Files
msd-core/tests/gsd-agent-isolation-guard.test.cjs
Tom Boucher 9faacc0c15 test(#3148): bound the long tail and delete the unbounded-spawn allowlist (#3192)
* test(#3148): bound the long tail and delete the allowlist

Migrates the final 170 unbounded sync spawn sites across 49 files, then
removes the allowlist entirely. local/no-unbounded-spawn now runs with no
exemption surface across tests/**: there is no file to add a name to.

drift-detection's throw-native git() helper routes to gitOrThrow -- bare
runGit would have taken 16 call sites quiet on failure. commands.test.cjs
has two independently-scoped runGsdTools/runCli helpers, one already bounded
and one not; they are kept distinct rather than unified, the same trap as the
two same-named git() helpers in Wave 1.

runNpm's bound was erasable. Its options spread callerOptions after the
defaults, so an explicit timeout:undefined silently dropped the 180000ms
bound -- the rule flagged it and was right; it was not a false positive. Fixed
by destructuring with a default, with a test that fails when the default is
removed.

Two sites stay on a raw spawn with an explicit timeout because the seam
cannot express them: one needs shell:true for npm.cmd on Windows, one
redirects stdout to a real fd. Both are the rule's own documented second
option, not an escape from it.

Closure verified rather than asserted: the derivation scan reports 0 unbounded
spawn helpers and 0 unbounded direct git call sites, and a temporary file
carrying an unbounded spawn still errors with the allowlist gone.

Closes #3064.

* test(#3148): close a hole in the guard's own eslint-disable ban

The ban listed only the top level of tests/, so it was blind to 37 .cjs
files under tests/helpers, qa, observability, fixtures and dispatch. With the
allowlist deleted this test is the sole remaining way to detect someone
silencing the rule inline, so the gap was load-bearing: a nested file could
carry an unbounded spawn plus an eslint-disable and pass everything.

Proven before and after. A probe planted under tests/helpers with both was
invisible to the guard and clean under eslint; after making the listing
recursive the guard fails on it. The scanned set goes from 771 files to 808.

Pre-existing since the guard shipped, but this wave is what promoted it to
sole defense, so it is fixed here rather than filed.

Also converts the last hand-rolled throw check to throwIfFailed and the last
re-derived legacy shape to compose toLegacyResult, which makes the epic's
none-remain claim true rather than nearly true. toLegacyResult itself is not
widened -- eight callers depend on its shape and one consumer does not
justify changing a shared contract.

* fix(#3148): correct seam incoherence at the bound and a slow review-lane error path

Two real failures from the remote runner, both fixed at the cause.

The seam could return outcome TIMED_OUT together with exitCode 0. At the
exact bound spawnSync reports ETIMEDOUT while the child has already exited
with a real status, and toSeamResult classified on the error code while
passing status straight through -- an incoherent pair its own boundary test
was written to catch, and did. A status that is not null is direct evidence
the child exited on its own, so it now decides the outcome before the
error-code branches run. process-seam.cjs was deliberately untouched by every
earlier wave; this is a defect in the module itself, kept surgical, with a
unit test that fails against the old logic.

review-lane with an unknown subcommand fell through to its usage error only
after loading the capability registry and building a per-lane plan, which
spawns one child process per lane -- up to twelve. The error path took
~1288ms instead of ~119ms, and under bench load it outran a caller's spawn
timeout and was killed before writing anything, which is the empty stdout and
stderr CI saw. It now fails fast before any of that work begins.

This is the epic's first production change. It is user-facing, so it carries
a changeset rather than a no-changelog label.

* test(#3148): replace a real-race timeout test with a deterministic one

E9 raced git rev-parse against a 1ms bound and assumed git always lost. On a
warm container git finishes first, spawnSync returns status 0 with no error
at all, the seam correctly classifies EXITED, and gitOrThrow correctly does
not throw -- so the test failed on both lanes. A probe confirms a genuine
timeout always carries status null, so this was never the seam misbehaving.

Raising the bound would only lengthen the odds, which is the same defect with
better luck. The test now drives gitOrThrow against a stubbed runGit that
returns a synthetic TIMED_OUT result, so it asserts exactly what it always
meant to -- that a timeout propagates as a throw -- with no timing
dependence. Five consecutive runs are identical where the old one varied.

I wrote this test in Wave 0; it is a real-race test by construction and
CLAUDE.md says to replace those rather than re-run them.

