Follow-up to 38c9395d, found while fact-checking the round-3 response rather than by a test. That commit made TEST_ENV_BASE derive its keys from NON_REGISTRY_CONFIG_HOME_DESCRIPTORS, but had the guard call resolveKimiHooksTomlDir directly. Both halves covered kimi, so nothing was broken — but only one of them would pick up a SECOND descriptor. That is the same partial-enumeration defect that put KIMI_SHARE_DIR outside the scrub set, reintroduced one layer over, in the very commit that closed it. resolveExtraWatchTargets now iterates the array and resolves each descriptor through resolveConfigHomeFromDescriptor, so the scrub set and the guard derive from one source and cannot drift apart. Verified: a synthetic second descriptor is picked up automatically (it was not before); kimi's target is unchanged on both the default (~/.kimi/config.toml) and KIMI_SHARE_DIR override paths. The new test asserts one target per descriptor plus the store root. The COUNT is the load-bearing half — every per-descriptor assertion passes vacuously today with a single entry, so only the count fails when the array grows and the guard does not follow. NAMED RESIDUAL, documented at NON_REGISTRY_OWNED_FILE: this assumes every non-registry descriptor is written the same way (config.toml). A descriptor whose owned file differs needs a per-descriptor mapping. It fails toward under-watching rather than false positives, so it is called out rather than left to be discovered.
339 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript
339 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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'use strict';
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/**
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* #2665 — post-suite hermeticity guard.
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*
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* The test suite must never write into a runtime's LIVE config directory. Two
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* mechanisms defend that, and neither one can see this failure:
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*
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* - `TEST_ENV_BASE` (tests/helpers.cjs) blanks every config-location env var,
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* but only for CHILD processes. A test that calls the installer IN-PROCESS
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* is untouched by it.
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* - CI is blind to the ambient-env half of the class outright, because CI
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* never has `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` and friends set.
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*
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* So the class is silent by construction: it damages the developer's machine and
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* reports nothing. #2665 records two prior authors each diagnosing it and fixing
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* only the instance in front of them. This module converts it from silent to
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* loud by snapshotting GSD's own install footprint before the suite and
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* re-checking it after.
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*
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* LOCATION — `scripts/`, deliberately NOT `scripts/lib/`. The installer copies
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* `scripts/lib/` into every user's config dir wholesale (readdirSync), while
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* uninstall removes only an explicit allowlist, so a test-only module placed
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* there would ship to users AND survive uninstall. `scripts/affected-tests-lib.cjs`
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* is the precedent for a non-shipped helper at this level.
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*
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* SCOPE — ownership-based, not whole-root. It watches entries GSD unambiguously
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* owns: the top-level install footprint (`GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES`) plus `gsd-`-prefixed
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* children of the dirs GSD shares with the host agent (`GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS`).
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* It does NOT watch whole config roots. A root such as `~/.claude` is shared with
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* the host agent, which may legitimately write `history.jsonl`, `todos/`, or
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* `settings.json` while the suite runs; watching the root would turn that into a
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* false failure, and a guard that cries wolf gets disabled — after which it
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* catches nothing at all.
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*
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* The ownership test is the prefix, not the location. That distinction is load
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* bearing: the first version of this guard watched only the three top-level
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* entries and MISSED a real leak into `<live>/skills/gsd-dev-preferences/`.
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*
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* KNOWN GAP — a leak into a file GSD does not own (e.g. mutating the host's own
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* `.claude.json`) is outside this guard by construction. Closing it would require
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* watching shared files, which is the false-positive trap above.
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*
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* SEVERITY — reports by default, fails only under GSD_STRICT_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1.
