Files
msd-core/scripts/lib/drift-scan.cjs
Jakub Zych a9a7a328e6 refactor: hard-fork GSD -> MSD (Make Software Done)
Mechanical rename produced by scripts/msd-rename.cjs: gsd/Gsd/GSD -> msd/Msd/MSD
across contents and paths, upstream package/repo coordinates -> @golem15/msd-core
and golem15com/msd-core. Deep links into upstream history, sibling upstream
packages, the GSD-2 import feature, CHANGELOG.md and .changeset/ are kept as-is.

Hand edits on top: MSD block-letter banner and logos, LICENSE copyright line,
package/plugin identity, regenerated lockfile, install-tree fixtures, derived
registries and benchmark baseline; migration checksum baseline re-locked
(MSD keeps its own install state, so no install had applied the old sums);
sort-order and regex-escaped expectations in tests adjusted.
2026-10-06 01:47:40 +02:00

309 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript
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#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
/**
* Shared anti-divergence scanner machinery (epic #3180, ADR-3180 Decision 4).
*
* Extracted from `scripts/lint-plan-count-drift.cjs` (#3183) so that
* `scripts/lint-milestone-window-drift.cjs` (#3184) and any future
* `scripts/lint-<derivation>-drift.cjs` guard consume ONE tree-walk /
* root-confinement / literal-tokenizer / sanitizer implementation instead of
* each copying it verbatim — the exact generative-fix-divergence class this
* epic exists to remove, now applied to the guards themselves (see
* `.msd/phase/refactor-3184-milestone-window-single-owner/40-design.md`,
* "Rejected: let the new drift guard copy Phase 1's tree-walk /
* root-confinement / sanitizer").
*
* `lint-plan-count-drift.cjs` re-exports every symbol it exported before this
* extraction (`readRegexLiteralAt`, `MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN`, `isInsideRoot`,
* `sanitizeForReport`), so `tests/plan-count-single-owner.test.cjs` — the
* ReDoS and root-confinement regression net for this exact machinery —
* continues to pass unchanged and is the regression net for this move too.
*/
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
// Longest regex literal this scanner will consider, in characters. Real
// plan/summary filename filters (and milestone-window regex literals) are far
// shorter; the bound is what keeps the scan linear. The tokenizer restarts at
// every `/` on the line (so that a literal preceded by a stray unpaired `/`
// is still found, matching the previous regex's "find anywhere" behaviour),
// which without a per-literal bound would be quadratic on a pathological
// line. With it the whole-line cost is O(n * MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN) with no
// backtracking at all.
const MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN = 400;
// Directory names this scanner never descends into or reports out of —
// `.git` (repo internals, e.g. a persisted CI token in `.git/config`),
// `node_modules` (thousands of third-party files, none of them authored
// source), `dist` (build output). Named once and used at BOTH skip sites
// below: the cheap `entry.name` fast path in `walk`, and the resolved-path
// component check in `isUnderSkippedDir` — a symlink whose OWN name is not
// in this set but whose target resolves through a directory that IS (e.g.
// `src/g -> ../.git`, `src/nm -> ../node_modules`) must still be skipped, or
// the name-only check is a trivial bypass.
const SKIP_DIR_NAMES = new Set(['node_modules', 'dist', '.git']);
/**
* Read the JS regex literal starting at `line[start]` (which must be `/`).
* Returns `{ text, end }` — `text` includes the delimiters and any trailing
* flags, `end` is the index one past the literal — or null if no literal
* closes within MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN characters.
*
* Single left-to-right pass, no backtracking. It models the two constructs a
* backtracking pattern gets wrong, which is why this is a tokenizer and not a
* regex:
* - `\x` escapes consume BOTH characters, so an escaped `\/` never
* terminates the literal;
* - inside a `[...]` character class a bare `/` does NOT terminate, so
* `/PLAN[\\/].*\.md$/` is one literal rather than two fragments. The
* previous regex silently MISSED every re-derivation using a
* cross-platform path-separator class for exactly this reason.
*/
// Deterministic regression seam for the MAJOR-2 bound (issue #3951/#3987): a
// counter of how many characters this tokenizer has actually examined, so a
// test can assert the bound HOLDS (total work stays a small linear multiple
// of the number of scan attempts × MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN) without resorting
// to a wall-clock elapsed-time assertion, which this repo's test rules ban
// ("Clock Seams: Do not assert on wall-clock time.") and which is exactly
// what flaked on a slow shared CI runner. `resetRegexScanStats`/
// `getRegexScanStats` are read-modify-reset around a single scan under test;
// they are process-global and NOT safe under concurrent scans, which is fine
// for this synchronous, single-threaded CLI tool and its tests.