* chore(#3148): backfill changeset PR number 3192

---------

Co-authored-by: sim <sim@local>
2026-08-07 21:03:50 -04:00

652 lines
29 KiB
JavaScript

'use strict';
/**
* gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js — Agent-dispatch isolation guard (#3045)
*
* Seam: hooks/gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js (PreToolUse hook, spawned with a
* JSON payload on stdin, exactly as every runtime bus invokes it).
*
* Defect: `gsd-core/workflows/execute-phase/steps/executor-isolation-dispatch.md`
* resolves dispatch isolation correctly, then relies on PROSE ("substitute
* $HARNESS_FLAG's value... on Claude Code it is literally isolation=\"worktree\"")
* to get it into the model-authored `Agent()` call. Nothing verified the
* substitution happened, so an executor could silently dispatch into the
* user's primary checkout. This hook enforces the invariant structurally.
*
* Matrix source: .gsd/bug/fix-3045-agent-dispatch-isolation-guard/50-test-matrix.md
* Part 1, rows 1-12. Every row below is annotated with its row number.
*
* Two implementation notes that diverge from a literal reading of the design
* (both intentional, both explained where they're tested):
*
* - Rows 8 and 12 ("config unreadable" / "config read times out") collapse
* to the SAME code path in the real implementation: resolveIsolationState
* resolves entirely via synchronous, in-process fs reads and require()
* calls — no subprocess is spawned (the guard prefers reading config
* directly, per the design's own preference), so there is no literal
* wall-clock timeout to simulate. Both rows are exercised here via two
* DIFFERENT real, deterministic, cross-platform-safe failure conditions
* that both land in the guard's single "cannot verify" catch: row 8 uses
* `.planning/config.json` being a DIRECTORY (fs.readFileSync → EISDIR),
* row 12 uses a syntactically invalid config.json (JSON.parse throws).
* Neither is a chmod/permission trick (CLAUDE.md's cross-platform IO
* injection rule) — both are real, deterministic file-type/content
* conditions that behave identically on macOS/Linux/Windows.
*
* - Runtime selection for rows 6/7 (orchestrator-worktree / none) uses the
* real capability-registry.cjs shipped alongside the hook, selected via
* GSD_RUNTIME (the same precedence resolveIsolationState implements):
* codex → orchestrator-worktree, windsurf → none. No fixture/mock
* registry is substituted — this is the real hook reading its real
* sibling data file, per the "drive the real hook entry point" mandate.
*/
process.env.GSD_TEST_MODE = '1';
const { describe, test, before, after } = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const fc = require('./helpers/fast-check-setup.cjs');
const { runHook: runHookSeam } = require('./helpers/process-seam.cjs');
const { toLegacyResult } = require('./helpers/git-fixture.cjs');
const { PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS } = require('./helpers/timeouts.cjs');
const { createTempDir, cleanup } = require('./helpers.cjs');
const { SENTINEL_RELATIVE_PATH, SENTINEL_STALE_MS } = require('../hooks/lib/isolation-sentinel.js');
const HOOK_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'hooks', 'gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js');
/**
* Write a #3045 dispatch-isolation sentinel under `dir` (mirrors what
* `gsd-tools.cjs record-dispatch-isolation` writes). `writtenAt` defaults to
* "now" (fresh); pass an explicit past timestamp to construct a stale one.
*/
function writeSentinel(dir, { isolation, harnessFlag = null, phase = null, plan = null, writtenAt = Date.now() }) {
const p = path.join(dir, SENTINEL_RELATIVE_PATH);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(p), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(p, JSON.stringify({ isolation, harness_flag: harnessFlag, phase, plan, written_at: writtenAt }));
}
/**
* Run the hook with a given payload against a given cwd.
* GSD_RUNTIME is deleted by default so ambient environment can never leak a
* runtime override into a test that expects the config.json `runtime` key
* (or the 'claude' default) to be used instead.
*/
function runHook(payload, cwd, extraEnv = {}) {
const env = { ...process.env };
delete env.GSD_RUNTIME;
Object.assign(env, extraEnv);
// Production code resolves the home directory via `os.homedir()` (correct,
// cross-platform), which on Windows reads `USERPROFILE`, not `HOME` —
// `os.homedir()` never honors `HOME` there. Tests below override `HOME` to
// redirect `os.homedir()` hermetically; mirror the override onto
// `USERPROFILE` too so that redirection actually takes effect on Windows
// instead of silently leaking the real CI runner's profile directory.
if ('HOME' in extraEnv) env.USERPROFILE = extraEnv.HOME;
const r = runHookSeam(HOOK_PATH, [], {
input: typeof payload === 'string' ? payload : JSON.stringify(payload),
cwd,
env,
timeoutMs: PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS,
});
return toLegacyResult(r);
}
function agentPayload(overrides = {}) {
return {
hook_event_name: 'PreToolUse',
tool_name: 'Agent',
tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', ...(overrides.tool_input || {}) },
...overrides,
};
}
function mkProject(prefix) {
const dir = createTempDir(prefix);
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(dir, '.planning'), { recursive: true });
return dir;
}