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* Not timidity: on its first CI run this guard found PRE-EXISTING leaks on the
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* Windows lane (`C:\Users\runneradmin\.claude\gsd-core` and
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* `skills\gsd-dev-preferences`), because os.homedir() reads USERPROFILE there and
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* ~190 test sites sandbox HOME alone. Those are real and worth fixing, but they
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* are a different defect class from the one #2665 closes, and a brand-new gate
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* that immediately reds an unrelated lane gets bypassed or reverted rather than
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* obeyed. This repo already has the pattern: the local/no-source-grep ESLint rule
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* shipped at `warn` and was promoted to `error` after its cleanup sweep (ADR 452).
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* Promote this the same way once the USERPROFILE sweep lands.
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*/
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const fs = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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const path = require('path');
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/** Top-level entries only a GSD install creates. See SCOPE above before widening. */
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const GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES = ['gsd-core', 'gsd-file-manifest.json', 'gsd-pristine'];
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/**
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* Directories GSD SHARES with the host agent. Watching them wholesale would
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* false-positive on the host's own writes, so only `gsd-`-prefixed children are
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* watched — those are unambiguously ours.
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*
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* Added after the first version of this guard MISSED a real leak: a raw
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* `spawnSync` that sandboxed HOME but inherited an ambient CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR
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* wrote `<live>/skills/gsd-dev-preferences/SKILL.md`, which sits under none of
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* the three top-level entries above.
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*/
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const GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS = ['agents', 'commands', 'skills'];
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const GSD_ARTIFACT_PREFIX = 'gsd-';
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/**
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* The file GSD writes into a NON-REGISTRY config home.
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*
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* Today's only such descriptor is kimi's `~/.kimi` (KIMI_SHARE_DIR), where GSD
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* writes its native `[[hooks]]` block into `config.toml`. NAMED RESIDUAL: this
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* assumes every non-registry descriptor is written the same way. A future
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* descriptor whose owned file differs needs a per-descriptor mapping here — the
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* consequence of getting it wrong is under-watching (a missed leak), not a false
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* positive, so it fails in the quiet direction and is called out rather than
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* left to be discovered.
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*/
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const NON_REGISTRY_OWNED_FILE = 'config.toml';
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/** Bounds on the recursive walk, so a pathological tree cannot stall the suite. */
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const MAX_ENTRIES = 20000;
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const MAX_DEPTH = 12;
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/**
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* Resolve every runtime config root the product could write to, using the REAL
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* resolver rather than a reimplementation — the guard must watch wherever the
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* product actually points, including through an ambient env var.
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*
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* @returns {string[]} deduped, sorted roots; empty if the built lib is absent.
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*/
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function resolveLiveConfigRoots(deps = {}) {
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const libDir = deps.libDir || path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib');
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let getGlobalConfigDir;
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let runtimes;
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try {
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({ getGlobalConfigDir } = require(path.join(libDir, 'runtime-homes.cjs')));
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({ runtimes } = require(path.join(libDir, 'capability-registry.cjs')));
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} catch {
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// Unbuilt tree: the guard is advisory infrastructure and must never be the
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// reason a test run cannot start. Callers treat [] as "guard unavailable".
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return [];
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}
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const roots = new Set();
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// 'grok' is a hardcoded branch of getGlobalConfigDir with no registry entry.
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for (const runtime of [...Object.keys(runtimes || {}), 'grok']) {
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try {
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const dir = getGlobalConfigDir(runtime);
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if (typeof dir === 'string' && dir.length > 0) roots.add(path.resolve(dir));
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} catch {
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// A descriptor the resolver cannot satisfy is not this module's problem.
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}
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}
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return [...roots].sort();
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}
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/**
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* Watch targets that are NOT runtime config roots, and so cannot be expressed as
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* `root x GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES`.
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*
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* #2665 round 3: resolveLiveConfigRoots enumerates getGlobalConfigDir per registry
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* runtime plus grok. Two live write surfaces are invisible to that shape, so a leak
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* on either passed through this guard — the PR's own safety net — silently:
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*
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* $GSD_HOME/.gsd — GSD's user-owned store (consent.json, defaults.json, capability
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* overlays). Watched WHOLESALE: unlike ~/.claude this root is
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* exclusively ours, so the shared-root false-positive trap in
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* SCOPE above does not apply and an ownership filter would only
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* narrow the guard for nothing.