let regexScanStats = { calls: 0, charsExamined: 0 };
function resetRegexScanStats() {
regexScanStats = { calls: 0, charsExamined: 0 };
}
function getRegexScanStats() {
return { ...regexScanStats };
}
function readRegexLiteralAt(line, start) {
if (line[start] !== '/') return null;
regexScanStats.calls++;
const limit = Math.min(line.length, start + MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN);
let inClass = false;
let i = start + 1;
for (; i < limit; i++) {
const ch = line[i];
if (ch === '\\') {
i++; // escape consumes the next character, whatever it is
continue;
}
if (ch === '\r' || ch === '\n') {
// a literal cannot span lines
regexScanStats.charsExamined += i - start;
return null;
}
if (ch === '[') {
inClass = true;
} else if (ch === ']') {
inClass = false;
} else if (ch === '/' && !inClass) {
// Trailing flags are bounded by the SAME `limit` as the literal body
// itself (not `line.length`) — a literal followed by an unbounded run
// of lowercase letters must not make `text` grow past
// MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN either.
let end = i + 1;
while (end < limit && line[end] >= 'a' && line[end] <= 'z') end++;
regexScanStats.charsExamined += end - start;
return { text: line.slice(start, end), end };
}
}
regexScanStats.charsExamined += limit - start;
return null;
}
// Symlinks report `isDirectory()`/`isFile()` as false on the Dirent from
// `readdirSync`, so a symlinked `.cts` (or a symlinked directory containing
// one) was previously invisible to this scanner — an evasion of a guard
// whose stated design principle (ADR-3180 Decision 4a) is whole-repo
// discovery with no allowlist. Resolve each entry with `fs.statSync` (which
// follows symlinks) to classify it, skipping broken links. `ctx.visitedRealDirs`
// guards against a symlink cycle sending `walk` into infinite recursion.
//
// Every sibling drift guard in `scripts/` that does NOT import this module
// (`lint-phase-id-drift.cjs`, `lint-package-identity-drift.cjs`,
// `lint-portable-timeout.cjs`, `lint-test-file-count.cjs`,
// `lint-allow-test-rule-refs.cjs`) uses the `Dirent` classification straight
// off `readdirSync` and does NOT follow symlinks at all. This scanner follows
// them so a symlinked source file cannot evade ADR-3180 Decision 4a's
// whole-repo discovery — root confinement (`isInsideRoot` below) is the price
// of doing so: without it, a symlink planted anywhere under a scan directory
// could walk this scanner out to read and report arbitrary files elsewhere on
// disk.
//
// DIRECTORY vs FILE symlinks are confined to two DIFFERENT roots, tracked as
// `ctx.scanDirRoot` (the realpath of the current top-level scan-dir entry,
// e.g. `<realRoot>/src`) vs `ctx.realRoot` (the whole repo):
// - a DIRECTORY symlink is descended ONLY if its resolved realpath is
// inside `ctx.scanDirRoot` — NOT merely inside `ctx.realRoot`. Without
// this, `src/up -> ..` (or `-> <realRoot>`) resolves inside the repo
// root and `walk` descends the ENTIRE repo, reporting violations under
// paths like `tests/not-src.cts` or `docs/other.cts` — files the caller's
// scan-dir list scopes it OUT of. This is a deliberate, fail-CLOSED
// trade-off: a directory symlink pointing elsewhere INSIDE the repo (but
// outside the scan directory) is simply not followed. The alternative —
// descending it — is exactly the whole-repo sweep this rule exists to
// prevent, and a fork PR could use that sweep to redden `lint:ci` on
// files this guard was never meant to read. The narrower rule is worth
// more than the missed edge case.
// - a FILE symlink is still scanned if its resolved realpath is inside
// `ctx.realRoot` (the whole repo, not just the scan directory) — this is
// what keeps `src/alias.cts -> vendor/real.cts` covered (test (f)): an
// aliased file genuinely is part of the compiled surface even when its
// real target lives outside `src/`, and it is still reported under its
// canonical (real) path.
//
// A resolved path is inside a root only if it IS that root or begins with
// root + separator — a plain `startsWith(root)` would also accept a sibling
// directory whose name merely starts with the root's name (`/repo-evil`).
function isInsideRoot(realPath, realRoot) {
return realPath === realRoot || realPath.startsWith(realRoot + path.sep); // allow-handrolled-containment: lint:ci guard; runs before build:lib, compiled security.cjs may not exist
}
// True when `realPath` (already confirmed inside `realRoot` by `isInsideRoot`)
// resolves THROUGH a skip-list directory anywhere along its path relative to
// the root — not just when `realPath` itself IS one. This is what closes the
// symlink bypass the `entry.name` fast path alone cannot: `walk` tests
// `entry.name` (the symlink's OWN name in its parent directory), but a
// symlink named something innocuous can still RESOLVE into `.git` /
// `node_modules` / `dist` (`src/g -> ../.git`, `src/leak.cts ->
// ../.git/config`, `src/nm -> ../node_modules`) — `isInsideRoot` alone admits
// all three, because every one of those real paths is still under the root.
function isUnderSkippedDir(realPath, realRoot) {
const rel = path.relative(realRoot, realPath);
return rel.split(path.sep).some((segment) => SKIP_DIR_NAMES.has(segment));
}
// `ctx.scanExt` is a `Set` of file extensions (e.g. `.cts`/`.ts`/`.mts`) the
// caller wants reported — threaded through `ctx` rather than as a positional
// parameter so recursive `walk(full, acc, ctx)` calls stay unchanged.