function writeConfig(dir, content) {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, '.planning', 'config.json'), content);
}
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: applicability matrix (#3045)', () => {
let harnessProject; // GSD project resolving to harness-worktree (claude)
let orchestratorProject; // resolves to orchestrator-worktree (codex)
let noneProject; // resolves to none (windsurf)
let noGsdProject; // not a GSD project at all
let unreadableConfigProject; // config.json is a directory (EISDIR)
let corruptConfigProject; // config.json is invalid JSON
before(() => {
harnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-harness-');
writeConfig(harnessProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
orchestratorProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-orch-');
writeConfig(orchestratorProject, JSON.stringify({}));
noneProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-none-');
writeConfig(noneProject, JSON.stringify({}));
noGsdProject = createTempDir('gsd-aig-nogsd-');
unreadableConfigProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-unreadable-');
// #3050 lesson: force a genuine, cross-platform-safe read failure by
// making the config path a DIRECTORY instead of a file — fs.readFileSync
// throws EISDIR deterministically on macOS/Linux/Windows. NOT a
// chmod/permission trick (CLAUDE.md's IO-failure-injection rule).
// eslint-disable-next-line local/no-raw-rmsync-in-tests -- removing a single fixture FILE (not a temp dir teardown) to replace it with a directory; helpers.cleanup() tears down whole temp dirs and isn't the right tool here
fs.rmSync(path.join(unreadableConfigProject, '.planning', 'config.json'), { force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(unreadableConfigProject, '.planning', 'config.json'));
corruptConfigProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-corrupt-');
writeConfig(corruptConfigProject, '{ this is not valid json');
});
after(() => {
cleanup(harnessProject);
cleanup(orchestratorProject);
cleanup(noneProject);
cleanup(noGsdProject);
cleanup(unreadableConfigProject);
cleanup(corruptConfigProject);
});
test('row 1: absent isolation param, harness-worktree, GSD project -> DENY', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
const out = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
assert.equal(out.decision, 'block');
assert.match(out.reason, /harness-worktree/);
assert.match(out.reason, /isolation="worktree"/);
assert.equal(r.stderr, out.reason, 'stderr must carry the same reason (Kimi reads stderr on exit 2)');
});
test('row 2: isolation="worktree" present -> allow', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', isolation: 'worktree' } }), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('row 3: isolation="" (empty) -> DENY', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', isolation: '' } }), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
});
test('row 4: isolation="none" -> DENY', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', isolation: 'none' } }), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
});
test('row 5: subagent_type=gsd-code-reviewer (not an executor) -> allow', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-code-reviewer' } }), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('row 6: resolved mode orchestrator-worktree -> allow (different path)', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), orchestratorProject, { GSD_RUNTIME: 'codex' });
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('row 7: resolved mode none -> allow', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), noneProject, { GSD_RUNTIME: 'windsurf' });
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('row 8: config unreadable (EISDIR) + GSD project present -> DENY, distinct reason', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), unreadableConfigProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
const out = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
assert.equal(out.decision, 'block');
assert.match(out.reason, /could not read or resolve/i);
assert.match(out.reason, /#3050/);
});
test('row 9: no GSD project (.planning/config.json absent) -> allow, inert', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), noGsdProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('row 10: wrong tool (Bash) -> allow', () => {
const r = runHook({ hook_event_name: 'PreToolUse', tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'echo hi' } }, harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('row 11a: subagent_type absent -> allow, must not throw', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload({ tool_input: {} }), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(r.stderr, '', 'must not crash or log a stack trace');
});
test('row 11b: subagent_type malformed (non-string, e.g. array) -> allow, must not throw', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: ['gsd-executor'] } }), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(r.stderr, '');
});
test('row 11c: tool_input entirely absent -> allow, must not throw', () => {
const r = runHook({ hook_event_name: 'PreToolUse', tool_name: 'Agent' }, harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
});
test('row 11d: payload is not JSON at all -> allow, must not throw', () => {
const r = runHook('not json {{{', harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
});