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* <kimi>/config.toml — the file GSD writes its native [[hooks]] block into
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* (resolveKimiHooksTomlDir, KIMI_SHARE_DIR). The INVERSE case:
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* ~/.kimi belongs to Kimi CLI, so only the one file GSD writes is
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* watched, never the root. This is the KNOWN GAP above accepted
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* deliberately in one direction — GSD demonstrably writes this
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* file (bin/install.js calls resolveKimiHooksTomlDir at two sites),
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* so a concurrent Kimi CLI write is the only false positive, and
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* Kimi is not running during the suite.
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*
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* @returns {string[]} absolute paths; empty if the built lib is absent.
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*/
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function resolveExtraWatchTargets(deps = {}) {
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const libDir = deps.libDir || path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', 'bin', 'lib');
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const env = deps.env || process.env;
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const homedir = (deps.os || os).homedir;
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const targets = [path.resolve(path.join(env.GSD_HOME || homedir(), '.gsd'))];
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try {
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const {
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NON_REGISTRY_CONFIG_HOME_DESCRIPTORS,
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resolveConfigHomeFromDescriptor,
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} = require(path.join(libDir, 'runtime-homes.cjs'));
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// ITERATE the descriptor array rather than naming one resolver. Calling
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// resolveKimiHooksTomlDir directly would cover today's only entry and
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// silently miss tomorrow's — the same partial-enumeration defect that put
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// KIMI_SHARE_DIR outside the scrub set in the first place, reintroduced one
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// layer over. TEST_ENV_BASE derives its keys from this array; deriving the
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// guard's paths from it keeps the two halves from drifting apart.
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//
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// Thread the SAME injected env/home used above: resolving bare would read
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// process.env and os.homedir() regardless of `deps`, leaving the seam
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// untestable and the targets resolved against different worlds.
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for (const descriptor of NON_REGISTRY_CONFIG_HOME_DESCRIPTORS) {
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const dir = resolveConfigHomeFromDescriptor(descriptor, { env, home: homedir() });
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// GSD writes ONE named file into these third-party roots; the root itself
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// belongs to the runtime, so it is never watched wholesale.
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targets.push(path.resolve(path.join(dir, NON_REGISTRY_OWNED_FILE)));
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}
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} catch {
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// Unbuilt tree — same posture as resolveLiveConfigRoots: advisory, never fatal.
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}
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return targets;
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}
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/**
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* Newest mtime within a tree, bounded. Returns `truncated: true` when a bound
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* was hit — the caller must NOT report such a result as clean, on the same
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* principle that an existence probe passing vacuously is worse than no probe.
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*/
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function newestMtime(target, budget) {
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let newest = 0;
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let truncated = false;
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const walk = (current, depth) => {
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if (budget.remaining <= 0) { truncated = true; return; }
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if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) { truncated = true; return; }
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let st;
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try {
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st = fs.lstatSync(current);
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} catch {
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return;
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}
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budget.remaining -= 1;
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if (st.mtimeMs > newest) newest = st.mtimeMs;
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if (!st.isDirectory()) return;
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let entries;
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try {
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entries = fs.readdirSync(current);
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} catch {
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return;
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}
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for (const entry of entries) walk(path.join(current, entry), depth + 1);
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};
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walk(target, 0);
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return { newest, truncated };
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}
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/**
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* Snapshot GSD-owned entries under each root.
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*
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* @returns {Record<string, {exists: boolean, newest: number, truncated: boolean}>}
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* keyed by absolute entry path.
