Files
msd-core/tests/helpers/emitted-caps.cjs
Tom Boucher 628648d63a chore(#2931): cap emitted per-runtime bytes and single-source windsurf (#2984)
* fix(#2931): preserve protected regions and cap emitted per-runtime bytes

Route every runtime brand swap through applyClaudeCodeBrandSwap so
"Claude Code" survives verbatim inside <runtime_compatibility> regions
(#2284b). The fix existed only in bin/install.js's local copies; the
src/*.cts exports still used a naive replace, so binding install.js to
the single source -- as this phase does for the Windsurf family --
would have silently regressed those runtimes. A table-driven parity
guard now covers all nine brand-swapping converters.

De-duplicate the Windsurf converter family: delete the six local copies
in bin/install.js and bind the four exported ones by reference, guarded
by reference-identity assertions (the ADR-1508/#1675 pattern). The two
unexported helpers and an unused tool table go with them.

Replace the Windsurf 12,000-byte throw with description truncation,
matching the bound its sibling skill converter already applied. The
throw could only fire on an ~11.7 KB frontmatter description: the
largest emitted workflow is 311 bytes. Truncation makes the cap
unreachable by construction and leaves 12,000 in exactly one place,
eliminating the dual-surface duplication rather than testing for it.

Add the emitted-byte cap gate: buildEmittedSizes captures LF- and
<HOME>-normalized bytes from the walk buildParityManifest already
performs, and evaluateEmittedCaps asserts them against a per-runtime
cap table with dead-rule detection. buildParityManifest's return shape
is deliberately unchanged -- diffEmitted compares its values with
===, so making them objects would report all 8,529 emitted paths as
moved. A regression test pins the values as strings.

Add a deterministic trim-safety gate over composeWithinBudget's
omitted/shrunk/floored/isolatePrefix metadata, with an anti-vacuity
rule, replacing the model-graded eval gate the issue described.

* docs(#2931): correct ADR-1671 windsurf premise and trim-safety contract

* fix(#2931): bound the windsurf command name and single-source the brand swap

Review findings from the orthogonal passes, all fixed inline.

The claim that removing the 12,000-byte throw left total emission
"bounded by construction" was false. The #1615 regex constrains the
character class but not the length, and commandName is interpolated
three times into the emitted workflow: a 20,000-character name emitted
60,162 bytes silently. Add WINDSURF_COMMAND_NAME_MAX=128 as a separate,
clearly-labelled size control that THROWS -- commandName is the @-ref
path target, so truncating it would point the workflow at a file that
does not exist (DEFECT.WORKFLOW-DELEGATION-TARGET-NOT-INSTALLED). The
#1615 security regex is untouched and still runs first. 128 is generous:
the longest shipped name is gsd-plan-review-convergence at 27.

Harmonize convertClaudeCommandToWindsurfSkill onto the code-point-safe
truncation helper. It still used a UTF-16 slice(0,177) -- the exact
surrogate-splitting bug the helper was written to avoid, in the very
sibling the helper's comment cites as its model. Bounds are unchanged,
so output is byte-identical for every shipped command (descriptions max
out at 99 chars).

Export applyClaudeCodeBrandSwap and bind it in bin/install.js, deleting
the local copy. Adding it to the .cts left two unlinked implementations
of identical logic -- the drift class this change exists to remove.
Verified byte-identical across eight fixtures and five sequential calls
before merging, and guarded by a reference-identity assertion.

Convert three try/finally test bodies to t.after (CONTRIBUTING.md:344),
add fast-check property coverage for the trim-safety contract, and use
fc.pre instead of a bare return in a property callback.

* test(#2931): fix three test-authoring bugs the remote matrix caught

The remote runner returned 8 unique failures on 6f15cdeb8. All three
causes were in the test files, not the modules under test -- local
harnesses exercise the modules directly, so nothing executed the test
bodies until the matrix did.

`{ __proto__: [...] }` in an object literal sets the prototype instead
of an own key, so the JSON round-trip erased it and the cap table never
saw a reserved runtime key. The production rejection was already
correct; the test could not reach it. Use a computed key.

