockPath(configDir)),
false,
'if unlinkSync EPERM is encountered but no error thrown, lock file must still be removed'
);
}
// Sanity: the fault injection was actually triggered.
assert.ok(unlinkCallCount > 0, 'unlinkSync must have been called for the lock file at least once');
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// T4: Counter-test — normal single acquire/release round-trip still works
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('T4: normal (non-recursive) runInstallerMigrations acquires and releases lock correctly', (t) => {
const configDir = createTempDir();
t.after(() => cleanup(configDir));
// No pre-seeded lock. Standard happy path.
const result = runInstallerMigrations({
configDir,
migrations: [],
});
assert.ok(result, 'runInstallerMigrations must return a result');
assert.equal(
fs.existsSync(lockPath(configDir)),
false,
'lock file must be cleaned up after normal completion'
);
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// T5: Counter-test — unreclaimable live lock must surface a bounded error
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// This test guards against over-reclamation: if the reclaim-unlink fails
// (e.g. Windows EPERM on a live open handle), the fix must NOT spin
// indefinitely — it must fall through to the timeout path and throw.
//
// Conditions forced by this test:
// 1. Lock file contains the CURRENT process.pid (triggers isSameProcess branch).
// 2. fs.unlinkSync is mocked to throw EPERM for the lock file (reclaim fails).
// 3. lockTimeoutMs: 200 — timeout must fire within a short wall-clock window.
//
// Expected outcome: throws with /installer migration lock is held/ within
// ~200ms. SUCCESS (no throw) is NOT acceptable here — that would mean the fix
// over-reclaimed a lock that it couldn't actually remove.
test('T5: unreclaimable same-PID lock throws bounded error (reclaim-unlink failure falls through to timeout)', (t) => {
const configDir = createTempDir();
const originalUnlinkSync = fs.unlinkSync;
t.after(() => {
mock.restoreAll();
fs.unlinkSync = originalUnlinkSync;
cleanup(configDir);
});
// Pre-seed lock file with the CURRENT process's PID.
// This triggers the isSameProcess reclamation path inside acquireInstallerMigrationLock.
writeLockFile(configDir, process.pid);
// Mock unlinkSync to throw EPERM for the lock file only.
// This simulates Windows NTFS refusing to delete a file with an open handle.
// With the fix: reclaim-unlink fails → reclaimed=false → falls through to
// the timeout check → throws "installer migration lock is held" after ≤200ms.
// Without the fix (original code): unlink throws but continue runs anyway →
// spins indefinitely, never reaches the timeout check → deadlock.
mock.method(fs, 'unlinkSync', function faultInjectUnlinkSync(targetPath) {
const isLock = path.basename(String(targetPath)) === INSTALL_MIGRATION_LOCK_NAME;
if (isLock) {
const err = Object.assign(
new Error('EPERM: operation not permitted, unlink ' + targetPath),
{ code: 'EPERM' }
);
throw err;
}
return originalUnlinkSync.call(fs, targetPath);
});
assert.throws(
() => runInstallerMigrations({
configDir,
migrations: [],
lockTimeoutMs: 200,
}),
(err) => {
assert.match(err.message, /installer migration lock is held/, 'error must name the held lock');
return true;
},
'must throw "installer migration lock is held" when reclaim-unlink fails — not spin indefinitely'
);
});