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*/
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function snapshotLiveConfig(roots, extraTargets = []) {
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const budget = { remaining: MAX_ENTRIES };
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const snap = {};
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const record = (target) => {
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if (!fs.existsSync(target)) {
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snap[target] = { exists: false, newest: 0, truncated: false };
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return;
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}
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const { newest, truncated } = newestMtime(target, budget);
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snap[target] = { exists: true, newest, truncated };
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};
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// Non-root targets (resolveExtraWatchTargets) are recorded verbatim — they are
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// already the exact path to watch, whole-dir or single-file. Passed explicitly
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// rather than resolved here so a caller testing a fixture root does not silently
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// pull the developer's real ~/.gsd into its snapshot.
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for (const target of extraTargets) record(path.resolve(target));
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for (const root of roots) {
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for (const entry of GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES) record(path.join(root, entry));
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// Shared dirs: enumerate only gsd-prefixed children. A child that appears
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// between the two snapshots is absent from `before` entirely — diffLiveConfig
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// treats after-only paths as created, which is exactly the leak signal.
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for (const parent of GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS) {
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const parentDir = path.join(root, parent);
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let children;
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try {
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children = fs.readdirSync(parentDir);
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} catch {
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continue; // parent absent — nothing of ours can be in it yet
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}
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for (const child of children) {
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if (child.startsWith(GSD_ARTIFACT_PREFIX)) record(path.join(parentDir, child));
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}
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}
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}
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return snap;
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}
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/**
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* Compare two snapshots. A path is a violation when it was created during the
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* run, or when its newest mtime advanced.
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*
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* @returns {{path: string, kind: 'created'|'modified'|'unverified'}[]}
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*/
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function diffLiveConfig(before, after) {
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const violations = [];
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for (const [target, post] of Object.entries(after)) {
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const pre = before[target];
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// Absent from `before` entirely: a gsd-prefixed child that did not exist
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// when the run started. Both snapshots cover the same roots, so an
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// after-only path was created BY the run — never skip it.
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if (!pre) {
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if (post.exists) violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'created' });
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continue;
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}
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if (!pre.exists && post.exists) {
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violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'created' });
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} else if (pre.exists && post.exists && post.newest > pre.newest) {
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violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'modified' });
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} else if (pre.truncated || post.truncated) {
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// Bound hit: we cannot attest this path either way, and saying nothing
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// would let a truncated scan read as a clean one.
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violations.push({ path: target, kind: 'unverified' });
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}
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}
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return violations;
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}
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/** Human-facing report for a non-empty violation set. */
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function formatViolations(violations) {
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const lines = [
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'',
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'run-tests: HERMETICITY WARNING — the suite wrote into a LIVE config directory.',
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'',
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'A test resolved a runtime config dir from the ambient environment instead of a',
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'sandbox. The usual cause is an IN-PROCESS install() call: tests/helpers.cjs',
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'TEST_ENV_BASE only scrubs CHILD process env, so an in-process caller must also',
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'use scrubConfigLocationEnv() (see tests/install.test.cjs) alongside its HOME',
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'sandbox. CI cannot catch this class — it never has these env vars set.',
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'',
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];
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for (const v of violations) {
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const label = v.kind === 'unverified'
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? 'UNVERIFIED (scan bound hit — not attested clean)'
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: v.kind.toUpperCase();
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lines.push(` ${label}: ${v.path}`);
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}
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lines.push('');
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lines.push(
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'Reporting only. Set GSD_STRICT_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1 to make this fail the run, ' +
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'or GSD_SKIP_LIVE_CONFIG_GUARD=1 to skip the check entirely.',
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);
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lines.push('');
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return lines.join('\n');
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}
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module.exports = {
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GSD_OWNED_ENTRIES,
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GSD_PREFIXED_PARENTS,
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GSD_ARTIFACT_PREFIX,
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MAX_ENTRIES,
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MAX_DEPTH,
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resolveLiveConfigRoots,
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resolveExtraWatchTargets,
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snapshotLiveConfig,
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diffLiveConfig,
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formatViolations,
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newestMtime,
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os, // exported for test seams only
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};
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