Two cap fixtures tripped orthogonal error paths rather than the paths
they name: one declared windsurf in the cap table but omitted it from
sizes (UNKNOWN_RUNTIME), the other left the sole windsurf pattern
matching nothing (a genuine dead rule). Both now include a compliant
artifact so the intended branch is what is asserted. The dead-rule and
unknown-runtime contracts are deliberate and unchanged.

`const { root } = makeSyntheticConfig({ ... `${root}` })` referenced
`root` from inside its own initializer -- a temporal dead zone error.
makeSyntheticConfig now optionally takes a (root) => files factory.

Also raise the npm pack --dry-run bound 60s -> 120s in the shipped-
scripts packaging test. That failure is NOT from this branch: the file
is byte-identical to next, a fresh tsc measures 1.98s there vs 2.14s
here, and the run recorded 60,637ms against a 60,000ms bound -- a
timeout under 28,948-test parallel contention, not a slowdown. Fixed
rather than deferred because a bound that tight is fragile regardless
of which branch trips it.

* chore(#2931): backfill changeset pr number to 2984

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-01 16:00:14 -04:00

463 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
/**
* emitted-caps.cjs — the per-runtime emitted-byte cap decision (issue #2931,
* epic #1671, Phase 4). Sibling law to `emitted-diff.cjs`'s conservation law:
* same pure/IO split, same error-accumulation shape, same reserved-key guard.
*
* ── Why this module is pure ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
* No fs, no git, no clock, no process. The expensive part — spawning an
* install and measuring real emitted bytes — lives elsewhere; this module only
* decides, given a `{ [runtime]: { [rel]: bytes } }` map and a cap table,
* which artifacts violate, which are unmeasured, and which comply. Keeping the
* decision pure makes every boundary (`cap-1`/`cap`/`cap+1`) a millisecond
* table test and keeps the Stryker gate able to bite.
*
* ── Why the cap table is HARD-CODED here, not read from capability.json ─────
* ADR-2719's guiding principle (already load-bearing in `emitted-diff.cjs`:
* it never re-derives a byte, because asserting `emitted == transform(source)`
* is the tautology ADR-2264's Amendment rejected) applies here too, one level
* up: a cap that is DERIVED from the same descriptor it is meant to guard
* (`capabilities/<rt>/capability.json`) would silently follow any edit to that
* descriptor. Bump the descriptor, the guard bumps with it, and a real
* regression sails through unnoticed. `EMITTED_CAPS` is a second, independent
* source of truth, edited deliberately by a human who has to look Windsurf's
* actual 12,000-byte platform limit in the eye — exactly the friction a guard
* exists to provide.
*/
// ─── REASON enum ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const REASON = Object.freeze({
CAP_EXCEEDED: 'cap_exceeded',
DEAD_RULE: 'dead_rule',
UNKNOWN_RUNTIME: 'unknown_runtime',
NO_ARTIFACTS: 'no_artifacts',
INVALID_SIZES: 'invalid_sizes',
INVALID_CAP_TABLE: 'invalid_cap_table',
INVALID_CAP_VALUE: 'invalid_cap_value',
RESERVED_KEY: 'reserved_key',
UNSAFE_PATTERN: 'unsafe_pattern',
});
/**
* Keys that can never legitimately name a runtime or an emitted path, and
* that also happen to be the JS-object footguns. Mirrors
* `emitted-diff.cjs`'s `RESERVED_ACK_KEYS`: rejected LOUDLY (REASON.RESERVED_KEY),
* never silently dropped.
*/
const RESERVED_KEYS = new Set(['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']);
/**
* The declared per-runtime emitted-byte cap table. Exactly one real entry
* today: Windsurf hard-caps a workspace workflow file at 12,000 bytes.
*
* Shape: `{ [runtime]: Array<{ pattern, maxBytes, note }> }`. `pattern` is a
* simple glob, evaluated against the emitted-relative path: `*` matches
* within one path segment (never crosses `/`), `**` matches across segments.
* Frozen two levels deep so a test cannot mutate the shipped table out from
* under a later assertion in the same run.
*/
const EMITTED_CAPS = Object.freeze({