function walk(dir, acc, ctx) {
let entries;
try {
entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
} catch {
return acc;
}
for (const entry of entries) {
const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (SKIP_DIR_NAMES.has(entry.name)) continue; // cheap fast path
let stat;
try {
stat = entry.isSymbolicLink() ? fs.statSync(full) : entry;
} catch {
continue; // broken symlink target
}
let realPath;
try {
realPath = fs.realpathSync(full);
} catch {
continue; // broken symlink target (race, or a link stat() followed but realpath cannot)
}
if (stat.isDirectory()) {
// Directories (symlinked or real) are confined to the CURRENT scan
// directory root, not merely the repo root — see the comment above
// `isInsideRoot` for why (`src/up -> ..` whole-repo sweep).
if (!isInsideRoot(realPath, ctx.scanDirRoot)) continue;
if (isUnderSkippedDir(realPath, ctx.realRoot)) continue; // symlink resolves through a skipped dir
if (ctx.visitedRealDirs.has(realPath)) continue; // symlink cycle guard
ctx.visitedRealDirs.add(realPath);
walk(full, acc, ctx);
} else if (stat.isFile() && ctx.scanExt.has(path.extname(entry.name))) {
// Files are confined to the whole repo root — a symlinked FILE whose
// real target lives outside the scan directory but inside the repo
// (e.g. `src/alias.cts -> vendor/real.cts`) is still part of the
// compiled surface and must be scanned.
if (!isInsideRoot(realPath, ctx.realRoot)) continue;
if (isUnderSkippedDir(realPath, ctx.realRoot)) continue; // symlink resolves through a skipped dir
if (ctx.visitedRealFiles.has(realPath)) continue; // two symlinks, same real file
ctx.visitedRealFiles.add(realPath);
acc.push(realPath);
}
}
return acc;
}
/**
* Whole-repo tree-walk driver shared by every `lint-<derivation>-drift.cjs`
* guard. Resolves `root`, walks each of `scanDirs` filtered to `scanExt`
* (symlink-following, root-confined, cycle-guarded — see `walk` above), reads
* each discovered file, and calls `onFile(relPath, text)` for it — `relPath`
* is repo-relative and already the file's canonical (real) path, so a
* per-file exemption keyed on `relPath` matches consistently regardless of
* which symlink reached it.
*
* `onFile` returns an array of violation objects (or an empty array / null /
* undefined for "no violations in this file"); `scanTree` flattens them all
* into one returned array. Pure I/O orchestration — detection logic lives
* entirely in the caller's `onFile`.
*/
function scanTree({ root, scanDirs, scanExt, onFile }) {
const violations = [];
let realRoot;
try {
realRoot = fs.realpathSync(root);
} catch {
return violations; // root itself does not exist / is unreadable
}
for (const dir of scanDirs) {
const scanDirPath = path.join(root, dir);
let scanDirRoot;
try {
scanDirRoot = fs.realpathSync(scanDirPath);
} catch {
continue; // scan directory itself does not exist / is unreadable
}
const ctx = { realRoot, scanDirRoot, scanExt, visitedRealDirs: new Set(), visitedRealFiles: new Set() };
for (const file of walk(scanDirPath, [], ctx)) {
const rel = path.relative(realRoot, file);
let text;
try {
text = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
} catch {
continue;
}
const found = onFile(rel, text);
if (found && found.length > 0) violations.push(...found);
}
}
return violations;
}
// A reported fragment AND a reported file path are both attacker-controlled
// source text on a fork PR (a repo can legally track a filename containing
// control bytes, so the path is exactly as attacker-controlled as the
// fragment), and both are written straight to a CI log. Replace C0/C1
// control bytes (ANSI escapes included) with a visible \xNN, AND the
// non-Latin-1 formatting/bidi/line-separator codepoints below with \uNNNN, so
// a crafted literal or filename cannot rewrite the terminal rendering of the
// report or hide/reorder its own text:
// - U+200B-U+200F: zero-width space/joiners and directional marks
// - U+2028/U+2029: Unicode LINE SEPARATOR / PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR (line
// breaks a `\n`-only log scan would not catch)
// - U+202A-U+202E: bidi embedding/override controls (RLO etc.)
// - U+2066-U+2069: bidi isolate controls
function sanitizeForReport(text) {
return text
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- the control range IS the target
.replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f]/g, (c) => '\\x' + c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))
.replace(/[\u200B-\u200F\u2028\u2029\u202A-\u202E\u2066-\u2069]/g, (c) => '\\u' + c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0'));
}
module.exports = {
SKIP_DIR_NAMES,
isInsideRoot,
isUnderSkippedDir,
walk,
readRegexLiteralAt,
MAX_REGEX_LITERAL_LEN,
sanitizeForReport,
scanTree,
resetRegexScanStats,
getRegexScanStats,
};