test('row 11e: payload is JSON null -> allow, must not throw', () => {
const r = runHook('null', harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
});
test('row 12: config read fails via corrupt JSON (stands in for "times out" — see file header) -> DENY', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), corruptConfigProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
const out = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
assert.equal(out.decision, 'block');
assert.match(out.reason, /could not read or resolve/i);
});
test('reason names the exact parameter to add (self-correction requirement)', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2);
const out = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
assert.match(out.reason, /Add isolation="worktree" to the Agent\(\) call/);
});
});
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: property — deny iff isolation param != "worktree" (harness-worktree project)', () => {
let harnessProject;
before(() => {
harnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-prop-');
writeConfig(harnessProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
});
after(() => {
cleanup(harnessProject);
});
test('for any string value, dispatch is blocked unless the value is exactly "worktree"', () => {
fc.assert(
fc.property(
fc.string(),
(isolationValue) => {
const r = runHook(
agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', isolation: isolationValue } }),
harnessProject
);
const expectBlocked = isolationValue !== 'worktree';
const actualBlocked = r.status === 2;
assert.equal(
actualBlocked, expectBlocked,
`isolation=${JSON.stringify(isolationValue)} expected ${expectBlocked ? 'blocked' : 'allowed'}, got status ${r.status}, stdout: ${r.stdout}`
);
}
),
{ numRuns: 30 } // each sample spawns the hook process — bound the cost
);
});
});
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: #3045 BLOCKER regression — sentinel is authoritative over registry capability', () => {
// These rows pin the exact defect the isolated code review flagged as a
// BLOCKER: the guard used to key enforcement on the REGISTRY's
// dispatch.isolation (a host CAPABILITY — "this host CAN isolate"), not
// the workflow's resolved per-dispatch ISOLATION ("this dispatch SHOULD be
// isolated"). Sequential ISOLATION=none legitimately happens even on a
// harness-worktree-capable host. Every row below uses `harnessProject`
// (registry resolves to harness-worktree for runtime 'claude') so a FAIL
// here proves the sentinel is actually consulted, not merely coincidental
// with what the registry alone would already allow.
let harnessProject;
let useWorktreesFalseProject;
before(() => {
harnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-sentinel-');
writeConfig(harnessProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
useWorktreesFalseProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-uwf-');
writeConfig(useWorktreesFalseProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude', workflow: { use_worktrees: false } }));
});
after(() => {
cleanup(harnessProject);
cleanup(useWorktreesFalseProject);
});
test('sentinel says isolation=none -> ALLOW even though registry resolves harness-worktree (the BLOCKER)', () => {
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none' });
try {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject); // no isolation param on the dispatch
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('sentinel says isolation=orchestrator-worktree -> ALLOW', () => {
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'orchestrator-worktree' });
try {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('sentinel says isolation=harness-worktree + dispatch missing the flag -> DENY', () => {
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'harness-worktree', harnessFlag: 'isolation="worktree"' });
try {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('sentinel says isolation=harness-worktree + dispatch carries the flag -> ALLOW', () => {
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'harness-worktree', harnessFlag: 'isolation="worktree"' });
try {
const r = runHook(
agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', isolation: 'worktree' } }),
harnessProject
);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('STALE sentinel (older than SENTINEL_STALE_MS) is ignored -> falls back to registry (DENY, harness-worktree still applies)', () => {
// The stale sentinel LIES (says none) — proving the fallback re-derives
// from the registry instead of trusting it is exactly the point.
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', writtenAt: Date.now() - (SENTINEL_STALE_MS + 60000) });
try {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('MALFORMED sentinel (invalid JSON) is treated as stale, never fatal -> falls back to registry (DENY)', () => {
const sentinelPath = path.join(harnessProject, SENTINEL_RELATIVE_PATH);
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(sentinelPath), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(sentinelPath, '{ this is not valid json');
try {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
assert.equal(r.stderr.length > 0, true, 'must not crash — a clean block reason, not a stack trace');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('no sentinel + workflow.use_worktrees=false -> ALLOW (project-level opt-out, case (a) from the BLOCKER)', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), useWorktreesFalseProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