windsurf: Object.freeze([
Object.freeze({
pattern: 'workflows/*.md',
maxBytes: 12000,
note: 'Windsurf hard-caps workspace workflow files at 12,000 bytes.',
}),
]),
});
// ─── Small predicates ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function isPlainObject(value) {
return value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);
}
function typeNameOf(value) {
if (value === null) return 'null';
if (Array.isArray(value)) return 'array';
return typeof value;
}
/** A legal byte count or cap value: a `number`, never a coerced string, never
* negative, NaN, Infinity, or fractional. `Number.isSafeInteger` alone
* already excludes NaN/Infinity/non-integers; `>= 0` excludes negatives. */
function isNonNegativeSafeInteger(value) {
return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= 0;
}
/** `..` traversal or a leading `/` in a cap-table pattern is never legitimate
* — every emitted-relative path in this repo is already relative and
* segment-clean, so either shape can only be an authoring mistake or a
* hostile table entry. */
function isUnsafePattern(pattern) {
return pattern.includes('..') || pattern.startsWith('/');
}
/**
* Translate a `pattern` (already validated safe) into an anchored RegExp.
* `*` -> one path segment (`[^/]*`); `**` -> across segments (`.*`). Every
* other character is escaped, so a pattern is never accidentally read as a
* richer regex than the two glob tokens it declares.
*/
function compileGlobPattern(pattern) {
let out = '';
for (let i = 0; i < pattern.length; i += 1) {
const ch = pattern[i];
if (ch === '*' && pattern[i + 1] === '*') {
out += '.*';
i += 1;
} else if (ch === '*') {
out += '[^/]*';
} else if (/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/.test(ch)) {
out += `\\${ch}`;
} else {
out += ch;
}
}
return new RegExp(`^${out}$`);
}
/** Stable comparator: runtime, then rel/pattern. Plain `<`/`>` on strings,
* not `localeCompare`, so ordering is locale-independent and reproducible. */
function byRuntimeThen(field) {
return (a, b) => {
if (a.runtime !== b.runtime) return a.runtime < b.runtime ? -1 : 1;
if (a[field] === b[field]) return 0;
return a[field] < b[field] ? -1 : 1;
};
}
// ─── The decision ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Evaluate every measured emitted artifact against the declared cap table.
*
* ── The conservation law (by construction) ───────────────────────────────
* Every `(runtime, rel)` key in `sizes` whose byte value is a legal
* non-negative safe integer, and whose `runtime`/`rel` are not reserved
* keys, is placed into EXACTLY ONE of `violations`, `unmeasured`, or
* `compliant` — the single walk below assigns each such key to precisely one
* push. A key excluded by a RESERVED_KEY or INVALID_SIZES error is not a
* legitimate size measurement at all (its own error already names it), so it
* is not counted as a fourth bucket; the law is over the WELL-FORMED subset,
* exactly as `diffEmitted`'s conservation law is over the entries `parseAck`
* accepted.
*
* Internal bookkeeping (which rule matched which path, for dead-rule
* detection) is kept as index-based tracking, never as an object keyed by an
* external string — so a hostile `rel`/`runtime` value cannot pollute
* anything even transiently.
*
* @param {object} opts
* @param {object} opts.sizes { [runtime]: { [rel]: bytes } }
* @param {object} [opts.capTable] defaults to the shipped `EMITTED_CAPS`
* @returns {{
* violations: Array, unmeasured: Array, compliant: Array,
* deadRules: Array, errors: Array, ok: boolean
* }}
*/
function evaluateEmittedCaps({ sizes, capTable = EMITTED_CAPS } = {}) {
const errors = [];
if (sizes === null || sizes === undefined) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_SIZES,
receivedType: sizes === null ? 'null' : 'undefined',
message: `sizes is required, got ${sizes === null ? 'null' : 'undefined'}`,
});
} else if (!isPlainObject(sizes)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_SIZES,
receivedType: typeNameOf(sizes),
message: `sizes must be a plain object keyed by runtime, got ${typeNameOf(sizes)}`,
});
}
if (capTable === null || capTable === undefined || !isPlainObject(capTable)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_CAP_TABLE,
receivedType: typeNameOf(capTable),
message: `capTable must be a plain object keyed by runtime, got ${typeNameOf(capTable)}`,
});
}
if (errors.length) {
return { violations: [], unmeasured: [], compliant: [], deadRules: [], errors, ok: false };
}
const violations = [];
const unmeasured = [];
const compliant = [];
const deadRules = [];
// ── capTable validation, once, up front — never at compare time ──────────
// Maps `runtime -> Array<{ regex, maxBytes, note, pattern, matches: number }>`
// for runtimes that ARE known (present in `sizes`) and whose rules parsed
// cleanly. Keyed on `runtime`, but only ever assigned via `Map.set`, never
// bracket-property assignment — a hostile `__proto__` runtime name cannot
// pollute anything here either.
const compiledRules = new Map();
const knownRuntimeNoArtifacts = new Set();
for (const runtime of Object.keys(capTable)) {
if (RESERVED_KEYS.has(runtime)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.RESERVED_KEY,
scope: 'capTable-runtime',
key: runtime,
message: `capTable key "${runtime}" is reserved and can never be a real runtime name`,
});
continue;
}
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(sizes, runtime)) {
// A cap declared for a runtime that never even reported sizes. Not
// installable/measured in this run at all — a hard error, distinct
// from "measured but produced zero files" (REASON.NO_ARTIFACTS below).
errors.push({
reason: REASON.UNKNOWN_RUNTIME,
runtime,
message: `capTable declares caps for "${runtime}", but sizes has no entry for it`,
});
continue;
}
const rules = capTable[runtime];
if (!Array.isArray(rules)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_CAP_TABLE,
runtime,
message: `capTable.${runtime} must be an array of rules, got ${typeNameOf(rules)}`,
});
continue;
}
const parsed = [];
rules.forEach((rule, index) => {
if (!isPlainObject(rule)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_CAP_TABLE,
runtime,
index,
message: `capTable.${runtime}[${index}] must be an object with pattern/maxBytes`,
});
return;
}
const { pattern, maxBytes, note } = rule;
let patternOk = true;
if (typeof pattern !== 'string' || pattern.length === 0) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_CAP_TABLE,
runtime,
index,
message: `capTable.${runtime}[${index}].pattern must be a non-empty string`,
});
patternOk = false;
} else if (isUnsafePattern(pattern)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.UNSAFE_PATTERN,
runtime,
pattern,
message: `capTable.${runtime}[${index}].pattern "${pattern}" contains a ".." traversal or a leading "/"`,
});
patternOk = false;
}
let capOk = true;
if (!isNonNegativeSafeInteger(maxBytes)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_CAP_VALUE,
runtime,
pattern: typeof pattern === 'string' ? pattern : null,
value: maxBytes,
message:
`capTable.${runtime}[${index}].maxBytes must be a non-negative safe integer, `
+ `got ${JSON.stringify(maxBytes)} (${typeNameOf(maxBytes)})`,
});
capOk = false;
}
if (patternOk && capOk) {
parsed.push({
pattern,
regex: compileGlobPattern(pattern),
maxBytes,
note: typeof note === 'string' ? note : undefined,
matches: 0,
});
}
});
compiledRules.set(runtime, parsed);
}
// ── Walk sizes, sorted, and assign every well-formed key exactly once ────
for (const runtime of Object.keys(sizes).sort()) {
if (RESERVED_KEYS.has(runtime)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.RESERVED_KEY,
scope: 'sizes-runtime',
key: runtime,
message: `sizes key "${runtime}" is reserved and can never be a real runtime name`,
});
continue;
}
const artifacts = sizes[runtime];
if (!isPlainObject(artifacts)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_SIZES,
runtime,
message: `sizes.${runtime} must be a plain object of { rel: bytes }, got ${typeNameOf(artifacts)}`,
});
continue;
}
const rels = Object.keys(artifacts);
if (rels.length === 0) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.NO_ARTIFACTS,
runtime,