test('no sentinel + workflow.use_worktrees absent + registry harness-worktree -> DENY (conservative fallback still enforces)', () => {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
});
test('tool_name="Task" behaves identically to "Agent" (#3045 MAJOR 1)', () => {
const r = runHook(
{ hook_event_name: 'PreToolUse', tool_name: 'Task', tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor' } },
harnessProject
);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
});
test('tool_name="Task" with isolation="worktree" present -> allow, same as "Agent"', () => {
const r = runHook(
{ hook_event_name: 'PreToolUse', tool_name: 'Task', tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', isolation: 'worktree' } },
harnessProject
);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout}`);
});
});
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: #3045 MAJOR 2 — undeterminable runtime does not demand the Claude kwarg', () => {
let unconfiguredProject;
before(() => {
unconfiguredProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-unconfigured-');
// No `runtime` key at all — mirrors gsd-core/templates/config.json,
// which ships every new project's scaffold WITHOUT one. GSD_RUNTIME is
// deleted by runHook(), so this project has NO explicit runtime signal.
writeConfig(unconfiguredProject, JSON.stringify({}));
});
after(() => {
cleanup(unconfiguredProject);
});
test('no GSD_RUNTIME override, no config.json runtime key, no ~/.gsd/defaults.json runtime -> ALLOW (cannot-determine degrades to inert, not a guessed "claude" demand)', () => {
// #3045 BLOCKER 2 fix: resolveRuntimeIdentity now ALSO reads
// ~/.gsd/defaults.json as a confidence signal. That makes this test's
// outcome environment-dependent unless HOME is pinned to a directory with
// no defaults.json (the project fixture dir itself has none) — otherwise
// a developer machine that ever installed GSD for a non-Claude runtime
// would have ~/.gsd/defaults.json's real `runtime` leak in here and
// silently flip this test's expectation depending on who runs it.
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), unconfiguredProject, { HOME: unconfiguredProject });
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(r.stdout, '');
});
});
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: #3045 BLOCKER 2 — default-install fail-open (isolated two-review finding)', () => {
let harnessProject; // registry resolves harness-worktree (claude), no defaults.json runtime
let unconfiguredHarnessProject; // same, but with NO explicit runtime signal at all
before(() => {
harnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-b2-harness-');
writeConfig(harnessProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
unconfiguredHarnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-b2-unconfigured-');
// Mirrors gsd-core/templates/config.json exactly: no `runtime` key.
writeConfig(unconfiguredHarnessProject, JSON.stringify({}));
});
after(() => {
cleanup(harnessProject);
cleanup(unconfiguredHarnessProject);
});
test('part A: fresh sentinel confirms harness-worktree but carries NO harness_flag, and the runtime is not confidently resolvable -> DENY (was ALLOW pre-fix)', () => {
// This is the exact BLOCKER 2 regression: previously this branch fell
// through to the "not confident -> none" degrade and ALLOWED the
// dispatch to run unisolated, on the DEFAULT-INSTALL path (no `runtime`
// key in config.json — gsd-core/templates/config.json's shipped shape —
// and no ~/.gsd/defaults.json runtime either).
writeSentinel(unconfiguredHarnessProject, { isolation: 'harness-worktree', harnessFlag: null });
try {
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), unconfiguredHarnessProject, { HOME: unconfiguredHarnessProject });
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr} — must DENY, not silently allow`);
const out = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
assert.equal(out.decision, 'block');
assert.match(out.reason, /cannot verify|harness_flag/i);
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(unconfiguredHarnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('part B: ~/.gsd/defaults.json runtime (installer-persisted, #2395) is now a confident signal — makes the default install enforce', () => {
// No sentinel at all here — pure conservative-fallback path. Before this
// fix, an unconfigured project (no config.json runtime key, the COMMON
// scaffold shape) always fell back to 'none'/allow regardless of what the
// machine actually has installed. After the fix, a `runtime` persisted to
// ~/.gsd/defaults.json (which bin/install.js's writeNonClaudeDefaults
// already writes for every non-Claude install) is read as confidently as
// GSD_RUNTIME or config.json's own key.
const home = mkProject('gsd-aig-b2-home-');
try {
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(home, '.gsd'), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(home, '.gsd', 'defaults.json'), JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), unconfiguredHarnessProject, { HOME: home });
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr} — defaults.json runtime must be enforced`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
} finally {
cleanup(home);
}
});