message: `sizes.${runtime} produced no artifacts — never read "nothing to check" as "pass"`,
});
knownRuntimeNoArtifacts.add(runtime);
continue;
}
const rules = compiledRules.get(runtime) || [];
for (const rel of rels.sort()) {
if (RESERVED_KEYS.has(rel)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.RESERVED_KEY,
scope: 'sizes-rel',
runtime,
key: rel,
message: `sizes.${runtime} key "${rel}" is reserved and can never be a real emitted path`,
});
continue;
}
const bytes = artifacts[rel];
if (!isNonNegativeSafeInteger(bytes)) {
errors.push({
reason: REASON.INVALID_SIZES,
runtime,
rel,
message:
`sizes.${runtime}["${rel}"] must be a non-negative safe integer, `
+ `got ${JSON.stringify(bytes)} (${typeNameOf(bytes)})`,
});
continue;
}
const rule = rules.find((r) => r.regex.test(rel));
if (!rule) {
unmeasured.push({ runtime, rel, bytes });
continue;
}
rule.matches += 1;
if (bytes <= rule.maxBytes) {
compliant.push({ runtime, rel, bytes, cap: rule.maxBytes });
} else {
violations.push({
runtime,
rel,
bytes,
cap: rule.maxBytes,
delta: bytes - rule.maxBytes,
reason: REASON.CAP_EXCEEDED,
note: rule.note,
});
}
}
}
// ── Dead rules: matched nothing across the WHOLE run ──────────────────────
// Skipped for runtimes already flagged UNKNOWN_RUNTIME or NO_ARTIFACTS —
// those are more specific, more actionable errors, and a rule for a
// runtime with zero measured artifacts trivially matches nothing for a
// reason this walk already named.
for (const [runtime, rules] of compiledRules) {
if (knownRuntimeNoArtifacts.has(runtime)) continue;
for (const rule of rules) {
if (rule.matches === 0) {
deadRules.push({
runtime,
pattern: rule.pattern,
cap: rule.maxBytes,
reason: REASON.DEAD_RULE,
message: `capTable.${runtime} rule "${rule.pattern}" matched zero emitted paths — a cap guarding nothing is rot`,
});
}
}
}
violations.sort(byRuntimeThen('rel'));
unmeasured.sort(byRuntimeThen('rel'));
compliant.sort(byRuntimeThen('rel'));
deadRules.sort(byRuntimeThen('pattern'));
const ok = errors.length === 0 && violations.length === 0 && deadRules.length === 0;
return { violations, unmeasured, compliant, deadRules, errors, ok };
}
// ─── Rendering ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Pure renderer. Tests assert on `evaluateEmittedCaps`'s structured result,
* never on this string (CONTRIBUTING.md, "Prohibited: Raw Text Matching on
* Test Outputs").
*
* The CAP_EXCEEDED message deliberately warns against the Goodhart's-Law
* escape hatch: moving bytes behind an EAGERLY `@`-imported reference file
* changes where the bytes are typed, not how many bytes load. An eager
* `@`-import is inlined at load time, so the cap would read green while the
* runtime still pays every byte — gaming the metric, not complying with it
* (this exact failure mode is recorded in CONTEXT.md
* `RULESET.WORKFLOW_SIZE_BUDGET`).
*/
function formatCapReport(result) {
const parts = [];
if (result.errors.length) {
parts.push(
`${result.errors.length} error(s):\n ${result.errors.map((e) => e.message).join('\n ')}`,
);
}
if (result.violations.length) {
const list = result.violations.map(
(v) => ` ${v.runtime}: ${v.rel} is ${v.bytes} bytes — exceeds the ${v.cap}-byte cap by ${v.delta}`
+ (v.note ? ` (${v.note})` : ''),
);
parts.push(
`${result.violations.length} emitted artifact(s) exceed their declared cap:\n${list.join('\n')}\n\n`
+ 'Moving these bytes behind an EAGERLY `@`-imported reference file is gaming this '
+ 'metric, not complying with it: an eager @-import is inlined before the cap is ever '
+ 'measured, so the runtime still pays every byte at load time (CONTEXT.md '
+ 'RULESET.WORKFLOW_SIZE_BUDGET). The fix is to reduce what actually loads.',
);
}
if (result.deadRules.length) {
const list = result.deadRules.map((r) => ` ${r.runtime}: "${r.pattern}" (cap ${r.cap}) matched nothing`);
parts.push(`${result.deadRules.length} cap rule(s) matched zero emitted paths — a cap guarding nothing is rot:\n${list.join('\n')}`);
}
return parts.join('\n\n');
}
module.exports = {
REASON,
EMITTED_CAPS,
evaluateEmittedCaps,
formatCapReport,
};