test('part B (negative control): a project WITH its own config.json runtime key still wins over defaults.json', () => {
const home = mkProject('gsd-aig-b2-home2-');
try {
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(home, '.gsd'), { recursive: true });
// defaults.json says a runtime with NO harness-worktree capability;
// config.json's own `runtime: claude` must take precedence.
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(home, '.gsd', 'defaults.json'), JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'windsurf' }));
const r = runHook(agentPayload(), harnessProject, { HOME: home });
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
} finally {
cleanup(home);
}
});
});
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: #3045 SECURITY F2 — sentinel bound to phase/plan, mismatch is "no applicable sentinel"', () => {
let harnessProject;
before(() => {
harnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-f2-');
writeConfig(harnessProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
});
after(() => {
cleanup(harnessProject);
});
test('a fresh "none" sentinel for a DIFFERENT phase than this dispatch is not applied — falls through to conservative fallback and DENIES', () => {
// Sentinel legitimately recorded 'none' for phase 1 (e.g. a submodule
// degrade). This dispatch's own description names phase 2 — the guard
// must not reuse phase 1's stale-but-fresh "none" to authorize it.
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', phase: '1', plan: 'plan-a' });
try {
const r = runHook(
agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', description: 'Execute plan plan-b of phase 2' } }),
harnessProject,
);
assert.equal(r.status, 2, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr} — mismatched sentinel must not silently allow`);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(r.stdout).decision, 'block');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('a fresh sentinel for the SAME phase/plan as this dispatch is applied normally (positive control)', () => {
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', phase: '2', plan: 'plan-b' });
try {
const r = runHook(
agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', description: 'Execute plan plan-b of phase 2' } }),
harnessProject,
);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('a dispatch whose description does not match the expected shape does not itself trigger a mismatch (best-effort extraction)', () => {
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', phase: '2', plan: 'plan-b' });
try {
const r = runHook(
agentPayload({ tool_input: { subagent_type: 'gsd-executor', description: 'some other free-form text' } }),
harnessProject,
);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, `stdout: ${r.stdout} stderr: ${r.stderr}`);
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
});
describe('gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js: #3045 MAJOR — clock seam boundary coverage (in-process, no subprocess wall-clock race)', () => {
const guardModule = require('../hooks/gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js');
let harnessProject;
let savedGsdRuntime;
before(() => {
harnessProject = mkProject('gsd-aig-clock-');
writeConfig(harnessProject, JSON.stringify({ runtime: 'claude' }));
// These tests call resolveIsolationState() directly, in-process (not via
// runHook's subprocess, which already strips GSD_RUNTIME) — guard against
// ambient env leakage from the CURRENT test process (repo hermeticity
// rule: an ambient GSD_ env var must never redirect a test's outcome).
savedGsdRuntime = process.env.GSD_RUNTIME;
delete process.env.GSD_RUNTIME;
});
after(() => {
cleanup(harnessProject);
if (savedGsdRuntime === undefined) delete process.env.GSD_RUNTIME;
else process.env.GSD_RUNTIME = savedGsdRuntime;
});
function fixedClock(nowMs) {
return { now: () => nowMs };
}
test('sentinel exactly at SENTINEL_STALE_MS - 1 is still FRESH (trusted)', () => {
const writtenAt = 1_000_000;
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', writtenAt });
try {
const state = guardModule.resolveIsolationState(harnessProject, { clock: fixedClock(writtenAt + SENTINEL_STALE_MS - 1) });
assert.equal(state.isolation, 'none', 'still within the trust window — must use the sentinel, not the registry fallback');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('sentinel exactly AT SENTINEL_STALE_MS is STALE (age > threshold is the only fresh condition)', () => {
const writtenAt = 1_000_000;
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', writtenAt });
try {
const state = guardModule.resolveIsolationState(harnessProject, { clock: fixedClock(writtenAt + SENTINEL_STALE_MS) });
// Registry fallback for this project resolves harness-worktree (claude,
// no workflow.use_worktrees:false) — proves the sentinel's 'none' was
// NOT trusted at exactly the boundary.
assert.equal(state.isolation, 'harness-worktree');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
test('sentinel at SENTINEL_STALE_MS + 1 is STALE', () => {
const writtenAt = 1_000_000;
writeSentinel(harnessProject, { isolation: 'none', writtenAt });
try {
const state = guardModule.resolveIsolationState(harnessProject, { clock: fixedClock(writtenAt + SENTINEL_STALE_MS + 1) });
assert.equal(state.isolation, 'harness-worktree');
} finally {
cleanup(path.join(harnessProject, '.gsd'));
}
});
});